

1 **IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report – Draft for Expert Review**

2  
3 **Chapter 20: Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability**

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## 1 **Executive Summary**

2  
3 Conclusions about the ability of nations and the globe to integrate issues of sustainability into  
4 their considerations of climate change *and* to integrate climate change into their deliberations  
5 about sustainable development can be offered with high confidence in the sense of being  
6 established though incomplete.  
7  
8 First of all, the vulnerability of any system depends on exposure and sensitivity and that both  
9 depend on its adaptive capacity. Recent work suggests that adaptive capacity is explained, in  
10 many instances, by the weakest of these determinants. The prerequisites for (sustainable)  
11 development match the determining factors that influence adaptive capacity relative to climate  
12 change and climate variability  
13  
14 The relative efficiency of adaptation options and sustainable development programs are site-  
15 specific and path-dependent empirical issues.  
16  
17 Equity, access to resources and technology, social and human capital, and access to risk-spreading  
18 mechanisms all function simultaneously as determinants of adaptive capacity and as prerequisites  
19 to sustainable development.  
20  
21 Development paths, and the choices that define them, affect the impacts of climate change not  
22 only through changes in exposure and sensitivity to external stresses, but also through changes in  
23 the capacities of systems to adapt.  
24  
25 Sustainability is a concern for development planners in developed and developing countries, alike;  
26 but issues of sustainability can be fundamentally different in developing countries than they are in  
27 developed countries.  
28  
29 Most of the sustainable development literature that recognizes climate change as an issue sees  
30 only the climate change literature that focuses on mitigation.  
31  
32 Millennium Development Goals and the Agenda 21 process focus on mitigation (protecting  
33 atmosphere) and are not motivated by adaptation to climate change.  
34  
35 Uncertainty in aggregate global and/or regional estimates of net impacts is expanding.  
36  
37 Reducing vulnerability to the hazards of current climate variability contributes to reducing  
38 vulnerability to climate change, but it is not in itself necessarily sufficient.  
39  
40 Participatory processes, carried out as part of climate change research, can facilitate the  
41 integration of biophysical and socio-economic aspects of climate change adaptation and  
42 development.  
43  
44 Programmatic preferences across adaptation options depend upon the relative weights given to  
45 equity and efficiency within the valuation criteria as well as the analytic decision framework that  
46 is actually applied in the decision process.

## 1 20.1 Introduction

2  
3 The fundamental nature of an effective societal response to questions of sustainable development  
4 was given by the international statesman Maurice Strong (Secretary General of the 1961 UN  
5 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and the 1992 UN “Earth Summit in Rio de  
6 Janeiro) in accepting the prestigious Public Welfare Medal from the U. S. National Academy of  
7 Sciences in 2004. He remarked on that occasion, that “... the main lesson I have drawn from my  
8 own experience in dealing with this complex of issues is the need for a major shift in the  
9 motivational basis of our current behaviour. People and nations are motivated not only by their  
10 immediate self-interest but by their deepest moral, ethical and spiritual values.”

11  
12 The fundamental conclusions of IPCC (2001a) that spoke to the intersection of climate change and  
13 sustainable development were summarized in the Executive Summary of Chapter 18: *Enhancement*  
14 *of adaptive capacity is a necessary condition for reducing vulnerability, particularly for the most*  
15 *vulnerable regions, nations, and socioeconomic groups*. Activities required for the enhancement of  
16 adaptive capacity are essentially equivalent to those promoting sustainable development. (pg. 879).  
17 These fundamentals still ring true. The effects of climate change and climate variability, net of  
18 adaptation responses but including the cost of adaptation, are still thought to play a significant role  
19 in determining the sustainability of a community’s, a society’s, a nation’s, and even the globe’s  
20 development trajectory. Moreover, it is still widely believed that the choices that communities,  
21 societies, nations, and global institutions make about their development paths are critical in  
22 determining the future of climate change.

23  
24 This chapter will provide evidence from both the relevant literatures and from case studies drawn  
25 from earlier chapters to support twelve separate conclusions that support and extend the  
26 conclusions published in the TAR. In particular, this chapter will argue, in the sections highlighted  
27 in italics, that:

- 28
- 29 1 IPCC (2001a) argued that the vulnerability of any system depends on exposure and sensitivity  
30 and that both depend on adaptive capacity. IPCC (2001a) also argued that adaptive capacity, in  
31 turn, depends on a collection of site-specific and path dependents. More recent work suggests  
32 that adaptive capacity is explained, in many instances, on the weakest of these determinants.  
33 The prerequisites for (sustainable) development match the determining factors that influence  
34 adaptive capacity relative to climate change and climate variability, and the development  
35 literature supports a parallel dependence of success in many instances on the weakest  
36 prerequisite. (Sections 20.3.3, 20.3.4 & 20.3.5).
  - 37 2 Since adaptive capacity and support for sustainable development of any specific socio-  
38 economic-political system are both site specific and path dependent (as is its mitigative  
39 capacity), determining the relative efficiency of adaptation options and the relative efficiency  
40 of development programs are essentially empirical questions whose answers cannot be  
41 predicted a priori. (Sections 20.3.3, 20.3.4, 20.3.5 & 20.6).
  - 42 3 Equity, access to resources and technology, social and human capital, and access to risk-  
43 spreading mechanisms all function simultaneously as determinants of adaptive capacity and as  
44 prerequisites to sustainable development. They also are goals for sustainable development  
45 programs. (Sections 20.6.4 & 20.8).
  - 46 4 A two-way causality between sustainable development and adaptive capacity exists.  
47 Development paths, and the choices that define them, affect the impacts of climate change not  
48 only through changes in exposure and sensitivity to external stresses, but also through changes  
49 in the capacities of systems to adapt. There continue to be questions regarding the sequence of

- 1 policy implementation to meet climate change adaptation and sustainable development  
2 objectives. (Section 20.3.6).
- 3 5 Sustainability is a concern for development planners in developed and developing countries,  
4 alike; but issues of sustainability can be fundamentally different in developing countries than  
5 they are in developed countries. Climate change is seldom included in the list of stressors that  
6 these decision-makers take to be sources of serious threat to sustainability. (Sections 20.3.7 &  
7 20.6).
- 8 6 Most of the sustainable development literature that recognizes climate change focuses on  
9 mitigation. This is reinforced by climate change policy literature where discussions of  
10 sustainable development are motivated by emissions reductions. (Sections 20.3.8 & 20.6)
- 11 7 Millennium Development Goals and the outputs of the Agenda 21 process focus on mitigation  
12 (protecting atmosphere) and are not motivated by adaptation to climate change even though  
13 achieving their goals can be beneficial for enhancing adaptive capacity. (Section 20.6.3).
- 14 8 Uncertainty in aggregate global and/or regional estimates of net impacts is expanding in part  
15 because global coverage of robust net impacts is incomplete (Section 20.6).
- 16 9 Environmental impact assessments and/or development policies are beginning to include  
17 climate change as a focus of attention in locations where the issues have gained prominence,  
18 but this practice is not yet widespread. (Section 20.3.7 & 20.4)
- 19 10 Reducing vulnerability to the hazards of current climate variability contributes to reducing  
20 vulnerability to climate change, but it is not in itself necessarily sufficient. (Sections 20.3.6  
21 and 20.5.2).
- 22 11 Participatory processes, carried out as part of climate change research, can facilitate the  
23 integration of biophysical and socio-economic aspects of climate change adaptation and  
24 development by creating opportunities for shared experiences in learning, problem definition,  
25 and solution design, appropriate to the context of decision making (Sections 20.8.3 & 20.8.4).
- 26 12 Programmatic preferences across adaptation options depend upon the relative weights given to  
27 equity and efficiency within the valuation criteria as well as the analytic decision framework  
28 that is actually applied in the decision process. Risk-management approaches to mitigation and  
29 adaptation offer new contexts through which mitigation and adaptation responses to climate  
30 change can be integrated and mainstreamed into development programs. (Section 20.8.4).

31  
32 Counterexamples exist for each of these subsidiary conclusions, so none of them can be  
33 advance with “very high confidence”. Still, they do hold across a sufficient set of applications  
34 that they can be offered to researchers and policy-makers alike as “well established” methods  
35 with which to engage policymakers in discussions about how to bring climate change to bear  
36 on issues of sustainable development *and* how to bring sustainable development to bear on  
37 issues of climate change (both on the adaptation side and on the mitigation side).

38  
39

#### 40 ***20.1.1 Defining sustainable development***

41

42 Kates, *et al.* (2000) argue that the world’s present development path is not sustainable, and therein  
43 lies a fundamental challenge for all of humanity. Policy makers and scientists are wrestling with  
44 how to balance economic growth with environmental conservation, and they have support in their  
45 efforts from the highest levels. The recent World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)  
46 made it clear that sustainable development is a widely held social and political goal.

47

48 Consistent with the IPCC (2001a), sustainable development is defined here to mean “*development*  
49 *that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet*  
50 *their own needs*”. Enhancing adaptive capacity is consistent with promoting sustainable

1 development because both have similar underpinnings and parallel goals (for example, improved  
2 access to resources, reduction of poverty, improved infrastructure, and so on). Notwithstanding  
3 the possibility that some decisions might work at cross purposes at the intersection of  
4 sustainability and reducing vulnerability to climate change, this working definition focuses  
5 attention immediately on making development more sustainable by increasing the ability of  
6 systems and societies to adapt to multiple stresses of which climate change and climate variability  
7 are but two. It can also highlight the practical truth that sustainable development is an issue  
8 confronting developed and developing countries, alike, though perhaps in profoundly different  
9 ways. UN (1992) offered “Agenda 21”. Because it focuses attention on economic growth *and*  
10 social development (including promoting equity as well as both protecting and enhancing the  
11 environment toward the end of promoting human development), it represents to a large degree the  
12 practical manifestation of this truth.

13  
14 In recent years, scientists from all over the world representing a wide array of disciplines have  
15 banded together to find ways in which the science and technology communities could exert more  
16 influence in promoting sustainable development. The Mexico City Workshop (2002) is evidence  
17 that both communities have increasingly recognized that they will play central roles in promoting  
18 understanding of both the origins of sustainability challenges and the prospect of successfully  
19 dealing with them. This has led to the emergence of what has been called “sustainability science”  
20 – an effort to improve on the substantial but still limited understanding of nature-society  
21 interactions. Kates, *et al.* (2000) argue that sustainability science is premised on the need for a  
22 better understanding of the complex and dynamic interactions between society and nature. As  
23 such, it will require fundamental advances in our ability to address such issues as the behaviour of  
24 complex self-organizing systems as well as the responses of the nature-society system to multiple  
25 and interacting stresses across a full range of scales from local to global.

26  
27

### 28 ***20.1.2 A wide range of interested parties***

29  
30 The non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) have played a major role in identifying agendas for  
31 sustainable development. Indeed, over the past 20 years, NGOs have become a politically  
32 important voice in a wide range of international negotiations and discussions over sustainable  
33 development, and its link to a wide range of environmental issues. International negotiations  
34 among governments on climate change, biodiversity loss, and desertification now routinely offer  
35 opportunities for the voices of NGO’s to be heard, and NGO’s have often helped to organize the  
36 governments of smaller state actors so as to maximize their voice in international negotiations.

37  
38 The scientific community has also become entrained in discussions about sustainability. Within  
39 the US, for example, the publication of *Our Common Journey* by the National Research Council  
40 (1999) marked a significant effort to define as a series of scientific and technological challenges  
41 the social, scientific, economic, and technological transitions that would enable the world to make  
42 progress towards the goals of sustainable development. The establishment of the InterAcademy  
43 Panel as an organization of national academies of science dedicated to capacity building and  
44 sustainability issues marks another institutional move forward by the scientific community in  
45 promoting a sustainability agenda. International scientific assessments, like the Millennium  
46 Ecosystem Assessment (2005), take the sustainable use of natural resources as an imperative, and  
47 explore the tradeoffs inherent in emphasizing any particular service provided by ecosystems over  
48 other services that those systems provide.

49

1 The business community has equal concerns over sustainability in the long term, although there is  
2 great variability among individual firms and organizations as to how that concern is expressed.  
3 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), for example, was created in  
4 the year leading up to the Rio Conference of 1992. The WBCSD provides a forum for discussion  
5 and comparison of best practices for many businesses concerned with the international dimensions  
6 of sustainability. The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) includes  
7 more than 70 large and small corporations that subscribe to the nine overarching principles:  
8 protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes,  
9 energy conservation, risk reduction, safe products and services, environmental restoration, and  
10 informing the public. Many individual firms have also made their own commitments to  
11 sustainability, both through their existing structures for environment, health, and safety, and  
12 through creating new offices responsible specifically for sustainability within their organizations.  
13 A growing number of companies, like Rio Tinto, British Petroleum, and Dupont to name just  
14 three, routinely produce sustainability reports that outline specific environmental and  
15 sustainability goals for the company and track progress towards them. Some firms that have not  
16 yet made a commitment to reporting on sustainability nonetheless have multiple activities that  
17 promote sustainability within particular divisions or product lines. Many firms have joined in  
18 partnerships with both NGO's and governments to promote sustainability within a large and  
19 growing network of voluntary actions.  
20  
21

22  
23 ***Box 20.1: “A case study of Time, Incorporated”***  
24

25 Time Inc. is the publishing unit of Time Warner, a global media conglomerate with headquarters  
26 in New York City. The company is one of the world's largest consumers of coated paper and  
27 altogether buys about 600,000 tons of paper a year from mills in the U.S., Canada, Finland,  
28 Scotland and Germany. The company, which is a member of the World Business Council for  
29 Sustainable Development, sees sustainability as crucial not only to environmental protection, but  
30 also to financial success and social responsibility, since only sustainable practices can insure a  
31 long-term supply of needed raw materials, continued employment for workers and reliable returns  
32 for shareholders.  
33

34 Time is rapidly increasing the proportion of paper it buys that comes from forests that are certified  
35 as sustainably managed by independent organizations such as the Forest Stewardship Council.  
36 Current goals call for Time's European suppliers to get 80% of their pulp from certified forests by  
37 the end of 2005 and for North American suppliers to meet the 80% mark by the end of 2006. Time  
38 teamed with International Paper, a global paper supplier based in Connecticut, and the National  
39 Recycling Coalition, a non-profit group based in Washington, D.C., to sponsor two pilot projects  
40 to promote magazine and catalogue recycling. The projects are underway in Boston and in Prince  
41 Georges County, Maryland. In Boston, magazine and catalogue recycling is up more than 20%  
42 since the beginning of the project. In Maryland, preliminary data showed a 13% increase and  
43 subsequent figures are expected to show greater gains.  
44

45 Making paper is among the most energy-intensive manufacturing businesses in the world. For that  
46 reason, Time joined with Stora Enso, Home Depot (an American retailer) and Canfor (a Canadian  
47 pulp supplier) to sponsor a yearlong study of the “carbon footprint” of the magazine business. One  
48 important finding of the study is that the biggest source of carbon emissions from the magazine  
49 industry is not the transportation of materials and products, as one might expect in a global

1 enterprise, but the use of energy in the paper manufacturing process and their suppliers are  
2 meeting desired sustainability benchmarks.  
3

4 So far, Time Inc. has focused primarily on the environmental aspects of sustainability. But several  
5 of the company’s initiatives have had important social benefits. For example, Time’s promotion of  
6 sustainable forestry in Maine has helped preserve vulnerable logging jobs in that state. Time’s  
7 promotion of magazine recycling in Boston and Maryland has created jobs and helped local  
8 governments reduce garbage-disposal costs and increase revenues from recycling companies.  
9 With its work on the EPAT and other projects, Time hopes to help establish benchmarks for  
10 corporate responsibility that go beyond the environmental arena.  
11

12  
13  
14 In parallel, the faith communities have recognized the need for a global ethic to guide humanity.  
15 Kung (1991) remarked that “the world’s human population has been growing at an every-  
16 increasing rate, and the more people there are on this finite globe, the more space we occupy, the  
17 more resources we consume, the more waste and pollution we produce and the more damage we  
18 do to the planet’s natural system when we indulge in civil, political and religious conflict.” His  
19 work led to the 1995 report, *A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s*  
20 *Religions* produced at a 1993 parliament in Chicago. It dealt with the human values, attitudes, and  
21 behaviour that need to be embraced by all cultures and religions to cope with the challenges  
22 (including “abuses of earth’s ecosystems”) in the twenty-first century.  
23  
24

## 25 **20.2 A synthesis of new knowledge relating to impacts and adaptation**

26

27 Chapter 17 assesses the state of knowledge about adaptation, noting once again that societies have  
28 been adapting to the impacts of weather and climate for a very long time. Still, it must be  
29 emphasized that adaptation measures are seldom undertaken in response to climate alone. They  
30 have, rather, been part of responses designed to address a range of socio-economic and  
31 environmental considerations. Brown (2002) sees this integration in terms of a maturing of the  
32 environmental movement from a single-issue focus to one that recognizes environmental quality  
33 as one fundamental component of sustainability – a context within which employment, social  
34 justice, equity and other dimensions of social and political life are considered simultaneously with  
35 environmental issues. How, he asks, can a development path that degrades the environment be  
36 sustainable? And how can an environmentally benign path be sustainable if it does not achieve  
37 some measure of social justice?  
38

39 Chapter 17 is in concert with Brown’s observation when it notes that the capacity to adapt is  
40 linked fundamentally to other indicators of development: education, health, governance, and the  
41 distribution of income. It is also clear, however, that a high generic capacity to adapt need not  
42 necessarily translate into real action even in developed countries. Different societies and groups  
43 within societies are vulnerable to diverse sets of multiple stresses to which adaptation can be  
44 prevented by violent conflict, infectious diseases, and other factors. Adaptive capacity can be  
45 enhanced by appropriate planning that recognizes climate variability and by mechanism that  
46 manage risk through social learning and adaptive management. While examples of mainstreaming  
47 adaptation to climate change into development plans can be identified in water management,  
48 infrastructure development, and some community development programs, Chapter 17 concludes  
49 that it is still too early to assess the sustainability of these initiatives.  
50

1 On a global level, recent initiatives have begun to support what Burton (2004) calls Type II  
2 adaptation (adaptation to climate change itself whose international support is borne from the  
3 global public goods nature of the climate problem). These initiatives are meant to support and  
4 expand Type I adaptation (existing adaptation to past and current climate conditions and  
5 variability), but Burton and van Aalst (2004) argue that this approach will work only if its design  
6 becomes part of mainstream (sustainable) development initiatives through a systematic  
7 management of risks derived from multiple sources. Much of what follows will, in its assessment  
8 of a broad range of literature, support their conclusion.  
9

## 11 **20.3 Impacts and adaptation in the context of multiple stresses**

13 This section begins with a catalogue of the multiple stresses that nations and communities  
14 currently face before offering a review of our current understanding of the determinants of  
15 adaptive capacity. Key, here, is the connection between those determinants and what might be  
16 termed the “precursors of sustainable development”. While this connection makes enormous sense  
17 on an abstract level, the devil is certainly in the confounding details; these are reviewed before the  
18 discussion turns to a consideration of aggregate indicators, some synthetic reflections on the  
19 insights offered by earlier chapters on adaptation and mitigation, and the identification of gaps in  
20 our understanding of how best to “mainstream” climate into the development planning.  
21

### 23 ***20.3.1 A catalogue of multiple stresses***

25 While climate change has been recognized for several decades as a major risk factor both for  
26 ecosystems and more generally for sustainable development, many early analyses of potential  
27 impacts and adaptation options have considered climate changes alone. It has become clear,  
28 however, that climate change will occur in a broader context of multiple stresses on ecological and  
29 social systems. It follows that analyses of potential impacts, adaptation options, and mitigation  
30 options should be conducted within that broader context.  
31

32 The challenge of considering global and regional environmental changes within a context of  
33 multiple stresses has now been documented in several different ways. The Pilot Analysis of  
34 Global Ecosystems prepared by the World Resources Institute (2000) conducted literature reviews  
35 to document the state and condition of forests, agro-ecosystems, freshwater ecosystems, and  
36 marine systems. Since then, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) has  
37 comprehensively documented the services that ecosystems provide and the stresses that they face.  
38 For example, the MEA reports that cultivated systems in 2000 cover 25% of Earth’s terrestrial  
39 surface, that more land was converted to cropland in the 30 years after 1950 than in the 150 years  
40 between 1700 and 1850, that 20% of the world’s coral reefs have been lost, that another 20% have  
41 been degraded in the past several decades, and that 35% of mangrove areas has been lost.  
42 Withdrawals from rivers and lakes have doubled since 1960, keeping pace with the overall growth  
43 in human population. Biogeochemical cycles have been substantially altered: in addition to the  
44 increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, flows of biologically available nitrogen in  
45 terrestrial ecosystems have doubled since 1960, and flows of phosphorus have tripled in the same  
46 time period. Humans now produce as much biologically available nitrogen globally as all natural  
47 pathways combined, and the human component is expected to continue to grow during the 21<sup>st</sup>  
48 century. In spite of the fact that there are some ecosystems whose condition has improved over the  
49 past several decades, land-use conversion rates remain high, and the biological consequences  
50 include raising the species extinction rate by as much as 1,000 times typical background rates. At

1 least 25% of major marine fish stocks have been over-fished, and global fish yields have actually  
2 begun to decline. Major changes in land-cover have been identified in the MA and by Lepers *et al.*  
3 (2005), and the consequences of rapid land-cover change explored by Foley *et al.* (2005).  
4

5 These multiple stresses have occurred in part because both direct and indirect drivers of change  
6 have themselves increased, especially over the past 40 years. The world's population has doubled  
7 from 3 to more than 6 billion people, and the global economy has increased more than six fold.  
8 Food production has increased 2 ½ times, water use doubled, wood harvests for pulp and paper  
9 have tripled, timber production doubled, and installed hydropower capacity has doubled. The  
10 basic demands for food, energy, materials and freshwater are being met in many places, but as  
11 documented elsewhere in this chapter, the divergence between wealthy and poor countries and  
12 populations has also grown. So even though there are important increases in human well-being in  
13 many places around the globe, they have also brought with them tradeoffs in terms of reductions  
14 in the extent and condition of the ecosystems and the services they provide.  
15

16 Figure 13 of the Synthesis Report for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005)  
17 provides an extraordinarily concise presentation of the multiple sources of stress that have  
18 confronted the planet's ecosystems and natural resources over the past 50 years. These are, of  
19 course, the resources upon which sustainable development pathways will be constructed over the  
20 next 50 years and beyond. A version of that figure is replicated in Table 20.1, and all of the  
21 caveats expressed in the MEA still apply. In particular, the current and anticipated levels of stress  
22 from various drivers in the future are the result of expert judgment of the rigorous assessment of  
23 current trends and conditions conducted by the Condition and Trends Working Group of the  
24 MEA. They are, therefore, extrapolations of the past and do not necessarily incorporate adaptive  
25 and mitigative interventions. Moreover, Table 20.1 reports global impacts and trends that may be  
26 extraordinarily different from place to place around the globe.  
27

28 Recognizing diversity from place to place, both in the manifestation of a specific stress and the  
29 potential of human intervention, brings a variety of other sources of stress to the table – sources on  
30 sustainability borne of human activity. Socio-economic conditions and trends are critical; for  
31 example, changes in population levels and distributions, rates of technological change and other  
32 sources of productivity growth, etc... can effect sustainability directly and indirectly through the  
33 drivers indicated in Table 20.1. So can the evolution of governmental and other institutional  
34 structures such as changes in property rights, redistributive initiatives, a wide range of economic  
35 incentives that may or may not be mutually consistent, and so on. Since the manifestations of  
36 these conditions and trends are so site-specific, however, it is perhaps best simply to offer a brief  
37 description of anthropogenic sources of stress for one region of the world as an illustration.  
38

1

2 **Table 20.1: Direct Sources of Stress on Ecosystems and Natural Resources \***

Ecosystem / Resource	Habitat Change	Climate Change	Over Exploitation	Pollution
<b>Boreal Forest</b>	L / faster	L / rapid	L / the same	M / rapid
<b>Temperate Forest</b>	M / slower	L / rapid	M / the same	M / rapid
<b>Tropical Forest</b>	VH / rapid	L / rapid	H / faster	L / rapid
<b>Temperate Grassland</b>	VH / faster	L / rapid	L / the same	VH / rapid
<b>Mediterranean Grassland</b>	M / faster	L / rapid	M / the same	L / rapid
<b>Tropical Grassland &amp; Savannah</b>	M / faster	M / rapid	VH / the same	M / rapid
<b>Desert Grassland</b>	L / the same	M / rapid	L / the same	L / rapid
<b>Inland Water</b>	VH / rapid	L / rapid	M / the same	VH / rapid
<b>Coastal Zones</b>	VH / faster	M / rapid	H / faster	VH / rapid
<b>Marine Systems</b>	M / rapid	L / rapid	VH / faster	L / rapid
<b>Islands</b>	M / the same	L / rapid	H / the same	L / rapid
<b>Mountain Regions</b>	M / the same	M / rapid	L / the same	L / rapid
<b>Polar Regions</b>	L / faster	H / rapid	H / faster	M / rapid

3 \* Each entry was taken from Figure 13 in MEA (2005, pg. 16); it records an assessment of  
4 current conditions (L, M, H and VH for “low”, “moderate”, “high”, and “very high”,  
5 respectively) as well as an assessment of whether or not the observed trend will accelerate as the  
6 future unfolds.

7

8

9 To that end, consider the stresses that can be documented across African continent. As described  
10 in Chapter 9, for example, Africa’s growing urban population, largely fuelled by rural-urban  
11 migration, has produced strong negative consequences. Murkirwa (----) documented the decline of  
12 rural agricultural production (the result of a contracting labour supply) and rural incomes. He can  
13 thereby explain why rural poverty escalated while investment opportunities diminished.  
14 Elsewhere, this migration produced largely unplanned urban and semi-urban centres and slums,  
15 with their attendant pressure on infrastructure, services and energy consumption. Ogbonna (----)  
16 noted that this pressure has turned viciously cyclical since increased demand for biomass sources  
17 of energy from the growing urban areas was confounded by increased demand for construction  
18 materials to build those areas. Meanwhile, rural-rural migration from marginal to more resource-  
19 endowed areas also produced heightened competition for scarce environmental resources. Fiki and  
20 Lee (2005) see this as a source of several violent conflicts. Amin, *et al.* (2005) concur in their  
21 chronicle of the international humanitarian crisis in the north Dafur region of the Sudan.

22

23 It is not difficult to see how these issues might be exacerbated by climate change. Oyebande, *et al.*  
24 (2002) report that West Africa has experienced a significant decline in freshwater availability (the  
25 region’s major river systems have dropped by 40 to 60%). This sharp decrease in water  
26 availability, which may be the norm in a world where the climate has changed, was accompanied  
27 by greater uncertainty in the spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall and surface water  
28 resources; but its largest legacy might be the associated escalation in trans-boundary tensions even  
29 when potentially effective adaptations are implemented.

30

1 Niasse (2005) chronicles the story of the Sengal River Basin, for example, where eight of the ten  
2 driest years from 1904 through 1984 occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. It was in this context that  
3 the Senegal River Basin Development Authority (OMVS) was created in Mali, Mauritania and  
4 Senegal with the mandate of developing and implementing a major water infrastructure program –  
5 a program that eventually included the construction of the downstream Diama Dam and the  
6 upstream Manantali Dam. These two dams were meant to reduce the vulnerability of these three  
7 countries to drought and climate variability. In 1988, two years after the commissioning of the  
8 Diama Dam and few months after the completion of the Manantali Dam, a conflict erupted  
9 between Senegal and Mauritania. The tension began when the river started to recede from adjacent  
10 floodplains. Senegalese farmers who went to the right bank of the river to prepare their fields were  
11 chased away by Mauritanian border guards. Senegalese authorities retaliated by sending back to  
12 Mauritania camel herds which used to spend most of the dry season in the northern part of  
13 Senegal. A few months later, in April 1989, after a dispute between Senegalese farmers and  
14 Mauritanian herders, Mauritanian border guards killed two Senegalese farmers and held 13 others  
15 in custody. Tensions grew, border communities were raided and looted, and retaliatory raids took  
16 hundred of lives. By the end of June 1989, 75,000 Senegalese and 150,000 Mauritians were  
17 repatriated. Thousands of black Mauritians, whose nationality was denied by Mauritania, were  
18 deported to Senegal to become refugees. The two countries severed their diplomatic relationships,  
19 deployed troops along the river, and exchanged of heavy artillery barrages. Although both  
20 countries restored diplomatic relationships in 1992, the wounds of the crisis linger on. Since IPCC  
21 (2001c) reports that climate models cannot agree on whether precipitation will increase or  
22 decrease as climate change progresses over the next century, it is impossible to guarantee that  
23 similarly inspired hostilities will not again erupt in West Africa.

24  
25

### 26 ***20.3.2 The role of the determinants of adaptive capacity***

27

28 Some of the critical boundaries that define vulnerability are defined by physical properties, but  
29 others are determined by social-economic context and social preferences. Even across this  
30 bifurcation, though, a fundamental IPCC (2001a) conclusion carries weight: it is worthwhile to  
31 recognize from the start that any system's vulnerability to climate change and climate variability  
32 will be determined initially by *its exposure to the impacts of climate and its baseline sensitivity to*  
33 *those impacts*, but then focus attention on the point that *its adaptive capacity will determine its*  
34 *ability to cope*. This approach exploits its recognition that all three of these factors, but perhaps  
35 most fundamentally the role adaptive capacity in defining social-economic thresholds of tolerance  
36 to climate-related stress, clearly depend on path dependent and site specific circumstances.

37

38 To sort through the implications of this insight, Yohe and Tol (2001) suggested that a list of the  
39 determinants of adaptive capacity should include:

- 40 1 the range of available technological options for adaptation,
- 41 2 the availability of resources and their distribution across the population,
- 42 3 the structure of critical institutions, the derivative allocation of decision-making  
43 authority, and the decision criteria that would be employed,
- 44 4 the stock of human capital including education and personal security,
- 45 5 the stock of social capital including the definition of property rights,
- 46 6 the system's access to risk spreading processes,
- 47 7 the ability of decision-makers to manage information, the processes by which these  
48 decision-makers determine which information is credible, and the credibility of the  
49 decision-makers, themselves, and

1 8 The public's perceived attribution of the source of stress and the significance of  
2 exposure to its local manifestations.  
3

4 This second tier list of critical factors identifies some of the fundamental sources of  
5 diversity across paths and locations. Other recent attempts to describe overall adaptive  
6 capacity include those of Brooks and Adger (2005), who list at least eight questions that  
7 must be answered for the purpose of identifying appropriate indicators:  
8

9 1 What is the nature of the system/population to be assessed?

10 2 What are the principal hazards faced by this system/population?

11 3 What are the major impacts of these hazards and which elements/groups of the  
12 system/population are most vulnerable to these hazards?

13 4 Why are these elements/groups particularly vulnerable?

14 5 What measures would reduce the vulnerability of these elements/groups?

15 6 What are the factors that determine whether these measures are taken?

16 7 Can we assess these factors in order to measure the capacity of the system/population to  
17 implement these measures?

18 8 What are the external and internal barriers to the implementation of these measures?  
19

20 The last four questions focus attention on the underlying determinants of the capacity of a system  
21 to adapt within the specific path-dependent and site-specific context described in the answers to  
22 the first four. Given the likelihood that no two contexts will ever be identical, it is clear that future  
23 research has a long way to go if it were to come to grips with the diversity of the socio-political-  
24 economic environments that produce wide ranges of sensitivities and imply enormous variances in  
25 adaptive capacity. Perhaps more importantly, though, strength across the determinants of adaptive  
26 capacity does not necessarily mean high adaptive capacity. A society, be it developed or  
27 developing, can have everything in place and still be vulnerable until its capacity is actually  
28 utilized either at the local/household or the national level. In short, as noted in Brooks and Adger  
29 (2005), societies have to move beyond rhetoric into action.  
30

31

32

### 32 **20.3.3 The implications of diversity**

33

34 Adger and Vincent (2004) confront the implications of the diversity noted by the IPCC (2001a)  
35 directly. They observe that uncertainty is pervasive and that adaptive capacity essentially  
36 describes the adaptation space within which decision-makers might find feasible adaptation  
37 options. They continue to argue that diversity in context makes it easier to anticipate changes in  
38 generic adaptive capacity than changes in adaptation, *per se*, so that linking the determinants of  
39 adaptive capacity to drivers and therefore perhaps to the available policy levers can help explain  
40 why certain responses to fundamental identical stressors work sometimes in some places, but not  
41 at other times in other places. Their argument conforms well with a "weakest link" hypothesis  
42 authored earlier by Yohe and Tol (2001): the overall capacity of a system to adapt to an external  
43 stress (be it climate-related or not), is a function of the weakest of the underlying determinants of  
44 adaptive capacity.  
45

46

47 Yohe and Ebi (2005) observed that the public health sector also recognizes that the ability to  
48 influence a public health problem (i.e., to adapt to a perceived level of vulnerability) depends on a  
49 number of factors that are equally path dependent and site specific; and it also recognizes the  
validity of a weakest link approach. Indeed, the health sector understands that it is not possible to

1 influence a public health problem when any of the following “prerequisites for prevention” are  
2 missing:

- 3 1 An awareness that a problem exists (*8*);
- 4 2 A sense that the problem matters (*7 & 8*);
- 5 3 Understanding of what causes the problem (*4, 5 & 7*);
- 6 4 Capability to intervene (*1, 2 & 6*); and
- 7 5 Political will to influence the problem (*3, 4 & 5*).

8  
9 It is not difficult to see that this list of prerequisites provide support for the IPCC (2001a)  
10 description of the determinants of adaptive capacity; the links are indicated by the numbers in  
11 italics that refer directly to the determinants of adaptive capacity listed above. The matches are not  
12 necessarily precise, of course, in large measure because the scales at which risks can be spread  
13 vary by health outcome and by disease determinant. For example, the risk of a heat-related event  
14 during a heat-wave can not be shared amongst individuals, but not vaccinating a particular child  
15 for measles increases the risks of that child contracting measles and of the community  
16 experiencing a measles epidemic. Nonetheless, experience in the public health context offers  
17 evidence that IPCC (2001a) recorded a workable list of determinants, especially with its emphasis  
18 on public infrastructure (governance, social capital), human capital (education and behaviour) and  
19 the ability to manage information.

20  
21 Ebi, K., et al. (2005a) used this mapping of the two sets of determinants as an organizing template  
22 in a collection of explorations into adaptation at the intersection of health and climate. Case  
23 studies included gradual long-term changes in public health (disease rates changing over decades),  
24 stimuli with severe consequences across short time scales (disease outbreaks), and intervention  
25 programs that have been in place for decades. The two sets of determinants provide a different  
26 lens through which to identify the weakest link for adaptive capacity. For some case studies, each  
27 set of determinants reaches similar conclusions. For example, Githeko and Shiff (2005) map  
28 epidemic malaria control in Africa and conclude that the limiting factor is social capital when  
29 framed from the lens of adaptive capacity, or the capability to deal with the problem when framed  
30 from the public health lens.

31  
32 The case studies also highlight that one set of determinants may more efficiently identify the  
33 weakest link. For example, Kovats and Koppe (2005) rank the determinants of adaptive capacity  
34 for heat-related deaths in the United States and identify the availability and distribution of  
35 resources and the structure of critical institutions as the weakest links, whereas ranking of the  
36 requirements for public health prevention identify political will. In this case, lack of political will  
37 is the more fundamental issue, because with political will, both resources and institutions could be  
38 resolved in the United States. Note that this conclusion is unlikely to apply to diseases in  
39 developing countries, where the political will may exist but human and financial resources limit  
40 implementation of adaptations.

41  
42 In another example, Gubler and Wilson (2005) rank the determinants of adaptive capacity for the  
43 resurgence of vector-borne diseases, particularly yellow fever, dengue fever, and malaria, in the  
44 Americas. This case study identifies risk spreading as the weakest link because resources for  
45 public health interventions are less available to the poor and require financial assistance from  
46 developed countries. Gubler and Wilson (2005) conclude that a greater commitment is needed  
47 from foundations and international funding agencies to address the serious problems that these  
48 vector-borne diseases represent. This weakest link is not directly identified through the  
49 requirements for public health prevention.

1 A difference between the two sets of determinants is that the adaptive capacity lens assumes a  
2 basic understanding exists of the causes of a problem. For example, Ebi *et al.* (2005b) explored  
3 the consequences of the installation of tube wells in Bangladesh in an effort to provide a “safe”  
4 source of drinking water to a population that was experiencing high morbidity and mortality from  
5 water-related diarrhoeal diseases (e.g., cholera, dysentery, and other intestinal diseases). In many  
6 regions of Bangladesh, the groundwater accessed by these wells has naturally occurring high  
7 concentrations of arsenic, a known carcinogen, resulting in possibly 30 million out of the 125  
8 million inhabitants of Bangladesh drinking arsenic-contaminated water. The determinants of  
9 adaptive capacity identify a number of limitations to address this problem, but a key problem is  
10 the lack of an understanding of why arsenic concentrations vary over short temporal and spatial  
11 scales, along with a limited understanding of methods to address this problem.

12  
13 Notwithstanding this growing body of evidence on a commonality of critical determinants for  
14 adaptive capacity and/or sustainable development, research on multivariate analysis suggests that,  
15 although a configuration of variables may be necessary to produce an effect, there may be many  
16 such configurations that produce the effect. Moreover, different configurations may have few or  
17 no variables in common. Charles Ragin (2000) describes an example where aggregate data about  
18 the occurrence of race riots in the United States masked two very different situations in the  
19 northern and southern states. In the north, the economic gap between whites and blacks played a  
20 major role; in the south, lack of black representation in the political sphere was the most important  
21 factor. This methodological finding parallels the game theoretic and economic finding that  
22 multiple equilibria – even equilibria where most people are well off – are possible under a given  
23 set of conditions. That is, outcomes are remarkably open-ended; see, for example, DeCanio (2003)  
24 for a discussion of the general issue and how it applies to economic models of climate change.

25  
26 Literature on vulnerability emphasizes the interactions of specific societies in specific places.  
27 There may be a core set of determinants and a “weakest link,” but these may apply only in one  
28 situation. Cross comparisons of case studies, perhaps Ragin (1987) method or the approach of  
29 Kasperson and Kasperson (1995) might shed some light on the generalizability of such sets. Thus,  
30 it is hard to identify all the relevant factors much less what might be the “weakest link.” In some  
31 situations, for instance, aggressive leadership might more than compensate for weaknesses (or  
32 strengths, in the case of destructive leadership) elsewhere in the social fabric. Diamond (2005) has  
33 made a scholarly attempt to determine the causes of civilization collapse and presents five factors,  
34 or “input variables,” where the “output” is collapse (not all of which need to be present):  
35 environmental damage inflicted by humans (e.g., deforestation), climate change, hostile  
36 neighbours, decreased support by friendly neighbours, and other components of the political-  
37 economic-social-cultural setting that influences societal responses. In the past civilizations that  
38 Diamond studies, there are different “weakest link(s).” As Meyer *et al.* (1998) point out, it is  
39 important to dig beneath the first analysis – the climate changed and civilization died out – to the  
40 next question: the climate changed, civilization died out, but why?

#### 41 42 43 **20.3.4 Factors that support sustainable development**

44  
45 The factors that determine a country’s ability to promote sustainable development coincide with  
46 the factors that influence adaptive capacity relative to climate change, climate variability and  
47 climatic extremes. Moreover, success in achieving sustainability can be explained at least to a  
48 large measure by a parallel “weakest link” approach. Indeed, the match between the list of  
49 characteristics upon which success in promoting long-term growth, site-specific productivity  
50 gains, and improved equity and the determinants of adaptive capacity inspired by IPCC (2001a) is

1 strong. Both include references to strong and skilled governance, appropriate distributions of  
2 resources and access to resources, strong stocks of human capital, and overall stability. Whether  
3 or not the links between an economic intervention (or an adaptation) and its desired outcomes are  
4 strong, weak, or actually run in a direction that is opposite to that predicted by theory or process  
5 analysis is essentially an empirical question in nearly every instance. A brief review of some very  
6 recent literature is sufficient to make this point.

7  
8 Lucas (1988) argued, for example, that human capital externalities are large enough to explain  
9 differences between the long-run growth rates of poor and rich countries. Moretti (2004) also  
10 concentrated attention on human capital by showing that plants located in cities where the fraction  
11 of college graduates grew faster experienced larger increases in productivity and that increases in  
12 wages generally followed observed increases in productivity. Guiso, *et al.* (2004) expanded the  
13 scope of analysis when they explored the role of social capital in supporting successful application  
14 of financial structures; they found that social capital matters most when education levels are low  
15 and law enforcement is weak. Meanwhile, Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) looked across transition  
16 countries across central Europe and the former Soviet Union and observed that countries which  
17 grew steadily a decade or more after their reforms have managed to create macroeconomic  
18 stability, reform property rights, harden budget constraints, *and* create institutions that facilitate  
19 exchange and develop an environment within which contracts can be enforced and new firms can  
20 enter. Order and timing did not matter, but success depended upon on meeting all of these  
21 underlying objectives. Winters, *et al.* (2004) reviewed a long literature to conclude that the ability  
22 of trade liberalization to reduce poverty depends on the existence and stability of markets, on the  
23 ability of actors to handle changes in risk, on access to technology, resources, on competent and  
24 honest government, *and* on policies that promote conflict resolution and promote human capital  
25 accumulation; shortfalls in any of these underpinnings makes it extremely difficult for the gains to  
26 trade to reach the most disadvantaged citizens. Finally, Sala-i-Martin, *et al.* (2004) apply new  
27 Bayesian estimation techniques to popular data to find robust power in explaining economic  
28 growth residing in a nation's level of participation in primary school education (human capital),  
29 other measures of human capital (e.g., health measures), the relative prices of investment goods  
30 (available options), and the initial level of per capita income (access to resources); interestingly,  
31 though, they find that public consumption and, in some cases, public investment are negatively  
32 correlated to growth (deficiency in governance determinants).

### 35 ***20.3.5 Two-way causality between sustainable development and adaptive capacity***

36  
37 There is two-way causality that is path dependent: sustainable development influences adaptive  
38 capacity and adaptive capacity influences sustainable development. It follows that development  
39 paths, and the choices that define them, affect the impacts of climate change not only through  
40 changes in exposure and sensitivity to external stresses, but also through changes in the capacities  
41 of systems to adapt.

42  
43 Swart, *et al.* (2003) argue convincingly that sustainable development policies can influence  
44 climate impacts and the design and implementation of climate change response measures and that  
45 the reverse can occur, as well. Although linkages between sustainable development and climate  
46 change policies have been primarily defined as mitigation measures, this need not leave out  
47 adaptation. Measures that build or improve institutional capabilities to address domestic and  
48 international socio-economic problems, including enhancement of 'social capital' would lead to  
49 improvements in adaptive capacity and adaptive response. Agricultural policies addressing  
50 options to reduce vulnerability to current drought risks could also reduce vulnerabilities to future

1 climate change. Promoting alternative development pathways as a means of achieving sustainable  
2 development could include measures to reduce construction of residential or industrial  
3 infrastructure in high risk areas (e.g. areas prone to flooding), thereby providing a ‘soft’  
4 contribution to an adaptation portfolio for a region or country. Environmental programs directed at  
5 protecting biodiversity (e.g. 12% land area target for establishing parks) would make it easier for  
6 ecosystems to adapt or migrate where corridors could be protected.

7  
8 Adaptation measures within climate change policies would be directed at reducing vulnerabilities  
9 and enhancing the adaptive capacity of communities and economies. This would be consistent  
10 with sustainability goals. Indeed, future linkage between sustainable development and climate  
11 change will evolve from current development frameworks. These are regionally unique, and have  
12 influenced the relationship between climate and place. Throughout history, societies have adapted  
13 to changing economic, technological, social and environmental conditions, creating a range of  
14 measures that have become part of their lifestyles, cultures and laws. Yet despite the growth of  
15 knowledge about development, and the management of risks from various forces (e.g. extreme  
16 climatic events), hazard-related financial losses continue to increase, and loss of life in developing  
17 countries continues to be high.

18  
19 Mileti (1999) shows that losses from hazards, and lack of progress at loss reduction, result from  
20 assumptions that technology can be used to control nature and protect people. Growing losses are  
21 partly the result of an expanding capital stock, but they are also evidence of increasing complexity  
22 in how nature systems interact with development choices to create new vulnerabilities for  
23 communities and regions; and climate change, which is expected to produce changes in  
24 frequencies of climatic events, would be superimposed on a moving platform of development  
25 paths. A few examples make this point. Population growth, particularly in low income regions,  
26 means greater exposure of vulnerable communities to many hazards. Migration into marginal  
27 areas for agriculture has created new exposures for vulnerable populations, resulting in the  
28 phenomenon dubbed by Glantz (1994) as “drought follows the plough”. The built environment is  
29 growing in density thereby increasing the probability of losses from extreme events. Settlement of  
30 hazardous areas (e.g. floodplains, steep slopes) has altered local ecosystems that could have  
31 provided protection. Certain measures designed to protect against extreme events, such as levees  
32 for flood protection, can destroy riparian habitat and heighten downstream floods. Such measures  
33 may also serve only to postpone damages until a larger magnitude event occurs, and this loss  
34 could be compounded by additional development dependent on that specific protective measure.

35  
36 Increases in costs of hazards and the prospects of cumulative environment – economy threats have  
37 been described as non-sustainable trajectories of development, or *syndromes*, borrowing a term  
38 from the medical sciences to describe concurrent symptoms of a disease. Schellnhuber *et al.*  
39 (1997) identify three categories: i) utilization (e.g. Sahel over cultivation of marginal land), ii)  
40 development (e.g. urban sprawl and associated destruction of landscapes), and iii) sink (e.g. large  
41 scale diffusion of long-lived substances). Schellnhuber *et al.* (2002) and Lüdeke *et al.* (2004)  
42 describe the potential future global distribution of some of these syndromes, suggesting how  
43 mechanisms of mutual reinforcement, including climate change and development drivers, can help  
44 to identify regions where syndromes may expand. Examples of development decisions resulting in  
45 cumulative threats include extensive water resource development in the Columbia River Basin  
46 (Hamlet, 2003), and potential implications for achievement of basin management objectives  
47 within scenarios of climate change (Payne, *et al.*, 2004).

### 1 20.3.6 From unsustainable exploitation to sustainable environmental management

2  
3 “Sustainability” is not just about encouraging sustainable development – often seen as a  
4 developing country issue. It is also about adjusting existing environmental management and  
5 resource exploitation practices to manage environmental resources more sustainability. This is  
6 relevant in both developed and developing countries, although arguably the drivers are currently  
7 greatest in the developed world (e.g., development agencies for provinces and states in Canada  
8 and the US). Huq and Reid (2004) and Agrawala (2004) have noted that climate change is being  
9 increasingly recognized as a key factor that could affect the development (sustainable  
10 development) of developed and developing countries alike. For example, the Philippine Country  
11 Report (1999) identified 153 sustainable development indicators of which a number pertain to  
12 climate change such as level of GHG emissions.

13  
14 There is, however, abundant evidence provided by UNEP (2000) and others that many human  
15 activities are currently resulting in degradation of the natural environment, at a range of scales  
16 and across all environments. Usmanova (2003) confirmed, for example, that Glantz, *et al.* (1993)  
17 were correct in concluding that over-abstraction of water for irrigation has led to the virtual  
18 destruction of the Aral Sea. Aparicia, *et al.* (2000) saw the same pattern when they looked at a  
19 much more local scale degradation of freshwater ecosystems in catchments affected by land use  
20 change and upstream interventions.

21  
22 In many countries managers of activities which use natural resources or are susceptible to  
23 variations in resource availability and hazard over time are currently seeking to revise practices  
24 and procedures to make their actions more “sustainable”. These managers include individual  
25 farmers, small businesses and major international corporations (Hilson (2001), for example, points  
26 to the mineral extraction industry) as well as public agencies from local to national and  
27 international scales. Definitions of “sustainable” vary across managers, but their common theme is  
28 to change the way resources are exploited or hazards managed in order to lessen adverse impacts  
29 “downstream” or for subsequent generations. However, climate change is seldom included in the  
30 list of stressors that might influence sustainability. Arnell and Delaney (2005) do note, though,  
31 that the water management industry in the United Kingdom is an exception; climate change is  
32 seen there as one of the reasons for increasing the sustainability of water abstractions.

33  
34 The published literature on the links between sustainable management of natural resources and the  
35 impacts of and adaptation to climate change is very sparse, but what does exist tends to focus on  
36 the following areas:

- 37
- 38 1 Engineering and management techniques which achieve management objectives, such as  
39 degree of protection against flood hazard or volume of crop production, whilst having  
40 smaller impacts on the environment. Harman, *et al.* (2002) and Turner (2004) speak to this  
41 point, but very few of the studies of engineering methods consider explicitly how the  
42 performance of these measures is affected by climate change or how suitable they would be  
43 in the face of a changing climate. Kundzewicz (2002) demonstrates how non-structural flood  
44 management measures can be sustainable adaptations to climate change. On the other hand,  
45 as shown in Clark (2002) and Kashyap (2004), much of the literature on integrated water  
46 management in the broadest sense emphasizes adaptation to climatic variability and change  
47 through the adoption of sustainable and integrated approaches.
  - 48  
49 2 The benefits to the organization of adopting more sustainable practices, in terms of reduced  
50 costs, increased efficiency, or financial performance more broadly interpreted. Johnson &

1 Walck (2004) offer an example from forestry while Epstein & Roy (2003) is illustrative of  
2 the more expansive context. Again, none of these studies consider the effects of climate  
3 change on the benefits of adopting more sustainable practices.  
4

- 5 3 The development of mechanisms for incorporating sustainable behaviour into organizational  
6 practice and monitoring its implementation Jasch (2003) as well as Figge and Hahn (2004)  
7 are examples of discussions of ISO certification or the use of environmental management  
8 accounting techniques. Still, none of these studies consider how to incorporate the effects of  
9 climate change into mechanisms or monitoring procedures.  
10

11 Clark (2002) and Bansal (2005) have identified several drivers behind moves to become more  
12 “sustainable”. First, altered legal or regulatory requirements may have an effect. Many  
13 governments have adopted legislation aimed at encouraging the sustainable use of the natural  
14 environment, but these rarely explicitly include reference to climate change. Heiskanen, *et al.*  
15 (2004) report how the European Union’s Water Framework Directive, for example, requires  
16 agencies responsible for managing water resources across the EU to reduce the environmental  
17 impacts of their actions, but the Directive does not explicitly require agencies to adapt to climate  
18 change. Secondly, as highlighted by Ramus (2002) and Thomas, *et al.* (2004), internally-generated  
19 desires to do things “better”, either following an ethical position held by an influential champion  
20 or in order to reduce costs or reputational risk and enhance attractiveness to potential employees,  
21 can push systems toward sustainability. Finally, customer and/or stakeholder expectations may  
22 change. While these drivers may encourage a shift towards sustainable management, they may not  
23 in themselves be directly related to concerns over the impacts of and adaptation to climate change.  
24  
25

### 26 ***20.3.7 The sustainable development focus on mitigation*** 27

28 Growing interest in the linkages between climate change and sustainable development is evident  
29 in a series of recent publications: Collier and Löfstedt (1997), Jepma and Munasinghe (1998),  
30 Toth (1999), Munasinghe and Swart (2000), Abaza and Baranzini (2002), Markandya and  
31 Halsnaes (2002), Kok *et al.* (2002), Swart *et al.* (2003), Yamin (2004) are all prime example. A  
32 number of themes recur in this literature, particularly the need for equity between developed and  
33 developing countries in the delineation of rights and responsibilities within any climate change  
34 response framework, particularly with regard to mitigation. Beg *et al.* (2002) outlines such  
35 challenges as well, but also identifies potential synergies between climate change and other  
36 policies that could facilitate adaptation such as those that address desertification and biodiversity.  
37 Masika (2002) specifically outlines gender aspects of differential vulnerabilities. Swart *et al.*  
38 (2003) identify the need to describe potential changes in vulnerability and adaptive capacity  
39 within the SRES storylines.  
40

41 Although these linkages should appear to be self evident, direct linkages within the climate  
42 change and sustainable development literatures have emerged only recently. Cohen, *et al.* (1998)  
43 suggest why. These fields have had different research and policy traditions, the former originating  
44 from physical science studies of natural systems and the latter emerging from social policy  
45 concerns associated with poverty and degradation of resources particularly in developing  
46 countries.  
47

48 This separation has been felt within the climate policy context. Initial framing of climate change  
49 as a problem of atmospheric disruption to be solved only by stabilization of greenhouse gases, as  
50 in Article 2 of the UNFCCC (1992), has led to a strong focus on mitigation of greenhouse gases,

1 while adaptation objectives have not been well defined. Burton and May (2004) have described  
2 the “adaptation deficit” as the gap between sustainable use of resources and present practice, and  
3 that climate change will lead to an increased future adaptation deficit. While mitigation within the  
4 UNFCCC includes clearly defined objectives, measures, costs, and instruments, this is not the case  
5 for adaptation.

6  
7 Similarly, within sustainable development community, climate change is seen primarily as a  
8 greenhouse gas stabilization challenge. The United Nations (2004) review of progress toward  
9 attaining the eight Millennium Development Goals notes that climate change is identified as a  
10 fundamental stressor only within Goal 7: “Ensure Environmental Sustainability”. Tracking  
11 indicators of protected areas for biological diversity, changes in forests, and access to water all  
12 appear in the Goals, but they are not linked to climate change impacts or adaptation; nor are they  
13 identified as part of a country’s capacity to adapt to climate change. The climate change  
14 component is represented solely by indicators of changes in energy use per unit of GDP, and by  
15 total and per capita emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>.

16  
17 This does not mean that the linkage between development and climate change adaptation remains  
18 unrecognized within the development community. Climate change is identified as a serious risk to  
19 poverty reduction in developing countries, particularly because these countries have a limited  
20 capacity to cope with climate variability and extremes. The World Bank (2003) has indicated that  
21 adaptation measures will need to be integrated into strategies of poverty reduction to ensure  
22 sustainable development, and that this will require improved governance, mainstreaming of  
23 climate change measures into poverty reduction strategies and strategies for sustainable  
24 development, and the integration of climate change impacts information into national economic  
25 projections.

26  
27 Recent negotiations within the Conference of the Parties of the Framework Convention (the COP)  
28 have led to the establishment of new mechanisms to support adaptation including the LDC Fund,  
29 Special Climate Change Fund, and the Adaptation Fund. This has provided visibility and  
30 opportunity to mainstream adaptation into local/regional development activities. However, there  
31 are technical challenges associated with defining adaptation benefits for particular actions within  
32 UNFCCC mechanisms such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). For example, Huq and  
33 Reid (2004) and Burton (2004) all note that the calculation of costs of adapting to future climate  
34 change (as opposed to current climate variability) as well as the local nature of resulting benefits  
35 are both problematic *vis a vis* GEF requirements for defining global environmental benefits.

36  
37 To avoid misunderstanding, statements about GEF funding requirements must be read carefully  
38 and with a clear recognition of the date of publication of this Fourth Assessment Report. As of the  
39 summer of 2005, the COP has not yet defined how funding of adaptation activities will be costed.  
40 The LDC Fund is currently the one adaptation fund that is operational in its support of National  
41 Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) in LDCs; and the COP and GEF are in the process of  
42 defining how the implementation of adaptation activities defined in NAPAs will be funded.

43  
44 *The last paragraph will requires updating as the writing process continues over the next year.*  
45  
46

## 1 **20.4 Implications for environmental quality**

2  
3 Climate change is widely recognized as a major environmental challenge. The latest global  
4 climate assessments have provided additional valuable data and information that led to greater  
5 understanding of climate change and its impacts (IPCC-TAR, 2001) on different human and  
6 natural systems. Climate change also affects other environmental issues such as loss of  
7 biodiversity, freshwater availability, and water and air quality. The United Nations Framework  
8 Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognizing this fact, included such concern into  
9 Article 4, which states that “All Parties...shall...take climate change considerations into account,  
10 to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions,  
11 and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined  
12 nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the  
13 quality of the environment, or projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to  
14 climate change.” (UNFCCC, 1992)

15  
16 Environmental management occurs at two vastly different scales: locally, in response to individual  
17 development projects, programs or plans (e.g., through Environmental Impact Assessments and  
18 local management plans) and at very large scales through international agreements  
19 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Convention on Biological Diversity, and others). It  
20 is also largely process-based, concentrating on improving practices through environmental  
21 assessments, the use of protected areas, or by limiting exploitation, degradation and pollution.  
22 Another approach is to focus on the accumulated outcome of many management efforts over  
23 different spatial and temporal scales of action through the use of different environmental  
24 indicators or indices.

25

26

### 27 ***20.4.1 Mainstreaming climate change into environmental impact assessments***

28

29 Considering the central role of people in development and recognizing that a development plan or  
30 project could produce effects detrimental to the welfare of the same people it intends to benefit, it  
31 is essential that the environmental assessment of a proposed project include an analysis of the  
32 critical role environmental and social aspects of the design and implementation interventions for  
33 sustainable development. Physical structures used to exploit natural resources (e.g. mining  
34 operations or hydroelectric developments) or to enhance convenience (e.g. bridges) are examples  
35 of projects that have a projected lifetime of several decades or more and may be subject to climate  
36 change. Some countries have recognized this concern and have initiated the incorporation of  
37 climate change during the environmental assessment (EA) process so that the impact of climate on  
38 such projects may be reduced. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, for example,  
39 explores new sources of knowledge on climate change that can assist in assessing potential  
40 impacts on projects. It also presents a generic guide for incorporating climate change and climate  
41 scenarios into EAs in Canada (Barrow, 2000). In the United Kingdom, the Department of  
42 Environment, Transportation and the Rural Affairs (DETR) conducted a study (Thomson, 2001) to  
43 explore the implications of the potential impacts of climate change across the whole range of its  
44 policy and operational responsibilities, and to advise on the next steps for taking forward  
45 consideration of the issues arising. One of the significant findings is the need to explore how to  
46 incorporate into environmental appraisal guidance clear messages about taking into account  
47 potential future climate change.

48

49 In developing countries, inclusion of climate change consideration into the environmental impact  
50 assessments for project developments is very limited and to a large extent, donor driven, as most

1 development projects are externally funded, Within the development co-operation agencies or  
 2 multi-lateral banks, addressing climate change and the associated potential vulnerabilities seldom  
 3 figures among the top priorities (OECD, 2004), (Sohn *et al.*, 2005), particularly in sectors that will  
 4 impact the long-term climate footprint of a national economy. Environmental safeguards such as  
 5 Environmental Impact Assessment address the impacts of projects on the environment but not the  
 6 impact of environmental changes on projects (e.g. due to global climate change).

#### 9 **20.4.2 Institutional, social, economic and cultural factors (capacity determinants)**

11 Environmental vulnerability, together with vulnerabilities of social and economic systems is made  
 12 up of more than just the risk of disasters and good or bad management. It is not just about climate  
 13 change, or globalization, or trade agreements. It must also include an understanding of how well  
 14 any system (environmental, social and economic) can cope with any hazards that may come its  
 15 way and that might harm it. It would be impossible to work towards good quality of life and  
 16 growth for countries under a sustainable development model if no account were made of the  
 17 potential harm that can occur from internal and outside influences and the capacities to overcome  
 18 them.

20 One approach to monitor environmental change is to focus on the accumulated outcome of many  
 21 management efforts over different spatial and temporal scales of action through the use of  
 22 different environmental indicators or indices. Environmental quality indicators are used to assess  
 23 the environment's capacity for supporting human and ecological health. They can warn of  
 24 impending environmental problems and enhance policymakers' and regulators' ability to manage  
 25 and resolve these problems. They may also be used to gauge progress in meeting short- and long-  
 26 term environmental goals. The development of useful environmental indicators requires not only  
 27 an understanding of concepts and definitions, but also a good knowledge of policy needs. The key  
 28 determinant of a good indicator is the link from measurement of some environmental conditions to  
 29 practical policy options. Environmental indicators can be used at international, national and local  
 30 levels as a tool for state-of-the-environment reporting, measuring environmental performance, and  
 31 reporting on progress toward sustainable development. Some of these indicators are presented in  
 32 Table 20.2.

34 **Table 20.2: Examples of environmental quality indicators**

<b>Environmental Quality Indicator</b>	<b>Proponent</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Environmental Indicators</b>	US-EPA	Track environmental conditions over time and help measure the state of air, water, and land; the pressures on those resources; the status of human health; and the integrity of the nation's ecosystems.
<b>Environmental Vulnerability</b>	South Pacific Applied Geo-	The EVI is among the first of tools now being developed to focus on environmental

<b>Index (EVI), (Pratt, et al, 2001)</b>	science Commission (SOPAC)	management at the same mesoscale that decisions are made (economies and social systems), and focus them on outcomes. The EVI is a method seen to provide a relatively quick and inexpensive way of characterizing the vulnerability of natural systems at the level of a region, state, province or island.
<b>Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI, 2005)</b>	Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP), Yale University, and the World Economic Forum's Environment Task Force.	A single meaningful index quantifies the progress towards environmental sustainability. Environmental sustainability is defined through five dimensions, described by 68 variables, which are synthesized into 20 indicators. The environmental stresses dimension reflects how much pressure is currently exerted on the environment; the environmental systems, social and institutional capacity, and human vulnerability dimensions capture the status of ecosystems and a societal notion of carrying capacity, while the global stewardship dimension extends the sustainability concept by adding a social responsibility function.
<b>Biodiversity Indicators - Climate Change Impacts (http://www.ecn.a c.uk/CCI/cci.asp)</b>	UK Environmental Change Network (ECN), funded by DEFRA	Indicator to measure changes in abundance in climate sensitive species. A single, composite indicator has been developed, based on a substantial core of common butterfly, moth and carabid species.

1  
2  
3 Attempts to produce indicators of environmental *sustainability* (ESI 2005, World Economic  
4 Forum 2002, Levy 2002, Prescott-Allen 2001, Consultative Group for Sustainable Development  
5 Indicators 2001) have succeeded at aggregating these individual indicators so that they respond to  
6 demands for measures of sustainability trends. However, environmental indicators directly  
7 associated with climate change are expressed in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such  
8 as: carbon economic efficiency expressed in CO<sup>2</sup> emissions per GDP, and carbon lifestyle  
9 efficiency expressed in CO<sup>2</sup> per capita. The environmental sustainability index (ESI, 2005)  
10 particularly noted the diversity of national priorities and circumstances between developed and  
11 developing countries. Developed countries are likely to put more emphasis on longer-term  
12 challenges such as climate change, waste treatment and disposal, clean and sustainable energy  
13 supply, and the protection of biodiversity. Developing nations underscore more urgent and short-  
14 term issues such as access to drinking water and sanitation, environmental health problems, and  
15 indoor air pollution. Aside from GHG emissions, ESI accounted for the ability to reducing  
16 environment-related natural disaster vulnerability in terms of the average number of deaths per  
17 million inhabitants from floods, tropical cyclones and droughts, and other environmental hazard  
18 exposure.  
19

1  
2 **20.4.3 Adaptive capacity, environmental quality and the feedback to sustainability**  
3

4 Healthy, productive and protective environments, social systems and economies are the basis of  
5 sustainable development and human welfare. The environment is the source of most raw materials  
6 and absorbs the pollution from human activities. In turn, while going about its daily business,  
7 communities use the environment and convert its resources and natural services into those that  
8 directly support them. The problem is that all of these systems can be damaged, overloaded, or  
9 prevented from meeting the communities' needs. By their own choices, communities can  
10 determine their own quality of life to a certain extent, the condition of lands and opportunities for  
11 future generations.

12  
13  
14 **20.5 Implications for risk, hazard and disaster management**  
15

16 The management of the risk from “natural” hazards and disasters is a special case of  
17 environmental management. In the most general terms, it has two components. The first is  
18 preparing for and reducing exposure to potentially hazardous events (such as floods, droughts,  
19 hurricanes or earthquakes), and the second is developing mechanisms to aid recovery after an  
20 event strikes. The literature on hazard and disaster management is huge, ranging from studies into  
21 the mechanisms which generate hazards, engineering and management responses to hazard and  
22 the factors which determine vulnerability to hazard. There is also a large and expanding literature  
23 on hazards and climate change (e.g. for drought and crops (Richter & Semenov, 2005), landslide  
24 (Schmidt & Glade, 2003), avalanche hazard (Stethem *et al.*, 2003), storm surge (Danard *et al.*  
25 (2003), and floods (Mirza *et al.*, 2003, Hunt, 2002; Bronstert, 2003)), and a growing literature on  
26 the linkages between hazard management and sustainable development (see below). The literature  
27 linking hazard management with sustainable development *and* climate change, however, is small.  
28  
29

30 **20.5.1 Hazard management and sustainability**  
31

32 “Pre-event measures” include measures to alter the physical manifestations of the hazard event,  
33 reduce exposure to loss and facilitate subsequent recovery from loss. They include engineering  
34 works to, for example, alter river channels, building works to reduce susceptibility to damage,  
35 land use planning to encourage wise use of hazard-prone areas, the development of warning and  
36 forecasting systems, and the development of insurance to pay for losses. “Sustainable” pre-event  
37 measures would (i) not lead to an increase in exposure (e.g. by encouraging development in risk  
38 zones), (ii) not differentially benefit or harm particular sectors of the community, (iii) not increase  
39 exposure to other hazards and threats, and (iv) not increase exposure to “downstream”  
40 communities. Examples of reviews of sustainable hazard-focused management include Hooijer *et al.*  
41 (2004), Harman *et al.* (2002), Yin (2001) and Penrose & Fry (2000): all examine how different  
42 measures can reduce the impact of flooding whilst maintaining and enhancing the physical  
43 environment. A different perspective is taken by those following a vulnerability approach to  
44 hazard management, who examine how enhancing adaptive capacity (e.g. Tompkins & Adger,  
45 2004; Ford & Smit, 2004; Liverman & Meredith, 2002; Finan *et al.*, 2002) can reduce the impacts  
46 of hazardous events.  
47

48 “Emergency measures” are those actions taken immediately after onset of a disaster, and include  
49 the provision of disaster relief and assistance. “Sustainable” disaster relief should not increase  
50 vulnerability to subsequent events or other hazards, and should be implemented equitably. Wisner

1 *et al.* (2004) give examples of disaster relief which sought to increase resilience to drought in  
2 Orissa, India. However, inappropriately targeted disaster relief can enhance inequalities in an  
3 impacted society (by concentrating effort on relatively wealthy victims, for example: Morris &  
4 Wodon., 2003), and can encourage a cycle of dependency (Wisner *et al.*, 2004). Reconstruction of  
5 damaged property in the same exposed locations will also, obviously, maintain and possibly  
6 enhance exposure to subsequent hazards.

7  
8 Climate change is just one of the drivers behind an increasing interest in “sustainable” hazard  
9 management approaches (and is not necessarily the most important), but it does affect the  
10 performance and benefits of sustainable measures. Few studies have explicitly addressed this  
11 issue, although O’Hare (2002) suggested that incorporating climate change and its uncertainty into  
12 measures to reduce vulnerability to hazard was essential in order for them to be truly sustainable,  
13 and Kundzewicz (2002) showed how non-structural flood management measures, such as flood  
14 forecasting and warning, land use planning, and property-scale flood proofing, were not only more  
15 sustainable than traditional measures but were also more robust to climate change uncertainty.

### 16 17 18 ***20.5.2 Reducing vulnerability to current climatic variability and adapting to climate change***

19  
20 Burton, *et al.* (2002), Davidson, *et al.* (2003) and Kashyap (2004) all recently reported that  
21 reducing vulnerability to current climatic variability can go a long way towards reducing  
22 vulnerability to increased hazard risk associated with climate change; Robledo, *et. al* (2004)  
23 emphasized the extra value to be gleaned if measures designed to reduce vulnerability are also  
24 sustainable. To a large extent, adaptation measures for climate variability and extremes already  
25 exist. Measures to reduce current vulnerability by capacity building rather than distribution of  
26 disaster relief, for example, will increase resilience to changes in hazard caused by climate change  
27 (Mirza, 2003). Similarly, the implementation of improved warning and forecasting methods and  
28 the adoption of some land use planning measures would reduce both current and future  
29 vulnerability. However, many responses to current climatic variability would not in themselves be  
30 a sufficient response to climate change. For example, a changing climate would alter the design  
31 standard of a physical defence, such as a realigned channel or a defence wall. It could alter the  
32 effectiveness of building codes based on designing against specified return period events (such as  
33 the 10 year return period gust). Finally, it could alter the area exposed to a potential hazard,  
34 meaning that development previously assumed to be “safe” was now located in a risk area. Burton  
35 and van Aalst (1999) in their assessment of the World Bank Country Strategic Programs and  
36 project cycle identify the need to assess the success of current adaptation to present day climate  
37 risks and climate variability, especially as they may increase with climate change.

38  
39 Coping with current changes in climatic variability and extremes will build learning in dealing  
40 with future climate changes and will enhance coping abilities of communities. Since climate  
41 change will likely manifest itself through changes in variability as well as in overall trend,  
42 methods used to cope with past and emerging patterns in climatic variability will be a useful  
43 starting point for the design of future adaptations. In LDC NAPA, there is emphasis on enhancing  
44 local coping mechanisms and indigenous knowledge systems as a way to build adaptive capacity  
45 at the community level. This is done in several ways. Approaches used to deal with emerging  
46 shifts in growing season conditions (shifts in start of rains, length and quality of growing season)  
47 such as diversifying crops planted, staggered planting, and increased use of water harvesting  
48 techniques (Desanker and Mushove, 2005), will increase community resilience and enhance their  
49 coping abilities to future changes in climate. Areas that are facing new or increased climatic  
50 threats such as drought or floods, can learn from areas that have traditionally been exposed to

1 frequent droughts and floods. This is highlighted in the NAPA Primer (Desanker, 2004) as an  
2 important area for regional synergies in adaptation planning.

3  
4

## 5 **20.6 Global and aggregate impacts**

6

### 7 ***20.6.1 Review of global and regionally aggregate estimates of impacts***

8

9 There are essentially two ways of estimating the global or regional impacts of climate change. The  
10 first aggregates detailed case studies to infer impacts for a given global temperature change. This  
11 approach underpins the “damage functions” used in many integrated assessments of the impacts of  
12 climate change such as Tol (2002a & 2002b) and Tol *et al.* (2004).

13

14 The integrated assessment models which take this approach can then be used to calculate the  
15 aggregate impacts of any scenario of greenhouse gas emissions, such as the SRES scenarios  
16 reported in Nakicenovic and Swart (2000). Regional climate changes from the scenario are  
17 combined with one or more damage functions, and the resulting impacts are aggregated across  
18 regions and, sometimes, over time, applying discount rates to bring them back to a present day  
19 equivalent; see Hope (2005) for a recent illustration. The outputs can also include estimates of the  
20 impacts of climate change across the regions of the world and over time, and the models can show  
21 how these impacts change if measures are taken to cut back the emissions of greenhouse gases, or  
22 adapt to changes in climate. They perform a useful service by taking the best information from the  
23 detailed scientific and economic research, and revealing its policy implications. They can also  
24 highlight just how much we still have to learn about the economic implications of climate change,  
25 and enable different views on economic and scientific parameters, such as discount rates, equity  
26 weights and climate sensitivity, to be rigorously explored.

27

28 Tol (2002b), Tol, *et al.* (2004) and Pearce (2003) identify some key problems associated with this  
29 approach. Most involve the difficulties in comparing studies that apply different approaches,  
30 assumptions and scenarios, particularly in the different ways that they, themselves, aggregate  
31 across both sectors and countries. Aggregation across countries requires assumptions about equity  
32 weighting, whilst aggregation across sectors requires impacts to be expressed in a common metric  
33 (usually dollars). Tol, *et al.* (2004), for example, estimated the global annual welfare impacts of a  
34 doubling of CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations at 2.3%, -2.7% or 0.2% of GDP, depending on whether  
35 aggregation weighting done in terms of output, world average prices or equity.

36

**Box 20.2: “Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters”**

Adger, *et al.* (2005) assessed the sources of social and ecological vulnerability to disasters and the outcomes of various extreme events in the context of coastal zones. They argue that hazards in coastal areas often degenerate into disasters “waiting to happen” because the sources of resilience are eroded through environmental change and/or human action. Resilience is, today, increasingly correlated with large scale processes like globalization, increased human mobility, and emerging new economic sectors. As a result, it becomes easier to ignore or even dismiss sources of resilience to make way for development that is, by virtue of continued or expanding natural risk, unsustainable. This trend can be reversed by incorporating diverse mechanisms for coping with change and crisis. For ecosystems, this means promoting biodiversity and functional redundancy by, for example, exploiting spatial patterns. For social systems, this means installing governance and management frameworks that can spread risk through similarly diverse patterns of resource use, human activity, and lifestyles. The authors offer some specific ideas, reflected in the table below; but they can all be understood with reference back to the determinants of adaptive capacity, connections to the potential to reduce exposure or sensitivity to externally generated risk, and reference to an analogy to the way individuals construct their financial portfolios to eliminate “diversifiable risk”.

**Box 20.2 Table 1: Examples of local and regional scale actions to enhance resilience**

<b>Elements of Vulnerability</b>	<b>Local Action</b>	<b>National &amp; International Action</b>
<b>Exposure &amp; sensitivity</b>	Maintaining/enhancing ecosystem function through sustainable use  Maintaining local memory and promoting learning	Mitigation of human-induced causes of hazard  Avoid perverse incentives  Promote early warning  Enhance disaster recovery
<b>Enhance adaptive capacity</b>	Diversify ecological systems  Diversify livelihood portfolios  Create legitimate and inclusive governance structures and social capital	Bridge organizations for integrated response  Create horizontal networks in civil society for social learning

22  
23  
24  
25

1 Despite these difficulties, this aggregation is the only feasible method of producing an estimate for  
2 the social cost of carbon; that is the extra impacts caused by the emission of one extra ton of  
3 carbon emissions – i.e., the benefit of reducing carbon emissions by one ton. These estimates are  
4 the product of summing the discounted value of the extra impacts generated by an extra ton of  
5 emissions for as long as it remains in the atmosphere. They are worth the effort, though, if the  
6 social cost calculations are complete, because economic efficiency holds that efforts to cut back  
7 the emissions of greenhouse gases should continue as long as the marginal cost of the cutbacks is  
8 lower than the social cost of the impacts they cause. If taxes are used as the policy tool, they  
9 should be set at the social cost. If tradable permits are used, then their price should be the same as  
10 the social cost. In any case, the ratio of these (marginal) social costs is the correct approach for  
11 any comparison between greenhouse gases.

12  
13 After surveying the literature, Clarkson and Deyes (2002) proposed a value of £70 per ton of  
14 carbon (in year 2000 prices) for the social cost of carbon. They also proposed using upper and  
15 lower values of £35 and £140 per ton. These values are higher than most other estimates in the  
16 literature such as Tol (1999) where the FUND model finds marginal costs of \$9-23/tC, depending  
17 on the discount rate. If the aggregation of impacts over countries accounts for inequalities in  
18 income distribution or for risk aversion, though, then marginal costs would rise by about a factor  
19 of 3; but they would still fall short of £70. Hope (2003) reports results from the PAGE model for  
20 which the mean social cost of carbon was US\$19 (or about US\$5 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>), US\$105 per ton  
21 for methane, and US\$200 000 per ton for SF<sub>6</sub>. For each gas, the range between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup>  
22 percentiles was about an order of magnitude. Tol (2005) found that studies that are peer-reviewed  
23 have lower estimates and smaller uncertainty ranges. The results depend strongly on the discount  
24 rate used, and are still highly uncertain; but they do provide enough information to start a rational  
25 discussion about sensible cutbacks of the emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, methane and other greenhouse gases,  
26 and the appropriate trade-off between gases.

27  
28 The second approach to aggregation applies a “top-down” perspective across geographically-  
29 distributed impacts model with consistent climate and socio-economic scenarios. Recent  
30 examples, here, include Arnell *et al.* (2002), Levy, *et al.* (2004), Arnell (2004), Parry, *et al.*  
31 (2004), Nicholls (2004), van Lieshout, *et al.* (2004), Leemans and Eickhout (2004), and  
32 Vorosmarty *et al.* (2000). Such studies ensure consistency in approach across a large geographic  
33 domain and, when they are multi-sectoral, across sectors. They can also give global or regional  
34 estimates of impact using a range of numeraires. The “Fast Track” studies, for example, estimate  
35 climate change impact in terms of millions of adversely affected people, while Leemans and  
36 Eickhout (2004) estimate changes in ecosystem extent and Levy, *et al.* (2004) index impact in  
37 terms of changes in carbon flux. Some of these studies have calculated impacts for specific GCM-  
38 based scenarios; Table 20.3 shows the numbers of people impacted by climate change by the  
39 2080s, under different socio-economic futures and climate change as estimated by the HadCM3  
40 climate model. Hitz & Smith (2004) constructed damage functions from a set of such studies,  
41 showing considerable variability in shape of damage function between studies and sectors, with  
42 uncertainty due to model and impact formulation being greatest for water, health and energy  
43 impacts.

44

1 **Table 20.3:** *Global scale impacts of climate change: millions of people adversely affected by*  
 2 *climate change by 2080, compared to situation without climate change.*

	A1FI	A2	B1	B2
Global temperature change (°C from 1961-1990)	3.97	3.21-3.32	2.06	2.34-2.4
Increased risk of hunger (Parry <i>et al.</i> , 2004)	290	550-580	50	150-170
Increased risk of water scarcity (Arnell, 2004)	1820	4700-5400	1700	2800-3100
Increased risk of malaria transmission (Van Lieshout <i>et al.</i> , 2004)	93	107-157	132	139-215
Increased risk of coastal flooding (Nicholls, 2004)	43	67	27	39

3 Change in climate derived from the HadCM3 model.  
 4  
 5

6 Other studies, including Leemans and Eickhout (2004) and Arnell (2005) as recent examples,  
 7 estimate impacts for specified global temperature changes by rescaling patterns of change in  
 8 temperature and precipitation before running impacts models. With increases of temperature of  
 9 between 1 and 2°C (above 2000), for example, Leemans and Eickhout (2004) show that most  
 10 species, ecosystems and landscapes would be impacted. Arnell (2005) meanwhile argues that an  
 11 increase of 2°C above the 1961-1990 mean by 2050 would result in between 550 and 900 million  
 12 people suffering an increase in water resources stress under the A1 and B1 worlds, 900-2200  
 13 million people suffering an increase under A2, and 600-1100 million suffering under B2. For each  
 14 assumed socio-economic world, the range represents different spatial patterns of rainfall change  
 15 associated with a 2°C rise in temperature.  
 16

17 Global estimates for impact, however, tend to hide very substantial variations in regional impacts.  
 18 Table 20.4 shows the regional distribution of millions of people adversely affected by water  
 19 resources stress from Arnell (2004), coastal flooding from Nicholls (2004) and malaria  
 20 transmission from van Lieshout *et al.* (2004).  
 21  
 22

23 **Table 20.4:** *Regional impacts of climate change: millions of people adversely affected by climate*  
 24 *change by 2080, compared to situation without climate change.*

	Population living in watersheds with an increase in water-resources stress (Arnell, 2004)				Increase in average annual number of coastal flood victims (Nicholls, 2004)				Additional population at risk of malaria, where transmission season increases by at least one month (van Lieshout <i>et al.</i> , 2004)			
	A1	A2	B1	B2	A1	A2	B1	B2	A1	A2	B1	B2
Europe	270	380-490	230	170-180	1.6	0.3	0.2	0.3	14	42	27	34
Asia	290	810-1200	300	330-600	1.3	14.7	0.5	1.4	198	341	151	180
North America	130	110-145	110	10-65	0.1	0.1	0	0	9	33	15	13
South America	160	430-470	100	130-190	0.6	0.4	0	0.1	-26	-47	18	15
Africa	410	690-910	400	490-560	2.8	12.8	0.6	13.6	31	44	37	65
Australasia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1

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### ***20.6.2 Interpreting global and regionally aggregate estimates***

Great care must be taken in interpreting aggregate estimates of impacts. In addition to the methodological issue raised above (that different authors use different techniques to produce their aggregate indicators), Yohe and Schlesinger (2002) argue that the recognition that adaptive capacity varies fundamentally from place to place and time period to time period leads immediately to the conclusion that aggregation significantly masks the distributional implications of climate change. This is a critical concern, of course, given the UNFCCC's focus on providing assistance for the world's most vulnerable nations and peoples in their attempts to adapt to the site-specific and path-dependent manifestations of locally experienced climate change.

To see this point, one need not sort through the implications of the diversity discusses in Section 20.2, although that would certainly be required to address climate policy in terms of a global cost-benefit problem. It is, for present purposes, sufficient to compare aggregate estimates of impacts estimated from one model with its regionally disaggregated underpinnings; i.e., compare the regional implications of smooth climate change with a global aggregate along a standard baseline emissions trajectory produced by something like the Nordhaus and Boyer (2001) RICE model. Some regions see possible benefits throughout the next century (though these benefits may be exaggerated because the regional "damage functions" in RICE were calibrated to earlier results that overestimate the positive influence of carbon dioxide fertilization on the agricultural sectors). Other regions show significant losses, ranging from 2 to 3 percent of GDP by 2095; and the countries collected in the low income (LI) category could expect losses that would average almost 5 percent of their GDP. The disparity captured by RICE ignores variation across nations within each regional aggregate as well as intra-national disparities of the sort noted by Yohe and Schlesinger (2002). Still, even the limited regional disparity that the RICE results do reflect is hidden entirely from view by a trajectory of global aggregate impacts weighted by income where modest benefits in the early years of this century are followed by damages that amount to no more than 1.8% of global economic activity by 2095.

### ***20.6.3 Consistency and tension across on global policies on CC and SD***

Sustainable development is essentially concerned with various aspects of human systems and activities and evolution of the environment, which can be specified in terms of two kinds of relationships: (i) human-human and (ii) human-environment. According to Agenda 21 of the Rio Earth Summit (1992), the human being has to be placed at the centre of the stage within a framework of social transformation that promotes harmonious economic (growth, efficiency, stability), social (equity, empowerment, institutions, poverty alleviation), and environmental (biodiversity, natural resources management, pollution control) processes. Ahmad (2001) reflected on this placement to conclude that the overarching issues guiding these processes towards a sustainable pathway are appropriate technologies, cultural issues, and good governance, underpinned by morality and ethics. The sustainable development pathway is expected to lead to peace, security, and intra-, inter-national and inter-generational equity. The set of human-human relationships would take into consideration the present status and future improvement of equity in all these respects, with a view to promoting social cohesiveness globally and nationally. The human-natural environment relationships focus on interactions between human activities and environmental health, arising from the on-going development pathway and technology regime and pressure on natural environment for eking out a living as a result of high levels of poverty, with a

1 view to improving the policy regime, the institutional framework and program implementation  
2 towards enhancement of the environment.  
3  
4 Various protocols and conventions have been signed internationally, which focus on improving  
5 both kinds of relationships for achieving sustainable development. These include (with their dates  
6 noted in parentheses): International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); International  
7 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1996); Montreal Protocol on Substances that  
8 Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) and Amendments (June 1990, November 1992, September 1997,  
9 December 1999); Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous  
10 Wastes and their Disposal (1989) and Amendment (September 1995); Basel Protocol on Liability  
11 and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes  
12 and their Disposal (1999); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992);  
13 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997);  
14 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992); Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the convention on  
15 Biological Diversity (2000); United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those  
16 Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (1994);  
17 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to  
18 Justice in Environmental Matters (1998); Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent  
19 Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998);  
20 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001).  
21  
22 National governments have been developing institutions and policy frameworks for sustainable  
23 development, and there have been many national, regional, and international conferences and  
24 workshops designed to assess their success. Early work in this regard culminated with the World  
25 Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg during the third quarter of 2002.  
26 The Summit reviewed the implementation of sustainable development protocols, conventions,  
27 policies, programs, and understandings generated through Rio Earth Summit and other  
28 conferences at the local, national, and international levels. It was noted that the implementation  
29 was extremely limited at all levels, and so a Plan of Implementation (PoI) for promoting  
30 sustainable development was adopted.  
31  
32 The PoI identified poverty as the greatest global challenge and reiterated the millennium  
33 development goal (MDG) of halving by 2015 the proportion of world's people whose income is  
34 less than US\$1 a day. Agreement was also reached on the related goals of halving the proportion  
35 of people without access to safe drinking water and appropriate sanitary conditions, also by 2015.  
36 (UN (2002), para 7). A strong appeal has been issued for changing unsustainable patterns of  
37 production and consumption by all countries of the world, particularly the developed countries  
38 (UN (2002), para 14). In this context, a strong emphasis has been placed on the management of  
39 natural resources in an integrated and sustained manner (UN (2002), para 24). Given that the  
40 human beings are at the center of the concerns for sustainable development, they are entitled to  
41 healthy and productive lives, in harmony with nature (UN (2002), para 53). A strong call has been  
42 issued for the promotion of equitable and improved access to affordable and efficient healthcare  
43 services for all segments of society (UN (2002), para 54).  
44  
45 The WSSD PoI also addressed the issue of sustainable development in a globalizing world. In the  
46 wake of globalization, there has been tremendous advancement in technology, particularly  
47 information technology, and an unprecedented increase in international trade and global wealth,  
48 but “there remain serious challenges including serious financial crises, insecurity, poverty,  
49 exclusion, and inequality within and among nations.” These problems are particularly faced by  
50 developing countries and countries in transition. A call has, therefore, been made for globalization

1 to be fully inclusive and equitable. To that end, policies and measures should be formulated and  
2 implemented at the national and international levels with full and effective participation of the  
3 developing countries and countries in transition and people of respective countries, as the case  
4 may be (UN (2002), para 47).

5  
6 While globalization is proceeding at a fast pace, spearheaded by private companies (particularly  
7 multinational and transnational companies) and supported by the national governments and  
8 international institutions, the sustainable development process remains more in the realm of  
9 discussions and agreements and very little in terms of practical action. It has been recognized that  
10 the primary responsibility for promoting sustainable development lies with each country, but  
11 developing countries (in particular the least developed countries) need substantial financial and  
12 technological assistance to be able to make progress towards achieving sustainable development  
13 within an integrated economic, social, and environmental framework. In this context, it has been  
14 agreed that the Monterrey Consensus relating to flow of financial resources as well as official  
15 development assistance (ODA) of 0.7 per cent of the GDP should be made available by the  
16 developed countries to the developing countries to help the latter achieve the goals concerning  
17 sustainable development (UN (2002), paras 81 and 85).

18  
19 The basic thrust would vary from country to country, depending on a country's level of  
20 development, its cultural dynamics, whether the economy of the country is primarily agricultural  
21 or it has substantial industrial base, whether the economy is large or small, whether the country is  
22 landlocked or has access to the sea, whether the country is largely mountainous or low and flat,  
23 and the state of its environment. The starting point is a reality check with respect to these and  
24 other relevant aspects, on the basis of which policies and program thrusts for promotion of  
25 sustainable development may be developed. But, what can be achieved would depend not only on  
26 the policies and programs developed but also on the institutional framework and access to  
27 resources. The developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, are seriously  
28 deficient in both respects. The WSSD has called for transfer of both adequate resources and  
29 appropriate technologies from developed to developing countries, as noted earlier, as well as for  
30 developing an effective institutional framework at all levels for both full implementation of the  
31 outcomes of Agenda 21 and WSSD and also for meeting other sustainable development  
32 challenges that may emerge as progress is made (Ahmad 2001; UN (2002), para 137).

#### 33 34 35 ***20.6.4 Commonality across goals and determinants***

36  
37 The seventh Millennium Development Goal (MDG) asks that the earth's decision makers strive to  
38 "ensure environmental sustainability." There are three targets under this goal:

- 39  
40 1 integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policy and programs and  
41 reverse the loss of environmental resources  
42 2 halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015  
43 and  
44 3 achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020.

45  
46 Clearly, there is no reflection in concrete in terms about climate change. Nor is their mention  
47 of the need for improvement of adaptive capacity and promotion of adaptation activities. It is,  
48 therefore, essential that the environment-related MDGs be more relevant to the practical  
49 aspects of promoting sustainable development, particularly in the developing countries. In this  
50 context, looking to the commonality across the determinants of adaptive capacity and the

1 prerequisites for sustainable development make it clear that both would be enhanced by  
2 offering income-poor, resource-constrained developing countries assistance in terms of  
3 financial resources and technologies. The link between climate and the MDG process can thus  
4 be extraordinarily complementary, especially since the MDGs are currently a high profile  
5 initiatives for which the United Nations has recommended increasing support.  
6  
7

8  
9 ***Box 20.3: “A case study of the Philippines”***

10  
11 The Philippines being an archipelagic country is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The  
12 country’s initial National Communication to the UNFCCC recognizes the need to formulate  
13 adaptation strategies for various sectors (The Philippines Initial National Communication, 1999).  
14 Recent studies have also identified potential adaptation options for water resources, forest  
15 resources and agriculture, and local communities in watershed areas (Lasco *et al.*, 2005).  
16

17 In contrast, (sustainable) development plans of the Philippines have practically nothing to say on  
18 the need for climate change adaptation. In general, these documents do not recognize climate  
19 change as a major issue of concern. If ever it is recognized, the focus is on climate change  
20 mitigation and not on adaptation. For example, the Philippine progress report on the Millennium  
21 Development Goals noted the increasing trend in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the country. In response,  
22 several initiatives were cited to help reverse the trend such as the Clean Air Act of 1999 (NEDA,  
23 2003). This is reflective of the emphasis of the Millennium Development Goals (Goal No. 7) on  
24 the mitigation of carbon emissions.  
25

26 The Philippine Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) for 2004-2010 did not explicitly  
27 mention climate change as a concern. There was an indirect reference to climate change mitigation  
28 in that 10 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects are targeted for implementation  
29 (NEDA, 2004). Direct references to climate change adaptation is lacking. However, there is a very  
30 strong focus on natural disaster vulnerability and adaptation which are mainly climate related such  
31 as tropical cyclones and the resulting floods and landslides. Among the planned activities include  
32 geo-hazard mapping of all regions of the country, and disaster preparedness and management in  
33 the development planning process at all levels of governance. Examples of the latter are periodic  
34 risk assessments, institutionalizing community-based mechanisms for disaster management, and  
35 capacity building. Several major flood control and drainage projects are also scheduled to be built.  
36

37 All of the above activities geared towards adapting to current climate extremes also increase  
38 adaptation to future climate change. For example, under a 2x CO<sub>2</sub> scenario, it is predicted that  
39 most of the country will experience higher rainfall which could cause more flooding. The flood  
40 control infrastructure to be built under the MTDP could help adapt to increased flooding in the  
41 future at least partially. Thus while climate change adaptation is not explicitly addressed by  
42 existing development plans, there are numerous initiatives that will promote adaptation to climate  
43 change.  
44

1 **20.7 Implications for regional, sub-regional, local and sectoral development; access to**  
 2 **resources and technology; equity**  
 3

4 Section 20.5.1 offered a few of the most current estimates of regional vulnerability to climate  
 5 change, but they fell short of connecting those estimates to sustainability. Arrow, *et al.* (2004)  
 6 began to fill this gap by estimating rates of growth of per capita “genuine wealth” – a measure of  
 7 the rate of change of investment in physical, natural and human capital. The two panels of Table  
 8 20.5 display their results. Panel A records estimates of “genuine investment” as a percentage of  
 9 GDP. This measure begins with domestic net investment in physical capital, adds investment in  
 10 education (human capital), and then subtracts estimates of resource depletion (disinvestment in  
 11 natural capital). Note that resource depletion includes damage from carbon emissions, but also  
 12 notes changes in energy, mineral and forest reserves. These data are the basis of the calculations  
 13 recorded in Panel B. The first column there matches the last column in Panel A, and a series of  
 14 adjustments, described in the notes, transform these investment estimates into estimates of the rate  
 15 of change in per capital “genuine wealth”; the adjustments take population growth and  
 16 technological change into account.  
 17  
 18

19 **Table 20.5: Reflections of Long Term Sustainability across the Globe, source: Arrow, et al. (2004)**  
 20 **Panel A: Genuine Investment as a Percentage of GDP**

Country	Domestic Net Investment	Education Spending	Damage From CO2	Energy Depletion	Mineral Depletion	Net Forest Depletion	Genuine Investment
<b>Bangladesh 1973-2001</b>	7.89	1.53	0.25	0.61	0.00	1.41	7.14
<b>India 1970-2001</b>	11.74	3.29	1.17	2.89	0.46	1.05	9.47
<b>Pakistan 1970-2001</b>	10.92	2.02	0.75	2.60	0.00	0.84	8.75
<b>Nepal 1970-2001</b>	14.82	2.65	0.20	0.00	0.30	3.67	13.31
<b>China 1982-2001</b>	30.06	1.96	2.48	6.11	0.50	0.22	22.72
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa 1974-2001</b>	3.49	4.78	0.81	<b>7.31</b>	1.71	0.52	<b>-2.09</b>
<b>Middle East North Africa 1976-2001</b>	14.72	4.70	0.80	<b>25.54</b>	0.12	0.06	<b>-7.09</b>
<b>UK 1971-2001</b>	3.70	5.21	0.32	1.20	0.00	0.00	7.38
<b>USA 1970-2001</b>	5.73	5.62	0.42	1.95	0.05	0.00	8.94

1  
2**Panel B: Growth Rates in Per Capita Genuine Wealth**

Country	Genuine Investment	Unadjusted Genuine Wealth	Population Growth	Per Capita Unadjusted Wealth	Technological Change	Adjusted Genuine Wealth
Bangladesh	7.14	1.07	2.16	-1.09	0.81	0.30
India	9.47	1.42	1.99	-0.57	0.64	0.54
Pakistan	8.75	1.31	2.66	-1.35	1.13	0.59
Nepal	13.31	2.00	2.24	-0.24	0.51	0.63
China	22.72	3.41	1.35	2.06	3.64	8.33
Sub-Saharan Africa	-2.09	-0.31	2.74	-3.05	0.28	-2.58
Middle East North Africa	-7.09	-1.06	2.37	-3.43	-0.23	-3.82
UK	7.38	1.48	0.18	1.30	0.58	2.29
USA	8.94	1.79	1.07	0.72	0.02	0.75

3 *Notes: The last column in Panel A is the result of subtracting estimates of depletion of natural*  
4 *resources from the sum domestic investment and education expenditure (all expressed as a*  
5 *percentage of GDP). The second column in Panel B is obtained by multiplying the first (taken*  
6 *directly from the last column of Panel A) by estimates of GDP/wealth ratios for each country.*  
7 *Subtracting population growth in the third column expresses growth in unadjusted genuine wealth*  
8 *in per capita terms; these are the values in the middle column. Estimates of technological change*  
9 *in the fifth column are then multiplied by the inverse of the output elasticity of capital investment*  
10 *(an estimated factor of 1.72) to obtain a comparable measure of the effects of technological*  
11 *change on wealth. Adding this multiplicative product to the unadjusted growth rates produces the*  
12 *estimates recorded in the last column.*

13  
14  
15 The ultimate results, while clearly approximations derived from data of uneven quality across the  
16 globe, suggest that much of the developed world is performing reasonably well in terms of  
17 sustainability. Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa are, however, serious  
18 exceptions to this general conclusion. Driven in large measure by significant depletion of natural  
19 resources (particularly energy resources in the Middle East), they display significant depreciation  
20 in the “genuine wealth” measure, and therein lies the difficulty in taking the good news for the  
21 developed world too seriously. The positive rates of growth in “genuine wealth” that they display

1 are derived significantly by their exploitation of the resources of the world's poorest countries and  
2 their exploitation of energy reserves in some of the richest (the oil exporting countries of the  
3 Middle East). This conclusion is confirmed by Figure 3.1 in MEA (2005, pg. 55) where the annual  
4 decline in savings (i.e., lost contributions to wealth) attributable to the same list of corrective  
5 factors listed in Table 20.5 is reported. The reduction in savings relative to a purely economic  
6 indicator is greater than 25% for countries like Trinidad and Tobago, Congo, Uzbekistan, Kuwait,  
7 Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Syria; and it is between 10% and 25%  
8 for countries like Venezuela, Mauritania, Bahrain, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Burundi,  
9 Malaysia, Ukraine, Viet Nam, Mongolia and Bolivia.

### 12 **20.7.1 The 2003 Heat Wave in Europe**

14 Luterbacher, *et al.* (2004), Schär, *et al.* (2004) and Rebetez (2004) have chronicled the anomalous  
15 hot and dry conditions between June and mid-August of 2003 that effected Europe as a whole the  
16 southern Mediterranean regions in particular. Stott, *et al.* (2004) have meanwhile argued that the  
17 risk of summers as warm as 2003 may increase by two orders of magnitude in the next 40 years.  
18 The direct impacts of the 2003 event included between 27,000 and 40,000 attributed deaths, a high  
19 prevalence of wildfires, a 30% reduction of primary productivity and associated large losses in  
20 crops, increases in the demand for electricity and water. The subsequent recovery in European  
21 vegetation suggests substantial resilience in some ecosystems, but Gobron, *et al.* (2005) warn that  
22 this resilience need not persist if such events become more frequent. Measures to cope with  
23 additional electricity and water demand in management may be possible, but their cost has not  
24 been estimated. Other systems were not prepared for this additional stresses, and poorly coped  
25 with the situation. Preparedness planning and how much of these damages could be actually  
26 avoided become essential questions in evaluating the sustainability of climate sensitive sectors  
27 even in developed countries, since the heat-wave 2003 was a first signal of the possible early  
28 effects of climate change.

### 31 **20.7.2 etc... other summaries cross chapter case per sustainability.**

## 34 **20.8 Opportunities, co-benefits and challenges for adaptation**

36 This section is devoted to a discussion of some of the opportunities and challenges that can be  
37 gleaned from the current state of knowledge. It begins by noting that the identification of both (or  
38 either) is sensitive to the decision-analytic approach adopted by either the researcher or the  
39 decision-maker; this point is illuminated by comparing two sets competing objectives  
40 (sustainability versus optimality and equity versus efficiency) and two alternative analytical  
41 methods (cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis). It closes with a discussion of “co-benefits”,  
42 taken here to mean mitigation benefits from adaptation and adaptation benefits from mitigation.

### 45 **20.8.1 Optimality versus sustainability**

47 Arrow, *et al.* (2004) offer a clear description of the difference between optimality and  
48 sustainability in the context of a social welfare function that is designed to reflect the discounted  
49 value of global of the social worth of consumption depicted in a standard utility context.  
50 Optimality involves maximizing social welfare through prudent investments in physical, human

1 and natural capital (which can, to some degree, substitute for one another in producing socially  
2 worthwhile consumption); optimality, in short, guarantees inter-temporal efficiency. It is well  
3 established that the inability to pool risks perfectly, the taxation of capital income, and the under-  
4 pricing of natural resources tend to contribute sub-optimally excessive consumption.

5  
6 Sustainability, meanwhile, can be defined as guaranteeing that social welfare never declines over  
7 time from one year to the next. The same factors just noted also tend to undermine efforts to  
8 maintain sustainability. As reported in Section 20.6, estimating genuine investment required to  
9 sustain social welfare year in and year out can offer empirical evidence that rich countries seem to  
10 be avoiding over-consumption relative to this sustainability metric while poor countries and some  
11 of the oil exporting regions are falling short of that goal. As was emphasized above, however,  
12 countries' consumption patterns are not independent so that some of the success of the rich to be  
13 sustainable might be attributable, in large part, to the failure of the poor to do so.

14  
15 For a discussion of sustainability, climate change, and a global approach to mitigation and  
16 adaptation, it is perhaps more important to note that Arrow, *et al.* (2004) clearly articulate reasons  
17 why optimality and sustainability are not the same thing. Indeed, they can be mutually exclusive.  
18 Since sustainability is concerned with the change in social welfare and not its level, it is possible  
19 that a sustainable path would not guarantee that contemporaneous utility at any point in the future  
20 would be as high as it is today. Moreover (and unlike optimality), sustainability does not imply a  
21 unique consumption path. Indeed, if resources were truly exhaustible and substitution potential  
22 were limited, then there may not exist a sustainable path even though it would be possible to  
23 characterize an inter-temporally efficient trajectory. As a result, achieving sustainability over  
24 some periods of time does not guarantee that it can be maintained forever. Conversely, even if the  
25 sustainability criterion could be satisfied for all time, proceeding along that path would not  
26 necessarily guarantee optimality. Casting these observations into a regional or national context, it  
27 is now easy to see why poorer countries who are trying to move closer to an optimal development  
28 pathway might resist calls from richer countries to take the sustainability criterion into account.

### 31 **20.8.2 Equity versus efficiency**

32  
33 The trade off between equity and efficiency in policy design has been recognized in the economics  
34 literature for a very long time. Indeed, coverage of the fundamental conflict between promoting  
35 equity and encouraging maximally efficient economic behaviour has made its way into  
36 introductory textbooks such as Stiglitz and Walsh (2002). In the climate arena, this trade off is  
37 much more complicated than simple textbook treatments would suggest. It is exacerbated by the  
38 observation that the problems are being caused by the actions of world's rich countries while the  
39 effects are being felt most severely by the world's poor countries. This is why the language of the  
40 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) calls for developed countries  
41 to support adaptation initiatives designed to help the world's most vulnerable people. Working  
42 Group III authors of IPCC (Chapter 1 in 2001b) framed this issue in terms of a contentious  
43 dichotomy between contraction and convergence – the notion that rich countries would have to  
44 curtail their economic growth to ameliorate the climate problem (contraction) even as the poor  
45 countries accelerate their growth to bring their per capita levels of economic activity more in line  
46 with the norm set by the rich (convergence).

47  
48 Working with a fifty year time horizon, Yohe and Van Engel (2004) have suggested that the trade  
49 off need not be quite so stark over the long term. They observe that the very transfers of  
50 international capital that would promote convergence over the near term between low and high

1 income countries could also work to spread the incidence of achieving any sustainability-  
2 motivated climate target more evenly across both types of countries over the long term. However,  
3 Manne and Richels (1992 and 1997) added even more complication to the mix by showing that  
4 certain emissions and concentrations targets would be impossible to achieve in their modelling  
5 framework (which is calibrated to achieve significant convergence in terms of per capita income  
6 across regions with minimal contraction for the developed countries) even if enormously stringent  
7 mitigation were undertaken immediately. Other modelling frameworks, like the Nordhaus and  
8 Boyer (2001) RICE model, can achieve these targets more easily, but their baseline trajectories of  
9 economic growth worldwide are far less robust and their underlying rates of convergence are less  
10 compelling.

11

12

### 13 **20.8.3 Cost-benefit approaches versus risk management**

14

15 The cost-benefit approach to evaluating the relative efficacy of various responses to climate  
16 change has come under increased scrutiny since the Third Assessment Report IPCC (2001a) and  
17 (2001b). With regard to the trade off between equity and efficiency, it is important to note that  
18 simply summing the costs and benefits of any particular intervention runs the risk of ignoring its  
19 distributional consequences; i.e., an intervention could be evaluated favourably if the sum of its  
20 benefits exceeded the sum of its costs regardless of who garnered the benefits and who suffered  
21 the costs. Practitioners have responded to this criticism, of course, by inserting “distributional  
22 weights” into the calculus. Brent (1996) provides some of the generic details of this  
23 methodological adjustment. Fankhauser, *et al.* (1997) add some specifics by considering a case in  
24 which impacts that are expressed in monetary terms are spread over a collection of groups.

25

26 Profound uncertainty can also create problems for the cost-benefit approach to climate. Tol (2003)  
27 and Yohe (2003) examined cases in which a few plausible climate futures produced catastrophic  
28 impacts in at least one region or for at least one group of people. In these cases, the standard  
29 Ramsey discount rate for the cost-benefit calculus could turn negative for those regions or groups  
30 if the catastrophic impacts drove per capita incomes to subsistence levels. Even if this collapse to  
31 subsistence happened for only one participant along one plausible climate scenario, the discounted  
32 stream of marginal benefits or marginal costs might not be finite. In such cases, policy decisions  
33 that were evaluated in terms of expected net benefits would be dominated to the extreme by the  
34 perhaps isolated cases where impacts were most severe.

35

36 Other efficiency based decision tools exists, of course, and risk management techniques have been  
37 designed explicitly to accommodate the uncertainties that can so significantly confound the cost-  
38 benefit approach (although Brent (1996) also suggests ways with which the fundamentals of risk-  
39 analysis can be brought into the cost-benefit context). In these approaches, both mean outcomes  
40 and the variance of outcomes around those means influence the valuations of alternative actions  
41 by risk-averse decision-makers. The results include the calculation of risk-premiums, on the one  
42 hand, and the willingness to pay for insurance that reduces risk), on the other. As noted in Manne  
43 and Richels (1992 and 1997) and Yohe, *et al.* (2004), either calculation adds the variance of  
44 outcomes to the valuation procedure and makes hedging against the possibility of intolerable  
45 outcomes at the expense of sacrificing some average return an efficient decision in the sense of  
46 maximizing expected welfare.

47

48 It is critical to emphasize that the risk-management approach to decisions is not simply an application  
49 of the precautionary principle to decision analysis under uncertainty. It is, instead, as rooted in the  
50 precise definition of economic efficiency as the cost-benefit approach. Hahn and Sunstein (2005) see

1 the growing popularity of the precautionary principle in discussions about climate change, nuclear  
2 power, genetically modified food, etc. as a threat to principled decision-making. However, risk-  
3 analysis collapses to the precautionary principle only when variance is given exclusive weighting in  
4 the context of critical thresholds whose crossings would produce marginal damages that are taken to  
5 be infinite. Hahn and Sustain (2005) also see the precautionary principle as paralyzing because the  
6 definitions of the critical thresholds can be entirely arbitrary. Yohe, *et al.* (2004) see cost-benefit  
7 approaches as equally paralyzing because uncertainty and discounting over the very long-term,  
8 especially in the context of a pervasive but not necessarily accurate view that it will decline over  
9 time, can be used as a reason not to act; i.e., a reason to wait and see. By way of contrast, a risk-  
10 based approach makes uncertainty a reason to act in the near-term; i.e., to purchase some “insurance”  
11 that either reduces the likelihood of an intolerable consequence or reduces the cost of responding to  
12 that consequence in a less distant and thus less discounted future.

#### 13 14 15 **20.8.4 Challenges and opportunities for mainstreaming adaptation into national/regional/local** 16 **development planning processes**

17  
18 Burton and van Aalst (2004) made the connection to a risk-management approach, but they also  
19 offered some concrete steps by which addressing climate-related risk might be mainstreamed into  
20 development planning. Using a World Bank context, they proposed, the creation of a Climate Risk  
21 Management Knowledge Base, the expansion of institutional support for including climate  
22 information into Country Assistance Strategies and other country-level planning documents, and  
23 the application of a routine risk-screening tool to identifying climate “hot spots” at the project  
24 level. The Knowledge Base would grow over time as his second and third proposals produced a  
25 climate-risk evaluation track record. Indeed, creating the risk-screening tool is the lynchpin to  
26 their approach as they envisioned each project being allocated to one of three categories:

27  
28 Category 1 – High Risk: projects in climate-sensitive sectors; projects located in hazard  
29 zones; projects related to livelihoods on the margin of climate tolerance; projects with  
30 long physical and/or economic lifetimes.

31  
32 Category 2 – Partial or Moderate Risk: projects with some specific climate vulnerability;  
33 projects that increase other vulnerabilities external to the project.

34  
35 Category 3 – No/Low Risk: projects independent of climate.

36  
37 Category 1 projects would not go forward until they were subjected to a full climate risk-  
38 assessment. Category 2 projects would be subjected to a cursory climate-risk screening, perhaps  
39 with a wide range of possible stakeholders; they could become Category 1 projects if the  
40 screening uncovered significant risks and/or proximate climate thresholds. Of course, climate  
41 would not be part of the assessment process for Category 3 projects.

#### 42 43 44 **20.8.5 Participatory processes**

45  
46 Knowledge about climate change and sustainable development can be translated into public policy  
47 through processes that generate usable knowledge. The idea of usable knowledge stems from the  
48 experiences of national and international bodies (academies, boards, committees, panels, etc.) that  
49 offer credible and legitimate information to policy-makers through transparent multi-disciplinary  
50 processes. This requires the inclusion of local knowledge with more formal technical

1 understanding generated through scientific research. Ultimately, social learning emerges through  
2 consensus that includes both scientific discourse and policy debate.

3  
4 Climate change adaptation is a local/regional scale challenge linked to larger scale forces. In this  
5 case, the learning process will have to include participation of local practitioners in climate-  
6 sensitive endeavours (water management, land use planning, etc.) so that past experiences can be  
7 included in the study of, and the planning for, future climate change and development pressures.  
8 Impacts of changing global climate patterns will lead to biophysical impacts that are regionally  
9 unique, depending on the initial state of each region's ecosystems and resources. At the same  
10 time, societies have been developing in different ways, and their relationships with their  
11 biophysical environments have been influenced by social, political and economic forces that are  
12 also regionally unique. There needs to be a process of integration of various dimensions of  
13 knowledge about how regional resource systems operate, how they're affected by biophysical and  
14 socioeconomic forces, and how they might be affected by future changes of various kinds.

15  
16 Haas (2004) describes examples of experiences in social learning on sustainable development and  
17 climate change, noting the importance of sustaining the learning process over the long term, and  
18 maintaining distance between science and policy while still promoting focused science-policy  
19 interactions. Lorenzoni, *et al.* (2001) chronicled an agriculture case from the eastern United  
20 Kingdom, for example, to show that while there are adaptation options available (e.g. shifting  
21 cultivation times, modifying soil management to improve water retention and avoid compaction),  
22 there are also questions on how a climate component can be built into the way non-climate issues  
23 are currently addressed. Long term strategies may have to include regional acceptance of greater  
24 fluctuations in crop yields than is currently the case, and to diversify operations in order to  
25 maintain farm incomes and employment. The compartmentalization of regional decision making is  
26 seen as a barrier to encouraging more sustainable land management over the periods in which  
27 climate change evolves.

28  
29 Cohen, *et al.* (2004) offers another illustration of this interdependence. Water resources  
30 management in the Okanagan region of western Canada will have to plan for population growth  
31 and potential increased drought risk due to projected climate change. A future portfolio of  
32 adaptation measures could include both supply enhancement and demand reduction. This region  
33 has previously had some positive experiences with implementing demand reduction measures, but  
34 Shepherd, *et al.* (2005) note a number of institutional and political obstacles. Future adaptation  
35 efforts will have to account for financial, political and social elements of water policy, with  
36 implications for water related governance and land use planning at the local and regional scales.

37  
38 Hisschemöller *et al.* (2001) suggest how participatory processes can play an important role in  
39 facilitating the integration of biophysical and socio-economic aspects of climate change adaptation  
40 and development by creating opportunities for shared experiences in learning, problem definition,  
41 and design of potential solutions. Van de Kerkhof (2004) has since observed that a variety of  
42 participatory techniques have been tried in the context of climate change mitigation, while Huitema  
43 *et al.* (2004) report on a recent exercise on water policy that employed citizen's juries. Cohen *et al.*  
44 (2004) also show how participatory processes were an integral part of the Okanagan case; and  
45 Summit Environmental Consultants Ltd. (2004) produced an indicator of a successful climate  
46 change participatory process is a recent report by regional planners that includes consideration on  
47 how to incorporate climate change adaptation into long term water plans.

48  
49 Two examples from the Canadian Arctic illustrate how participatory processes have been used to  
50 incorporate indigenous knowledge into environmental assessments of ongoing and planned

1 development. The Northern River Basins Study assessed the effects of pulp mills and upstream  
2 flow regulation on aquatic ecosystems. The traditional knowledge component focused on  
3 obtaining local historical knowledge through protocols developed with indigenous communities.  
4 Conclusions and recommendations on balancing environment and development included  
5 recognition of the implications of climate change on river flows and ice formation important for  
6 the ecological integrity of a large freshwater delta (NRBS Board, 1996). More recently, an  
7 environmental assessment of the West Kitikmeot / Slave region was prepared as part of a review  
8 of proposed expansion of mining. This assessment was produced through a partnership with  
9 governments and indigenous peoples, and included traditional knowledge projects. Knowledge to  
10 facilitate sustainable development was identified as an explicit goal of the assessment, and climate  
11 change impacts were listed as one of the long term concerns for the region, though there were no  
12 specific recommendations for managing these impacts (WKSS Society, 2001).

13  
14 Toth and Hizsnyik (2005) describe how participatory techniques might be applied to inform  
15 decisions in the context of possible abrupt climate change. They note explicitly that a comprehensive  
16 understanding of the implications of extreme climate change requires an in-depth exploration of the  
17 perceptions and reactions of the affected stakeholder groups and the lay public. The project on  
18 “Atlantic sea level rise: Adaptation to imaginable worst-case climate change” (Atlantis) has  
19 studied one such case, the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a subsequent 5-6 meter  
20 sea-level rise. Possible methods for assessing the societal consequences of impacts and adaptation  
21 options in selected European regions include simulation-gaming techniques, a policy exercise  
22 approach, as well as directed focus group conversations. Each approach can be designed to explore  
23 adaptation as a local response to a global phenomenon. As a result, each sees adaptation being  
24 informed by a fusion of “top down” descriptions of impacts from global climate change and  
25 “bottom up” deliberations rooted in local, national and regional experiences.

26  
27

#### 28 ***20.8.6 Expanding co-benefits***

29

30 The obvious linkages between mitigation and adaptation present a policy challenge, especially in a  
31 development context. Chapter 18 distinguishes two levels at which mitigation and adaptation  
32 aspects are interrelated. At highly aggregated, global or multinational levels, these two activities  
33 are extent substitutes to some degree: the more mitigation is undertaken, the less adaptation is  
34 necessary and vice versa. Accordingly, the larger amount of resources is devoted to mitigation, the  
35 less is available for investments in overall socioeconomic development, in specific investments in  
36 enhancing adaptive capacity, and for individual adaptation projects. At the national and sub-  
37 national levels, though, this trade-off is doubtful because the effectiveness of the mitigation  
38 outlays in terms of averted climate change depends on the mitigation efforts of other major  
39 emitters of greenhouse gases. It follows that the magnitude of necessary adaptation is  
40 disconnected from the nation’s mitigation effort. At the level of greenhouse gas emitting and/or  
41 climate sensitive sectors where specific mitigation and adaptation projects are to be considered,  
42 the relationship can be positive (adaptation reducing emissions as well or mitigation fostering  
43 adaptation), negative (adaptation increasing emissions or mitigation inhibiting adaptation) or  
44 neutral. Section 18.4.1 summarizes the insights from recent work on these issues.

45

46 The approach taken in this chapter can be exploited to uncover two ways by which decision-  
47 makers might expand the scope of their attempts to achieve this fundamental integration beyond  
48 the narrow confines of searches for win-win options for which co-benefits are easily articulated. In  
49 the first, noting that the determinants of mitigative capacity described in Yohe (2001) are almost  
50 identical to the determinants of adaptive capacity reveals that working to enhance the precursors

1 for sustainable development can also enhance a country's ability to adapt and to contribute to  
2 global mitigation initiatives. More to the point, programs and policies that promote more equitable  
3 distributions of resources, more responsive governance structures, more reliable networks of  
4 social and human capital, more thorough understandings of the causal links in political, social,  
5 economic and climate systems, and so on can complement one another on all three fronts.  
6 Moreover, as argued above, these underlying commonalities can bring climate issues, both on the  
7 adaptation side and the mitigation side, to the table of the decision-makers who are most critically  
8 concerned with development issues.

9  
10 Incorporating the risk-based approach described above into the decision process offers a second  
11 means by which a multitude of co-benefits can be identified and explored. Tol (2003) has argued  
12 that mitigation and adaptation cannot be integrated into a common decision-making context  
13 because their scales are different. Adaptations work at local scales with horizons that are  
14 sometimes very short while mitigation policies work essentially at global scales and very long  
15 time horizons. Brown (2005) shows, however, that the benefits of mitigation can be expressed in  
16 terms of both reductions in the pace of climate change over the long term and resulting reductions  
17 in the variance in the outcomes of climate change. Tol's critique applies well to the first  
18 component of benefits, but not to the second. Reductions in the variance of what climate change  
19 might bring begin immediately, and so the associated benefits for any mitigation target can be  
20 expressed as the "willingness to pay" for this reduction in risk. Moreover, different estimates of  
21 the "willingness to pay" can be associated with alternative adaptation programs whose net benefits  
22 accrue over a relatively short time horizon. In this context, there may be value to mitigation as a  
23 complement to adaptation even in places where climate change itself may be beneficial (at least  
24 for a while in terms of expected impacts) and that this phenomenon is not confined to the  
25 developed world.

## 26 27 28 **20.9 Uncertainties, unknowns, and priorities for research**

29  
30 Lubchenko (1999) argued forcefully that scientists have highlighted the need for a "new contract"  
31 between science and society for sustainable development. As it stands now, though, a large gap  
32 exists between what scientists think they can offer and what society has demanded and supported.  
33 Several concrete steps, borne of the conceptual framework offered here, can begin to close this  
34 gap.

### 35 36 37 ***20.9.1 Bringing climate to the development community***

38  
39 Careful analyses of site-specific issues can show academics (in the development field, for  
40 example) how assuming a constant climate over even the relatively short-run can be misleading,  
41 especially if this assumption is combined with the view that coping with climate variability in a  
42 development strategy guarantees that climate change has been accommodated. Practitioners can  
43 come to recognize a common set of concerns in underlying determinants of adaptive capacity and  
44 prerequisites for sustainable development.

### 45 46 47 ***20.9.2 Bringing development and policy to the scientific community***

48  
49 Differentiating the relative contribution of climate variability from that of climate change in  
50 impacts and adaptation is difficult if not impossible to achieve, and many policy decisions need to

1 be informed by a clear recognition of this complication. Burton (2004) has argued that every  
2 country will need to adapt to climate change even as they cope with other stresses. He concludes,  
3 therefore, that the allocation of funds for adaptation between countries is only one critical issue to  
4 be confronted. Equally important is determining an equitable distribution of funds across the  
5 competing needs of every country eligible for funding. Although climate change can be  
6 extraordinarily important to most countries, it is likely that other challenges will be ranked higher  
7 at different levels and when considering varying time scales. The science community needs to  
8 recognize the development context as it designs its research agenda and, perhaps more  
9 importantly, as it communicates its results.

### 12 **20.9.3 Cataloguing best practices**

14 Because vulnerability is site-specific and path-dependent, it is difficult to cast adaptation in terms  
15 of global benefits. Still, as understanding about the mechanisms by which the determinants of  
16 adaptive capacity support successful implementation of adaptation strategies across the globe,  
17 commonalities will be discovered; and their discovery will have global benefit. The UNFCCC  
18 country technology needs assessment reports, for example, identify hard and soft options for  
19 mitigation and adaptation, and a careful review of their content can be a first step in compiling  
20 catalogues of “best practices” across rural communities in developing countries where indigenous  
21 adaptation have been adopted; and this can be a first step in uncovering the valuable  
22 understanding of what does or does not work where, and why. Implementing pilot programs,  
23 chosen individually only on the basis of maximum benefit but organized collectively on the basis  
24 of spanning the maximum amount of contextual diversity, can also facilitate the productive  
25 discovery of fundamental commonalities.

### 28 **20.10 Conclusions**

30 IPCC (2001a) reported that adaptation can contribute to reducing vulnerability of the poor and the  
31 most vulnerable – a fundamental conclusion that has been well established. Indeed, several donor  
32 agencies are advocating mainstreaming of adaptation in development plans, especially through  
33 Poverty Reduction Strategies as reported in Word Bank (2003). As it stands, now, the issue is not  
34 one of convincing decision-makers that bringing climate to bear on development deliberations is a  
35 good idea; it is, instead, one of suggesting how it might be accomplished when development  
36 planners already have so much “on their plates”. Nonetheless, the IPCC (2001a) warned that  
37 planners that ignore climate at their own risk, especially when long-term investment decisions can  
38 lock their economies into specific development trajectories from which it could be expensive to  
39 deviate.

41 This chapter has established the connection between the precursors of sustained support of  
42 economic growth and improved well-being, on the one hand, and the determinants of adaptive  
43 capacity, on the other. Development planners are, of course, already familiar with the precursors  
44 for success in their initiatives, and they are already concerned with seeking ways of strengthening  
45 the “weakest links” that support the connections between implementation and success. The first  
46 key to bringing climate into their agendas is simply to make it clear to decision-makers in the  
47 development ministries that they are already working these problems. Indeed, recognizing climate  
48 could provide them more ammunition when they negotiate for claims to scarce economic  
49 resources.

1 This chapter has also highlighted the complexity of trying to predict what will work and what will  
2 not at any single site specific and path depend context; but development planners are already  
3 experienced in coping with this complexity, as well. They already know that the effectiveness of  
4 the programs that they contemplate all the time, like opening trade or imposing environmental  
5 restrictions on industrial activity, may or may not work to increase productivity, improve general  
6 welfare (including equity considerations) or reduce poverty in a specific sector or across a specific  
7 region. Determining which adaptation to climate change will work (and where) is an analogous  
8 empirical question, and one with which they have some familiarity. Indeed, noting that the  
9 determinants of more mainstream “adaptations” to other external stresses are the same as the  
10 determinants for the capacity to adapt to climate stress suggests that they are already confronting  
11 exactly the same empirical questions. Climate, therefore, is not a new issue to be added to an  
12 already clogged agenda. It is, instead, an additional incentive for the careful examination how and  
13 why policies designed to promote productivity in an interdependent world might function  
14

15 Preparing and planning for adaptation by strengthening the determinants of adaptive capacity can  
16 simultaneously work as a hedge against climate impacts and as a means of improving prospects  
17 for sustainable development by supporting (for example) productivity growth (or at least adding to  
18 the insulation that protects productivity initiatives from external stress). Cast as a risk-reducing  
19 tool, improving adaptive capacity can be seen as a tool with which to reduce climate risk,  
20 complement mitigation, improve socio-economic stability, widen the range of attractive  
21 investment opportunities, and thereby enhance the prospects for developing sustainably.

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