8.5 Aspects of International Emission Trading
It has long been recognized that international trade in emission quota can
reduce mitigation costs. This will occur when countries with high domestic marginal
abatement costs purchase emission quota from countries with low marginal abatement
costs. This is often referred to as "where flexibility". That is,
allowing reductions to take place where it is cheapest to do so regardless of
geographical location. It is important to note that where the reductions take
place is independent of who pays for the reductions.
Table TS.5: Energy Modeling Forum main results.
GDP loss in 2010 (in % of GDP; 2010 Kyoto target) |
|
|
No trading |
Annex I trading |
Global trading |
Model |
US |
OECD |
Japan |
CANZ |
US |
OECD |
Japan |
CANZ |
US |
OECD |
Japan |
CANZ |
|
ABARE-GTEM |
1.96 |
0.94 |
0.72 |
1.96 |
0.47 |
0.13 |
0.05 |
0.23 |
0.09 |
0.03 |
0.01 |
0.04 |
AIM |
0.45 |
0.31 |
0.25 |
0.59 |
0.31 |
0.17 |
0.13 |
0.36 |
0.20 |
0.08 |
0.01 |
0.35 |
CETA |
1.93 |
|
|
|
0.67 |
|
|
|
0.43 |
|
|
|
G-CUBED |
0.42 |
1.50 |
0.57 |
1.83 |
0.24 |
0.61 |
0.45 |
0.72 |
0.06 |
0.26 |
0.14 |
0.32 |
GRAPE |
|
0.81 |
0.19 |
|
|
0.81 |
0.10 |
|
|
0.54 |
0.05 |
|
MERGE3 |
1.06 |
0.99 |
0.80 |
2.02 |
0.51 |
0.47 |
0.19 |
1.14 |
0.20 |
0.20 |
0.01 |
0.67 |
MS-MRT |
1.88 |
0.63 |
1.20 |
1.83 |
0.91 |
0.13 |
0.22 |
0.88 |
0.29 |
0.03 |
0.02 |
0.32 |
Oxford |
1.78 |
2.08 |
1.88 |
|
1.03 |
0.73 |
0.52 |
|
0.66 |
0.47 |
0.33 |
|
RICE |
0.94 |
0.55 |
0.78 |
0.96 |
0.56 |
0.28 |
0.30 |
0.54 |
0.19 |
0.09 |
0.09 |
0.19 |
|
"Where flexibility" can occur on a number of scales. It can be global,
regional or at the country level. In the theoretical case of full global trading,
all countries agree to emission caps and participate in the international market
as buyers or sellers of emission allowances. The CDM may allow some of these
cost reductions to be captured. When the market is defined at the regional level
(e.g., Annex B countries), the trading market is more limited. Finally, trade
may take place domestically with all emission reductions occurring in the country
of origin.
Table TS.5 shows the cost reductions from emission trading
for Annex B and full global trading compared to a no-trading case. The calculation
is made by various models with both global and regional detail. In each instance,
the goal is to meet the emission reduction targets contained in the Kyoto Protocol.
All of the models show significant gains as the size of the trading market is
expanded. The difference among models is due in part to differences in their
baseline, the assumptions about the cost and availability of low-cost substitutes
on both the supply and demand sides of the energy sector, and the treatment
of short-term macro shocks. In general, all calculated gross costs for the non-trading
case are below 2% of GDP (which is assumed to have increased significantly in
the period considered) and in most cases below 1%. Annex B trading lowers the
costs for the OECD region as a whole to less than 0.5% and regional impacts
within this vary between 0.1% to 1.1%. Global trading in general would decrease
these costs to well below 0.5% of GDP with OECD average below 0.2%.
The issue of the so-called "hot air"17
also influences the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol. The recent decline
in economic activity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has led to
a decrease in their GHG emissions. Although this trend is eventually expected
to reverse, for some countries emissions are still projected to lie below the
constraint imposed by the Kyoto Protocol. If this does occur, these countries
will have excess emission quota that may be sold to countries in search of low-cost
options for meeting their own targets. The cost savings from trading are sensitive
to the magnitude of "hot air".
Numerous assessments of reduction in projected GDP have been associated with
complying with Kyoto-type limits. Most economic analyses have focused on gross
costs of carbon emitting activities18,
ignoring the cost-saving potential of mitigating non-CO2 gases and
using carbon sequestration and neither taking into account environmental benefits
(ancillary benefits and avoided climate change), nor using revenues to remove
distortions. Including such possibilities could lower costs.
A constraint would lead to a reallocation of resources away from the pattern
that is preferred in the absence of a limit and into potentially costly conservation
and fuel substitution. Relative prices will also change. These forced adjustments
lead to reductions in economic performance, which impact GDP. Clearly, the broader
the permit trading market, the greater the opportunity for reducing overall
mitigation costs. Conversely, limits on the extent to which a country can satisfy
its obligations through the purchase of emissions quota can increase mitigation
costs. Several studies have calculated the magnitude of the increase to be substantial
falling in particular on countries with the highest marginal abatement costs.
But another parameter likely to limit the savings from carbon trading is the
very functioning of trading systems (transaction costs, management costs, insurance
against uncertainty, and strategic behaviour in the use of permits).
8.6 Ancillary Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
Policies aimed at mitigating greenhouse gases can have positive and negative
side effects on society, not taking into account benefits of avoided climate
change. This section assesses in particular those studies that evaluate the
side effects of climate change mitigation. Therefore the term "ancillary
benefits or costs" is used. There is little agreement on the definition,
reach, and size of these ancillary benefits, and on methodologies for integrating
them into climate policy. Criteria are established for reviewing the growing
literature linking specific carbon mitigation policies to monetized ancillary
benefits. Recent studies that take an economy-wide, rather than a sectoral,
approach to ancillary benefits are described in the report and their credibility
is examined (Chapter
9 presents sectoral analyses). In spite of recent progress in methods development,
it remains very challenging to develop quantitative estimates of the ancillary
effects, benefits and costs of GHG mitigation policies. Despite these difficulties,
in the short term, ancillary benefits of GHG policies under some circumstances
can be a significant fraction of private (direct) mitigation costs and in some
cases they can be comparable to the mitigation costs. According to the literature,
ancillary benefits may be of particular importance in developing countries,
but this literature is as yet limited.
The exact magnitude, scale, and scope of these ancillary benefits and costs
will vary with local geographical and baseline conditions. In some circumstances,
where baseline conditions involve relatively low carbon emissions and population
density, benefits may be low. The models most in use for ancillary benefit estimation
- the computable general equilibrium (CGE) models - have difficulty
in estimating ancillary benefits because they rarely have, and may not be able
to have, the necessary spatial detail.
With respect to baseline considerations most of the literature on ancillary
benefits systematically treats only government policies and regulations with
respect to the environment. In contrast, other regulatory policy baseline issues,
such as those relating to energy, transportation, and health, have been generally
ignored, as have baseline issues that are not regulatory, such as those tied
with technology, demography, and the natural resource base. For the studies
reviewed here, the biggest share of the ancillary benefits is related to public
health. A major component of uncertainty for modelling ancillary benefits for
public health is the link between emissions and atmospheric concentrations,
particularly in light of the importance of secondary pollutants. However, it
is recognized that there are significant ancillary benefits in addition to those
for public health that have not been quantified or monetized. At the same time,
it appears that there are major gaps in the methods and models for estimating
ancillary costs.
|