2.3.2.3. Adaptation and Vulnerability
Climate change will have various effects on water resources and water management
in Africa. The large variability in projected climate scenarios over Africa's
most vulnerable river basin systems (such as the Nile) makes any policy reformulation
in anticipation of climate change difficult. However, improved efficiency in
irrigation systems and water use are strongly recommended modes of action because
they will benefit the region regardless of the degree and direction of climate
change. Detailed studies of the river basins are essential to provide adequate
information for planning and negotiation purposes in this area that will continue
to generate tension across many borders.
Sharma et al. (1996) have evaluated the sub-Saharan African countries with
respect to their degree of national commitment and planning to address water
problems in general and have developed a list of country performance indicators
(Table 2-5). Columns 4-7 describe the enabling
environment; columns 1 and 2 are poverty indicators; and columns 1, 2, and 3
are risk indicators, where problems will call for either more water or more
efficient management of existing stocks. The following points are critical:
- The extent of political stability, ownership of development efforts, and
commitment to sustainable water resources management in each country
- The extent to which an enabling environment exists-consisting of transparent
and accountable governance in the water sector, clear legislation and policy,
strategies and investment programs, stakeholder participation, and the capacity
for water resources management at all levels
- The extent to which information and knowledge exists to gauge water availability
and quality, consumer demand, and sectoral needs (e.g., sanitation coverage,
irrigation, hydropower).
Knowledge also is needed about multiple cross-sectoral linkages relating to
a nation's water development (competing demands from agriculture, industry,
and municipalities; reliance upon international waters). Depending on how a
country fares with regard to the three critical points above, the types of efforts
and interventions required by funding agencies and nations will vary. Countries
that fare poorly in this analysis will be most vulnerable to climate changes
because they will have less capacity to adapt.
2.3.3. Agriculture and Food Security
2.3.3.1. Socioeconomic Vulnerability
Many indicators of human development highlight Africa's relative poverty and
vulnerability (Table 2-6). With smaller holdings and
little investment in agriculture, household production faces difficulties in
meeting subsistence requirements or developing specialized export crops. Household
expenditures on food are high-more than half of the annual budget, on average.
Africa receives the largest amount of food aid of any continent. Low rates of
female literacy and high rates of infant mortality are indicative of populations
that have low status and inadequate infrastructure for education and health-two
essential requirements for vigorous rural development. The high numbers of refugees
highlight potential economic and political instability. Vulnerable populations
include smallholder agriculturists with inadequate resources, pastoralists,
rural landless laborers, and the urban poor. Rural populations are directly
affected by climatic variations. Reduced food supplies and high prices immediately
affect landless laborers who have little savings. The effect on agriculturists
and pastoralists depends on how much surplus they produce and the relative terms
of trade (e.g., between food and livestock). A dramatic increase in urban poverty
has been noted in the past decade-one consequence of stagnant rural development
and high population pressures. The urban poor are indirectly affected by climate
change through changes in prices and regional investment.
Table 2-6: Regional vulnerability to food crises in
Africa. |
|
|
Expenditure
on Food
(% of consumption)
|
Food Aid
(cereals)
(kg per capita)
|
Refugees
|
Female
Literacy
(adult) (%)
|
Infant
Mortality
(per 1000)
|
|
African Region (1) |
Northern |
42
|
18
|
221,450
|
45
|
59
|
Sudano-Sahelian |
42
|
13
|
974,800
|
17
|
119
|
Gulf of Guinea |
39
|
6
|
819,750
|
28
|
109
|
Central |
39
|
3
|
480,500
|
41
|
97
|
Eastern |
37
|
4
|
1,408,150
|
43
|
102
|
Indian Ocean |
57
|
12
|
0
|
73
|
66
|
Southern |
57
|
15
|
1,793,800
|
53
|
85
|
Total |
57
|
10
|
5,698,450
|
35
|
97
|
|
Comparison Country |
Bangladesh |
59
|
12
|
245,300
|
22
|
108
|
Thailand |
30
|
2
|
255,000
|
90
|
26
|
Mexico |
35
|
3
|
47,300
|
85
|
35
|
Greece |
30
|
-1
|
1,900
|
89
|
8
|
United Kingdom |
12
|
-3
|
24,600
|
X
|
7
|
|
(1) Northern: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia; Sudano-Sahelian:
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan; Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Cote d'Ivoire,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo; Central:
Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire; Eastern: Burundi, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda; Indian Ocean: Comoros, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Seychelles; Southern: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Source: WRI, 1994.
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Box 2-6. African Drought: Episodes and Impacts
|
Extensive droughts have afflicted Africa, with serious episodes since
independence in 1965-1966, 1972-1974, 1981-1984, 1986-1987, 1991-1992,
and 1994-1995 (WMO, 1995; Usher, 1997). The causes of African drought
are numerous and vary among regions, seasons, and years. Local droughts
occur every year; continental crises appear to occur once (or more recently
twice) every decade. Major droughts tend to be connected to ENSO anomalies.
It seems prudent to expect drought in Africa to continue to be a major
climatic hazard.
The potential effect of climate change on drought in Africa is uncertain.
At a local level, increased temperatures are likely to lead to increased
moisture demand. The balance between rainfall and higher evapotranspiration
implies more frequent water scarcity. However, a great deal depends on
vegetation response to higher CO2 concentrations and the timing of rainfall.
The combination of higher evapotranspiration and even a small decrease
in precipitation could lead to significantly greater drought risks. An
increase in precipitation variability would compound temperature effects.
For example, Hulme (1996b) reports that interannual variability increases
on the order of 25% in much of southern Africa in the UKTR scenario for
the 2050s. Within the region, however, some areas experience a similar
decrease in variability. The temperature-precipitation-CO2 forcing of
seasonal drought probably is less significant than the prospect of large-scale
circulation changes that drive continental droughts that occur over several
years. A change in the frequency and duration of atmosphere-ocean anomalies,
such as the ENSO phenomenon, could force such large-scale changes in Africa's
rainfall climatology. However, such scenarios of climate change are not
well developed at the global level, much less for Africa.
The effects of drought are cross-cutting, with severe direct impacts
on agriculture, water resources, and natural vegetation and indirect effects
on health, the economy, and institutions (see Benson and Clay, 1994, for
an overview of drought impacts). The impacts of drought are confounded
by environmental degradation, including soil erosion, water pollution,
and deforestation. Intersectoral linkages, the diversity of the economy,
the numbers of vulnerable people, the intensity of water use in the economy,
the role of financial systems and public enterprises, and public revenue
and expenditure affect the severity and distribution of drought impacts.
Drought in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s triggered widespread starvation
and loss of life, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Similar
famine has been averted in the 1990s through more effective early warning
systems and responses. The aggregate impact of drought on the economies
of Africa can be large: 8-9% of GDP in Zimbabwe and Zambia in 1992, 4-6%
of GDP in Nigeria and Niger in 1984 (Benson and Clay, 1994).
The 1991-1992 episode in southern Africa amply illustrates the impact
of drought. In that episode, the SADC countries experienced the worst
drought of the century: From central Zambia through central Malawi and
Mozambique southward, there were seasonal deficits of as much as 80% of
normal rainfall (Zinyowera and Unganai, 1993). Large sections of the SADC
subregion received scanty rainfall-20-75% of normal-during the rainy season
from October 1991 through April 1992. Abnormally high temperatures (47°C
along the South Africa-Zimbabwe border) exacerbated the extreme dryness.
Regional grain production fell 60% short of expected levels. Food stocks
had been depleted, largely as a consequence of exports. Roughly five times
more food had to be brought into southern Africa than had been delivered
to the Horn of Africa during the famine of 1984-1985. Six different transport
corridors were used to deliver food aid, and 11 countries assisted in
trying to alleviate the crisis wrought by the drought. Even though 1992-1993
and 1993-1994 could be considered post-drought periods, recovery in the
subregion was slow. Nutritional status was affected by crop failure, depending
on alternative sources of income and drought responses. The number of
food-insecure households among communal farmers in Zimbabwe more than
doubled during the 1991-1992 drought, especially in semi-arid zones (Christensen
and Stack, 1992). The level of the reservoir at Kariba Dam, which supplies
power to Zambia and Zimbabwe, fell below the level required to generate
hydroelectric power (see IUCN, 1994). Water shortages, electricity shortages
and rationing, input supply difficulties, reduction in demand, and macroeconomic
constraints led to a 9% reduction in manufacturing output in Zimbabwe,
with a 6% loss in foreign currency receipts (Benson and Clay, 1994).
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