

1 **IPCC WG II Fourth Assessment Report – Draft for Government and Expert Review**

2  
3 **Chapter 2 – New Assessment Methods and the Characterisation**  
4 **of Future Conditions**

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6  
7 **Coordinating Lead Authors**

8 Timothy Carter (Finland), Roger Jones (Australia), Xianfu Lu (China)

9  
10 **Lead Authors**

11 Suruchi Bhadwal (India), Cecilia Conde (Mexico), Linda Mearns (USA), Brian O'Neill (IIASA),  
12 Mark Rounsevell (Belgium), Monika Zurek (FAO),

13  
14 **Contributing Authors**

15 Jacqueline de Chazal (Belgium), Stephane Hallegatte (France), Milind Kandlikar (Canada),  
16 Robert Nicholls (United Kingdom), Michael Oppenheimer (USA), Anthony Patt (USA), Kimmo  
17 Ruosteenoja (Finland), Claudia Tebaldi (USA), Detlef van Vuuren (Netherlands)

18  
19 **Review Editors**

20 Hans-Martin Füssel (Germany), Yihui Ding (China), Geoff Love (Australia)

21  
22  
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## 1 **Executive Summary**

2

3 This chapter describes the significant developments in methods of climate change impact,  
4 adaptation and vulnerability (CCIAV) assessment since the Third Assessment Report (TAR). It also  
5 introduces the main scenarios and approaches to scenario construction that are used to characterise  
6 future conditions in the studies reported in this volume.

7

8 *Assessment methods for CCIAV have expanded.* Since the TAR, the demand for policy-relevant  
9 information concerning climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (CCIAV) has seen the  
10 number of different methods in use expand significantly. Although the standard climate scenario-  
11 driven approach dominates the assessments described in this report, the use of other approaches is  
12 increasing. They include assessments of current and future adaptations to climate, of adaptive  
13 capacity, of social vulnerability, and of adaptation in the context of sustainable development.

14 [2.2.1.1] [2.2.1.2]

15

16 *Risk management is a useful framework for decision-making.* There is an emerging recognition that  
17 risk management is a useful unifying framework for decision-making on climate change related  
18 threats and opportunities. The advantages of risk management methods include the flexibility to  
19 incorporate a range of mental models, formalised methods to manage uncertainty, stakeholder  
20 involvement, methods for evaluating policy options without being policy prescriptive and  
21 integration of different disciplinary approaches. [2.2.1.3] [2.2.1.4]

22

23 *Assessments of appropriate responses to future climate risks require knowledge about current  
24 climate risks, and this involves stakeholders.* An understanding of how a group or system can cope  
25 with current climate risks is an important part of undertaking CCIAV assessments for the future.  
26 Stakeholder participation is vital to the assessment process, and an increasing number of  
27 vulnerability and adaptation assessments include an active stakeholder component. This is crucial  
28 both for establishing credibility and for placing an assessment in a problem-driven context, which is  
29 a pre-requisite for effective risk management. [2.2.1.3] [2.2.3.3]

30

31 *Vulnerability to climate change can be strongly conditioned by non-climate factors.* Many new  
32 studies have applied non-climate scenarios at regional scale derived from the global scenarios  
33 developed in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). These studies demonstrate  
34 how the large differences in regional population, income and technological development implied  
35 under alternative SRES storylines can produce sharp contrasts in exposure to climate change, in  
36 adaptive capacity and vulnerability. Such studies also emphasise that it is not sufficient to rely on a  
37 single characterisation of future conditions. [2.2.2.8] [2.2.2.9]

38

39 *Scenarios are being applied in CCIAV studies at a range of scales.* Since the TAR there has been  
40 more quantification of the SRES storylines. With some regional exceptions, the original SRES  
41 assumptions for population and economic development largely remain credible. A range of methods  
42 have been applied to downscale and interpret the SRES storylines to regions, including stakeholder  
43 participation, expert judgement, modelling, and disaggregation. New regional scenarios have been  
44 developed of socio-economic development, land use and land cover, atmospheric composition,  
45 climate and sea level. Many have been applied in impact studies reported in this volume. [2.3.1.1]  
46 [2.3.1.2] [2.3.1.3] [2.3.1.4] [2.3.1.5] [2.3.1.6]

47

48 *Improved understanding of the processes of adaptation and technological change will be essential  
49 for many future CCIAV studies.* Technology scenarios are increasingly recognised as important for  
50 CCIAV studies, but there is a lack of theories and process knowledge about how future technology  
51 will evolve, and this has limited scenario development. Similarly, few CCIAV studies have

1 developed scenarios of future adaptation, and the process and costs of adaptation are rarely  
2 accounted for in most global scenario exercises. [2.2.2.10] [2.2.2.11]

3  
4 *GCMs are still widely used for developing climate scenarios in CCIAV studies, but regionalisation*  
5 *methods are increasingly adopted, especially for treating extreme events.* Coupled atmosphere-  
6 ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) continue to be the primary resource for characterising  
7 future regional climate but regionalisation methods have increasingly been employed to obtain high  
8 resolution climate scenarios. The added value of regionalisation is context-specific, but it can  
9 provide new information about climatic variability and extreme climate events, and in some cases  
10 has revealed systematic differences to AOGCM projections. The range of uncertainties in regional  
11 projections from AOGCMs remains little changed from the TAR, but the importance of regional  
12 aerosol emissions and land use change to regional climate change has become more evident.  
13 [2.2.2.5] [2.3.1.2]

14  
15 *Non-SRES scenarios, incorporating climate policies or representing singular events, are gradually*  
16 *being adopted.* SRES-based scenarios do not adequately address all concerns of policy makers.  
17 CCIAV studies assuming mitigated or stabilised futures, not considered in SRES, are beginning to  
18 assess the benefits (through impacts ameliorated or avoided) of climate policy decisions.  
19 Characterisations of singular events with potentially widespread consequences have also been  
20 developed, though questions remain over the plausibility (e.g. timing, magnitude) of projections  
21 that deal with surprises and shocks.[2.3.2] [2.2.2.12]

22  
23 *Probabilistic characterisations are being developed that can be applied to climate-related risks.*  
24 Probabilistic characterisations of future climate and non-climate conditions are increasingly  
25 becoming available. Emerging methods of developing and applying probabilities to climate-related  
26 risks now indicate, for a limited range of examples, the probability of exceeding predefined  
27 thresholds of impact and the timing associated with this exceedence. However, many characteristics  
28 of the future are still inherently too uncertain to be handled probabilistically. [2.2.2.14]

## 2.1 Introduction

Assessments of climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability are carried out to inform decision making in an environment of uncertainty. The management of this uncertainty drives the development of new and improved methods of assessment. It also defines the requirements for characterisations of future conditions (scenarios) that are required in applying many of these methods. It is important that assessments deliver their findings and recommendations based on up-to-date knowledge, accounting for all major uncertainties affecting those findings in a transparent and informative manner. This chapter describes the significant developments in climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (CCIAV) assessment methods since the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR). Also introduced are the main approaches used to characterise future conditions in the studies reported in this volume, with prominent examples of these highlighted.

In previous years, IPCC Working Group II<sup>1</sup> has devoted a Special Report and two chapters to assessment methods (Carter *et al.* 1996; IPCC 1994; Ahmad *et al.* 2001). Moreover, recognising the fundamental importance of scenario development in most CCIAV assessments, the TAR included a broad treatment of this topic (Carter *et al.* 2001; Mearns *et al.* 2001), which built on earlier descriptions of climate scenario development (IPCC-TGCIA 1999). These contributions provide detailed descriptions of assessment methods and scenarios, which are not repeated in the current assessment.

The range of approaches and methods in use has expanded since the TAR. Starting as the straightforward application of climate scenarios to assess impacts and potential adaptations, CCIAV methods have expanded to treat the management of uncertainty by addressing a variety of spatial scales, assessment directions and temporal aspects. These advances have also challenged some of the concepts and definitions associated with climate change (e.g. adaptation and vulnerability), which have had to become more inclusive to account for their uses in other disciplines. In particular, the development and application of risk management frameworks to CCIAV assessment is a major advance and is described in detail.

Managing uncertainty refers to taking account of uncertainty and integrating it into policy and decision-making processes (Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti 2002). Appropriate characterisation of uncertainty is part of that process. Thus, uncertainty management is a prominent driver of the development of new modelling approaches, such as those involving probabilistic analysis. Conditional likelihoods are being developed to describe projections of future climate, and are being used in integrated assessment and impact assessment. However, process-based methods, such as those for managing the interactions between researchers and stakeholders, for developing and comparing conceptual models of risk and for constructing and assessing thresholds, are also being developed and applied. These improvements are interrelated and the integration of both models and processes is an important part of the new developments.

Many methodological developments and applications are hampered by insufficient data describing past trends and present conditions required for model calibration and testing. While data paucity continues to impede research in many parts of the developing world, in particular, the emergence of new methods for evaluating adaptation options and assessing vulnerability has highlighted a more universal need for new types of information; for example: understanding the processes and practice of current adaptation, the adoption and diffusion of new technologies, and the costing of impacts and adaptation.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter, IPCC Working Groups I, II and III are referred to as WG I, WG II and WG III, respectively.

1 The characterisation of climate and non-climate futures continues to be prominent in assessments,  
2 specifying the main drivers for estimating future impacts and providing a context for considering  
3 future vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Methods of developing socio-economic and land use  
4 change scenarios have advanced considerably since the TAR, and new methods are emerging for  
5 quantifying future conditions probabilistically, for addressing extreme climate events, and for  
6 treating singular events with indeterminate likelihood but potentially widespread consequences.

7  
8 Many of the more recent studies evaluated in this Report have adopted scenarios based on the IPCC  
9 Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) and derivative studies. These are compared with  
10 representations of the future developed to serve other research and policy communities, which have  
11 also been applied in some CCIAV studies. The SRES scenarios assume no explicit climate policies,  
12 and other studies have begun to explore the implications of policy interventions aimed at mitigating  
13 greenhouse gas emissions, including those targeting stabilisation of atmospheric GHG  
14 concentrations.

15 The structure of information presented in this chapter follows a hierarchy of approaches, methods  
16 and results. An approach describes the overall orientation of a range of assessments, providing a  
17 framework that utilises a common set of methods. In that sense, vulnerability, adaptation and risk  
18 assessment can all be described as (not unrelated) approaches. A method is a particular procedure  
19 designed to carry out a limited number of tasks; therefore, a number of different methods may be  
20 applied within a single approach. Results of new or improved approaches and methods are  
21 illustrated where possible.

22  
23 We begin the chapter with a description of different methodological approaches, concentrating  
24 especially on the development of risk assessment for CCIAV (section 2.2.1). Most CCIAV  
25 approaches have a scenario component, so section 2.2.2 details recent advances in methods of  
26 characterising future conditions. Section 2.2.3 then describes a range of new and improved methods  
27 that have been applied in CCIAV assessments since the TAR, with the critical issue of data needs  
28 for assessment treated in the following section (2.2.4). Given the wide adoption of SRES-based  
29 scenarios as well as increasing application of mitigation and stabilisation scenarios, section 2.3  
30 provides a short summary of these as an introduction to the remaining chapters of the report.  
31 Finally, in section 2.4 we address key new findings and future directions.

## 32 33 34 **2.2 Developments in methods**

### 35 36 ***2.2.1 Towards a suitable framework for assessment***

#### 37 38 *2.2.1.1 Conventional approaches to assessment*

39  
40 Since the TAR, the range of approaches and methods available for CCIAV assessments has been  
41 significantly expanded. Factors that distinguish a particular approach take into account the purpose  
42 of an assessment, its focus (who, what and at what scale), the methods available and the  
43 management of uncertainty. Stemming from the standard approach, which has its origins in the  
44 seven-step approach of IPCC (IPCC 1994), other approaches include inverse methods (e.g. those  
45 that focus on a specific outcome and assess the conditions under which that outcome may be  
46 realised or avoided), risk management approaches and integrated assessment. Constructing a  
47 taxonomy of approaches is difficult because of the many terms in use and the interdependence of  
48 different approaches; in this chapter we focus on the standard climate scenario-driven, adaptation,  
49 vulnerability, and risk management approaches.

50  
51 Two of the most common terms describing assessment types are "top-down" and "bottom-up",

1 which can variously describe the approach to scale, to subject matter (e.g. stress-impact-response;  
2 physical to socio-economic disciplines) and to policy (national as opposed to local policy);  
3 sometime mixing two or more of these. Note that some more integrated assessments combine top-  
4 down and bottom-up aspects, preventing any definitive conclusion as to what constitutes a top-  
5 down and bottom-up assessment. In this chapter, terminology is intended to communicate a general  
6 principle or purpose unless specifically defined otherwise. Application of the standard IPCC  
7 approach has expanded significantly since the TAR. For example, the context of input scenarios has  
8 risen in importance with impacts assessed from non-greenhouse policy emission scenarios being  
9 contrasted with those derived from stabilisation scenarios (e.g. Parry *et al.* 2001). The use of  
10 probabilities in impact assessments, presented as proof-of-concept examples in the TAR (Mearns *et*  
11 *al.* 2001), have contributed to concrete adaptations (see chapter 11), though examples remain  
12 limited (section 2.2.2.14). Adaptation and vulnerability assessments, once the outputs of impact  
13 assessments, are now being conducted in a broader socio-economic context.

14  
15 The development of other approaches has been necessary to overcome the limitations of the  
16 standard climate scenario-driven approach. While for some purposes it remains the most suitable  
17 approach, a broader range of techniques is required to fulfil the following objectives: assessing  
18 current vulnerabilities and experience in adaptation; stakeholder involvement in dealing with  
19 extreme events; capacity-building needs for future vulnerability and adaptation assessments;  
20 potential adaptation measures; prioritization and costing of adaptation measures; interrelationships  
21 between vulnerability and adaptation assessments and national development priorities and actions  
22 to integrate adaptation options into existing or future sustainable development plans (e.g. SBI 2001;  
23 COP 2005).

24  
25 Addressing these needs has prompted the development of risk assessment approaches, ranging from  
26 those that deal exclusively with adaptation, to those that aim to integrate the management of both  
27 adaptation and mitigation under climate change.

#### 28 29 2.2.1.2 *Climate change assessment in the context of risk*

30  
31 Although the enhanced greenhouse effect has previously been linked to the management of risk  
32 (Shlyakhter *et al.* 1995; Beer 1997) only recently have formal risk management frameworks for  
33 climate change been developed. This includes frameworks for adaptation (Jones 2001; Willows and  
34 Connell 2003; UNDP 2005), mitigation (e.g. Heal 2002) and integrated approaches suitable for  
35 addressing Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC  
36 Jones 2001; Mastrandrea and Schneider 2004). Article 2 itself is compatible with risk management  
37 (e.g. Lorenzoni *et al.* 2005). The requirement to stabilise "greenhouse gas concentrations ... at a  
38 level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" sets the  
39 objective for risk management, while ensuring that food security is not threatened, facilitating  
40 sustainable economic development and allowing ecosystems to adapt naturally set the criteria for  
41 management (United Nations 1999).

42  
43 Climate change assessments have evolved from relatively straightforward scientific assessments –  
44 applying greenhouse gas scenarios to model the response of the climate system and then assessing  
45 the ensuing impacts of the changed climate – to those addressing the many factors listed in the  
46 previous section (e.g. Lorenzoni *et al.* 2005). Three iterations of risk assessment can be linked to  
47 successive IPCC assessments (Table 2.1).

48  
49 The two major forms of climate risk management are the mitigation of climate change through the  
50 abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and sequestration of greenhouse gases, and adaptation to  
51 the consequences of a changing climate. Mitigation reduces the rate and magnitude of changing

1 climate hazards whereas adaptation reduces the consequences of those hazards (Jones 2004).  
 2 Mitigation also reduces the upper bounds of the potential climate change, whereas adaptation will  
 3 have to cope with the lower bounds (Yohe and Toth 2000). Therefore, adaptation and mitigation  
 4 treat different elements of climate change risk (consequences and hazards, respectively) and act on  
 5 the upper and lower bounds of the plausible range of climate change, so are complementary  
 6 processes. However, the benefits will appreciate at different time scales and, in many cases, they  
 7 can be assessed and implemented separately (Klein *et al.* 2005). These aspects of complementarity  
 8 and difference are discussed in chapter 18.

9  
 10 **Table 2.1:** *Evolution of risk assessments over time.*

Assessment	Policy question	IPCC process	Methodological approach	Scenario requirement
<b>First iteration</b>	Is climate change really a problem?	IPCC (1988) IPCC FAR (1990)	Sensitivity analysis	Incremental scenarios for primary climate variables
<b>Second iteration</b>	What are the potential impacts of unmanaged climate change?	IPCC IS92a-f scenarios (1992) IPCC SAR (1996) IPCC SRES emissions (2000) IPCC TAR (2001)	Scenario-driven impact assessments	Climate model derived scenarios for a large number of variables, at global and regional levels
<b>Third iteration</b>	How do we effectively manage climate change?	IPCC AR4 (2007)	Risk assessment framework	Model derived scenarios for a large number of variables, consistent with other scenario components; integration of scenarios at varying scales

11  
 12  
 13 To date, most CCIIV studies have assessed climate change without specific regard to how  
 14 mitigation policy will influence those impacts. However, the certainty that some climate change  
 15 will occur (and is already occurring – see chapter 1) is driving adaptation assessment beyond the  
 16 limits of what scenario-driven methods can provide. The issues to be appended include linking  
 17 current adaptation to climate variability and extremes with those to future climate, linking  
 18 adaptation to sustainable development, engaging stakeholders and decision-making under  
 19 uncertainty. Risk management has been identified as a framework that can deal with all of these  
 20 issues in a manner consistent with existing methodologies. However, risk assessment frameworks  
 21 introduce a new lexicon that needs to be reconciled with terms used in conventional CCIIV  
 22 assessment. This is a difficult task – the climate change lexicon needs to be updated to encompass  
 23 broader meanings consistent with mainstream activities, while the language surrounding risk is  
 24 highly inconsistent, employing different nomenclature across a range of applications (Beer 2003).  
 25 Box 2.1 outlines a range of broadly used, but not exclusive, terms and meanings from the literature.

### 26 27 *2.2.1.3 Reconciling conventional assessment approaches with risk management*

28  
 29 As the aims of CCIIV assessment have expanded in range and sophistication, so too have the  
 30 approaches and methods used to address these aims. Although the purpose of an assessment has the  
 31 greatest influence on which approach may be the most suitable for addressing that purpose,  
 32 assessments share a number of common elements summarised in Table 2.2.

33  
 34 The standard climate scenario-driven approach is often described as top-down because it combines  
 35 scenarios down-scaled from global climate models (GCMs) to the local scale with a process that  
 36 begins with the climate system and moves towards socio-economic assessment. Bottom-up methods  
 37 are those that commence at the local scale by addressing socio-economic responses to climate,  
 38 which tend to be location specific (Dessai and Hulme 2004). Assessments that combine bottom-up  
 39 and top-down approaches can seem complex because of the need to switch between frames of

1 reference, the involvement of multidisciplinary approaches, stakeholder involvement and the  
2 presence of multiple uncertainties. However, such combined approaches are much more relevant to  
3 the adaptation process. The United Nations Development Programme’s Adaptation Policy  
4 Framework (UNDP APF – UNDP 2005) has also identified a third major assessment approach – a  
5 policy-based approach, which assesses current policy and plans for their effectiveness under climate  
6 change.

7  
8 ***Box 2.1: Definitions of risk and climate change terms***

9  
10 This box provides generic definitions for risk and selected climate change terms designed for  
11 readers to extract the core meaning encompassed within each term and use it in different contexts  
12 without deforming that core meaning (Sources: AS/NZS 2004; ISO/IEC 2002; Renn 2005)

13  
14 *Acceptable risk* – insignificant or acceptably controlled risk

15 *Consequence* – the outcome of an event; can be single or multiple, range from positive to negative, be  
16 expressed qualitatively or quantitatively and be considered in relation to objectives.

17 *Coping range* – a range of climate variability or derived variable or set of variables with which an  
18 identifiable group, body, species or community can cope. The coping range serves both as a mental  
19 model and analytic tool that can be used to relate consequences to a pattern of varying climate

20 *Critical threshold* – denoting where an impact or risk exceeds a stated level of tolerance. A critical threshold  
21 can define a state change or set management criteria.

22 *Exposure* – duration of time subject to a harmful substance or process.

23 *Hazard* – a source of potential harm or situation with the potential to cause loss

24 *Likelihood* – a measure of probability expressed qualitatively or quantitatively

25 *Probability* – the extent to which an event is likely to occur. Probability can be related to a long-run relative  
26 frequency of occurrence or to a degree of belief that an event may occur

27 *Residual risk* – the risk remaining after the implementation of risk management/treatment

28 *Risk* – the chance of something happening that will have an impact on something that humans value. Most  
29 often measured as likelihood times consequence.

30 *Risk analysis* – systematic process to understand the nature of and deduce the level of risk

31 *Risk assessment* – the initial part of the process of identifying and quantifying risk (but sometimes used to  
32 describe the entire risk process; see risk management).

33 *Risk criteria* – terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed

34 *Risk evaluation* – process of comparing the level of risk against risk criteria (i.e. weighing up likelihood with  
35 consequence in order to make a decision on risk).

36 *Risk management* – the culture, processes and structures directed towards realizing potential opportunities  
37 whilst managing adverse effects. In some jurisdictions this term is restricted to the evaluation and  
38 implementation of options to control risk.

39 *Risk reduction* – actions to reduce the likelihood, negative consequences or both associated with a risk.

40 *Risk sharing* – the act of sharing a burden of loss or benefit of gain from a particular risk between entities.

41 *Risk treatment* – process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk. The two major risk  
42 treatments for the enhanced greenhouse effect are adaptation and mitigation measures.

43 *Vulnerability* – the extent to which a person or group is susceptible to harm or loss from exposure  
44  
45




1 **Table 2.2: Common Elements of approaches to undertaking CCIAV assessments**

<b>Elements</b>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Spatial scale</i>	
Global (top-down)	Begins at the global scale, yields results at a regional or local scale
Local (bottom-up)	Begins at the local scale, results can be aggregated to a larger scale
<i>Subject matter</i>	
(Natural) Hazard (scenario-driven)	Begins with the drivers of change moving through to stresses on system functioning, , impacts and responses; Drivers-Pressure-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) framework
Vulnerability/critical threshold (downside)	Assesses vulnerability (e.g. critical thresholds) then assesses likelihood of exceedence and/or measures to reduce vulnerability
Resilience/sustainable state (upside)	Defines a successful outcome or state, then establishes how to achieve that under climate change
Policy	Assesses an existing policy or set of actions, then determines how they fare under climate change
<i>Temporal</i>	
Exploratory (projection/ conditional forecast)	Projects forward in time (transient and time slice methods)
Normative (goal-oriented)	Explores a goal then diagnoses pathways towards that goal
<i>Research methods</i>	
Qualitative	Mathematical modelling approaches, data collection
Quantitative	Stakeholder elicitation, narrative approaches, risk perception
<i>Involvement</i>	
Stakeholders	May range from stakeholder information sessions through to stakeholders initiating and conducting assessments
Public at large	Communication strategy to disseminate results and lessons learnt

2  
3  
4 A further development is the linking of current climate, impacts, adaptations and vulnerability to  
5 potential future climate, impacts, adaptations and vulnerability. This recognises that adaptation to  
6 current climate is the basis from which future adaptations will take place (Mirza 2003b; Jones and  
7 Boer 2005). Figure 2.1 shows the major elements of the CCIAV assessment process, and relates the  
8 three major approaches described above to both current and future climate. The left-hand side of the  
9 figure emphasises the importance of assessing a range of historical and current factors, progressing  
10 well beyond the construction of baseline climate data. Baseline adaptation, existing adaptive  
11 capacity and adaptations to historically experienced climate risks are all utilised, especially when  
12 they have been developed to deal with climate variability and extremes.

13  
14 The first, standard approach is labelled a natural hazards approach, where climate scenarios are  
15 projected through impact models to assess outcomes. The natural hazards approach is so named  
16 after the process used in the discipline of the same name, which identifies the hazard, assesses its  
17 likelihood and impact before going on to define vulnerability. Treatment can then reduce the  
18 consequences of an event (e.g. adaptation), or modify the event itself (e.g. mitigation). The second,  
19 vulnerability-based approach addresses the socio-economic context in which climate change occurs,  
20 then seeks to maximise potential benefits and minimise or reverse potential losses. Vulnerability  
21 concentrates on the downside of risk (see Table 2.2) whereas a resilience-based approach focuses  
22 on adaptation and adaptive capacity. The third, policy-based or normative approach focuses on how  
23 current or proposed policies and plans may be able to cope with climate change and how they may  
24 be modified to better meet their objectives (Table 2.3). Chapters 17 (adaptation options) and 20  
25 (climate change and sustainability) are mainly concerned with these approaches at the local level,  
26 whereas chapter 19 looks at key vulnerabilities and risks.

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**Figure 2.1:** Flow chart showing relationship of different assessment approaches with the process of assessing current and future climate risks. Though highly simplified, the arrows aim to highlight how simple pathways through the assessment, cross-links and inverse methods are all possible, depending on the scope and context of the assessment.

**Table 2.3:** Summary of approaches to CCAV assessments showing characteristics of the assessment and criteria affecting the choice of approach (based on UNDP 2005).

Approach	Natural hazard-driven	Vulnerability/Resilience-driven	Policy-driven
Objectives	What risks may we face under this projected scenario(s)?	What is the likelihood that a specific place, process, group or activity may be harmed and how do we reduce that level of harm?	How will our current plans for the future be affected by climate change?
Analytical method	Analyse possible outcomes from a given climate hazard(s) ± other drivers of change. Assess actions that may reduce consequences.	Determine the likelihood that current or desired vulnerability may be affected by future climate hazards. Assess ability to withstand shocks, recover from setbacks and manage change.	Assess the efficacy of an existing or proposed policy under climate change. Assess actions that will improve policy effectiveness.
Outcomes	An understanding of current/future climate-related risks and measures to manage those risk	Understanding of exposure to harm and harmful processes. Better knowledge of coping mechanisms and socio-political institutions, barriers to adaptation, increased benefits	Fitter policy under climate change
Scenario types	Exploratory scenarios of climate with other biophysical and socio-economic conditions	Characterisation of socio-economic states; can use scenarios or assess drivers through inverse methods. Baseline adaptation, adaptation analogues from history, other locations other activities	Unmanaged climate change impacts and vulnerability
Criteria influencing choice of method	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Probabilities of hazard constrained</li> <li>• Main drivers known</li> <li>• Chain of consequences understood</li> <li>• P(Hazard) × Consequences</li> <li>• Largely exploratory</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Probabilities of hazard not constrained</li> <li>• Many drivers resulting in vulnerability</li> <li>• Multiple pathways and feedbacks</li> <li>• P(Vulnerability)/Hazard (e.g. critical threshold exceedence)</li> <li>• Largely normative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy aims sensitive to climate change</li> <li>• Desire to "mainstream" adaptation</li> </ul>

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#### 2.2.1.4 *Formalising the risk management approach for use in CCIAV*

Risk management is defined as the culture, processes and structures directed towards realising potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects (AS/NZS 2004). Risk is generally measured as likelihood × consequence (Box 2.1). This definition is also appropriate in guiding adaptation to climate change-related risks. There may be more than one event, while consequences can range from positive to negative and probabilities and consequences can be measured qualitatively or quantitatively (ISO/IEC 2002).

Risk management frameworks contain all of the characteristics that have also been deemed necessary for CCIAV assessment. Frameworks for adaptation assessment that utilise a risk management framework have been produced by Jones (2001), Willows (2003) and UNDP (2005). Figure 2.2 shows the UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework and the UKCIP Risk Assessment Framework (Willows and Connell 2003).

Some of the standard elements within the risk management process that can be linked to parallel CCIAV methods are:

- A scoping exercise, where the context of the assessment is established. This identifies the overall approach to be used.
- Risk identification, where the system of interest (exposure unit), its key elements considered to be at risk, the main climate and non-climate factors to which the receptors are sensitive (scenarios) and levels of acceptable risk are identified.
- Risk analysis, where the consequences and their likelihood are analysed. This is a highly developed area with a wide range of available methods to undertake impact analysis.
- Risk evaluation, where adaptation and/or mitigation methods are prioritised.
- Risk treatment, where selected adaptation and/or mitigation measures are applied, with follow-up monitoring and review.

Two over-arching activities are communication and consultation with stakeholders and monitoring and review, which in CCIAV assessments are largely concerned with addressing the needs for uncertainty management and ensuring clarity and transparency surrounding the assumptions and concepts being used.


### 2.2.2 *Methods for characterising the future*

#### 2.2.2.1 *Why and how do we characterise future conditions?*


Evaluations of future climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability require assumptions about how future socio-economic and biophysical conditions will develop, whether explicit or implicit. Literature in the CCIAV field and methods of characterising the future have grown in tandem, but these methods have not been defined consistently across different research communities. Box 2.2 presents a consistent typology of characterisations that expands on the definitions presented in the TAR (Carter *et al.* 2001). Although they may overlap, different types of characterisations of the future can be usefully distinguished in terms of their plausibility and ascription of likelihood on the one hand, and the comprehensiveness of their representation on the other (see Box 2.2 for definitions). Since the TAR, comprehensiveness has increased and ascriptions of likelihood have become more common.

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(a) UKCIP Framework




(b) UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework



**Figure 2.2:** Comparison of (a) UKCIP decision-making framework for climate change risk (Willows and Connell 2003) with (b) the UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework (UNDP 2005). Note: the analysis is iterative in the former and builds upwards in the latter.

**Box 2.2: Definitions of characterisations of the future**

Figure B2.2.1 illustrates the categories of characterisations of the future most commonly used in CCIAV studies. They are distinguished according to comprehensiveness and plausibility.



**Figure B2.2.1: Characterisations of the future**

*Comprehensiveness* primarily indicates the degree to which a characterisation of the future captures the various aspects of the integrated socio-economic-biophysical system it aims to represent. Secondly, it indicates the detail with which any single element is characterised.

*Plausibility* is a subjective measure of whether a characterisation of the future is possible. Implausible futures are assumed to have zero or negligible likelihood. Plausible futures can be further distinguished by whether a specific likelihood is ascribed or not.

*Artificial experiment.* A characterisation of the future constructed without regard to plausibility (and hence often implausible), but that still follows a coherent logic in order to study a process or communicate an insight. Such artificial experiments range in comprehensiveness from simple thought experiments to detailed integrated modelling studies.

*Sensitivity analysis.* Sensitivity analyses employ characterisations that involve arbitrary or mechanical adjustments of one or several variables relative to a reference case. These characterisations may be implausible or within plausible limits, but the primary intention is to explore model sensitivity to inputs, possibly to help assess the uncertainty in an outcome.

*Analogues.* Analogues are based on current or past conditions that exhibit similarities to characterisations of the future obtained for a study region using other methods. These may have plausibility in respect to a limited set of details but may be implausible in other respects.

*Scenarios.* A scenario is a coherent, internally consistent and plausible description of a possible future state of the world (IPCC 1994; Nakićenović *et al.* 2000; Carter *et al.* 2001; Raskin *et al.* 2005). Scenarios are not predictions or forecasts but are alternative images without ascribed likelihoods, of how the future might unfold. They may be qualitative, quantitative, or both. An

1 over-arching logic often relates several components of a scenario, for example a *storyline* and/or  
2 *projections* of particular elements of a system. *Exploratory (or descriptive)* scenarios describe how  
3 the future might unfold according to known processes of change, or as extrapolations of past trends  
4 (Carter *et al.* 2001). *Normative (or prescriptive)* scenarios describe a pre-specified future, either  
5 optimistic, pessimistic or neutral (Alcamo 2001), and a set of actions that might be required to  
6 achieve (or avoid) it. Such scenarios are often developed using an *inverse modelling approach*, by  
7 defining constraints not to be exceeded and then diagnosing plausible combinations of the  
8 underlying conditions that satisfy those constraints (see chapter 3, WG III).

9  
10 *Storylines*. Storylines are qualitative, but internally consistent, narratives of how future worlds may  
11 evolve and describe the principal trends in socio-political-economic drivers of change and the  
12 relationships between these drivers. Storylines may be self standing, but more often they underpin  
13 quantitative projections of future change that, together with the storyline, constitute a scenario.

14  
15 *Projection*. In general usage a projection is regarded as any description of the future and the  
16 pathway leading to it. However, here we define a projection as a model-derived estimate of future  
17 conditions related to one element of an integrated system (e.g., an emissions projection, a climate  
18 projection, an economic growth projection). Projections are thus, by definition, generally less  
19 comprehensive than scenarios, even if the projection of an element is influenced by other elements.  
20 In addition, projections may be probabilistic while scenarios do not ascribe likelihoods.

21  
22 *Probabilistic futures*. Futures with ascribed likelihoods are probabilistic. The degree to which the  
23 future is characterised in probabilistic terms can vary widely. For example, conditional probabilistic  
24 futures treat some uncertainties probabilistically, conditional on deterministic assumptions about  
25 the future of other uncertain elements of the system. Assigned probabilities may be partial and can  
26 also be qualitative rather than quantitative.

27  
28  
29  
30 The following sections make use of the typology in Box 2.2 to address notable advances in methods  
31 of characterising the future.

### 32 33 2.2.2.2 *Artificial experiments*

34  
35 The most significant advance in artificial experiments since the TAR is the development of a new  
36 set of *commitment runs*. These are climate change projections that assume that the radiative forcing  
37 at a particular point in time (often the current forcing) is held constant into the future (see chapter  
38 10, WG I). The projections demonstrate time lags in the climate system: under conditions of  
39 changing radiative forcing, some fraction of the climate change that would eventually result has not  
40 yet been realized. This lag in climate response is induced by the delayed penetration of heat into  
41 the oceans (Hoffert *et al.* 1980; Hansen *et al.* 1985; Wigley and Raper 1993; Church *et al.* 2001)  
42 and, for sea level response, the dynamics of ice sheets. Recent experiments estimate the global  
43 mean annual warming commitment associated with radiative forcing in 2000 of about 0.5°C by  
44 2100 (WG I, chapter 10). Sea level rise due to thermal expansion of the oceans responds much more  
45 slowly, on a timescale of millennia; committed sea level rise to 2300 has been estimated at between  
46 5 and 25 cm per century (WG I, chapter 10), not including contributions from glaciers, ice caps, and  
47 ice sheets. However, commitment runs are unrealistic because they exceed the limits of plausible  
48 mitigation scenarios (see chapter 3, WG III). They are therefore inappropriate baselines for impact  
49 assessment, except to assess impacts seen as inevitable (Parry *et al.* 1998).

### 50 51 2.2.2.3 *Sensitivity analysis*

1  
2 Sensitivity analysis is commonly applied in many model-based CCIAV studies to investigate the  
3 behaviour of a system assuming arbitrary, often regularly spaced, adjustments in important driving  
4 variables. It has become a standard technique in assessing sensitivity to climatic variations,  
5 enabling the construction of impact response surfaces over multivariate climate space (e.g. van  
6 Minnen *et al.* 2000; Miller *et al.* 2003). Response surfaces are increasingly constructed in  
7 combination with probabilistic representations of future climate to assess risk of impact (see section  
8 2.2.3.1). Sensitivity analysis has also been used as a device for studying land use change, by  
9 applying arbitrary adjustments to areas, such as + 10% forest, -10% cropland, where these area  
10 changes are either spatially explicit (Shackley and Deanwood 2003) or not (Ott and Uhlenbrook  
11 2004; van Beek and van Asch 2004; Vaze *et al.* 2004).

#### 12 13 2.2.2.4 Analogues

14  
15 Temporal and spatial analogues are applied in a range of CCIAV studies. The most common of  
16 recently reported analogues are historical extreme weather-related events. These correspond to  
17 events that may recur more frequently under anthropogenic climate change requiring some form of  
18 adaptation measure. Examples of such analogues judged likely or very likely by the end of the  
19 century (Table 11.3, chapter 11, WG I) include: the European 2003 heatwave (see Box 2.2),  
20 wildfires associated with continental summer drying in Colorado in 2002 (see chapter 14) and the  
21 Iberian peninsula in 2005 (Moreno *et al.* 2005), flooding (related to more intense summer  
22 precipitation) in Bangladesh (Mirza 2003a) and Norway (Næss *et al.* 2005). Examples of potential  
23 analogues for which supporting evidence is currently uncertain (chapters 10 and 11, WG I) include  
24 intense precipitation and flooding events in central Europe (Kundzewicz *et al.* in press) and El  
25 Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)-related events (Glantz 2001; Heslop-Thomas *et al.* submitted;  
26 Desanker *et al.* submitted; Sanjak *et al.* submitted).

27  
28 Spatial analogues have also been applied in CCIAV analysis. For example, projected climates by  
29 the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in selected European cities have been likened to current climates in  
30 analogue cities as a heuristic device for analysing economic impacts and adaptation requirements  
31 under a changing climate (Hallegatte *et al.* submitted). A variant of the approach is to seek  
32 projected climates that have no present-day climatic analogues (novel climates) or regions where  
33 present-day climates are no longer to be found in the future (disappearing climates – Williams *et al.*  
34 submitted). Using recent global AOGCM projections (e.g. see chapter 10, WG I), novel climates  
35 were found in 18% of land areas for the A2 scenario and 5% for the B1 scenario, with the highest  
36 incidence in Africa and South America and the lowest in Eurasia and North America. Disappearing  
37 climates were found on tropical mountains and the poleward side of continents. These results were  
38 linked to possible risks to ecological systems and biodiversity.

#### 39 40 2.2.2.5 Scenarios and storylines

41  
42 Advances in scenario development since the TAR address issues of consistency and comparability  
43 between global drivers of change, and regional scenarios required for CCIAV assessment.  
44 Numerous methods of downscaling from global to sub-global scale are emerging (see later  
45 sections), some relying on the narrative storylines underpinning the global scenarios.

46  
47 Storylines for CCIAV studies are increasingly adopting a multi-sectoral and multi-stressor approach  
48 (Holman *et al.* 2005b; Holman *et al.* 2005a) over multiple scales (Kok *et al.* 2006a; Alcamo *et al.*  
49 2005; Lebel *et al.* 2005; Westhoek *et al.* 2006b) and including stakeholder elicitation (Kok *et al.*  
50 2006b). As they have become more comprehensive, the increased complexity and richness of the  
51 information they contain has assisted in the interpretation of adaptive capacity and vulnerability

1 (Metzger *et al.* 2006). Storyline development is also subjective, however, so more comprehensive  
2 storylines can have alternative interpretations that are equally plausible (Rounsevell *et al.* 2006).  
3 The concept of a "region", for example, may be interpreted within a storyline in different ways – as  
4 world regions, nation states or sub-national administrative units. This may have profound  
5 implications for how storylines are characterised at local scale, limiting their reproducibility and  
6 credibility (Abildtrup *et al.* 2006). The alternative is to link a locally sourced storyline, regarded as  
7 credible at that scale, to a global scenario.

8  
9 Storylines can be an endpoint in their own right (e.g. Rotmans *et al.* 2000), but often provide the  
10 basis for quantitative scenarios. Models using input parameters interpreted from the qualitative  
11 storylines follow the SAS (storyline and simulation) approach (Alcamo 2001). Parameter estimation  
12 is often subjective, using expert judgment, although more objective methods, such as pairwise  
13 comparison, have been used to improve internal consistency (Abildtrup *et al.* 2006). Analogues and  
14 stakeholder elicitation have also been used for parameter estimation (e.g. Berger and Bolte 2004;  
15 Kok *et al.* 2006a; Rotmans *et al.* 2000). Participatory approaches are important in reconciling a  
16 given long-term scenario framework with the shorter-term and particular policy-driven  
17 requirements of stakeholders (Shackley and Deanwood 2003; Velázquez *et al.* 2001; Lebel *et al.*  
18 2005).

19  
20 Five classes of scenarios relevant to CCIAV analysis were distinguished in the TAR: climate, sea  
21 level, socio-economic, land use and land cover, and other (non climatic) environmental scenarios  
22 (Carter *et al.* 2001), with climate scenarios covered in more depth by (Mearns *et al.* 2001). The  
23 following sections describe recent progress in the methods applied in each of these classes as well  
24 as in three new categories on future technology, adaptation scenarios and singular events with  
25 widespread consequences.

#### 26 27 2.2.2.6 *Development and application of high resolution climate scenarios*

28  
29 The development and application of scenarios from high resolution climate models since the TAR  
30 confirms that improved resolution allows a more realistic representation of the response of climate  
31 to fine scale topographic features (lakes, mountains, coastlines), and that impact models will often  
32 produce different results depending on whether scenarios are based on high resolution or direct  
33 GCM outputs (e.g. Arnell *et al.* 2003; Mearns *et al.* 2003; Leung *et al.* 2004; Stone *et al.* 2003;  
34 Wood *et al.* 2004). However, most experiments still rely on only one driving AOGCM and only one  
35 or two regional climate models (RCMs).

36  
37 The recent development of more elaborate and extensive AOGCM-RCM programmes permits the  
38 exploration of multiple uncertainties (across different RCMs, AOGCMs, and emissions scenarios)  
39 and the effects of those uncertainties on ensuing impacts. The PRUDENCE project in Europe  
40 produced multiple RCM simulations based on two different AOGCM or AGCM simulations and  
41 two different emissions scenarios (Christensen *et al.* submitted). In the impact studies that used  
42 these simulations (e.g. Ekstrom *et al.* in press; Graham *et al.* submitted; Fronzek and Carter  
43 submitted; Hingray *et al.* in press; Olesen *et al.* submitted) uncertainties due to the spatial scale of  
44 the scenarios and resulting from different RCMS versus different GCMs were elaborated on. For  
45 example, Olesen *et al.* (submitted), using scenarios from a range of RCMs and GCMs, and two  
46 emissions scenarios, found that the variation in simulated impacts (agricultural) was smaller across  
47 RCMs nested in a single GCM than those across different GCMs or across the different emissions  
48 scenarios. Similar results were found in other PRUDENCE impact studies. However, these  
49 conclusions were drawn from an unbalanced set of experiments, i.e., most RCM groups used only  
50 one GCM (HadAM3H), for which the contrast in the scale of the GCM to the RCMs (150 km  
51 down to 50 km) was relatively small. Fewer RCM groups used the other AOGCM or both



1 emissions scenarios. Nevertheless, these types of analyses can indicate more efficient use of  
 2 resources for scenario development based on where the largest uncertainties are found. For  
 3 example, using the experience of PRUDENCE, a North American climate scenarios program  
 4 (NARCCAP) is producing a more balanced set of experiments across four GCMs and six RCMs  
 5 (Mearns *et al.* 2005).

6  
 7 The construction of higher resolution scenarios (now often finer than 50 km), has encouraged new  
 8 types of impact studies to be undertaken. For example, studies examining the combined impacts of  
 9 increased heat stress and air pollution are now more feasible because the resolution of regional  
 10 climate models is converging with that of air quality models (e.g. Hogrefe *et al.* 2004). Finally,  
 11 scenarios developed from RCMs (e.g. UKMO 2001) are now being used in many more regions of  
 12 the world, particularly the developing world (e.g. Gao *et al.* 2003; Anyah and Semazzi 2004; Arnell  
 13 *et al.* 2003; Rupa Kumar *et al.* 2006; Government of India 2004). Results of these regional  
 14 modelling experiments are found in WG I, chapter 11.

15  
 16 Much additional work has been produced using methods of statistical downscaling (SD) for climate  
 17 scenario generation (Wilby *et al.* 2004 and see WG I, chapter 11). Various SD techniques have been  
 18 used in downscaling directly to (physically based) impacts and to a greater variety of climate  
 19 variables, including extremes of variables. For example, Wang (2004) and Caires (2005) have  
 20 developed non-stationary extreme value models for projecting changes in wave height.

21  
 22 While statistical downscaling has mostly been used to develop climate change scenarios at single  
 23 locations, Hewitson (2003) developed empirical downscaling for point scale precipitation at  
 24 numerous sites across the continent of Africa and on a 0.1 degree resolution grid over Africa.  
 25 Finally, the wider availability of statistical downscaling tools is being reflected in wider  
 26 application; for example the Statistical Downscaling Model (SDSM) tool of Wilby (2002), which  
 27 has been used to produce scenarios for islands in the Caribbean (Chen *et al.* 2004) and for the River  
 28 Thames basin (Wilby and Harris 2006).

29  
 30 **2.2.2.7 Sea level scenarios**

31  
 32 One of the major impacts projected under global warming is sea-level rise. Klein (1999) suggested  
 33 three levels of analysis for sea-level rise impacts, which demand increasingly sophisticated  
 34 scenarios (Figure 2.3).

35  
 36  
 37

Type of assessment	Purpose of assessment	Needs for sea level rise scenarios
Screening assessment	To determine the sensitivity to sea level rise	Arbitrary sea level rise scenarios
Vulnerability assessment	To understand the potential impacts of sea level rise	A range of global projections of sea level rise superimposed on local information about vertical land movements
Planning assessment	To develop adaptive responses to sea level rise	A range of sea level rise scenarios accounting for global, regional, and local processes contributing to sea level rise at local scale

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47 **Figure 2.3:** Types of assessment and their requirements for sea-level rise scenarios (after Klein and  
 48 Nicholls 1999)

49  
 50  
 51 Basic techniques for developing sea level scenarios were described in the TAR (Carter *et al.* 2001).

1 Since the TAR, there have been refinements to methods that account more effectively for regional  
2 and local factors affecting sea level and in so doing, presenting scenarios that are more relevant for  
3 planning purposes. Two main types of scenarios are distinguished here: regional sea level scenarios  
4 and scenarios of storm surges. A third type, characterising abrupt sea level rise, is described in  
5 section 2.2.2.12. Analogue approaches have also been reported (e.g. Arenstam Gibbons and  
6 Nicholls 2006). More details on sea level and sea level scenarios can be found in chapters 5 and 10  
7 of the WG I report and chapter 6 of this report.

8  
9 *Regional sea level scenarios.* Sea level does not change uniformly across the world due to climate  
10 change: different rates of oceanic thermal expansion and region-specific changes in oceanic and  
11 atmospheric circulation affect the level of the sea surface differently, giving rise in AOGCM  
12 simulations to regional departures of up to 50% from global-mean sea-level rise (Church *et al.*  
13 2001). Moreover, account also needs to be taken of the long-term, non-climate related trend, usually  
14 associated with vertical land movements that affect relative sea level.

15  
16 To account for regional variations, Hulme (2002) recommends applying the range of global-mean  
17 scenarios  $\pm 50\%$  change. Alternative approaches utilise scenario generators. The Dynamic  
18 Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) model computes relative sea-level rise scenarios  
19 using either global-mean or regional patterns of sea-level rise scenarios from a climate model of  
20 intermediate complexity, CLIMBER-2 (Petoukhov *et al.* 2000; Ganopolski *et al.* 2001).  
21 CLIMsystems (2005) have developed a software tool that rapidly generates place-based future  
22 scenarios of sea-level change during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, accounting for contributing factors at global,  
23 regional, and local scales. Spatial patterns of sea-level rise from thermal expansion and ocean  
24 processes taken from AOGCM simulations with global-mean sea-level rise projections from simple  
25 climate models through the pattern-scaling technique (Santer *et al.* 1990). Users are required to  
26 input a value for the local sea-level trends to account for local land movements.

27  
28 *Storm surge scenarios.* Several studies stress the importance of characterising high impact, extreme  
29 sea level events. In many locations, the risk of extreme sea levels is poorly constrained even under  
30 present-day climatic conditions, due to sparse tide gauge networks and relatively short records of  
31 high measurement frequency. Where such records do exist, detectable trends are highly dependent  
32 on local conditions (Woodworth and Blackman 2004). Chapter 6 of this report summarises several  
33 recent studies, one method using a combination of stochastic sampling and dynamical modelling  
34 (Box 6.2).. Scenarios may also be developed by downscaled regional climate predictions from  
35 global climate models which are used to drive barotropic storm surge models (Lowe and Gregory  
36 2005). These analyses suggest that extreme water level scenarios may differ from relative sea-level  
37 rise scenarios.

#### 38 39 2.2.2.8 *Socio-economic scenarios*

40  
41 Socio-economic changes are key drivers of projected changes in future emissions and climate so are  
42 key determinants of most climate change impacts, potential adaptations and vulnerability (Malone  
43 and La Rovere 2005). CCI/V studies increasingly include scenarios of changing socio-economic  
44 conditions, which can substantially alter assessments of the effects of future climate change (Parry  
45 2004; Schröter *et al.* 2005; Alcamo *et al.* submitted). Typically these assessments require  
46 information at the sub-national level, whereas many scenarios are developed at a broader scale,  
47 thereby necessitating downscaling of aggregate socio-economic scenario information.

48  
49 Guidelines are presented for the analysis of current and projected socio-economic conditions as part  
50 of the UNDP APF (Malone and La Rovere 2005). They advocate the use of indicators to  
51 characterise socio-economic conditions and prospects, concepts which can often be too abstract to

1 be easily measured. Five categories of indicators are suggested: demographic analysis economic  
2 analysis, natural resource use, analysis of governance and policy, and cultural analysis. Most recent  
3 studies have focused on the first two of these.

4  
5 The sensitivity of climate change effects to socio-economic conditions was highlighted by a series  
6 of multi-sector impact assessments (Parry *et al.* 1999; Parry *et al.* 2001; Parry 2004 – Table 2.4).  
7 The first two relied on only a single representation of future socio-economic conditions (IS92a),  
8 comparing effects of mitigated versus unmitigated climate change (Arnell *et al.* 2002; Nicholls and  
9 Lowe 2004). The third set considered four alternative SRES-based development pathways (see  
10 section 2.3.1.1, below), finding that these assumptions are often a stronger determinant of impacts  
11 than climate change itself (Arnell *et al.* 2004; Levy *et al.* 2004; Arnell 2004; Parry *et al.* 2004;  
12 Nicholls 2004; van Lieshout *et al.* 2004). For example, the number of people estimated to be living  
13 in water stressed areas (Arnell 2004) or at risk of hunger (Parry *et al.* 2004; Goklany 2005) depends  
14 much more on the assumed development pathway than it does on the effect of climate change.  
15 Furthermore, climate impacts can themselves depend on the development pathway (see chapters 17  
16 and 20), emphasising the limited value of impact assessments of human systems that do not account  
17 for possible socio-economic changes.

18  
19 **Table 2.4:** Key features of scenarios underlying three global-scale multi-scale assessments (Parry  
20 *et al.* 1999; Arnell *et al.* 2002; Parry 2004).

	<b>Impacts of unmitigated emissions</b>	<b>Impacts of stabilisation of CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations</b>	<b>Impacts of SRES emissions scenarios</b>
<b>Emissions scenarios</b>	IS92a (1% per increase in CO <sub>2</sub> -equivalent concentrations per year from 1990)	S750 and S550	Four SRES emissions scenarios: A1FI, A2, B1 and B2
<b>Climate scenarios</b>	Derived from four ensemble HadCM2 simulations and one HadCM3 simulation forced with IS92a emissions scenarios	Derived from HadCM2 experiments assuming stabilisation of CO <sub>2</sub> at 550 and 750 ppm; comparison with IS92a.	Derived from HadCM3 ensemble experiments (number in brackets): A1FI (1), A2 (3), B1 (1) and B2 (2)
<b>Socio-economic scenarios</b>	IS92a consistent GDP and population projections	IS92a consistent GDP and population projections	SRES-based socio-economic projections

21  
22  
23 The advantages of being able to directly link regional socio-economic futures to scenarios and  
24 storylines are being recognised. For example, the SRES scenarios have been used as a basis for  
25 developing storylines and quantitative scenarios at national (Carter *et al.* 2004; Carter *et al.* 2005;  
26 van Vuuren *et al.* submitted) and sub-national (Berkhout *et al.* 2002; Shackley and Deanwood  
27 2003; Solecki and Oliveri 2004; Heslop-Thomas and Bailey 2004) scales. The content of  
28 downscaled storylines depends on information needs for a particular application. For example, four  
29 sub-national storylines for northern Nigeria that included qualitative demographic and economic  
30 trends, the nature of governance, policy, and social and cultural values were developed (Nyong *et al.*  
31 2004). In contrast, most regional studies in the AIACC (Assessments of Impacts and  
32 Adaptations to Climate Change in Multiple Regions and Sectors) research programme<sup>2</sup> adopted a  
33 participatory, sometimes *ad hoc*, approach to socio-economic scenario development utilising  
34 current trends in key socio-economic indicators and stakeholder consultation (e.g. Heslop-Thomas  
35 and Bailey 2004; Pulhin *et al.* 2004).

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.aiaccproject.org>

1 Methods for downscaling quantitative socio-economic information have focused on population and  
2 gross domestic product (GDP). Initial but crude methods to downscale population growth have been  
3 replaced by methods of regional differentiation (van Vuuren and O'Neill submitted; Grüber *et al.*  
4 submitted). Methods of downscaling to the sub-national level have included: unrealistic assumptions  
5 that population changes everywhere within a country at the same rate (Gaffin *et al.* 2004; van Vuuren  
6 and O'Neill submitted), simple rules for preferential growth in coastal areas (Nicholls 2004),  
7 extrapolations of recent trends at the grid cell level (Gaffin *et al.* submitted), and scenario-dependent  
8 algorithms leading to preferential growth in urban areas (Grüber *et al.* submitted).

9  
10 Downscaling approaches for GDP are also evolving. The first downscaled SRES GDP assumptions  
11 applied regional growth rates uniformly to all countries within the region (Gaffin *et al.* 2004) without  
12 accounting for country-specific differences in initial conditions and growth expectations. New  
13 methods specify scenario-dependent convergence assumptions across countries, an approach that  
14 avoids implausibly high growth for rich countries in developing regions (van Vuuren and O'Neill  
15 submitted; Grüber *et al.* submitted). GDP scenarios have also been downscaled to the grid level,  
16 either by assuming constant shares of GDP in each grid cell (Gaffin *et al.* 2004; van Vuuren and  
17 O'Neill submitted) or through scenario dependent sub-national algorithms (Grüber *et al.* submitted).

#### 18 19 2.2.2.9 Land use scenarios

20  
21 Many CCIAV studies need to account for future changes in land use and land cover. This is  
22 especially important for regional studies of agriculture and water resources (Barlage *et al.* 2002;  
23 Klöcking *et al.* 2003), forestry (Bhadwal and Singh 2002) and ecosystems (Bennett *et al.* 2003;  
24 Cumming *et al.* 2005; Dirnbock *et al.* 2003; Zebisch *et al.* 2004), but also has a large influence on  
25 regional patterns of demography and economic activity (Geurs and van Eck 2003) and associated  
26 problems of environmental degradation (Yang *et al.* 2003) and pollution (Bathurst *et al.* 2005).  
27 Land use and land cover change scenarios have also been used to analyse forcing to the climate  
28 system (DeFries *et al.* 2002; Leemans *et al.* 2002; Maynard and Royer 2004) and the emissions of  
29 GHGs (El-Fadel *et al.* 2002; Fearnside 2000; Sands and Leimbach 2003).

30  
31 The TAR concluded that Integrated Assessment Models (IAMS) were the most appropriate method  
32 for the development of land use change scenarios, and this remains the case for global scale studies.  
33 Since the TAR, however, a number of new models have emerged that provide new insights into  
34 regional land use change. Comparative studies across similar scenarios (e.g. Busch 2006) have shown  
35 that IAMS can generate land use changes that are very different to those from regional land use  
36 models, often with opposing directions of change. This is analogous to the observation for global and  
37 regional climate models discussed in section 2.2.2.6. The need, however, to define exogenous input  
38 variables to regional scale land use scenario analyses remains a challenge (e.g. Alcamo *et al.* 2006;  
39 Sands and Edmonds 2005) and IAMS have an important role to play in characterising the global  
40 boundary conditions for regional land use change assessments (van Meijl *et al.* 2006).

41  
42 Regional scale land use models often adopt a two-phase (nested scale) approach with an assessment  
43 of aggregate quantities of land use for the entire region followed by 'downscaling' procedures to  
44 create regional land-use patterns. Aggregate quantities are often based on IAMS or economic  
45 models such as General Equilibrium models (van Meijl *et al.* 2006) or input/output approaches  
46 (Fischer and Sun 2001). Methods of downscaling vary considerably and include proportional  
47 approaches to estimate regional from global scenarios (Arnell *et al.* 2004), regional scale economic  
48 models (Fischer and Sun 2001), spatial allocation procedures based on rules (Rounsevell *et al.*  
49 2006), micro-simulation with cellular automata (de Nijs *et al.* 2004; Solecki and Oliveri 2004),  
50 linear programming models (Holman *et al.* 2005b; Holman *et al.* 2005a) or empirical-statistical  
51 techniques (Verburg *et al.* in press; de Koning *et al.* 1999; Verburg *et al.* 2002). An emerging

1 method is the use of Agent-Based Models (ABM) to address climate change impacts on land use, as  
2 well as decision processes of adaptation and vulnerability assessment (Alcamo *et al.* 2006; Acosta-  
3 Michlik and Rounsevell 2005).

4  
5 Most land use scenario assessments are based on mean trends in socio-economic and climate  
6 change baselines, although responses to extreme weather events such as hurricane Mitch in Central  
7 America have also been assessed (Kok and Winograd 2002). Probabilistic approaches in the  
8 development of land use futures are rare with the exception being the effects of uncertainty in  
9 alternative representations of land use change for hydrological variables (Eckhardt *et al.* 2003). Not  
10 all land use scenario exercises have addressed the effects of climate change even though they  
11 consider time frames over which a changing climate would be important. This may reflect a  
12 perceived lack of sensitivity to climate variables (e.g. studies on urban land use Allen and Lu 2003;  
13 Barredo *et al.* 2003; Barredo *et al.* 2004; Loukopoulos and Scholz 2004), or is an omission within  
14 the analysis (Ahn *et al.* 2002; Berger and Bolte 2004).

#### 15 16 2.2.2.10 *Scenarios of future technology*

17  
18 The importance of technology has been highlighted specifically for land use change (Ewert *et al.*  
19 2005; Rounsevell *et al.* 2005; Rounsevell *et al.* 2006; Abildtrup *et al.* 2006) and for ecosystem  
20 service changes, such as agricultural production, water management or climate regulation (Nelson  
21 *et al.* 2005). Technological change is also a principal driver of change for GHG emissions. Since  
22 the TAR, scenarios addressing different technology pathways for climate change mitigation and  
23 adaptation have increased in number (see chapter 3, WG III). Technological change can be treated  
24 as an exogenous factor to the economic system or be endogenously driven through economic and  
25 political incentives. More work is needed, but recent modelling exercises are representing theories  
26 on technical and institutional innovation, such as the "Induced Innovation Theory", in scenario  
27 development (Grübler *et al.* 1999; Grubb *et al.* 2002).

28  
29 For integrated global scenario exercises, the rate and magnitude of technological development is  
30 often based on expert judgements and mental models. Storyline assumptions are then used to  
31 modify the input parameters of environmental models (e.g. for ecosystems, land use or climate)  
32 prior to conducting model simulations (e.g. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Ewert *et al.*  
33 2005). Such an approach is useful in demonstrating the relative sensitivity of different systems to  
34 technological change, but the role of technology remains a key uncertainty in characterisations of  
35 the future. In particular, questions such as the uptake and diffusion of new technologies deserve  
36 greater attention. Only a few studies have tackled technology, suggesting an imbalance in the  
37 treatment of environmental change drivers within many CCI/V scenario studies which future work  
38 should seek to redress.

#### 39 40 2.2.2.11 *Adaptation scenarios*

41  
42 Limited attention has been paid to characterising alternative pathways of future adaptation.  
43 Narrative information within scenarios can assist in characterising potential adaptive responses to  
44 climate change. For instance, the ATEAM project (Schröter *et al.* 2005) identified determinants and  
45 their indicators of adaptive capacity in Europe through questionnaire survey. Empirical  
46 relationships between these indicators and population and GDP over 1960–2000 were then  
47 established. Scenarios of adaptive capacity were then inferred by applying these empirical  
48 relationships to downscaled, SRES-based GDP and population projections (see section 2.3.1,  
49 below). Nicholls (2004) also interpreted the SRES storylines to estimate the exposure of human  
50 populations to coastal flooding, using GDP per capita scenarios to estimate the future standards of  
51 coastal defences. Hijioka (2002) used the narrative description of SRES worlds in conjunction with

1 quantitative scenarios of GDP per capita to assume future changes in access to safe water in a study  
2 to estimate diarrheal incidence under climate change.

3  
4 Parry (2004) estimated future risk of hunger using a food model that makes assumptions about yield  
5 changes, food demands and trade liberalisation. Two types of adaptation strategy were  
6 incorporated: farm-level adaptation strategies, such as changes in planting date, and application of  
7 additional fertilization and irrigation, and regional-scale adaptation, where production functions in  
8 developed countries simulated yield increases due to innovations such as new cultivars and  
9 irrigation infrastructure. Other economic adjustments to the modelled yield changes were tested by  
10 a world food trade model, including increased agricultural investment, re-allocation of agricultural  
11 resources according to economic returns, and reclamation of additional arable land as a response to  
12 higher cereal prices. Future studies, following consultation with key stakeholders, are more likely to  
13 include adaptation explicitly as part of socio-economic scenario development, hence offering the  
14 possibility to gauge the effectiveness of adaptation options in comparison with baseline scenarios  
15 (Holman *et al.* 2005b).

#### 16 17 2.2.2.12 *Singular events with widespread consequences*

18  
19 Singular events with widespread consequences are extreme, often irreversible changes in the earth  
20 system such as an abrupt cessation of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (MOC) or the  
21 melting of ice sheets in Greenland or West Antarctica (see chapters 8 and 10, WG I). Artificial  
22 experiments have been applied to test the impacts of the Atlantic MOC. "Hosing" experiments  
23 assuming the injection of large amounts of freshwater at high latitudes, have been conducted using  
24 AOGCMS (e.g. Vellinga and Wood 2002; Wood *et al.* 2003), inducing a MOC shutdown. Substantial  
25 reduction of greenhouse warming occurred in the Northern Hemisphere, with a net cooling occurring  
26 mostly in the North Atlantic region (Wood *et al.* 2003). Such scenarios have subsequently been  
27 applied in impact studies (Higgins and Vellinga 2004; Higgins and Schneider 2005 and see chapter  
28 19).

29  
30 Complete deglaciation of Greenland and the West Antarctica Ice Sheet (WAIS) would raise sea  
31 level by 7 m and about 5 m, respectively. One recent study assumed an extreme rate of sea level  
32 rise, 5m by 2100 (Nicholls *et al.* submitted), to test the limits of adaptation (Toth and Hizsnyik  
33 submitted; Dawson submitted; Poumadère *et al.* submitted; Olsthoorn *et al.* submitted; Tol *et al.*  
34 submitted) and decision making (Guillerminet and Tol submitted; Lonsdale *et al.* submitted;  
35 Kaspersen and Bohn submitted). A second study employed a scenario of rapid sea-level rise of  
36 2.2m by 2100 by adding an ice-sheet contribution to the highest IPCC projection for the period  
37 (Cubasch *et al.* 2001), with the increase continuing unabated after 2100 (Arnell *et al.* 2005). Both  
38 studies describe the potential impacts of such a scenario in Europe, based on expert assessments.

#### 39 40 2.2.2.13 *Integrating scenarios*

41  
42 The widespread adoption of SRES-based scenarios in studies described in this report (see section  
43 2.3.1, below) acknowledges the desirability of seeking consistent scenario application across  
44 different studies and regions. For instance, SRES-based downscaled socio-economic projections  
45 were used in conjunction with SRES-derived climate scenarios in a set of global impact studies  
46 (Arnell *et al.* 2004 see section 2.2.2.8). At a regional scale, the European ATEAM project  
47 developed multiple scenarios for the main global change drivers (socio-economic factors,  
48 atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration, climate factors, land use and technology), based on interpretations  
49 of the global IPCC SRES storylines (Schröter *et al.* 2005 – see section 2.3.1.6, below).

50  
51 Nationally, scenarios of socio-economic development (Kaivo-oja *et al.* 2004), climate (Jylhä *et al.*

1 2004), sea level (Johansson *et al.* 2004), surface ozone exposure (Laurila *et al.* 2004), and sulphur  
2 and nitrogen deposition (Syri *et al.* 2004) were developed for Finland in the FINSKEN project.  
3 Though the SRES driving factors were used as an integrating framework, downscaling from global  
4 scenarios alone was not sufficient to ensure mutual consistency between scenario types, as this  
5 ignored important regional dependencies (e.g. between climate change and air pollution and  
6 between air pressure and sea level Carter *et al.* 2004). Similar exercises have also been conducted at  
7 sub-national scale in the east (Lorenzoni *et al.* 2000) and north-west (Holman *et al.* 2005b) of  
8 England.

9  
10 Integration across scales was emphasised in the scenarios developed for the Millennium Ecosystem  
11 Assessment (MA). A SAS approach (see section 2.2.5) was followed in developing scenarios at  
12 scales ranging from regional through national, basin and local (Lebel *et al.* 2005). Many differ  
13 greatly from the set of global MA scenarios that were also constructed (Alcamo *et al.* 2005). This is  
14 due, in part, to different stakeholders being involved in the development of scenarios at each scale,  
15 but also reflects an absence of feedbacks from the sub-global to global scales (Lebel *et al.* 2005).

#### 16 2.2.2.14 Probabilistic futures

17  
18  
19 Since the TAR, many studies have produced probabilistic representations of future climate change and  
20 socio-economic conditions suitable for use in impact assessment. Some key choices faced in these  
21 studies include which components of climate change and socio-economic inputs to quantify and how  
22 to define the input probability density functions (pdfs) for each component. Integrated approaches  
23 derive pdfs of climate change from input pdfs for emissions and for key parameters in models of  
24 greenhouse gas cycles, radiative forcing, and the climate system. The models then sample repeatedly  
25 from the uncertainty distributions for inputs and model parameters, in order to produce a pdf of  
26 outcomes, e.g. global temperature and precipitation change. Either simple climate models (e.g. Wigley  
27 and Raper 2001) or climate models of intermediate complexity (Forest *et al.* 2002) have been applied.

28  
29 The most important uncertainties to be represented in pdfs of regional climate change, the scale of  
30 greatest relevance for impact assessments, are greenhouse gas emissions, climate sensitivity and  
31 inter-model differences in climatic variables at the regional scale. Of those, pdfs for emissions have  
32 not been explicitly calculated due to the controversial nature of quantifying socio-economic futures  
33 (Grübler and Nakicenovic 2001; Lempert and Schlesinger 2001), although integrated methods  
34 contain implicit distributions (e.g. Wigley and Raper 2001; Dessai and Hulme 2001; New and  
35 Hulme 2000). All of these studies refer back to the SRES emissions scenarios, for which likelihoods  
36 were not explicitly assigned. However, probabilistic projections have also been produced  
37 independent of SRES based on expert judgment, leading to both wider (Webster *et al.* 2002) and  
38 narrower (Richels *et al.* 2004) ranges of future emissions as compared to SRES. A rapidly growing  
39 literature reporting pdfs of climate sensitivity is challenging the long-held IPCC estimate of 1.5–  
40 4.5°C for the range of global mean annual temperature change for a doubling of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>  
41 (see WG I, chapter 10 for a detailed description).

42  
43 For regional change, early work on generating regional probabilities was covered in the TAR (e.g.  
44 Jones 2000; New and Hulme 2000). A number of methods applying different weighting schemes to  
45 multi-model ensemble projections of climate have since been developed based on model  
46 performance and degree of convergence (Giorgi and Mearns 2002; Giorgi and Mearns 2003),  
47 Bayesian methods (Tebaldi *et al.* 2004 Tebaldi, 2005, Regional probabilities of precipitation;  
48 Greene *et al.* in press), and weighting models equally (Räisänen 2005) – see chapter 11, WG I for  
49 more details. Dessai (2005) sampled a wider range of uncertainty by scaling the normalized  
50 regional patterns of change from a large suite of GCMs by global mean temperature changes  
51 simulated using a simple climate model. They tested the sensitivity of probabilistic regional climate

1 changes to a range of uncertainty sources including climate sensitivity, GCM simulations, and  
2 emissions scenarios. Other groups are developing additional methods of establishing probabilities  
3 of regional climate change. For example, the ENSEMBLES research project<sup>3</sup> is producing regional  
4 probabilities of climate change for Europe.

5  
6 Methods to translate probabilistic climate changes for use in impacts assessment (e.g. New and  
7 Hulme 2000; Yates *et al.* submitted; Wilby and Harris 2006) include those assessing probabilities of  
8 impact threshold exceedences (e.g. Jones 2000; Jones 2004; Jones *et al.* in press). Wilby and Harris  
9 (2006), combined information from various sources of uncertainty (emissions scenarios, GCMs,  
10 statistical downscaling and hydrological model parameters) to estimate probabilities of low flows in  
11 the River Thames basin, finding that the most important uncertainty was the difference among the  
12 GCMs, a conclusion supported in water resources assessments in Australia (Jones and Page 2001;  
13 Jones *et al.* 2005). Probabilistic impact studies sampling across emissions, climate sensitivity and  
14 regional climate change uncertainties have been conducted for wheat yield (Howden and Jones  
15 2005; Luo *et al.* 2005), coral bleaching (Jones 2004; Wooldridge *et al.* 2005), water resources  
16 (Jones and Page 2001; Jones *et al.* 2005) and freshwater ecology (Preston in press).

17  
18 Probabilistic scenario approaches to emissions futures have also been explored. SRES storylines have  
19 been used to assign probability distributions to drivers such as population (O'Neill 2004). The  
20 resulting conditional probability distributions for emissions demonstrate a much wider range of  
21 emissions uncertainty for some SRES storylines than represented in SRES. Fully probabilistic  
22 projections have also been used to identify scenarios of emissions and drivers (Webster and Reilly  
23 submitted) or for population and its determinants for use in integrated scenario assessments (O'Neill  
24 2005).

25  
26 The use of subjective probability assignments for future emissions has been debated. Some argue  
27 that decision makers will estimate the relative likelihood of different possible outcomes themselves,  
28 so it is better to explore underlying assumptions through decision analytic techniques and  
29 communicate the results (Schneider 2001, 2002; Webster *et al.* 2002; Webster *et al.* 2003). Others  
30 argue that the climate change issue is characterised by "deep uncertainty" – i.e. system models,  
31 parameter values, and interactions are unknown or contested – and therefore elicited probabilities  
32 may not represent well the nature of the uncertainties faced (Lempert *et al.* 2004; Grüber and  
33 Nakicenovic 2001). Adaptation strategies may benefit more from understanding and enhancing  
34 adaptive capacity than from improving probabilistic projections of climate change, and probabilities  
35 may not be essential for making mitigation decisions (Dessai and Hulme 2004). Non-probabilistic  
36 approaches to addressing uncertainty propose the use of model-based test beds to search for robust  
37 strategies that are relatively insensitive to a wide range of possible outcomes (Casman *et al.* 1999;  
38 Lempert and Schlesinger 2001; Lempert *et al.* 2004). However, many impacts such as those for  
39 water resources and coral bleaching, which may require substantial adaptation within planning  
40 horizons of several decades, are relatively insensitive to underlying uncertainties in emissions (e.g.  
41 Jones 2001). In this regard, probabilistic impact assessments carried out on water resources in  
42 Australia have already led to adaptation actions being taken (see chapter 11).

### 43 44 45 **2.2.3 Methods for measuring and interpreting CCAV**

#### 46 47 **2.2.3.1 Thresholds and criteria for risk**

48  
49 The development of criteria, especially those setting the limits of tolerable risk, set the terms of

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.ensembles-eu.org/>



1 reference by which the significance of a risk is assessed. This allows a risk to be analysed and  
2 management options to be evaluated, prioritised and implemented. In CCIAV, this requires linking  
3 climate impacts to potential outcomes. The most significant criterion is that of dangerous  
4 anthropogenic interference with the climate system (see section 2.2.1.2) but most criteria are  
5 context specific, relating to a given activity at a particular location, so can be representative on all  
6 scales from local to global.

7  
8 In climate change assessments, the setting of criteria involves the use of thresholds; in particular  
9 critical thresholds that denote the lower limit of tolerable risk. A threshold is a non-linear response  
10 of a variable, activity or system to an internal or external stress. Thresholds are used in assessing  
11 change in two ways:

- 13 1. A non-linear change in state, where a system shifts from one identifiable set of conditions to  
14 another.
- 15 2. A criterion on a linear measurement scale denoting a change in condition that invites some form  
16 of response; e.g. a management threshold.

17  
18 Thresholds used to assess risk are a value-laden, or normative, concept, where crossing a boundary  
19 meets a given criterion. A threshold may represent a state change that can be objectively measured,  
20 to which a value judgement is attached, for example many of the key vulnerabilities listed in  
21 chapter 19. A threshold can also be attached to a given value on a linear, gradational scale, where  
22 the response is the non-linear aspect; for example, a management threshold (Kenny *et al.* 2000).  
23 Exceeding a management threshold will result in a change of legal, regulatory, economic or cultural  
24 behaviour. This gives rise to the concept of the critical threshold (IPCC 1994; Parry *et al.* 1996;  
25 Pittock and Jones 2000), where criticality exceeds, in risk assessment terms, the level of tolerable  
26 risk. Critical thresholds are used to define the coping range (section 2.2.3.4).

27  
28 Thresholds derived with stakeholders avoid the pitfall of researchers ascribing their own values to  
29 an assessment (Pittock and Jones 2000; Kenny *et al.* 2000; Conde and Lonsdale 2005).  
30 Stakeholders thus become responsible for the management of the uncertainties associated with that  
31 threshold through ownership of the assessment process and its outcomes (Jones 2001).

32  
33 The probability of threshold exceedence is being used in risk analyses (Jones 2001, 2004) on local  
34 and global scales. For example, probabilities of critical thresholds for coral bleaching and mortality  
35 for sites in the Great Barrier Reef as a function of global warming show that catastrophic bleaching  
36 will occur biennially with a warming of ~2°C (Jones 2004). Mastrandrea and Schneider (2004)  
37 assess the likelihood of exceeding a thresholds of DAI derived from the TAR (Smith *et al.* 2001)  
38 under probabilistic representations of climate projections also derived from the TAR, estimating the  
39 reductions in emissions that would be required to reduce the probability of exceeding DAI to  
40 acceptable levels using a simple integrated model of the climate and economy.

#### 41 42 2.2.3.2 *Advances in impact assessment*

43  
44 Major advances in impact assessment since the TAR are: meta-analyses summarising a range of  
45 assessments; integrated impact analysis across one or more sectors at the national or global scale;  
46 the vertical integration of impacts to address social and economic outcomes; and probabilistic  
47 impact analyses (see section 2.2.2.14). More specific descriptions of recent developments in impact  
48 modelling can be found in the sectoral chapters of this report (3-8). However, there are many  
49 regions and sectors, especially in developing countries, where detailed impact assessments of  
50 climate-sensitive resources have not yet been carried out.

1 A global scale analysis of a range of studies for different sectors, involving a range of impacts  
2 models and levels of climate was conducted by Hitz and Smith (Hitz and Smith 2004). For some  
3 sectors and regions, such as agriculture and the coastal zone, sufficient studies were available to  
4 construct a summary of sectoral impacts as a function of increase in global mean temperature. For  
5 other sectors, such as marine biodiversity and energy, only broad conclusions of low confidence  
6 were possible because of limited information.

7  
8 Aggregated climate change damages have been estimated by Mendelsohn and Williams (2004) and  
9 Nordhaus (in press), using statistical relationships between climate variables (mean temperature and  
10 annual precipitation) and economic variables (e.g., farm values, energy expenditures and others for  
11 the former; local GDP for the latter). Mendelsohn and Williams, working at the national scale,  
12 found the impact of climate change to be quasi-neutral, with total impacts lower than 0.1% of GWP,  
13 but with significant consequences for developing countries. Nordhaus, working in more detail on a  
14 1°x1° latitude x longitude grid, suggests higher damages than past studies, with impacts between 1  
15 and 3% of gross world product (GWP) for a doubling of CO<sub>2</sub> concentration.


16  
17 A range of recent economic studies utilise processes models that assess the cost of uncertainty and  
18 consider adaptation. Fischer *et al.* (2002) extensively analysed climate change consequences for  
19 global agriculture, finding no global disruption of food production, but identified growing regional  
20 imbalances with possible consequences for food security and large economic consequences for  
21 developing country economies. This result is consistent with findings by Mendelsohn and Williams  
22 (2004), who assume perfect adaptation. Neumann *et al.* (2000) and Nicholls and Tol (in press)  
23 investigate the consequences of sea-level rise, finding lower estimates than past studies. Hallegatte  
24 *et al.* (in press) suggest that altered extreme event distributions producing short-term reconstruction  
25 constraints may increase significantly the long-term costs of natural disasters. Hamilton *et al.*  
26 (2005) found the influence of climate change on tourism to be significant but lower than the impact  
27 of drivers like population and economic growth. Hallegatte *et al.* (submitted) concluded that low-  
28 cost adaptation in European cities to higher temperatures is impeded by climate uncertainty,  
29 possibly leading to adaptation costs that ultimately reach several percent of GDP. The role of  
30 economic dynamics has also been emphasized (Fankhauser and Tol 2005; Hallegatte 2005;  
31 Hallegatte *et al.* in press). Some new studies suggest damage overestimations by previous  
32 assessments, while others suggest underestimations, leading to the conclusion that uncertainty is  
33 likely to be larger than suggested by the range of previous estimates.

### 34 35 2.2.3.3 Stakeholder involvement

36  
37 Stakeholder involvement is crucial to risk, adaptation and vulnerability assessments because it is  
38 they who will be most affected and thus may need to adapt (Burton *et al.* 2002; UNDP 2005).  
39 Stakeholders are characterised as individuals or groups who have anything of value (both monetary  
40 and non-monetary) that may be affected by climate change or by the actions taken to manage the  
41 ensuing risks of climate. They might be policymakers, scientists, communities, and/or managers in  
42 the sectors and regions most at risk now and in the future (Conde and Lonsdale 2005). Stakeholder  
43 engagement in climate change initiatives has been reinforced since the TAR.

44  
45 People's and institutional knowledge and expertise comprise the principal resource for adapting to  
46 the impacts of climate change. Adaptive capacity is developed if people have time to strengthen  
47 networks, knowledge, resources and the willingness to find solutions (Cebon *et al.* 1999; Cohen  
48 1997; Ivey *et al.* 2004). Through an ongoing process of negotiation and modification, stakeholders  
49 can assess the viability of adaptive measures, by integrating scientific information into their own  
50 social, economic, cultural and environmental context (van Asselt and Rotmans 2002). However,  
51 stakeholder involvement may occur in a context where political differences, inequalities, or

1 conflicts may be raised; researchers must accept that it is not their role to solve those conflicts,  
 2 unless they want to be part of them (Conde and Lonsdale 2005). Approaches to stakeholder  
 3 engagement vary from passive interactions, where the stakeholders only provide information, to a  
 4 level where the stakeholders themselves initiate and design the process (Figure 2.4).



23 **Figure 2.4:** Ladder of stakeholder participation (based on Pretty 1994; Conde and Lonsdale 2005)

26 Current adaptation practices for climate risks are being developed by communities, governments,  
 27 NGOs and other organised stakeholders to increase their adaptive capacity (Thomalla *et al.* 2005;  
 28 Ford and Smit 2004; Conde *et al.* in press). Indigenous knowledge studies are a valuable source of  
 29 information for CCIAV assessments, especially where formally collected and recorded data is  
 30 sparse (Huntington and Fox 2005). Stakeholders have a part to play in scenario development  
 31 (Bärlund and Carter 2002; Lorenzoni *et al.* 2000) and participatory modelling (e.g. Welp 2001; van  
 32 Asselt and Rijkens-Klomp 2002).


34 Stakeholders are also central in assessing future needs for developing policies and measures to  
 35 adapt (Nadarajah and Rankin 2005). These needs have been recognised in regional and national  
 36 approaches to assessing climate impacts and adaptation, including the UK Climate Impacts  
 37 Programme (UKCIP) (West and Gawith 2005), the US National Assessment (Parson *et al.* 2003;  
 38 National Assessment Synthesis Team 2000), the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 2005)  
 39 the Finnish National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (Marttila *et al.* 2005) and related  
 40 FINADAPT research consortium (Kankaanpää *et al.* 2005), and the Mackenzie Basin Impact Study  
 41 (Cohen 1997).

#### 43 2.2.3.4 Defining coping ranges

45 The coping range of climate (Hewitt and Burton 1971) is described in the TAR as the capacity of  
 46 systems to accommodate variations in climatic conditions (Smith *et al.* 2001), so serves as a  
 47 suitable template for understanding the relationship between changing climate hazards and society.  
 48 The concept of the coping range has since been expanded to incorporate concepts of current and  
 49 future adaptation, planning and policy horizons, and likelihood (Yohe and Tol 2002; Willows and  
 50 Connell 2003; UNDP 2005). It can thus serve as a conceptual model (Morgan *et al.* 2001) which  
 51 can be used to integrate analytical techniques with a broader understanding of climate-society

1 relationships (Jones and Mearns 2005).

2  
3 The coping range is used to link the understanding of current adaptation to climate with adaptation  
4 needs under climate change. It is a useful mental model to use with stakeholders who often have an  
5 intuitive understanding of which risks can be coped with and those which cannot, that can be  
6 developed into a quantitative model (Jones and Boer 2005). It can be depicted as one or more  
7 climatic or climate-related variables upon which socio-economic responses are mapped (Figure  
8 2.5). The core of the coping range contains beneficial outcomes. Towards one or both edges of the  
9 coping range, outcomes become negative but tolerable. Beyond the coping range, the damages or  
10 losses are no longer tolerable and denote a vulnerable state, the limits of tolerance describing a  
11 critical threshold. A coping range is usually specific to an activity, group and/or sector, though  
12 society-wide coping ranges have been proposed (Yohe and Tol 2002).



33 **Figure 2.5:** Coping range showing (a) the relationship between climate change and threshold  
34 exceedence, and (b) how adaptation can establish a new critical threshold, reducing vulnerability  
35 to climate change. (Jones and Mearns 2005)

36  
37  
38 Risk is assessed by calculating how often the coping range is exceeded under given conditions. For  
39 example, Jones (2001) constructed two separate critical thresholds for the Macquarie River  
40 catchment in Australia irrigation allocation and environmental flows. The probability of exceeding  
41 these thresholds was a function of both natural climate variability and climate change. Yohe (2002)  
42 explored hypothetical upper and lower critical thresholds for the Nile River using current and  
43 historical streamflow data. The upper threshold denoted serious flooding, and the lower threshold  
44 the minimum flow required to supply water demand. Historical frequency of exceedence served as a  
45 baseline from which to measure changing risks using a range of climate scenarios.

#### 46 2.2.3.5 Adaptation assessment

47  
48  
49 The evaluation of specific adaptation options is likely to benefit from the use of formal methods for  
50 selection and prioritisation (Niang-Diop and Bosch 2004). Often, because of issues such as  
51 institutional reform, legislation and regulation, the benefits or impacts of a measure cannot be

1 quantified and expert judgements are made on the basis of diverse criteria using existing  
2 institutional or informal structures. Many options currently appear to be selected on this basis,  
3 reflecting the limited experience with such assessments. Further research on both formal and  
4 informal methods is urgently needed.

5  
6 Niang-Diop(2004) discuss the following four methods, which range from measures that are almost  
7 exclusively monetary, to those that can use a variety of metrics:

- 8
- 9 • Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): compares costs and benefits of a measure with a view to deciding  
10 whether it is attractive to undertake an activity (a project or a project-type adaptation measure).
  - 11 • Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA): once a course is chosen, this technique evaluates different  
12 options that achieve the same objective, and compares them to determine how a well-defined  
13 objective can be met with least cost.
  - 14 • Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA): assesses between three and eight criteria (seldom more, for  
15 practical reasons), sometimes with different weightings, orders and other methods of  
16 uncertainty analysis.
  - 17 • Expert judgement: employs structured methods to elicit information from experts (often  
18 stakeholders) who utilise their experience to prioritise different measures.
- 19

20 Guidance for methods and tools to use in prioritising adaptations include the Compendium of  
21 Decision Tools (UNFCCC 2004), the Handbook on Methods for Climate Change Impact  
22 Assessment and Adaptation Strategies (Feenstra *et al.* 1998) and Costing the Impacts of Climate  
23 Change (Econometrica 2004). A range of different methods can also be used with stakeholders (e.g.  
24 van Asselt and Rotmans 2002; Rowe and Frewer 2000; Renn 2004).

25  
26 For instance, a successful application of cost benefit analysis was applied to a risk assessment  
27 approach using critical thresholds of damage due to storm surges on a proposed coastal road in the  
28 Pacific (ADB 2005). It showed a net benefit of US\$2.8 million over 50 years for an investment in  
29 adaptation costs of US\$3.3 million using a discount rate of 3%. Retrofitting an existing roadway  
30 also showed a net benefit. Several more case studies in the same report show wide benefits of  
31 allowing for climate change when investing in sustainable development.

32  
33 The financing of adaptation has received minimal attention. Bouwer and Vellinga (2005) suggest  
34 applying a more structured decision-making framework to decisions affecting disaster management  
35 and adaptation to climate change, sharing risk between private and public sources. Quiggin and  
36 Horowitz (2003) argue that the economic costs will be dominated by the costs of adaptation, which  
37 depend on the rate of change, especially that of climate extremes. By treating the result of economic  
38 analyses as an optimal result and not factoring in such adjustments, many methods under-estimate  
39 the true costs. Impact assessments that account for adaptation costs are also described in section  
40 2.2.3.2.

#### 41 42 2.2.3.6 *Advances in vulnerability assessment*

43

44 Since the TAR, the IPCC definition of vulnerability has been challenged, both by a broadening of  
45 the remit of vulnerability assessments to include social vulnerability, which is influenced by a  
46 whole range of stressors, and by risk assessment. Vulnerability to climate change within a risk  
47 assessment framework depends on whether risk has or has not been reduced. Different states of  
48 vulnerability to climate include vulnerability to current climate, vulnerability to unmanaged climate  
49 change, where adaptation and mitigation options have not yet been exercised, and residual  
50 vulnerability, where adaptive and mitigative capacity are unlikely to be sufficient to keep an  
51 activity from harm (e.g. Jones *et al.* in press). Chapter 19 defines a key vulnerability as having the

1 potential for significant adverse affects on both natural and human systems as outlined in the  
2 UNFCCC, which may contribute to dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

3  
4 Therefore, vulnerability is highly dependent on context and scale. Downing and Patwardhan (2004)  
5 surveyed different meanings of vulnerability in the literature, advising that when the term is used,  
6 care should be taken to clearly describe its derivation and meaning. There have been calls for  
7 frameworks that are able to integrate the social and biophysical dimensions of vulnerability to  
8 climate change (Klein and Nicholls 1999; Polsky *et al.* 2003; Turner *et al.* 2003a). This includes the  
9 need to place vulnerability of biophysical systems within a social context, as these assessments  
10 involve value judgements about the identification of important ecosystem services and of the  
11 acceptability or otherwise of ecosystem change (e.g. Neudoerffer and Waltner-Toews submitted; de  
12 Chazal submitted). There is also a recognised need to develop formal methods for vulnerability  
13 assessment (Metzger and Schröter submitted; Ionescu *et al.* submitted) and to address the  
14 uncertainties inherent in vulnerability assessments (Patt *et al.* 2005).

15  
16 Vulnerability assessment offers a frame for policy measures that focus less on technical aspects and  
17 more on social aspects, including poverty reduction, diversification of livelihoods, protection of  
18 common property resources, and strengthening of collective action (O'Brien *et al.* 2004). Such  
19 measures enhance the ability to respond to stressors and secure livelihoods under present stress,  
20 which can also reduce vulnerability to future climate conditions. One way of operationalising this is  
21 by first understanding the distribution of vulnerability and identification of "hotspots" through  
22 vulnerability mapping. At a more local scale, however, community based interactive approaches on  
23 coping potentials provide insights into the underlying causes and structures that shape vulnerability  
24 (O'Brien *et al.* 2004). Two recent projects – ATEAM (Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis  
25 and Modelling<sup>4</sup>) and VISTA (Vulnerability of ecosystem services to land use change in traditional  
26 agricultural landscapes<sup>5</sup>) – assessed ecosystem vulnerability by downscaling global scenarios to a  
27 regional level. Both projects involved stakeholder participation to assess vulnerability (Schröter  
28 *et al.* 2005; de Chazal submitted).

29  
30 Most regional studies in the AIACC programme were vulnerability assessments applying a bottom-  
31 up approach. Methods included in the programme included using stakeholder elicitation and survey  
32 (Eakin and Wehbe 2004; Pulhin *et al.* 2004; Rawlins 2004), sustainable livelihood frameworks  
33 (Zakieldin 2004), multi-criteria modelling (Wehbe *et al.* 2004), policy assessment (Gichangi and  
34 Toteng 2004) and vulnerability indices (Kokot *et al.* 2004; Norbis *et al.* 2004).

35  
36 Traditional knowledge of local communities represents an important, yet currently largely under-  
37 used resource for CCAV assessment (Huntington and Fox 2005). Empirical knowledge from past  
38 experience in dealing with climate-related natural disasters such as droughts and floods (Desanker  
39 *et al.* submitted), health crises (Wandiga *et al.* 2005) as well as longer-term trends in mean  
40 conditions (Huntington and Fox 2005; McCarthy and Long Martello 2005) can be particularly  
41 helpful in understanding the coping strategies and adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities.

#### 42 43 2.2.3.7 *Integrated assessment*

44  
45 Integrated assessment represents complex interactions across spatial and temporal scales, processes  
46 and activities, requiring the integration of different research disciplines. Integrated assessments are  
47 a process that may involve one or more mathematical models, which may themselves be integrated.  
48 Integrated models range from simple models linking large-scale processes, through models of

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.pik-potsdam.de/ateam>

<sup>5</sup> <http://lotus5.vitamib.com/hnb/vista/vista.nsf/Web/Frame?openform>

1 intermediate complexity to the complex, physically explicit representation of Earth systems. These  
2 different levels involve a trade-off between realism and flexibility, where simple models better  
3 represent uncertainty and are less accurate, whereas scenarios and projections from complex models  
4 offer more detail and a greater range of output. However, no single theory describes and explains  
5 dynamic behaviour across scales in socio-economic and ecological systems (Rotmans and Rothman  
6 2003), nor can a single model represent all interactions within a single entity, or provide responses  
7 to questions in a rapid turn-around time (Schellnhuber *et al.* 2004). Therefore, integration at all  
8 these scales is required to comprehensively assess CCIAV.

#### 9 10 *Cross-sectoral integration*

11  
12 Cross-sectoral integration is required for purposes such as national assessments, analysis of  
13 economic and trade effects, and joint population and climate studies. National assessments can  
14 utilise nationally integrated models (e.g. Hurd *et al.* 2004; Rosenberg *et al.* 2003; Izaurralde *et al.*  
15 2003), or can synthesise a number of disparate studies for policy makers (e.g. West and Gawith  
16 2005). Markets and trade can have significant effects on outcomes. For example, a study assessing  
17 the global impacts of climate change on forests and forest products showed that trade can affect  
18 efforts to stabilise carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Trade can also significantly affect regional  
19 welfare, with adverse effects on those regions with high production costs (Perez-Garcia *et al.* 2002).

#### 20 21 *Integration of climate with other stressors and processes*

22  
23 Integration yields results that can often not be produced in isolation. For example, the Millennium  
24 Ecosystem Assessment assessed the impact of a broad range of stresses on ecosystem services, of  
25 which climate change was only one (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Linked impact and  
26 vulnerability assessments can also benefit from taking the multiple stressors approach. For example,  
27 the AIR-CLIM Project integrated climate and air pollution impacts covering Europe between 1995  
28 and 2100, concluding that that while the physical impacts were weakly coupled in the policy  
29 environment, air pollution and climate change were strongly coupled. The indirect effects of  
30 climate policies were found to reduce the costs of controlling air pollution emissions by more than  
31 50% (Alcamo *et al.* 2002).

#### 32 33 *Coupling of impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessments with Earth System Models*

34  
35 Earth System Models of intermediate complexity that link the atmosphere, oceans, cryosphere, land  
36 system and biosphere are being developed to assess impacts, particularly global scale singular  
37 events that may be considered dangerous, within a risk and vulnerability framework (Rial *et al.*  
38 2004 – see section 2.2.2.12). Global climate models are also moving towards a more complete  
39 representation of the Earth system; recent simulations integrating the atmosphere with the biosphere  
40 via a complete carbon cycle showing the potential of the Amazon rainforest to suffer large-scale  
41 dieback, leading towards a positive feedback decreasing the carbon sink and increasing atmospheric  
42 CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations (Cox *et al.* 2004; Betts *et al.* 2004).

#### 43 44 *Integrating adaptation and mitigation to assess climate policy benefits*

45  
46 The assessment of climate policy benefits has arisen out of the need to assess the complementary  
47 but different benefits of adaptation and mitigation and balance these against the risks associated  
48 with various policy options. This type of integrated assessment modelling integrates simple to  
49 intermediate models of the climate, impacts and the economy. To date, the impacts of climate  
50 change and the benefits of avoiding consequent damages have been overlooked in favour of  
51 asymmetric attention being paid to the costs of mitigation commitments on the one hand, and, more

1 recently, the potential benefits of adaptation on the other (Corfee-Morlot and Agrawala 2004). This  
2 is because of the relatively crude state of impact damage functions and the limited ability of such  
3 models to provide realistic simulations of impacts under a wide range of scenarios. Analyses of the  
4 costs of adaptation within these frameworks are also rare.

5  
6 The benefits of avoided damage can be assessed in a risk assessment framework, providing a means  
7 to assess the trade-offs associated with decisions about mitigation (O'Neill and Oppenheimer 2002;  
8 Arnell *et al.* 2002; Jacoby 2004). Impact analyses are carried out for a range of scenarios with  
9 unmanaged greenhouse gas emissions and contrasted with scenarios where some type of  
10 management has been imposed. The range of key vulnerabilities summarised in chapter 19 allows  
11 thresholds to be set where the risk of abrupt and irreversible change is high. The aggregation of  
12 smaller local and regional thresholds will also help identify thresholds for global mean temperature  
13 change or rates of change that limit the risk of irreversible damage to vital natural or human  
14 systems (Jones 2004). In turn, such thresholds provide a means to establish boundaries for near-  
15 term actions consistent with emission pathways that lead to stabilisation of greenhouse gas  
16 concentrations.

17  
18 The risk of exceeding critical thresholds can also be estimated within a Bayesian framework, by  
19 expressing global warming and sea level rise as cumulative distribution functions that are much  
20 more likely to be exceeded at lower levels than higher levels (Jones 2004; Mastrandrea and  
21 Schneider 2004; Yohe 2004). However, although this may be achieved for key global  
22 vulnerabilities there is often no straightforward way to integrate local critical thresholds into a  
23 "mass" damage function of many different metrics across the wide range of potential (Jacoby 2004).  
24 IAMs may do so, but it is difficult to run them within a probabilistic framework. Webster *et al.*  
25 (2003) use an integrated model of moderate complexity to link selected critical outcomes to  
26 different levels of forcing under both SRES and stabilisation scenarios.

#### 27 28 2.2.3.8 *Communicating uncertainty and risk*

29  
30 Communicating risk and uncertainty is a vital part of helping people respond to climate change.  
31 However, people often rely on intuitive decision-making processes, or heuristics, in solving  
32 complicated problems of judgment and decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In many  
33 cases, these heuristics are surprisingly successful at leading to successful decisions under information  
34 and time constraints (Gigerenzer 2000; Muramatsu and Hanich 2005). In other cases, heuristics can  
35 lead to predictable inconsistencies or errors of judgment. For example, people consistently  
36 overestimate the likelihood of low probability events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kammen *et al.*  
37 1994), or events that have a strong emotional impact (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Elster 1998)  
38 often resulting in choices that increase their exposure to harm (Thaler and Johnson 1990).

39  
40 Participatory approaches establish a dialogue between stakeholders and experts, where the experts  
41 can explain the uncertainty and the ways it is likely to be misinterpreted, the stakeholders can explain  
42 their decision-making criteria, and the two parties can work together to design a risk management  
43 strategy (Fischhoff 1996; NRC 2002; Jacobs 2002). Because stakeholders are often the decision-  
44 makers themselves (Kelly and Adger 2000) the communication of impact, adaptation, and  
45 vulnerability assessment has risen in importance (Jacobs 2002; Fussler and Klein in press).  
46 Adaptation decisions also depend on changes outside the climate change arena (Turner *et al.* 2003b).

47  
48 If factors that give rise to the uncertainty in the first place are described (Willows and Connell  
49 2003) stakeholders will view that information as more credible because they can make their own  
50 judgments about its quality and accuracy (Funtowicz 1993; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990). People  
51 will remember and use uncertainty assessments when they can mentally link the uncertainty and



1 events in the world with which they are familiar; assessments of climate change uncertainty are  
2 more memorable, and hence more influential, when they fit into people's pre-existing mental maps  
3 of experiences of climate variability, or when sufficient detail is provided to help people to form  
4 new mental models (Hansen 2004).

5  
6 Finally, there are a number of common pitfalls stakeholders have in understanding and responding  
7 to uncertainty (Morgan *et al.* 2001; Nicholls 1999). The perception of risk and deficiencies in  
8 human judgement in the face of uncertainty are discussed at length in the TAR chapter on methods  
9 (Ahmad *et al.* 2001).

#### 10 11 12 **2.2.4 Data needs for assessment**

13  
14 The two main areas of need regarding data and information for use in CCIAM assessments are: the  
15 collection and dissemination of environmental and socio-economic data in ongoing programmes  
16 and the context-specific data and information required for a project (e.g. Briassoulis 1997).  
17 Context-specific data and information can come from existing sources or through stakeholder  
18 elicitation. Types of information elicited from stakeholders include, for example, past adaptation  
19 actions, thresholds denoting limits of coping capacity and past vulnerability to climate.

20  
21 Monitored data includes traditional sources of data, such as climate data, but as the range and  
22 complexity of CCIAM methods increases, so too do their data requirements (Basher 1999):

- 23
- 24 • The climatic influencing factors (e.g. temperature, rain, wind);
- 25 • The non-climatic influences (e.g. population, prices, pests, policies);
- 26 • The internal functions of the system, and their climatic and other sensitivities;
- 27 • The interactions (physical, biological and social) with other systems and resultant integrated  
28 behaviours.

29  
30 As discussed in section 2.2.1, this will require integrated data on current climate risks and how they  
31 have been responded to, along with model projections and scenarios if numerical studies are to be  
32 undertaken, or even if projections are to be communicated to stakeholders.

33  
34 However, instrumental data and records of human systems can be difficult to access and validate,  
35 particularly in developing countries where financial support is low and/or decreasing. In many  
36 jurisdictions, long-term monitoring is decreasing, jeopardising future assessments (Basher 1999).  
37 Also, in developing countries, formal observations of natural and human behaviour are scarce,  
38 given the small scientific communities and limited resources. Many assessments are now obtaining  
39 data through stakeholder elicitation and survey methods. For example, in many traditional societies  
40 a large number of social interactions may not be recorded by bureaucratic processes, but records of  
41 how societies adapt to climate change, how they perceive risk and measure their vulnerability exist  
42 with community members (e.g. Cohen 1997; ACIA 2005 – see Section 2.2.3.6). Even in data rich  
43 situations it is likely that some additional data from stakeholders will be required. However, this  
44 also requires adequate resourcing.

45  
46 New programmes to record human-environment interactions are being implemented. For example,  
47 the recent history past climatic disasters in Latin America<sup>6</sup>, highlights not only climatic adverse  
48 events, but also the actors and consequences of those events. Information on local coping strategies  
49 applied by different communities and sectors is being recorded by the UNFCCC<sup>7</sup>.

---

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.desinventar.org/desinventar.html>

<sup>7</sup> <http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/adaptation>

1  
2 New sources of data are also becoming available from remote sensing (e.g. Justice *et al.* 2002) and  
3 theoretically could fill the gaps where no ground-based data are available but would also need to be  
4 resourced for developing country access. Lastly, the coverage of different sectors is very different.  
5 Agriculture and water resources are relatively well served areas, whereas information on coastal  
6 and marine environments and stock and materials in the built environment is difficult to obtain in  
7 useable form.

## 10 **2.3 Characterising the future in this assessment**

11  
12 Recent methodological advances in the characterisation of future climatic and non-climate  
13 conditions were outlined in section 2.2.2. They are directed towards developing scenarios,  
14 storylines and other representations of the future, based on the best available knowledge. At the  
15 time of the TAR, most CCIAM studies utilised climate scenarios (many based on the IS92  
16 emissions scenarios), but very few applied contemporaneous scenarios of socio-economic, land use  
17 or other environmental changes, and those that did used a range of sources to develop them.

18  
19 The publication of the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES – Nakićenović *et al.*  
20 2000) presented the opportunity to construct a range of mutually consistent climate and non-  
21 climatic scenarios. Originally developed to provide scenarios of future greenhouse gas emissions,  
22 the SRES scenarios are also accompanied by storylines of social, economic and technological  
23 development that can be used in CCIAM studies. They are discussed in section 2.3.1. The SRES  
24 storylines assume that no specific climate policies are implemented, and thus form a baseline  
25 against which narratives with specific mitigation and adaptation measures can be compared.  
26 Mitigation scenarios are described in section 2.3.2. As yet, there are few examples of scenarios that  
27 account for feedbacks from impacts and adaptation to the global economy and in future a new  
28 generation of integrated scenarios, covering a range of spatial scales, will be required to address  
29 more adequately the varied needs of the CCIAM community.

### 32 **2.3.1 SRES-based characterisations of the 21st century**

#### 34 *2.3.1.1 The SRES global storylines and scenarios*

35  
36 SRES presented four narrative storylines, labelled A1, A2, B1 and B2, describing the relationships  
37 between the forces driving greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions and their evolution during the 21st  
38 century for large world regions and globally (Figure 2.6). Each storyline represents different  
39 demographic, social, economic, technological, and environmental developments that diverge in  
40 increasingly irreversible ways and result in different levels of greenhouse gas emissions.

41  
42 The SRES storylines formed the basis for the development of derivative quantitative scenarios  
43 using various numerical models that were presented in the TAR. Emissions scenarios were  
44 converted to projections of changing atmospheric greenhouse gas and aerosol concentrations,  
45 radiative forcing of the climate, effects on regional climate, and climatic effects on global sea level  
46 (IPCC 2001). However, little regional detail of these projections and no CCIAM studies that made  
47 use of them were available for the TAR. Subsequent work is described below, with examples given  
48 of SRES-based regional scenarios applied in CCIAM studies and assessed elsewhere in this report.

#### 50 *2.3.1.2 SRES-based climate characterisations*

1 Not all of the impact studies reported in this assessment employed SRES-based climate scenarios.  
 2 Earlier scenarios are described in previous IPCC reports (IPCC 1992, 1996; Greco *et al.* 1994). The  
 3 remaining discussion focuses on SRES-based projections, which are applied in most CCIAV studies  
 4 currently undertaken.

		<b>Economic emphasis</b>			
<b>Global Integration</b>	<b>A1 storyline:</b>	<b>A2 storyline</b>			
	<u>World:</u> market-oriented <u>Economy:</u> fastest per capita growth <u>Population:</u> 2050 peak, then decline <u>Governance:</u> strong regional interactions; income convergence <u>Technology:</u> three scenario groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>A1FI:</b> fossil intensive</li> <li>• <b>A1T:</b> non-fossil energy sources</li> <li>• <b>A1B:</b> balanced across all sources</li> </ul>	<u>World:</u> differentiated <u>Economy:</u> regionally oriented; lowest per capita growth <u>Population:</u> continuously increasing <u>Governance:</u> Self-reliance with preservation of local identities <u>Technology:</u> slowest and most fragmented development	<b>Regional emphasis</b>		
		<b>Environmental emphasis</b>			
	<b>B1 storyline</b>	<b>B2 storyline</b>			
	<u>World:</u> convergent <u>Economy:</u> service and information based; lower growth than A1 <u>Population:</u> same as A1 <u>Governance:</u> global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability <u>Technology:</u> clean and resource-efficient	<u>World:</u> local solutions <u>Economy:</u> intermediate growth <u>Population:</u> continuously increasing at lower rate than A2 <u>Governance:</u> local and regional solutions to environmental protection and social equity <u>Technology:</u> More rapid than A2; less rapid, more diverse than A1/B1			

26 **Figure 2.6:** Summary characteristics of the four SRES storylines (based on Nakićenović *et al.*  
 27 2000)

30 *Projections of regional mean changes assessed in this report*

31 Global mean annual temperature is the measure most commonly employed by the IPCC and  
 32 adopted in the international policy arena to summarise future changes in global climate and its  
 33 likely impacts. In the TAR, a projected range of global mean temperature change by 2100 (relative  
 34 to 1990) of 1.4 to 5.8°C was reported for the range of SRES emissions scenarios (IPCC 2001). This  
 35 is very similar to the 65% probability range cited by WG I (chapter 10) of 1.5 to 5.8°C. While this  
 36 measure is adopted in some global assessments of the aggregate costs and damages of climate  
 37 change (Hitz and Smith 2004), it is of little use for CCIAV studies conducted at a regional scale.  
 38 These studies require more detailed spatial and temporal projections of the key climate variables to  
 39 which natural and human systems are exposed (see section 2.2.2.6).

41 Since publication of the TAR, a large number of simulations of the global climate response to the  
 42 SRES emission scenarios have been completed with AOGCMs. Early runs (labelled "pre-TAR")  
 43 were reported in the TAR (Cubasch *et al.* 2001) and are available from the IPCC Data Distribution  
 44 Centre (DDC)<sup>8</sup>. Many have been employed in CCIAV studies reported in this volume. A new  
 45 generation of AOGCMs, some of which incorporate improved representations of climate system  
 46 processes and land surface forcing, are now utilising the SRES scenarios in addition to other  
 47 emissions scenarios of relevance for impacts and policy. These were unavailable for use in the  
 48 CCIAV studies reported here. The new models and their projections are evaluated in Chapters 8, 10  
 49 and 11 of the WG I report and compared with the pre-TAR results below.

<sup>8</sup> <http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk/>

1  
2 Pre-TAR AOGCM results held at the DDC were included in a model inter-comparison of seasonal  
3 mean temperature and precipitation change for 32 world regions (Ruosteenoja *et al.* 2003)<sup>9</sup>. The  
4 range of changes by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are summarised in Figure 2.7 across the four SRES  
5 emissions scenarios (B1, B2, A2 and A1FI) and for the A2 scenario alone, expressed as rates of  
6 change per century. Recent A2 projections, reported in WG I, are also shown for the same regions  
7 for comparison.

8  
9 Almost all model-simulated temperature changes, but fewer precipitation changes were statistically  
10 significant relative to 95% confidence intervals calculated from 1000-year unforced coupled  
11 AOGCM simulations (Ruosteenoja *et al.* 2003 – Figure 2.7). Modelled surface air temperature  
12 increases in all regions and seasons, with most land areas warming more rapidly than the global  
13 average (Giorgi *et al.* 2001; Ruosteenoja *et al.* 2003). Warming is especially pronounced in high  
14 northern latitude regions in the boreal winter and in southern Europe and parts of central and  
15 northern Asia in the boreal summer. Warming is less than the global average in southern parts of  
16 Asia and South America, southern ocean areas (containing many small islands) and the North  
17 Atlantic (Figure 2.7a).

18  
19 For precipitation, changes with both sign occur, but an increase of regional precipitation is more  
20 common than a decrease. All models simulate higher precipitation at high latitudes in both seasons,  
21 in northern mid-latitude regions in boreal winter, and enhanced monsoon precipitation for Southern  
22 and Eastern Asia in boreal summer. Models also agree that precipitation declines in Central  
23 America, Southern Africa and southern Europe in certain seasons (Giorgi *et al.* 2001; Ruosteenoja  
24 *et al.* 2003 Figure 2.7b).

25  
26 *Comparing TAR projections to recent projections*

27  
28 Chapters 10 and 11 of WG I provide an extensive inter-comparison of recent regional projections  
29 from AOGCMs, focusing on those assuming the SRES A1B emissions scenario, for which the  
30 greatest number of simulations (21) were available. In summary:



- 31
- 32 • the basic pattern of projected warming is little changed from previous assessments.
  - 33 • all models project temperature increases in a narrow range of 0.64–0.69°C, averaged over  
34 2011–2030 relative to 1980–1999, regardless of emission scenario.
  - 35 • the inter-model range of warming for the A2 scenario is smaller than the pre-TAR range at  
36 2100, despite the larger number of models (compare the red and blue bars in Figure 2.7a).
  - 37 • the global mean near-surface temperature changes (between the 20-year periods 1980–1999 and  
38 2080–2099) averaged across the GCMs analysed are in the ratio 0.69:1:1.17 for the B1:A1B:A2  
39 emissions scenarios, respectively, with local temperature responses in most regions following  
40 the same ratio.
  - 41 • the ensemble mean local precipitation responses also roughly scale with the global mean  
42 temperature response, although not as precisely as for local temperature.
  - 43 • the evolution of the local temperature response in the mean model A1B projection is typically  
44 very linear in time.

45  
46 While AOGCMs are the most common source of regional climate scenarios, other methods and  
47 tools are also applied in specific CCI/AV studies. Numerous regionalisation methods have been  
48 employed to obtain high resolution SRES-based climate scenarios, nearly always using low  
49 resolution GCM outputs as a starting point. The added value of these methods is context-specific, as  
50 described in section 2.2.2.6 and chapter 11, WG I.

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
<sup>9</sup> Scatter diagrams are downloadable at: [http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk/asres/scatter plots/scatterplots\\_region.html](http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk/asres/scatter%20plots/scatterplots_region.html)

(a) Temperature change (°C per century)



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**(b) Precipitation change (percent per century)**



**Figure 2.7:** AOGCM projections of seasonal changes in (a) mean temperature and (b) precipitation up to the end of the 21st century for 32 world regions. For each region three ranges between minimum and maximum are shown. Red bar: range from 15 recent AOGCM simulations for the A2 emissions scenario (data analysed for chapter 11, WG I). Blue bar: range from seven pre-TAR AOGCMs for the A2 emissions scenario (Ruosteenoja et al. 2003). Whiskers: range from seven pre-TAR AOGCMs (some pattern-scaled), assuming the four SRES emissions scenarios – B1, B2, A2 and A1FI (Ruosteenoja et al. 2003). Seasons: DJF (December–February); MAM (March–May); JJA (June–August); SON (September–November). Regional definitions, plotted on the ECHAM4 model grid (resolution  $2.8 \times 2.8^\circ$ ), are shown on the inset map (Ruosteenoja et al. 2003). Pre-TAR changes were originally computed for 1961–90 to 2070–99 and recent changes for 1979–1998 to 2079–2098, and are converted here to rates per century for comparison. 95% confidence limits on modelled 30-year natural variability (grey bars) are based on millennial AOGCM control simulations with HadCM3 (dark grey) and CGCM2 (light grey) for constant forcing (Ruosteenoja et al. 2003). Numbers on precipitation plots show the number of recent A2 runs giving negative/positive precipitation change. Percentage changes for the SAH region (Sahara) exceed 100% in JJA and SON due to low present-day precipitation.



1 **Table 2.5:** Trends, attribution and projections of extreme weather and climate events for which  
 2 there is evidence of an observed late 20th century trend. Colour coding groups phenomena with  
 3 similar levels of likelihood of attribution of trend to human influence. Italics indicate cases where  
 4 no formal detection and attribution study has been completed. Source: Working Group I, Technical  
 5 Summary.

<b>Phenomenon</b>	<b>Likelihood that trend occurred in late 20th century (typically post 1960)</b>	<b>Likelihood that observed trend is due to human influence</b>	<b>Confidence<sup>a</sup> in trend predicted for 21st century</b>
<b>Cool days / cool nights / frosts: decrease over mid- and high-latitude land areas</b>	Very likely	Likely	High
<b>Warm days / warm nights: increase over mid- and high-latitude land areas</b>	Very likely	Likely (warm nights)	High
<b>Warm spells / heat waves: increase</b>	Likely	<i>More likely than not</i>	High
<b>Proportion of heavy precipitation events: increase over many areas</b>	Likely	<i>More likely than not</i>	High (but a few areas with projected decreases in absolute number of heavy events)
<b>Droughts: increase over low-latitudes (and mid-latitudes in summer)</b>	Likely	More likely than not	Moderate – mid-latitude continental interiors in summer (but sensitive to model land-surface formulation)
<b>Tropical cyclones: increase in intensity</b>	More likely than not since 1970	<i>More likely than not (but with low confidence)</i>	Moderate (few high-resolution models)
<b>Mid- and high-latitude cyclones: increase in most intense storms; storm tracks move polewards</b>	More likely than not	<i>Not assessed</i>	Moderate (intensity not explicitly analysed for all models)
<b>High sea level events: increase (excludes tsunamis)</b>	More likely than not	<i>Not assessed</i>	Moderate (most mid-latitude oceans)

6 Notes:

7 (a) Confidence terms for projected trends are as follows: “high” means consistency across model projections and/or  
 8 consistent with theory and/or changes in mean; “moderate” indicates some inconsistencies across model projections or  
 9 only a few relevant model projections available or analysed.

10

11

### 12 *Projections of climate variability and extremes*

13 Possible changes in variability and the frequency/severity of extreme events are critical to  
 14 undertaking realistic CCI AV assessments. Past trends and projected changes in extreme weather  
 15 and climate events were summarised globally in the TAR (Cubasch *et al.* 2001), and an updated  
 16 version from the Technical Summary of WG I is reproduced in Table 2.5. Some key conclusions  
 17 reported by WG I include:

18

- 19 • Heat waves become more frequent and longer lasting in a future warmer climate. Decreases in  
 20 frost days are projected almost everywhere in the mid and high latitudes, with an increase in  
 21 growing season length. Many mid-continental areas become drier during summer, indicating a

- 1 greater risk of droughts.
- 2 • Extremes of precipitation or storms show large ranges in amplitude and geographical locations.
  - 3 • Extremes in daily precipitation will very likely increase in northern Europe, South Asia, East
  - 4 Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand.
  - 5 • The response of some major modes of climate variability such as ENSO still differs from model
  - 6 to model, due to differences in spatial and temporal representation.
  - 7 • The robustness of model responses of tropical cyclones and mid-latitude storms is still limited
  - 8 by a too-coarse resolution.
  - 9 • In some regions the study of key aspects of regional climate change has been very limited,
  - 10 particularly with regard to extreme events.

### 11 12 2.3.1.3 *SRES-based sea level scenarios*

13  
14 At the global level, simple models that account for the expansion of sea water and melting/sliding  
15 of land-based ice sheets and glaciers were used in the TAR to obtain estimates of global mean sea-  
16 level rise across the SRES scenarios, yielding a range of 9–88 cm by 2100 relative to 1990 (IPCC  
17 2001). This range has been updated in this assessment to 14–44 cm relative to 2000 (chapter 10,  
18 WG I). The range is narrower than in the TAR because: (i) the new projections are only presented  
19 for the A1B emissions scenario, (ii) projections of ice melt are smaller than in the TAR, and (iii)  
20 additional terms (i.e. the ongoing response of the ice sheets to palaeoclimate change, runoff from  
21 permafrost and sedimentation in the oceans), which were in the TAR projections, are not yet  
22 included (chapter 10, WG I).

23  
24 A number of studies have made use of the TAR sea level scenarios. In a global study of coastal  
25 flooding and wetland loss, Nicholls (2004) used global mean sea-level rise estimates for the four  
26 SRES storylines by 2025, 2055 and 2085. These were consistent with climate scenarios used in  
27 parallel studies (see section 2.2.2.8). Two subsidence rates were also applied to obtain relative sea  
28 level rise in countries already experiencing coastal subsidence. The United Kingdom Climate  
29 Impacts Programme adopted the TAR global mean sea-level rise estimates in national scenarios out  
30 to the 2080s. Scenarios of high water levels were also developed, by combining mean sea level  
31 changes with estimates of future storminess, using a storm surge model (Hulme *et al.* 2002). SRES-  
32 based sea level scenarios accounting for global mean sea level, local land uplift and estimates of the  
33 water balance of the Baltic Sea were estimated for the Finnish coast up to 2100 by Johansson  
34 (2004), along with calculations of uncertainties and extreme high water levels.

### 35 36 2.3.1.4 *SRES-based projections of CO<sub>2</sub> and other atmospheric components*

37  
38 Projections of atmospheric composition account for the concurrent effects of air pollution and  
39 climate changes. Apart from CO<sub>2</sub> concentration (discussed below), spatially and temporally detailed  
40 scenarios of atmospheric composition are needed to account for large variations in the  
41 concentration and impacts of different atmospheric species. However, the SRES scenarios have  
42 only provided global-scale summaries (e.g. for surface ozone concentrations in the TAR – Prather  
43 *et al.* 2001, and see updates for the A2 scenario in chapter 10, WG I). Examples of regional  
44 scenarios based on SRES include Mayerhofer *et al.* (2002) for Europe, and two related studies for  
45 Finland (Laurila *et al.* 2004; Syri *et al.* 2004 – see section 2.2.2.13).

46  
47 Carbon dioxide concentration is required as a direct input to plant growth models, since it can affect  
48 both the growth and water use of many plants (see chapters 4 and 5), with possible feedbacks on  
49 regional hydrology (Gedney *et al.* 2006). CO<sub>2</sub> is well mixed in the atmosphere, so concentrations at  
50 a single observing site will usually suffice to represent global conditions. In the TAR, global CO<sub>2</sub>  
51 concentration was projected to increase from 367 ppm in 1999 to between 490 and 1,260 ppm by



1 2100 under the SRES emissions scenarios (Prentice *et al.* 2001).

2

### 3 2.3.1.5 *SRES-based socio-economic characterisations*

4

5 SRES provides socio-economic information in the form of storylines and quantitative assumptions  
6 on population, GDP, and rates of technological progress, for four large world regions. Since the  
7 TAR, several of the quantitative assumptions about the SRES driving forces have been re-examined  
8 (see also the discussion in chapter 3, WG III). For example, the range of global population size  
9 projections made by major demographic institutions has shifted downward by about 1–2 billion  
10 since the SRES were developed (van Vuuren and O'Neill submitted). Nevertheless, on balance the  
11 population assumptions used in SRES remain credible, with the exception of some regions of the  
12 A2 scenario which now lie above the current range of projections (van Vuuren and O'Neill  
13 submitted). Researchers are now producing alternative interpretations of SRES population  
14 assumptions (Hilderink 2004; Grübler *et al.* submitted national; O'Neill 2004; Fisher *et al.* in press).

15

16 SRES GDP growth assumptions for the ALM region (Africa, Latin America and Middle East) are  
17 generally higher than those of more recent projections, particularly for the A1 and B1 scenarios  
18 (van Vuuren and O'Neill submitted). The SRES GDP assumptions are generally consistent with  
19 recent projections for other regions and, given the small share of the ALM region in global GDP,  
20 for the world as a whole.

21

22 For international comparison, economic data must be converted into a common unit, which is  
23 generally done in terms of US\$ based on market exchange rates (MER). Purchasing-Power-Parity  
24 estimates (PPP), in which a correction is made for differences in price levels among countries, are  
25 considered to be a better alternative for comparison of income levels across regions and countries.  
26 Most models and economic projections, however, use MER-based estimates, partly due to a lack of  
27 consistent PPP-based data sets. The use of MER-based economic projections in SRES has been  
28 questioned (Castles and Henderson 2003), suggesting that this results in inflated economic growth  
29 projections. In an ongoing debate, some researchers argue that PPP is indeed a better measure and  
30 that its use will, in the context of scenarios of economic convergence, lead to lower economic  
31 growth and emissions paths for developing countries. Others argue that consistent use of either  
32 PPP- or MER-based numbers will lead to, at most, only small changes in emissions. This debate is  
33 summarised in chapter 3 of WG III, which concludes that the impact on emissions of the use of  
34 alternative GDP metrics is likely to be small, but indicating alternative positions as well (van  
35 Vuuren and Alfsen in press). The use of alternative measures of income is likely to affect CCAV  
36 assessments, since both are related to income level (Tol in press), especially where vulnerability  
37 and adaptive capacity are related to access to locally traded goods and services.

38


### 39 2.3.1.6 *SRES-based land use and land cover characterisations*

40

41 Future land use was estimated by most of the IAMs used to characterize the SRES storylines, but  
42 estimates for any one storyline are model-dependent, so vary widely. For example, under the B2  
43 storyline the change in the global area of grassland between 1990 and 2050 varies between -49 and  
44 +628 million ha (Mha), with the marker scenario giving a change of +167 Mha (Nakićenović *et al.*  
45 2000). The IAM used to characterize the A2 marker scenario did not include land cover change, so  
46 changes under the A1 scenario were assumed to apply also to A2. Given the differences in socio-  
47 economic drivers between A1 and A2 that can affect land use change, this assumption is not  
48 appropriate. Nor do the SRES land cover scenarios include the effect of climate change on future  
49 land cover. This lack of internal consistency will especially affect the representation of agricultural  
50 land use where changes in crop productivity play an important role (Audsley *et al.* 2006; Ewert *et al.*  
51 2005). A proportional approach to downscaling the SRES land cover scenarios has been applied

1 to global ecosystem modelling (Arnell *et al.* 2004) by assuming uniform rates of change  
 2 everywhere within an SRES macro region. In practice, however, land cover change is likely to be  
 3 greatest where population and population growth rates are greatest. A mismatch was also found in  
 4 some of the SRES storylines and for some regions between recent trends and projected trends for  
 5 cropland and forestry (Arnell *et al.* 2004).

6  
 7 More sophisticated downscaling exercises of the SRES scenarios have been undertaken at the  
 8 regional scale within Europe (Abildtrup *et al.* 2006; Audsley *et al.* 2006; Ewert *et al.* 2005;  
 9 Kankaanpää and Carter 2004; Rounsevell *et al.* 2005; Rounsevell *et al.* 2006; van Meijl *et al.*  
 10 2006). These analyses highlighted the potential role of non-climate change drivers in future land  
 11 use change. Indeed, climate change was shown in many examples to have a negligible effect on  
 12 land use compared with socio-economic change (Schröter *et al.* 2005). Technology, especially as it  
 13 affects crop yield development, is an important determinant of future agricultural land use (and  
 14 much more important than climate change), contributing to declines in agricultural areas of both  
 15 cropland and grassland by as much as 50% by 2080 under the A1FI and A2 scenarios (Rounsevell  
 16 *et al.* 2006). Such declines in land use did not occur within scenarios that assumed more extensive  
 17 agricultural management, such as "organic" production systems, or the widespread substitution of  
 18 agricultural food and fibre production by bioenergy crops. This highlights the role of policy  
 19 decisions in moderating future land use change. However, broad-scale changes often belie large  
 20 potential differences in the spatial distribution of land use change that can occur at the sub-regional  
 21 scale (Schröter *et al.* 2005 – see Figure 2.8), and these spatial patterns may have greater effects on  
 22 CCIAV than the overall changes in land use quantities (Metzger *et al.* 2006; Reidsma *et al.* 2006).



49 **Figure 2.8:** Percentage change in cropland area (for food production) by 2080 compared with the  
 50 baseline in 2000 for the 4 SRES storylines (A1FI, A2, B1, B2) with climate calculated by the  
 51 HadCM3 AOGCM (after Schröter *et al.* 2005)

1 2.3.1.7 *Comparison of SRES with other scenarios and storylines*

2  
3 Other assessments have also used the scenario approach as a way to explore uncertainties and risks  
4 related to climatic and other global environmental changes. Many of these are based on similar  
5 assumptions to those used in the SRES scenarios, in some cases employing the same models for  
6 quantifying the main drivers and indicators.

7  
8 Table 2.6 compares the SRES scenarios with some major global scenario exercises, based on  
9 reviews by Raskin (2005) and Westhoek (2006a). A common feature of all these exercises is their  
10 adoption of the Storyline-and-Simulation (SAS) approach (introduced in section 2.2.2.5, above –  
11 Alcamo 2001). Furthermore, since they also share similar archetypical visions of the future, they  
12 can be conveniently grouped into "scenario families" (Raskin, 2005, Global scenarios in historical;  
13 Westhoek, 2006, A brief comparison of, and see Table 2.4).

14  
15 **Table 2.6:** *Comparison of SRES with other selected global scenarios using the GSG scenario*  
16 *structure as a framework. Adapted from Raskin et al. (2005)*

SRES 2100	WBCSD* 2050	WWV 2025	GSG 2050	GEO-3 2032	MA 2100
<b>Conventional Worlds</b>					
<i>A1</i>	<i>FROG!</i>	<i>BaU</i>	<i>Market Forces</i>	<i>Markets First</i>	<i>Global Orchestration</i>
<i>B1</i>	<i>GeoPolity</i>	<i>Technology &amp; economics</i>	<i>Policy Reform</i>	<i>Policy First</i>	<i>Techno Garden</i>
<b>Barbarization</b>					
<i>A2</i>			<i>Fortress World</i>	<i>Security First</i>	<i>Order from Strength</i>
<b>Great transitions</b>					
<i>B2</i>	<i>Jazz</i>	<i>Lifestyle &amp; values</i>	<i>Eco- communalism New sustainability paradigm</i>	<i>Sustainability First</i>	<i>Adapting Mosaic</i>

17 \*WBCSD: World Business Council of Sustainable Development; WWV: World Water Vision; GSG: Global  
18 Scenarios Group; GEO-3: UNEP Global Environmental Outlook; MA: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

19  
20  
21 Important defining features of most exercises are also described by the SRES scenarios: how fast  
22 and in what way will global integration take place (and can it be reversed) and how readily will  
23 environmental considerations be mainstreamed into economic decision-making? All exercises  
24 include scenarios that describe "conventional worlds", depicting extensions of currently strong  
25 trends, such as increased globalization. A reversed trend that, combined with low economic and  
26 high population growth and a disregard for the environment, could result in a "Fortress world", with  
27 "Barbarization" or societal breakdown being another common vision various exercises share. The  
28 quest to reach the "Great Transition" to an environmentally sustainable and equitable society is also  
29 an important future pathway described by a number of the studies, though methods of realising this  
30 goal differ widely.

31  
32 All the global scenarios exercises described contain important features that can be useful for  
33 CCAV studies. A number of the exercises (e.g. MA, WWV, GEO-3) also go one step further than

1 the original SRES scenarios. They not only describe possible emissions under differing socio-  
 2 economic pathways but also include imaginable outcomes for climate variables and their impact on  
 3 ecological and social systems. This helps to illustrate risks and possible response strategies to deal  
 4 with possible impacts.

### 7 **2.3.2 Mitigation/stabilisation scenarios**

9 Mitigation scenarios (also known as climate intervention or climate policy scenarios) are defined,  
 10 as in TAR WG III (Morita *et al.* 2001), as scenarios that "(1) include explicit policies and/or  
 11 measures, the primary goal of which is to reduce GHG emissions (e.g. carbon tax) and/or (2)  
 12 mention no climate policies and/or measures, but assume temporal changes in GHG emission  
 13 sources or drivers required to achieve particular climate targets (e.g. GHG emission levels, GHG  
 14 concentration levels, temperature increase or sea level rise limits)." A wide variety of mitigation  
 15 scenarios have been developed (see chapter 3 WG III) that differ in three principal ways: their  
 16 degree of comprehensiveness, whether they take a forward or inverse approach to scenario  
 17 development, and whether they are deterministic or probabilistic (see section 2.2.2.1).

#### 19 **2.3.2.1 Types of mitigation/stabilisation scenarios**

21 Stabilisation scenarios are an important sub-set of inverse mitigation scenarios, describing futures in  
 22 which emissions reductions are undertaken so that greenhouse gas concentrations or global average  
 23 temperature change do not exceed a prescribed limit. The majority of mitigation scenarios focus on  
 24 economic and technological aspects of emissions reductions (e.g. van Vuuren *et al.* 2006; Morita *et al.*  
 25 2001). The use of mitigation scenarios in regional impact assessments, discussed in section  
 26 2.2.3.8, has been less common, in large part due to a paucity of regional socio-economic, land use  
 27 and other detail commensurate with a mitigated future (see discussion in Arnell *et al.* 2002).

#### 29 **2.3.2.2 Climate change information for mitigation scenarios**

31 While simple climate models have been used to explore the implications for global mean  
 32 temperature of stabilising CO<sub>2</sub> concentration at different levels (e.g. Cubasch *et al.* 2001), relatively  
 33 few AOGCM runs have been undertaken using stabilisation scenarios (see chapter 10, WG I for  
 34 recent examples), with few direct applications in regional impact assessments (e.g. Parry *et al.*  
 35 2001). However, although they are non-intervention scenarios, some of the SRES scenarios closely  
 36 resemble mitigation scenarios because they assume policies that promote emissions reduction for  
 37 reasons other than climate change. These similarities have been analysed by Swart (2002) who  
 38 suggested the use of selected projections based on SRES emissions scenarios as surrogates (Table  
 39 2.7). There is no surrogate in the SRES scenarios for stabilisation at 450 ppm, one of the  
 40 stabilisation levels often considered in policy analyses (Swart *et al.* 2002).

42 **Table 2.7:** *The six SRES illustrative scenarios and the stabilisation scenarios (parts per million*  
 43 *CO<sub>2</sub>) they most resemble (based on Swart et al. 2002).*

SRES illustrative scenario	Description of emissions	Surrogate stabilisation scenario
A1FI	High end of SRES range	Does not stabilise
A1B	Intermediate case	750 ppm
A1T	Intermediate/low case	650 ppm
A2	High case	Does not stabilise
B1	Low end of SRES range	550 ppm
B2	Intermediate/low case	650 ppm

## 2.4 Key conclusions and future directions

Climate change impact, adaptation and vulnerability (CCIAV) assessment has now moved far beyond its early status as a speculative, narrowly defined academic curiosity. Climate change is already underway, and the natural environment and human societies are adapting to its consequences, many of which are summarised in this volume. Since the TAR, knowledge and uncertainty in many areas of CCIIV assessment have changed:

- *Uncertainty has been reduced.* Inter-model differences in projected climate have narrowed (in most regions for temperature and in some regions for precipitation); confidence in projections of some climate extremes has increased. Current impacts and their attribution are becoming better quantified.
- *Uncertainty has increased.* The quantified range of climate sensitivity has increased from previous IPCC assessments. The integration of multiple drivers into integrated models increases quantified uncertainties (see below).
- *Known uncertainties have become better quantified.* The interaction of climate with other changes (e.g. population, the economy, technology, land-use change), their integrated impacts and feedbacks of these impacts to the climate system have been better quantified. Many of these changes lead to an increase in quantified uncertainty.
- *Uncertainties are being better managed in CCIIV assessments.* The development of risk assessment, and improved adaptation and vulnerability assessments, all involving stakeholders, are processes designed to manage uncertainty.

Policy makers need to know how best to respond to a changing climate, and this potentially places demands on the CCIIV community to provide:

- good quality information on what impacts are occurring now, their location and the groups or systems most affected;
- reliable estimates of impacts to be expected due to natural climate variability and projected climate change;
- early warning of potentially alarming or irreversible impacts;
- quantification of different risks and opportunities associated with a changing climate;
- effective approaches for identifying and evaluating both existing and prospective adaptation measures and strategies;
- credible methods of costing different outcomes and response measures;
- an adequate basis to compare and prioritise alternative response measures, including both adaptation and mitigation.

To meet these demands, future research efforts need to address a set of fundamental scientific, technical, and information gaps. These include:

- *Developing methods and tools appropriate for regional and local application.* An increasing focus on adaptation to climate change at local scales requires new methods, scenarios, and models to address emerging issues. New approaches are also reconciling scale issues in scenario development, such as the nesting of scenarios at different scales.

- 1 • *Cross-sectoral assessments*. Limited by data and technical complexity, most CCIAV  
2 assessments have so far focused on single sectors. However, impacts of climate change on one  
3 sector will have implications, directly and/or indirectly, for others, some adverse and some  
4 beneficial. To be more policy relevant, future analyses need to account for the interactions  
5 between different sectors, particularly at national level.  
6
- 7 • *Use of local knowledge*. The knowledge of local communities, especially traditional knowledge  
8 from indigenous populations (as contrasted with modern, formal methods of learning and  
9 imparting knowledge), represents an important, yet currently largely under-used resource for  
10 CCIAV assessment.  
11
- 12 • *Collection of empirical knowledge from past experience*. Experience gained in dealing with  
13 climate-related natural disasters, documented using both modern methods and traditional  
14 knowledge, can be particularly helpful in understanding the coping strategies and adaptive  
15 capacity of vulnerable communities. This applies to climate events such as droughts and floods  
16 as well as longer-term trends in mean climatic conditions  
17
- 18 • *Effective communication of the risks and opportunities of climate change to policy makers and  
19 the public*. Awareness-building and dissemination of research results is essential for many  
20 aspects of CCIAV assessments, in particular for engaging key stakeholders and for gaining trust  
21 and credibility among the public as a whole.  
22
- 23 • *Use of storylines in scenario development*. Improved methods of interpreting and quantifying  
24 storylines that limit subjectivity and promote reproducibility are needed, especially at regional  
25 and local scales.  
26
- 27 • *Consistent approaches in relation to scenarios in other assessments*. Climate change is only one  
28 issue of many that concern policy makers. The integration of climate-related scenarios into  
29 those widely accepted and used by other international bodies is needed (e.g. as part of  
30 mainstreaming). The interchange of ideas and information between different research and policy  
31 communities will strongly improve scenario quality, usage and acceptance.  
32
- 33 • *Improved scenarios for poorly specified indicators*. CCIAV outcomes are highly sensitive to  
34 assumptions about factors such as future technology and adaptive capacity that at present are  
35 poorly understood. For instance, the theories and processes of technological innovation and its  
36 relationship to other indicators such as education, wealth and governance, requires closer  
37 attention, as do studies of the processes and costs of adaptation.  
38
- 39 • *Internally-consistent scenarios*. The increasing diversity of scenarios being applied in CCIAV  
40 studies has highlighted shortcomings in how interactions between key drivers of change are  
41 represented. For example, SRES did not account for the effects of climate change on land cover,  
42 pointing to a clear need for more integrated treatment of interactions and feedbacks involving  
43 ecosystems, hydrology, climate and land cover. Similarly, socio-economic and technological  
44 scenarios need to account for the costs and other ancillary effects of both mitigation and  
45 adaptation actions, which at present are rarely considered.  
46
- 47 • *Provision of improved climate predictions for near-term planning horizons*. Many of the most  
48 severe impacts of climate change are manifest through extreme weather events. Resource  
49 planners increasingly need reliable information, years to decades ahead, on the risks of adverse  
50 weather events at the scales of river catchments and communities.

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