9.2.1.2 Reducing Subsidies in the Energy Sector
Empirical and theoretical studies indicate that no regrets policies can result
from the removal of subsidies from fossil fuels or from electricity that relies
on fossil fuels. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC article
4.2e (ii)) calls for Annex I Parties to identify and periodically review
its own policies and practices which encourage ... [greater emissions] than
would otherwise occur. The Kyoto Protocol calls for such Parties to implement
measures ... such as ... progressive reduction or phasing out of market
imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all
greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention
.
The extent of the impact of reducing subsidies will depend on the specific
characteristic of each country, the type of subsidy involved, and the international
co-ordination to implement similar measures. Most countries introduce subsidies
in order to accomplish several policy objectives. In the case of energy, these
are usually in order to:
- secure domestic energy supplies;
- ensure that power supply is sufficient to meet demand;
- provide access to energy for low-income households;
- maintain or slow the loss of employment in mining communities; and
- retain the international competitiveness of domestic industry.
Coal subsidies have encouraged high production of coal in a number of industrial
countries and high coal consumption in numerous developing and transition economies
(OECD, 1997c). For example, a complete measure of the total support to producers
can be estimated in the form of the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE), which
has been calculated annually by the International Energy Agency (IEA) for several
countries since 1988 ( IEA, 1998b). DRI (1994) used revised versions of the
IEAs coal PSE estimates (shown in Table 9.2) to model
the effects of removing subsidies. These subsidies tend to increase GHG emissions
and more general pollution.
Table 9.2: Producer subsidy equivalents for coal
production in OECD countries in 1993 |
|
|
PSE per
tonne
US$/tce
|
Total
PSE
MUS$
|
Budgetary
support
|
Price
support
Mtce
|
Subsidized
production
|
|
France
Germany
Japan
Spain
Turkey
UK
US |
43
109
161
84
143
15
0
|
428
6688
1034
856
416
873
0
|
100%
40%
12%
37%
100%
2%
0
|
0%
60%
88%
63%
0%
98%
0
|
10.0
61.5
6.4
10.2
2.9
57.4
0
|
|
In recent years many countries have changed their energy policy, from a focus
on energy self-sufficiency, to broader policy objectives, oriented towards encouraging
economic efficiency and taking into account environmental problems. Subsidies
are currently under review by many countries, and in some cases reforms have
already taken place. Nevertheless, large subsidies remain in both Annex I and
non-Annex I countries.
In theoretical terms, polluting activities, such as coal mining and coal burning,
could be taxed in order to achieve economic efficiency. Economic theory indicates
that the optimal policy would be to replace those production and consumption
subsidies with optimal taxes. According to global studies, even without adding
new taxes, removing the subsidies and trade barriers at a sectoral level would
create a win-win situation, improving efficiency and reducing the environmental
damage (Burniaux et al., 1992; Hoeller and Coppel, 1992; Larson
and Shah, 1992, 1995; Anderson and McKibbin, 1997). It is a well-established
finding that removal of these subsidies would result in substantial reductions
in GHG emissions, as well as stimulating economic growth. Local studies also
indicate that removing support to the production and use of coal and other fossil
fuels can result in substantial reductions in CO2 emissions in the
main coal-using countries, at the same time as reducing the cost of electricity
production (DRI, 1994; Shelby et al., 1994; Golub and Gurvich,
1996; Michaelis, 1996; OECD, 1997c, Appendix A). Table
9.3 is a review of the quantitative results of these case studies, along
with the global studies. Note, however, that these analyses adopt different
methodologies, so that the figures are not directly comparable.
In spite of these results, it is not wise to generalize about the environmental
and economic effects of removing subsidies in the energy industry (OECD, 1997c).
For example, the effect of removing subsidies to coal producers depends heavily
on the type of subsidy removed and the availability and economics of alternative
energy sources, including imported coal. Removing some electricity sector subsidies
may have very little effect on GHG emissions or may even increase emissions,
for example, when subsidies to electricity supply industry investment are supporting
the use of less polluting energy sources. Finally, there may be cases where
removing a subsidy to an energy-intensive industry in one country would lead
to a shift in production to other countries with lower costs or environmental
standards, resulting in a net increase in global GHG emissions (OECD, 1997c).
The issue of carbon leakage is addressed in greater detail in Chapter
8.
9.2.1.3 Sectoral Impacts of the Kyoto Mechanisms
The effects of the Kyoto Mechanisms at the sectoral level are complex. The
available studies have looked at the effect of international emissions trading,
but there have been no comprehensive studies on the sectoral effects of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or joint implementation (JI). Countries buying
assigned amount units (AAUs), or funding CDM and JI projects, may have less
need to reduce fossil fuel consumption. Therefore, the sectors in these countries
that depend on fossil fuel production or use may experience smaller economic
impacts (Brown et al., 1999). This would also reduce the impact
on fossil fuel producers, both at the domestic and international level. However,
countries selling credits, or hosting JI and CDM projects, will have to generate
these AAUs or Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) through either reduction
of GHG emissions or enhancement of sinks. The economic impact on sectors within
those countries will vary depending on the source of the credits. Some sectors
will benefit, while others may see reduced rates of growth. Until the rules
for implementation of the Kyoto mechanisms have been decided, sectoral impacts
of their use will remain speculative.
|