Countinued from previous page
In addition to the problems identified above, other important barriers include
(1) the invisibility of energy efficiency measures and the difficulty
of demonstrating and quantifying their impacts; (2) lack of inclusion of external
costs of energy production and use in the price of energy, and (3) slow diffusion
of innovative technology into markets (Fisher and Rothkopf, 1989; Levine et al., 1994; Sanstad and Howarth, 1994). Regulation can contribute to more successful
innovation (see above), but sometimes, indirectly, be a barrier to implementation
of low GHG emitting practices. A specific example is industrial co-generation
(CHP), which may be hindered by the lack of clear policies for buy-back of excess
power, regulation for standby power, and wheeling of power to other users (Box
5.5). Co-generation in the Indian sugar industry was hindered by the lack
of these regulations (WWF, 1996), while the existence of clear policies can
be a driver for diffusion and expansion of industrial co-generation, as is evidenced
by the development of industrial co-generation in the Netherlands (Blok, 1993).
Finally, firms typically under-invest in R&D, despite the high paybacks
(Nelson, 1982; Cohen and Noll, 1994), but recent analyses seem to suggest that
public and private R&D funding for sustainable energy technologies is decreasing
in developed countries (Kammen and Margolis, 1999).
Box 5.5. Combined (Cooling) Heating and Power or Cogeneration
Co-generation is applied in utility district heating and in distributed
on-site power units. Most barriers to on-site co-generation are the same
barriers as the ones that impede the development of other types of distributed
and/or independent power generation projects. The most important barriers
are related to information, technology character, regulatory and energy
policy.
Informational barriers
The significant technological advances of recent years (Major, 1995; Rohrer,
1996) are not spread widely enough. This barrier is the most stringent
in developing countries and in small institutions and companies, especially
when the latter have no technical background. When donors, international
institutions, lending banks, etc. are not familiar with the co-generation
technology, it will not be implemented by developing and transitional
economies (Dadhich, 1996; Nielsen and Bernsen, 1996). Additionally, the
economics of co-generation is relatively complex (Verbruggen et al., 1992;
Hoff et al., 1996; Verbruggen, 1996). Optimization of co-generation projects
requires extensive information about many determinants of profitability.
This span of know-how makes its availability to small-scale independent
projects exceptional. Finally, uncertainty about the main determinants
like fuel prices, fuel availability, regulatory conditions, environmental
legislation, contract terms with the power grid, etc. constitutes a significant
barrier.
Decentralized character of the technology
Private investors impose high profitability standards on distributed generation
projects. This payback gap is mainly due to a risk-averse attitude regarding
non-core business activities. The distances to the energy grids (electricity,
natural gas) limit the capacity or co-generation opportunities. Unequal
treatment with respect to fuel supplies, authorization and licensing arrangements,
and environmental and emissions regulation, constitutes an additional
set of barriers that especially affect the small-scale distributed generation
projects and add to the costs of the technology (COGEN Europe, 1997).
The terms of grid connection
In several countries, the position and attitude of the grid operator have
been hostile towards distributed generation initiatives (Rüdig, 1986;
Dufait, 1996). Incumbent power companies sometimes impose heavy regulations
on producers or industries that file for a connection to the electricity
grid, imposing technical prescriptions that cannot be set in standard
packages. Tariff conditions are a particularly difficult issue, because
the value of the kWh is dependent on time, place, quality, and reliability
of supply, and differs for the three types of power flows that can be
exchanged: surplus power that the co-generator delivers to the grid, shortage
or make-up power bought by the co-generator at the grid, and back-up power
(Verbruggen, 1990). Although there are widely accepted principles to fix
the tariff for the different transactions, theoretical and practical difficulties
in defining and measuring the costs constrain the development of contracts
(Dismukes and Kleit, 1999). In many countries high tariffs on wheeling
of electricity act as an additional barrier. In several countries the
opportunities for small-scale distributed power generation are improving
because grid connection is provided at neutral or even subsidized terms
(the Netherlands and Japan; Blok and Farla, 1996).
Energy policy
Utility co-generation requires long-term planning from an integrated point
of view (WEC, 1991). Very few nations own the intellectual and administrative
capacity to realize an integrated energy policy plan that preserves the
place for district heating and related co-generation. Some countries (e.g.,
Denmark) and international organizations have favoured the development
of CHP (EC, 1997). Firm public policy and regulatory authority is necessary
to install and safeguard harmonized conditions, transparancy and unbundling
of the main power supply functions, and the position of independent players
(Fox-Penner, 1990).
|
Programmes and Policies for Technological Diffusion
A wide array of policies, to reduce the barriers or the perception of barriers
has been used and tested in the industrial sector in developed countries (Worrell
et al., 1997), with varying success rates. With respect to technology diffusion
policies there is no single instrument to reduce barriers; instead, an integrated
policy accounting for the characteristics of technologies, stakeholders, and
countries addressed would be helpful.
Selection of technology is a crucial step in any technology transfer. Information
programmes are designed to assist energy consumers in understanding and employing
technologies and practices to use energy more efficiently. Information needs
are strongly determined by the situation of the actor. Therefore, successful
programmes should be tailored to meet these needs. Surveys in western Germany
(Gruber and Brand, 1991) and the Netherlands (Velthuijsen, 1995) showed that
trade literature, personal information from equipment manufacturers and exchange
between colleagues are important information sources. In the United Kingdom,
the Best Practice programme aims to improve information
on energy efficient technologies, by demonstration projects and information
dissemination. The programme objective is to stimulate energy savings worth
US$5 for every US$1 invested (Collingwood and Goult, 1998). In developing countries
technology information is more difficult to obtain. Energy audit programmes
are a more targeted type of information transaction than simple advertising.
Energy audit programmes exist in numerous developing countries, and limited
information available from 11 different countries found that on average 56%
of the recommended measures were implemented by audit recipients (Nadel et al.,
1991).
Environmental legislation can be a driving force in the adoption of new technologies,
as evidenced by the case studies for India (TERI, 1997), and the process for
uptake of environmental technologies in the USA (Clark, 1997). Market deregulation
can lead to higher energy prices in developing countries (Worrell et al., 1997),
although efficiency gains may lead to lower prices for some consumers.
Direct subsidies and tax credits or other favourable tax treatments have been
a traditional approach for promoting activities that are socially desirable.
An example of a financial incentive programme that has had a large impact on
energy efficiency is the energy conservation loan programme that China instituted
in 1980. This loan programme is the largest energy efficiency investment programme
ever undertaken by any developing country, and currently commits 7% to 8% of
total energy investment to efficiency, primarily in heavy industry. The programme
contributed to the remarkable decline in the energy intensity of Chinas
economy. Since 1980 energy consumption has grown at an average rate of 4.8%
per year (compared to 7.5% in the 1970s) while GDP has grown twice as fast (9.5%
per year), mainly thanks to falling industrial sector energy intensity. Of the
apparent intensity drop in industry in the 1980s, about 10% can be attributed
directly to the efficiency investment programme (Sinton and Levine, 1994).
New approaches to industrial energy efficiency improvement in developed countries
include voluntary agreements (VA). A VA generally is a contract between the
government (or an other regulating agency) and a private company, association
of companies or other institution. The content of the agreement may vary. The
private partners may promise to attain certain energy efficiency improvement,
emission reduction target, or at least try to do so. The government partner
may promise to financially support this endeavour, or promise to refrain from
other regulating activities. Many developed countries have adopted VAs directed
at energy efficiency improvement or environmental pollution control (EEA, 1997;
IEA, 1997; Börkey and Lévêque, 1998; OECD, 2000). There is
a wide variety in VAs, ranging from public and consumer recognition for participation
in a programme (e.g., Energy Star Program in the USA) to legally binding negotiated
agreements (e.g., the Long-Term Agreements in the Netherlands). Voluntary agreements
can have some apparent advantages above regulation, in that they may be easier
and faster to implement, and may lead to more cost-effective solutions. Initial
experiences with environmental VAs with respect to effectiveness and efficiency
varied strongly, although only a few ex-post evaluations are available as most
voluntary approaches are recent (EEA, 1997; Worrell et al., 1997, Börkey
and Lévêque, 1998). The Dutch long-term agreements on energy efficiency
in industry have been evaluated favourably, and are expected to achieve the
targets for most sectors (Universiteit Utrecht, 1997). The evaluation highlighted
the need for more open and consistent mechanisms for reporting, target setting,
and supportive policies. Preliminary evaluations show that VAs are most suitable
for pro-active industries, a small number of participants, mature sectors with
limited competition, and long-term targets (EEA, 1997). The evaluations also
show that VAs are most effective if they include clear targets, a specified
baseline, a clear monitoring and reporting mechanism, and if there are technical
solutions available with relatively limited compliance costs (EEA, 1997). In
some cases the result of a VA may come close to those of a regulation, i.e.,
in the case of negotiated agreements as used in some European countries. Outside
developed countries, also some NICs, e.g., Republic of Korea, consider the use
of VAs (Kim, 1998), while the Global Semiconductor Partnership is an example
of an international voluntary agreement to reduce PFC emissions.
|