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Chapter 4: Sustainable Development and Equity

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Executive Summary

Since the first assessment report, the IPCC has considered issues of sustainable development (SD) and equity: acknowledging the importance to climate decision-making, and progressively expanding the scope to include: the co-benefits of climate actions for SD and equity, the relevance of lifestyle and behaviour, the relevance of technological choices, the relevance of procedural equity to effective decision-making, and the relevance of ethical frameworks and equitable burden-sharing in assessing climate responses. This Assessment Report further explores key dimensions of SD and equity, highlighting the significance of disparities across different regions and groups, and the ways in which designing a climate policy is a component of a wide-ranging societal choice of a development path [4.1, 4.2].

Sustainable development, a central framing issue in this Assessment Report, is intimately connected to climate change (high confidence). SD is variably conceived as development that preserves the interests of future generations, that preserves the ecosystem services on which continued human flourishing depends, or that harmonizes the co-evolution of three pillars (economic, social, environmental) [4.2]. First, the climate threat constrains possible development paths, and sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any prospect for a sustainable future (medium evidence, high agreement). Thus, a stable climate is one component of SD. Second, there are synergies and trade-offs between climate responses and broader SD goals, because some climate responses generate co-benefits for human and economic development, while others can have adverse side-effects and generate risks (robust evidence, high agreement). These co-benefits and risks are studied in the sector chapters of this report, along with measures and strategies to optimize them. Options for equitable burden-sharing can reduce the potential for the costs of climate action to constrain development (medium evidence, high agreement). Third, at a more fundamental level, the capacities underlying an effective climate response overlap strongly with capacities for SD (medium evidence, high agreement) and designing an effective climate policy involves “mainstreaming” climate in the design of comprehensive SD strategies and thinking through the general orientation of development (medium evidence, medium agreement) [4.2, 4.5].

Equity is an integral dimension of SD (high confidence). First, intergenerational equity underlies the concept of sustainability. Intra-generational equity is also often considered an intrinsic component of SD. In the particular context of international climate policy discussions, several arguments support giving equity an important role: a moral justification that draws upon ethical principles; a legal justification that appeals to existing treaty commitments and soft law agreements to cooperate on the basis of stated equity principles; and an effectiveness justification that argues that a fair arrangement is more likely to be agreed internationally and successfully implemented domestically (medium evidence, medium agreement). A relatively small set of core equity principles serve as the basis for most discussions of equitable burden-sharing in a climate regime: responsibility (for GHG emissions), capacity (ability to pay for mitigation, but sometimes other dimensions of mitigative capacity), the right to development, and equality (often interpreted as an equal entitlement to emit) [4.2, 4.6].

While it is possible to envision an evolution toward equitable and sustainable development, its underlying determinants are also deeply embedded in existing societal patterns that are unsustainable and highly inertial (high confidence). A useful set of determinants from which to examine the prospects for and impediments to SD and equity are: the legacy of development relations; governance and political economy; population and demography; values and behaviour; human and social capital; technology; natural resource endowments; and finance and investment. The evolution of each of these determinants as a driver (rather than barrier) to a SD transition is conceivable, but also poses profound challenges (medium evidence, medium agreement) [4.3].
Governing a transition toward an effective climate response and SD pathway is a challenge involving rethinking our relation to nature, accounting for multiple generations and interests (including those based on endowments in natural resources), overlapping environmental issues, among actors with widely unequal capacities, resources, and political power, and divergent conceptions of justice (high confidence). Key debated issues include articulating top-down and bottom-up approaches, engaging participation of diverse countries and actors, creating procedurally equitable forms of decentralization and combining market mechanisms with government action, all in a particular political economic context (robust evidence, high agreement) [4.3].

Technology and finance both are strong determinants of future societal paths, and while society’s current systems of allocating resources and prioritizing efforts toward investment and innovation are in many ways robust and dynamic, there are also some fundamental tensions with the underlying objectives of SD (high confidence). First, the technological innovation and financial systems are highly responsive to short-term motivations, and are sensitive to broader social and environmental costs and benefits only to the –often limited– extent that these costs and benefits are internalized by regulation, taxation, laws and social norms. Second, while these systems are quite responsive to market demand that is supported by purchasing power, they are only indirectly responsive to needs, particularly of those of the world’s poor, and they operate with a time horizon that disregards potential needs of future generations (medium evidence, medium agreement) [4.3].

Enhancing human capital based on individual knowledge and skills, and social capital based on mutually beneficial formal and informal relationships is important for facilitating a transition toward sustainable development (medium evidence, high agreement). ‘Social dilemmas’ arise in which short-term individual interests conflict with long-term social interests, with altruistic values being favourable to SD. However, the formation of values and their translation into behaviours is mediated by many factors, including the available set of market choices and lifestyles, the tenor of dominant information sources (including advertisements and popular culture), the culture and priorities of formal and civil institutions, and prevailing governance mode (medium evidence, medium agreement). The demographic transition toward low fertility rates, though an ageing population creates economic and social challenges, and migrations due to climate impacts may exacerbate tensions (medium evidence, medium agreement) [4.3, 4.4].

The global consumption of goods and services has increased dramatically over the last decades, in both absolute and per capita terms, and is a key driver of environmental degradation, including global warming (high confidence). This trend involves the spread of high-consumption lifestyles in some countries and sub-regions, while in other parts of the world large populations continue to live in poverty. There are high disparities in consumption both between and within countries (robust evidence, high agreement) [4.4].

Two basic types of decoupling often arise in the context of a transition toward sustainable development: the decoupling of material resource consumption (including fossil fuels) and environmental impact (including climate change) from economic growth, and the decoupling of economic growth from human well-being (high confidence). The first type – the dematerialization of the economy, i.e. of consumption and production – is generally considered crucial for meeting SD and equity goals, including mitigation of climate change. Production-based (territorial) accounting suggests that some decoupling of impacts from economic growth has occurred, especially in industrialized countries, but its extent is significantly diminished based on a consumption-based accounting (robust evidence, medium agreement). Consumption-based emissions are more strongly associated with GDP than production-based emissions, because wealthier countries generally satisfy a higher share of their final consumption of products through net imports compared to poorer countries. Ultimately, absolute levels of resource use and environmental impact – including GHG emissions – generally continue to rise with GDP (robust evidence, high agreement), though great variations between countries highlight the importance of other factors such as geography, energy system, production methods, waste management, household size, diet and lifestyle. The second type
of decoupling – of human well-being from economic growth – is a more controversial goal than the first. There are ethical controversies about the measure of well-being and the use of subjective data for this purpose (robust evidence, medium agreement). There are also empirical controversies about the relationship between subjective well-being and income, some recent studies across countries finding a clear relationship between average levels of life satisfaction and per capita income, while the evidence about the long-term relationship between satisfaction and income is less conclusive and quite diverse among countries (medium evidence, medium agreement). Studies of emotional well-being do identify clear satiation points beyond which further increases in income no longer enhance emotional well-being (medium evidence, medium agreement). Furthermore, income inequality has been found to have a marked negative effect on average subjective well-being, due to perceived unfairness and undermined trust of institutions among low income groups (medium evidence, medium agreement) [4.4].

Understanding how development paths impact on emissions and mitigative capacity, and, more generally, how development paths can be made more sustainable and more equitable in the future requires in-depth analysis of the mechanisms that underpin these paths (high confidence). Of particular importance are the processes that may generate path dependence and lock-ins, notably “increasing returns” but also use of scarce resources, switching costs, negative externalities or complementarities between outcomes (robust evidence, high agreement) [4.5, 4.6]. The study of transitions between pathways is an emerging field, notably in the context of technology transitions. Yet analyzing how to transition to a sustainable, low-emission pathway remains a major scientific challenge. It would be aided by models with a holistic framework encompassing the economy, society (in particular the distribution of resources and well-being), and the environment, take account of relevant technical constraints and trends, and explore a long-term horizon while simultaneously capturing processes relevant for the short-term and the key uncertainties (medium evidence, medium agreement) [4.5, 4.7].

Mitigation and adaptation measures can strongly affect broader SD and equity objectives, and it is thus useful to understand their broader implications (high confidence). Building both mitigative capacity and adaptive capacity relies to a profound extent on the same factors as those that are integral to equitable and sustainable development (medium evidence, high agreement), and equitable burden-sharing can enhance these capacities where they are most fragile [4.6]. This chapter focuses on examining ways in which the broader objectives of equitable and sustainable development provide a policy frame for an effective, robust, and long-term response to the climate problem. [4.8].
4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Key messages of previous IPCC reports

This chapter seeks to place climate change, and climate change mitigation in particular, in the context of equity and SD. Prior IPCC assessments have sought to do this as well, progressively expanding the scope of assessment to include broader and more insightful reflections on the policy-relevant contributions of academic literature.

The IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR) (IPCC, 1990) underscored the relevance of equity and SD to climate policy. Mandated to identify “possible elements for inclusion in a framework convention on climate change”, the IPCC prominently put forward the “endorsement and elaboration of the concept of sustainable development” for negotiators to consider as part of the Convention’s Preamble. It noted as key issues “how to address equitably the consequences for all” and “whether obligations should be equitably differentiated according to countries’ respective responsibilities for causing and combating climate change and their level of development”. This set the stage for the ensuing UNFCCC negotiations, which ultimately included explicit appeals to equity and SD, including in its Preamble, its Principles (Art. 2), its Objective (Art. 3), and its Commitments (Art. 4).

The IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) (IPCC, 1995), published after the UNFCCC was signed, maintained this focus on equity and SD. It reflected a growing appreciation for the prospects for SD co-benefits and reiterated the policy relevance of equity and SD. It did this most visibly in a special section of the Summary for Policymakers presenting “Information Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the UNFCCC”, including “Equity and social considerations” and “Economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. Notably, the SAR added an emphasis on procedural equity through a legitimate process that empowers all actors to effectively participate, and on the need to build capacities and strengthen institutions, particularly in developing countries.

The IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) demonstrated that broader SD goals can contribute indirectly, yet substantially, to reducing emissions. This IPCC contribution reflected a change in the scientific literature, which had in recent years expanded its discussion of SD to encompass analyses of lifestyles, culture, and behaviour, complementing its traditional techno-economic analyses. It also reflected a recognition that economic growth (especially as currently measured) is not the sole goal of societies. The SRES thus provided insights into how policy intervention can decouple economic growth from emissions and well-being from economic growth, showing that both forms of decoupling are important elements of a transition to a world with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001) deepened the consideration of broader SD objectives in assessing response strategies. Perhaps owing to a growing appreciation for the severity of the climate change challenge, the TAR stressed the need for an ambitious and encompassing response, and was thus more attentive to the risk of climate-focused measures conflicting with basic development aspirations. It thus articulated the fundamental equity challenge of climate change as ensuring “that neither the impact of climate change nor that of mitigation policies exacerbates existing inequities both within and across nations”, specifically because “restrictions on emissions will continue to be viewed by many people in developing countries as yet another constraint on the development process” (See Box 4.1 for further discussion of the relationship between climate change and development challenges in developing countries.). The TAR recognized the need to deepen the analysis of equitable burden-sharing in order to avoid undermining prospects for SD in developing countries. More generally, the TAR observed that equitable burden-sharing is not solely an ethical matter. Even from a rational-actor game-theoretic perspective, an agreement in which the burden is equitably shared is more likely to be signed by a large number of countries, and thus to be more effective and efficient.
The IPCC *Fourth Assessment Report* (AR4) (IPCC, 2007) further expanded the consideration of broader SD objectives. It stressed the importance of civil society and other non-government actors in designing climate policy and equitable SD strategies generally. The AR4 focused more strongly on the distributional implications of climate policies, noting that conventional climate policy analysis that is based too narrowly on traditional utilitarian or cost-benefit frameworks will neglect critical equity issues. These oversights include human rights implications and moral imperatives; the distribution of costs and benefits of a given set of policies, and the further distributional inequities that arise when the poor have limited scope to influence policy. This is particularly problematic, the AR4 notes, in integrated assessment model (IAM) analyses of “optimal” mitigation pathways, because climate impacts do not affect the poor exclusively through changes in incomes. Nor do they satisfactorily account for uncertainty and risk, which the poor treat differently than the rich. The poor have higher risk aversion and lower access to assets and financial mechanisms that buffer against shocks. The AR4 went on to outline alternative ethical frameworks including rights-based and capabilities-based approaches, suggesting how they can inform climate policy decisions. In particular, the AR4 discussed the implications of these different frameworks for equitable international burden-sharing.

The IPCC *Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation* (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011) deepened the consideration of broader SD objectives in assessing renewable energy options, noting particularly that while synergies can arise (for example, helping to expand access to energy services, increase energy security, and reduce some environmental pressures), there can also be trade-offs (such as increased pressure on land resources, and affordability) and these must be negotiated in a manner sensitive to equity considerations.

The IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) (IPCC 2012a) highlighted key further dimensions of SD and equity, including the distinction and interplay between incremental and transformative changes – both of which are necessary for an effective climate policy response, and emphasized the diversity of values that underlie decision-making, e.g., a human rights framework vs. utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.

### 4.1.2 Narrative focus and key messages

In keeping with the previous IPCC assessments, this chapter considers SD and equity as matters of policy relevance for climate change decision-makers. It examines the ways in which climate change is in fact inextricably linked with SD and equity. It examines these links with the aim of drawing policy-relevant conclusions regarding equitable and sustainable responses to climate change.

In one direction, the link is self-evident: an effective climate response is necessary for equitable and sustainable development to occur. The disruptions that climate change would cause in the absence of an effective societal response are sufficiently severe (see AR5 WGI and WGII) to severely compromise development, even taking into account future societies’ ability to adapt (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010). Nor is this development likely to be equitable, as an increasingly inhospitable climate will most seriously undermine the future prospects of those nations, communities, and individuals that are in greatest need of development. Without an effective response to climate change, including both timely mitigation and proactive adaptation, development can be neither sustainable nor equitable.

In recent years, the academic community has come increasingly to appreciate the extent to which SD and equity are also needed as frameworks for assessing and prioritizing climate responses: given the strong trade-offs and synergies between the options for a climate response and SD, the design of an effective climate response must accord with the objectives for development and equity and exploit the synergies. A climate strategy that does not do so runs the risk either of being ineffective for lack of consensus and earnest implementation or of jeopardizing SD just as unabated climate change would. Therefore, a shift toward more equitable and sustainable modes of development may provide the only context in which an effective climate response can be realized.
The scientific community is coming to understand that climate change is but one example of how humankind is pressing up against its planetary limits (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rockström et al., 2009a). Technical measures can certainly help in the near-term to alleviate climate change. However, the comprehensive and durable strategies society needs are those that recognize climate change shares its root causes with other dimensions of the global sustainability crisis, and that without addressing these root causes, robust solutions may not be accessible.

This chapter, and many parts of this report, uncovers ways in which a broader agenda of SD and equity may support and enable an effective societal response to the climate challenge, by establishing the basis by which mitigative and adaptive capacity can be built and sustained. In examining this perspective, this chapter focuses on several broad themes.

### 4.1.2.1 Consumption, disparities and well-being

The first theme relates to well-being and consumption. The relationship between consumption levels and environmental pressures, including GHG emissions, has long been a key concern for SD, with a growing focus on high-consumption lifestyles in particular and consumption disparities. A significant part of the literature develops methodologies for assessing the environmental impacts across national boundaries of consumption, through consumption-based accounting and GHG footprint analysis. Important research is now also emerging on the relationship between well-being and consumption, and how to moderate consumption and its impacts without hindering well-being – and indeed, while enhancing it. More research is now available on the importance of behaviour, lifestyles and culture, and their relationship to over-consumption (Sections 4.3, 4.4).

Research is emerging to help understand “under-consumption”, i.e., poverty and deprivation, and its impacts on well-being more broadly, and specifically on the means by which it undermines mitigative and adaptive capacity (WGII Chapter 20). Energy poverty is one critical example, linked directly to climate change, of under-consumption that is well-correlated with weakened livelihoods, lack of resilience, and limited mitigative and adaptive capacity. Overcoming under-consumption and reversing over-consumption, while maintaining and advancing human well-being, are fundamental dimensions of SD, and are equally critical to resolving the climate problem (Sections 4.5, 4.6).

### 4.1.2.2 Equity at the national and international scales

Given the disparities evident in consumption patterns, the distributional implications of climate response strategies are critically important. As recent history shows, understanding how policies affect different segments of the population is essential to designing and implementing politically acceptable and effective national climate response strategies. A transition perceived as just would attract a greater level of public support for the substantial techno-economic, institutional and lifestyle shifts needed to reduce emissions substantially and enable adaptive responses.

At the international level, an equitable regime with fair burden-sharing is likely to be a key condition for an effective global response (Sections 4.2, 4.6). Given the urgency of the climate challenge, a rather rapid transition will be required if the global temperature rise is to remain below the politically discussed targets, such as 1.5°C or 2°C over pre-industrial levels, with global emissions possibly peaking as soon as 2020 (see WGI, Figure 6.25). Particularly in a situation calling for a concerted global effort, the most promising response is a cooperative approach “that would quickly require humanity to think like a society of people, not like a collection of individual states” (Victor 1998).

While scientific assessments cannot define what equity is and how equitable burden-sharing should be implementing the Convention and climate policies in general, they can help illuminate the implications of alternative choices and their ethical basis (Section 4.6, also Sections 3.2, 3.3, 6.3.6, 13.4.3).
4.1.2.3 Building institutions and capacity for effective governance

While there is strong evidence that a transition to a sustainable and equitable path is technically feasible (see Sections 6.1.2, 6.3), charting an effective and viable course through the climate challenge is not merely a technical exercise. It will involve myriad and sequential decisions, among states and civil society actors, supported by the broadest possible constituencies (Section 4.3). Such a process benefits from the education and empowerment of diverse actors to participate in systems of decision-making that are designed and implemented with procedural equity as a deliberate objective. This applies at the national as well as international levels, where effective governance relating to global common resources, in particular, is not yet mature.

Any given approach to addressing the climate challenge has potential winners and losers. The political feasibility of that approach will depend strongly on the distribution of power, resources, and decision-making authority among the potential winners and losers. In a world characterized by profound disparities, procedurally equitable systems of engagement, decision-making and governance appear needed to enable a polity to come to equitable and sustainable solutions to the sustainable development challenge.

Box 4.1. Sustainable development and climate change mitigation in developing countries

The interconnectedness of climate change, sustainable development, and equity poses serious challenges for developing countries but it also presents opportunities.

Developing countries are confronted by a daunting mitigation challenge in the midst of pressing development needs. Developing country emissions comprised more than half of global emissions in 2010, and grew during the preceding decade by an amount that accounted for the total global emissions rise (JRC/PBL (2012), IEA (2012); see Annex II.8; see Section 5.3). In the absence of concerted mitigation actions, the coming decades would see this trend prolonged, with a continued growth in global emissions driven predominantly by developing countries’ rising emissions (see Section 6.3). This trend is the unsurprising outcome of the recent economic growth in many developing countries. The increase in emissions coincided with a number of positive developments:
Over the past decade, the overall poverty rate has declined, maternal and child mortality have fallen, the prevalence of several preventable diseases has decreased, and access to safe drinking water and sanitation has expanded, while the Human Development Index across nations has risen and its convergence has become more pronounced. This “rise of the South” has been termed “unprecedented in its speed and scale [...] affecting a hundred times as many people as the Industrial Revolution” and setting in motion a “dramatic rebalancing” of economic and geopolitical forces (United Nations, 2011a; United Nations Development Programme, 2013).

Notwithstanding these gains, further developmental progress is urgently needed throughout the developing world. More than 1.5 billion people remain in multi-dimensional poverty, energy insecurity is still widespread, inequality of income and access to social services is persistently high, and the environmental resource base on which humans rely is deteriorating in multiple ways (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Bazilian et al., 2010; United Nations Development Programme, 2013). Moreover, unavoidable climate change will amplify the challenges of development: climate impacts are expected to slow economic growth and exacerbate poverty, and current failures to address emerging impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development (WGII SPM).

Thus, the challenge confronting developing countries is to preserve and build on the developmental achievements to date, sharing them broadly and equitably across their populations, but to do so via a sustainable development pathway that does not reproduce the fossil-fuel based and emissions-intensive conventional pathway by which the developed world moved from poverty to prosperity. Faced with this dilemma, developing countries have sought evidence that such alternative development pathways exist, looking in particular to developed countries to take the lead during the
two decades since the UNFCCC was negotiated. Some such evidence has emerged, in the form of a
variety of incipient climate policy experiments (see Section 15.6, 15.7) that appear to have
generated some innovation in low-carbon technologies (see Section 4.4) and modestly curbed
emissions in some countries (see Section 5.3).
Developing countries have stepped forward with significant actions to address climate change, but
will need to build mitigative and adaptive capacity if they are to respond yet more effectively (see
Section 4.6). More broadly, the underlying determinants of development pathways in developing
countries are often not aligned toward a sustainable pathway (see Sections 4.3, 4.5). At the same
time, developing countries are in some ways well-positioned to shift toward sustainable pathways:
Most developing countries are still in the process of building their urban and industrial infrastructure
and can avoid lock-in (see Sections 4.5, 5.6). Many are also in the process of establishing the cultural
norms and lifestyles of an emerging middle class, and can do so without reproducing the
consumerist values of many developed countries (4.3, 4.4). Some barriers, such as lack of access to
financial and technological resources, can be overcome through international cooperation based on
principles of equity and fair burden-sharing (see Sections 4.6, 6.3).

4.2 Approaches and indicators

This section maps out the various conceptual approaches to the issues of SD (4.2.1), equity (4.2.2),
and their linkages to climate change and climate policy.

4.2.1 Sustainability and sustainable development (SD)

4.2.1.1 Defining and measuring sustainability

The most frequently quoted definition of SD is “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, from the
Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). This definition
acknowledges a tension between sustainability and development (Jabareen, 2006), and that
development objectives aim at meeting basic needs for all citizens and securing them in a
sustainable manner (Murdiyarso, 2010). One of the first definitions of SD (Prescott-Allen, 1980)
refers to a development process that is compatible with the preservation of ecosystems and species.

A popular conceptualization of SD goes beyond securing needs and preserving the environment and
involves three “pillars” or three “bottom-lines” of sustainability: environmental, economic, and
social aspects (Dobson, 1991; Elkington, 1998; Flint and Danner, 2001; Pope et al., 2004; Sneddon et
al., 2006; Murdiyarso, 2010; Okereke, 2011). There is some variation in the articulation of the three
spheres, with some arguing for an equal appraisal of their co-evolution and mutual interactions, and
others positing a hierarchy with economic activities embedded in the social matrix, which is itself
grounded in the ecosphere (Levin, 2000; Fischer et al., 2007). This broad SD framework is equally
relevant for rich countries concerned with growth, well-being, human development, and lifestyles.

A well-known distinction opposes weak sustainability to strong sustainability approaches
(Neumayer, 2010). The former rely on the assumption that human-made capital can replace natural
resources and ecosystem services with a high degree of substitutability. Strong sustainability, in
contrast, takes the view that certain critical natural stocks – such as the climate system and
biodiversity – cannot be replaced by human-made capital and must be maintained. Weak
sustainability is often believed to be inherent to economic modeling that aggregates all forms of
capital together (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007), but economic models and indicators can accommodate
any degree of substitutability between different forms of capital (Fleurbaey and Blanchet, 2013). The
linkage between strong sustainability and IAMs is discussed in Sathaye et al. (2011). A different but
related issue is whether one should evaluate development paths only in terms of human well-being,
which depends on the environment services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), or also account for natural systems as intrinsically valuable (McShane, 2007; Attfield, 2008).

Sustainability is closely related to resilience (ARS WII 2.5 and 20.2-20.6, Folke et al. (2010), Gallopín (2006), Goerner et al. (2009) and vulnerability (Kates, 2001; Clark and Dickson, 2003; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012a). A key premise of this direction of research is that social and biophysical processes are interdependent and co-evolving (Polsky and Eakin, 2011). The biosphere itself is a complex adaptive system, the monitoring of which is still perfectible (Levin, 2000; Thuiller, 2007). Critical perspectives on these concepts, when applied to SD analysis, can be found in Turner (2010) and Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010).

Although there are various conceptions of sustainability in the literature, there are internationally agreed principles of SD adopted by heads of states and governments at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and reaffirmed at subsequent review and implementation conferences (United Nations, 1992a, 1997, 2002, 2012a). A key guiding principle is: “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations” (1992 Rio Declaration Principle 3). The Rio principles were reaffirmed at the June 2012 summit level UN Conference on SD.

Box 4.2. Sustainable development indicators (SDI)

When SD became a prominent consideration in policy-making in the early 1990s, SDI initiatives flourished. Pressure-state-response (PSR) and capital accounting-based (CAB) frameworks, in particular, were widely used to assess sustainability. The PSR approach was further modified as driving force-state-response (DSR) by UNCSD (2001) and driving force-pressure-state-impact-response (DPSIR) by UNEP (UNEP, 1997, 2000, 2002). The System of Integrated Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) of the United Nations offers a wealth of information about the state of ecosystems and is currently under revision and expansion. 1 The CAB approach is embodied in the Adjusted Net Savings indicator of the World Bank (2003, 2011), which is mentioned in Section 4.3 and 14.1 of this report. It is based on the economic theory of “genuine savings” (defined as the variation of all natural and man-made capital stocks, evaluated at certain specific accounting prices), which shows that on a path that maximizes the discounted utilitarian sum, a negative value for genuine savings implies that the current level of well-being is not sustainable (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Pezzy, 2004).

General presentations and critical assessments of SDIs can be found in a large literature (Daly, 1996; Aronsson et al., 1997; Pezzy and Toman, 2002; Lawn, 2003; Hamilton and Atkinson, 2006; Asheim, 2007; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007; Neumayer, 2010; Martinet, 2012; Mori and Christodoulou, 2012; Fleurlaë and Blanchet, 2013). This literature is pervaded by a concern for comprehensiveness – i.e., recording all important aspects of well-being, equity, and nature preservation for current and future generations – and accuracy – i.e., avoiding arbitrary or unreliable weighting of the relevant dimensions when synthesizing multidimensional information. The general conclusion of this literature is that there is currently no satisfactory empirical indicator of sustainability.

A limitation of the PSR model is that it fails to identify causal relations, and it oversimplifies the links between dimensions. It is moreover based upon aggregate indices which lose much information contained in the underlying indicators. An important limitation of the SEEA is that social and institutional issues are essentially left out, and its stock-and-flow approach is problematic with respect to environmental and social aspects that do not have a market price. Similarly, computing CAB indicators compiles the difficulty of comprehensively estimating the evolution of capital stocks with the difficulty of computing the accounting prices. Market prices do provide relevant information, but they are not necessarily a good indicator of sustainability.

The literature on the complex relations between climate change, climate policies, and SD is large (Swart et al., 2003; Robinson et al., 2006; Bizikova et al., 2007; Sathaye et al., 2007; Thuiller, 2007; Akimoto et al., 2012; Janetos et al., 2012). The links between SD and climate issues are examined in detail in WGII Chapter 20. Mapping out these links is also important in the WGIII report; this subsection puts the relevant components of the report in perspective.

Three main linkages can be identified, each of which contains many elements. First, the climate threat constrains possible development paths, and sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any prospect for sustainable future (WGII Chapter 19). In this perspective, an effective climate response is necessarily an integral objective of an SD strategy.

Second, there are trade-offs between climate responses and broader SD goals, because some climate responses can impose other environmental pressures, have adverse distributional effects, draw resources away from other developmental priorities, or otherwise impose limitations on growth and development (Sections 4.6, 8.9, 9.8, 10.10, 11.9, 12.8). Section 4.4 examines how to avoid such trade-offs by changing behavioural patterns and decoupling emissions and growth, and/or decoupling growth and well-being.

Third, there are multiple potential synergies between climate responses and broader SD objectives. Climate responses may generate co-benefits for human and economic development (Sections 3.6, 4.6, 7.9, 8.7, 9.6, 10.8, 11.7). At a more fundamental level, capacities underlying an effective climate response overlap strongly with capacities for SD (Section 4.6, 5.3).

A key message of this report is that designing a successful climate policy may require going beyond a narrow focus on mitigation and adaptation, beyond the analysis of a few co-benefits of climate policy, and may instead require “mainstreaming” climate issues into the design of comprehensive SD strategies, including at local and regional levels. Figure 4.1 illustrates the different perspectives from which climate policy can be envisioned. In the broadest, boldest perspective, the choice of the development path (see Sections 4.5, 6.1) is at stake.

Equity is prominent in research and policy debates about SD and climate, both as distributive equity (distribution of resources in contexts such as burden-sharing, distribution of well-being in the broader context of social justice, see Sections 3.3, 4.4, 4.6) and procedural equity (participation in decision-making, see Section 4.3). Various aspects of the general concept, as developed in social ethics, are introduced in Section 3.2 under the name of fairness and justice. (In this chapter the terms equity, fairness, and justice are not distinguished but are used according to common usage depending on context). The aim of this subsection is to analyse the links between equity, SD, and climate issues.
Figure 4.1. Three frameworks for thinking about mitigation

Equity between generations underlies the very notion of SD. Figure 4.2, a variant of a figure from Howarth and Norgaard (1992), illustrates sustainability as the possibility for future generations to reach at least the same level of well-being as the current generation. It shows in particular that sustainability is a matter of distributive equity, not of efficiency, even if eliminating inefficiencies affecting future sustainable well-being may improve sustainability, as stressed in Grubb et al. (2013).

There has been a recent surge of research on intergenerational equity, motivated by dissatisfaction with the tradition of discounting the utility of future generations in the analysis of growth paths (see, e.g., Asheim (2007), Roemer and Suzumura (2007) for recent syntheses). The debate on discounting is reviewed in 3.6.2. Recent literature presents new arguments deriving the imperative of sustaining well-being across generations from more basic equity principles (Asheim et al., 2001, 2012).
Figure 4.2. The well-being level of the current generation is sustainable if it does not exceed the maximum sustainable well-being level of the future generations—indeed, independently of whether one is or is not on the possibility frontier.

Equity within every generation is often considered an intrinsic component of SD linked to the social pillar. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may be seen as one indication of a more explicit global commitment to the social pillar (United Nations, 2000). Yet, the relation between equity within generations and SD is complex. Attempting to meet the needs of the world’s poor by proliferating the consumption patterns and production processes of the world’s richest populations would be unsustainable (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rockström et al., 2009b; Steffen et al., 2011; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Such a scenario would not likely play out well for the world’s poor. Environmental issues are interwoven with the fabric of racial, social and economic injustice. Environmental costs and benefits are often distributed so that those who already suffer other socio-economic disadvantages tend to bear the greatest burden (Okereke, 2011).

Figure 4.3 illustrates the normative framework in which a SD path can be grounded on certain values (well-being, equity) and interrelated goals (development and conservation), and the synergies and trade-offs between SD and climate policy, with procedural equity and iterative learning nurturing each step, from conceptualization to implementation.
Figure 4.3. Links between SD, equity, and climate policy

In the rest of this section, we focus on one key dimension of equity that is of central importance to international negotiations toward an effective global response to climate change. As in many other contexts, fundamental questions of resource allocation and burden-sharing arise in climate change, and therefore equity principles are invoked and debated. Three lines of argument have been put forward to justify a reference to equity in this context (Section 4.6 examines the details of burden-sharing principles and frameworks in a climate regime.)

The first justification is the normative claim that it is morally proper to allocate burdens associated with our common global climate challenge according to ethical principles. The broad set of ethical arguments for ascribing moral obligations to individual nations has been reviewed in Section 3.3, drawing implicitly upon a cosmopolitan view of justice, which posits that some of the basic rights and duties that arise between people within nations also hold between people of different nations.

The second justification is the legal claim that countries have accepted treaty commitments to act against climate change that include the commitment to share the burden of action equitably. This claim derives from the fact that signatories to the UNFCCC have agreed that: “Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 2002). These commitments are consistent with a body of soft law and norms such as the no-harm rule according to which a state must prevent, reduce or control the risk of serious environmental harm to other states (Stockholm Convention (UNEP, 1972), Rio declaration (United Nations, 1992b), Stone (2004)). In addition, it has been noted that climate change adversely affects a range of human rights that are incorporated in widely ratified treaties (Aminzadeh, 2006; Humphreys, 2009; Knox, 2009; Wewerinke and Yu III, 2010; Bodansky, 2010).

The third justification is the positive claim that equitable burden-sharing will be necessary if the climate challenge is to be effectively met. This claim derives from the fact that climate change is a classic commons problem (Hardin, 1968; Soroos, 1997; Buck, 1998; Folke, 2007) (also see Section 13.2.2.4). As with any commons problem, the solution lies in collective action (Ostrom, 1990). This is true at the global scale as well as the local, only more challenging to achieve (Ostrom et al., 1999).
Inducing cooperation relies, to an important degree, on convincing others that one is doing one’s fair share. This is why notions of equitable burden-sharing are considered important in motivating actors to effectively respond to climate change. They are even more important given that actors are not as equal as the proverbial “commoners,” where the very name asserts homogeneity (Milanović et al., 2007). To the contrary, there are important asymmetries or inequalities between stakeholders (Okereke et al., 2009; Okereke, 2010): asymmetry in contribution to climate change (past and present), in vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, in capacity to mitigate the problem, and in power to decide on solutions. Other aspects of the relation between intragenerational equity and climate response include the gender issues noted in 4.2.1.2, and the role of virtue ethics and citizen attitudes in changing lifestyles and behaviours (Dobson, 2007; Lane, 2012), a topic analyzed in Section 4.4.

Young (2013) has identified three general conditions—which apply to the climate context—under which the successful formation and eventual effectiveness of a collective action regime may hinge on equitable burden-sharing: the absence of actors who are powerful enough to coercively impose their preferred burden-sharing arrangements; the inapplicability of standard utilitarian methods of calculating costs and benefits; the fact that regime effectiveness depends on a long-term commitment of members to implement its terms. With respect to climate change, it has long been noted that a regime that many members find unfair will be face severe challenges to its adoption or be vulnerable to festering tensions that jeopardize its effectiveness (Harris, 1996; Müller, 1999; Young, 2012). Specifically, any attempt to protect the climate by keeping living standards low for a large part of the world population will face strong political resistance, and will almost certainly fail (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Baer et al., 2009). While costs of participation may provide incentives for non-cooperation or defection in the short-term, the climate negotiations are not a one-shot game, and they are embodied in a much broader global context; climate change is only one of many global problems—environmental, economic, and social—that will require effective cooperative global governance if development—and indeed human welfare—is to be sustained in the long term (Singer, 2004; Jasanoff, 2004; Speth and Haas, 2006; Kjellen, 2008).

Despite these three lines of justification, the question of the role that equity does or should play in the establishment of global climate policy and burden-sharing in particular is nonetheless controversial (Victor, 1998). The fact that there is no universally accepted global authority to enforce participation is taken by some to mean that sovereignty, not equity is the prevailing principle. Such a conception implies that the bottom-line criterion for a self-enforcing (Barrett, 2005) cooperative agreement would be simply that everyone is no worse off than the status quo. This has been termed “International Paretianism” (Posner and Weisbach, 2010), and its ironic, even perverse results have been pointed out: “an optimal climate treaty could well require side payments to rich countries like the United States and rising countries like China, and indeed possibly from very poor countries which are extremely vulnerable to climate change - such as Bangladesh.” (Posner and Weisbach, 2010, p. 86).

However, both critics and advocates of the importance of equity in the climate negotiations acknowledge that governments can choose to act on moral rather than purely self-interested principles (DeCanio and Fremstad, 2010; Posner and Weisbach, 2010, 2012; Baer, 2013; Jamieson, 2013) (See also Section 3.10.). Whether or not states behave as rational actors, given the significant global gains to be had from cooperation, this leaves ample room for discussion of the role of equity in the distribution of those global gains, while still leaving all parties better off (Stone, 2004).

While the above discussion focuses on equity among nations, equally relevant concerns regarding equity within nations also arise, and indeed can be overriding determinants of the prospects for climate policy to be adopted. Demands for equity have been articulated by labour communities primarily in terms of a just transition (International Labour Office, 2010; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013), and often by marginalized populations and racial minorities in terms of environmental justice and just sustainability (Agyeman and Evans, 2004; Walker and Bulkeley, 2006; Shiva, 2008).
the particular demands are highly location- and context-specific, the broad concerns are procedural and distributive justice with reduced power asymmetries, as underscored throughout this chapter.

4.3 Determinants, drivers and barriers

This section explores the determinants of SD, emphasizing how each influences the extent to which societies can balance the economic, social and environmental pillars of SD, whilst highlighting potential synergies and trade-offs for the building of mitigative and adaptive capacity and the realisation of effective and equitable mitigation and adaptation strategies. Determinants refer to social processes, properties, and artefacts, as well as natural resources, which together condition and mediate the course of societal development, and thus the prospects for SD. When determinants facilitate SD they act drivers and when they constrain it they act as barriers.

The determinants discussed include: the legacy of development relations; governance and political economy; population and demography; human and social capital; behaviour, culture and values; technology and innovation processes; natural resources; and finance and investment. These determinants are interdependent, characterized by feedbacks that blur the distinction between cause and effect, and their relative importance depends on context—see analogous discussion in the context of GHG emission drivers in 5.3. They are not unique, and other determinants such as leadership (Jones and Olken, 2005), randomness (Holling, 1973; Arthur, 1989), or human nature (Wilson, 1978) could be added to the list, but they are less amenable to deliberate intervention by policy-makers and other decision-makers and have therefore been excluded. What follows lays the foundations for understanding concepts that recur throughout this chapter and those that follow.

4.3.1 Legacy of development relations

Following World War II, security, economic, and humanitarian relations between rich nations and poor nations were comingled and addressed under the umbrella of “development” (Truman, 1949; Sachs, Wolfgang, 1999). Differing perspectives on the mixed outcomes of six decades of development, and what the outcomes may indicate about underlying intentions and capabilities, inform different actors in different ways as to what will work to address climate change and the transition to SD. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, expectations were that poverty would be reduced dramatically by the end of the century (Rist, 2003). It was widely believed that economic development could be instigated through aid from richer nations, both financial and in kind. Development was seen as a process of going through stages starting with transforming traditional agriculture through education, the introduction of new agricultural technologies, improved access to capital for farm improvements, and the construction of transportation infrastructure to facilitate markets. Improved agriculture would release workers for an industrial stage and thereby increase opportunities for education and commercial development in cities. As development proceeded, nations would increasingly acquire their own scientific capabilities and, later, sophisticated governance structures to regulate finance and industry in the public good, becoming well-rounded, well-governed economies comparable to those of rich nations.

By the 1970s, however, it was clear that development was not on a path to fulfilling these linear expectations because: 1) contributions of aid from the rich nations were not at levels anticipated; 2) technological and institutional changes were only partially successful, proved inappropriate, or had unpredicted, unfortunate consequences; 3) requests for military aid and the security and economic objectives of richer nations in the context of the Cold War were frequently given priority over poverty reduction; and 4) graft, patronage, and the favouring of special interests diverted funds from poverty reduction. Beliefs that nations naturally went through stages of development to become well-rounded economies faded by the early 1980s. Greater participation in global trade, with its implied specialization, was invoked as the path to economic growth. Diverse other efforts were made to improve how development worked, but with only modest success, leaving many in rich and poor nations concerned about development process and prospects (United Nations, 2011a).
Layering the goal of environmental sustainability onto the goal of poverty reduction further compounded the legacy of unmet expectations (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). There have been difficulties determining, shifting to, and governing for sustainable pathways (Sanwal, 2010) - see 4.3.2 below. The negotiation of new rules for the mobility of private capital and the drive for globalization of the economy also came with new expectations for development (Stiglitz, 2002). The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) established in 2000 to be met by 2015 are an example of how such expectations were thought to be realizable in the rapidly evolving times of the global financial economy. In retrospect and after the 2008 financial sector induced recession, significant improvements are largely in China and India where economic growth accelerated through private capital flows independent of the MDG process. Excluding these countries, the record is mixed at best and still poor in most of Africa (Keyzer and Wesenbeeck, 2007; Easterly, 2009; United Nations, 2011a). Additionally, since the 1990s, greenhouse gas emissions became another focus of contention (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Penetrante, 2011; Dryzek et al., 2011). The developed nations became rich through the early use of fossil fuels and land transformations that put GHGs in the atmosphere, imposing costs on all people, rich and poor, through climate impacts that will persist over centuries (Srinivasan et al., 2008). Connections between causal and moral responsibility arose, complicating the legacy of development.

Such legacy of unmet development and sustainability expectations is open to multiple interpretations. In richer nations, the evidence can be interpreted to support the views of fiscal conservatives who oppose aid, libertarians who oppose humanitarian and environmental interventions, progressives who urge that more needs to be done to reach social and environmental goals, and some environmentalists who urge dematerialization and degrowth among the rich as necessary to meet the needs of the poor. In poorer nations, the legacy similarly supports various views including a distrust of rich nations for not delivering development and environmental assistance as promised, cynicism toward the intentions and conceptual rationales when it is provided, and also a wariness of development’s unpredicted outcomes.

In both developed and developing nations these diverse sentiments among the public, policy makers, and climate negotiators contribute to what philosopher Gardiner (2011b) refers to as the “perfect moral storm” of climate policy. Some analysts argue that the legacy of development and interrelated issues of equity so cloud global climate negotiations that ad hoc agreements and voluntary pledges are the most that can be achieved (Victor, 2004) and considerations of development and equity are better left aside (Posner and Weisbach, 2010), although this leaves open whether such arrangements could provide an adequately ambitious climate response consistent with the UNFCCC’s objectives. (See Section 4.6.2 for further discussion of perspectives on equity in a climate regime, and Section 13.4.3 for further discussion of regime architectures).

4.3.2 Governance and political economy

Governance and political economy are critical determinants for SD, equity and climate mitigation because they circumscribe the process through which these goals and how to attain them are articulated and contested. The quest for equity and climate mitigation in the context of SD thus necessitates an improved understanding and practice of governance (Biermann et al., 2009; Okereke et al., 2009). Governance in the broadest sense refers to the processes of interaction and decision-making among actors involved in a common problem (Kooiman, 2003; Hufty, 2011). It goes beyond notions of formal government or political authority and integrates other actors, networks, informal institutions and incentive structures operating at various levels of social organization (Rosenau, 1990; Chotray and Stoker, 2009). In turn, climate governance has been defined as the mechanisms and measures “aimed at steering social systems towards preventing, mitigating or adapting to the risks posed by climate change” (Jagers and Stripple, 2003). From this definition, it can be seen as a broad phenomenon encompassing not only formal policy-making by states but all the processes through which authority is generated and exerted to affect climate change and sustainability. This
includes policy-making by states but also by many other actors -NGOs, TNCs, municipalities, for example- operating across various scales (Okereke et al., 2009).

Many scholars have highlighted the challenges associated with governing for SD and climate change (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Levin et al., 2012). First, it involves rethinking the ways society relates to nature and the underlying biophysical systems. This is relevant in the context of the growing evidence of the impact of human activity on the planet and the understanding that extraordinary degrees of irreversible damage and harm are distinct possibilities if the right measures are not taken within adequate timescale (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rockström et al., 2009a).

Second, governing climate change involves complex intergenerational considerations. On the one hand, cause and effect of some environmental impacts and climate change are separated by decades, often generations, and on the other hand, those who bear the costs of remediation and mitigation may not be the ones to reap the benefits of avoided harm (Biermann, 2007).

Third, effective response to climate change may require a fundamental restructuring of the global economic and social systems which in turn would involve overcoming vested multiple interests and the inertia associated with behavioural patterns and crafting new institutions that promote sustainability (Meadows et al., 2004; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). This challenge is exacerbated by the huge mismatch between the planning horizon needed to address global environmental problems and climate change and the tenure of decision makers (Hovi et al., 2009).

Fourth, and finally, SD governance cuts across several realms of policy and organisation. Particularly, the governance of climate mitigation and adaptation is an element of a complex and evolving arena of global environmental governance, which deals with other, and often overlapping, issues such as biodiversity loss, desertification, water management, trade, energy security, and health, among others (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Brown, 2009; Bell et al., 2010; Balsiger and Debarbieux, 2011; da Fonseca et al., 2012; Bark et al., 2012). Sites of climate change governance and policy-making are thus multiple and are not confined to the UNFCCC and national rule-making processes, a situation which raises challenges in relation to coordination, linkages and synergies (Ostrom, 2010; Zelli, 2011; Jinnah, 2011) – see Sections 13.4, 13.13, 14.1, 15.2, notably Figure 13.1 for a visual summary.

These considerations explain why climate governance has attracted more political controversy than any other issue in relation to global sustainability and its equity considerations. Some of the main aspects of this controversy include: who should participate in decision making; how to modulate power asymmetry among stakeholders; how to share responsibility among actors; what ideas and institutions should govern response measures, and where should interventions most focus? Questions of justice are embedded in these five domains, aggravated by the high stakes involved and the stark asymmetry among states and others actors in terms of cause, effect, and capability to respond to the problem (Okereke and Dooley, 2010; Okereke, 2010; Schroeder et al., 2012).

Scholars have long analysed climate governance focusing on the above key controversies with a multitude of possible solutions being volunteered. Concerning participation, a departure from the top-down approach implied in the Kyoto Protocol towards a more voluntary and bottom-up approach has been suggested (Rayner, 2010). Some argue that limiting participation to the "most capable, responsible and vulnerable" countries can foster progress toward more stringent mitigation policy (Eckersley, 2012). However, the latter has been opposed on the basis that it would further exacerbate issues of inequity (Aitken, 2012; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). Others have discussed the need to create spaces for collaborative learning to debate, legitimize and potentially overcome knowledge divides between experts and lay people in sectoral climate policy development (Swanson et al., 2010; Armitage et al., 2011; Colfer, 2011; Larsen et al., 2012) -see Section 13.13 for further detail. On allocation of responsibility, a global agreement has been elusive not merely because parties and other key actors have differing conceptions of a fair allocation (Okereke, 2008), but because the pertinent policies are highly contentious given the combination of factors at play, prominent among which are finance, politics, ineffective institutions and vested interests.
Precisely, a defining image of the climate governance landscape is that key actors have vastly disproportionate capacities and resources, including the political, financial and cognitive resources that are necessary to steer the behaviour of the collective within and across territorial boundaries (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). A central element of governance therefore relates to huge asymmetry in such resources and the ability to exercise power or influence outcomes. Some actors, including governments, make use of negotiation power and/or lobbying activities to influence policy decisions at multiple scales and, by doing so, affect the design and the subsequent allocation and distribution of benefits and costs resulting from such decisions (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005; Benvenisti and Downs, 2007; Schäfer, 2009; Sandler, 2010) - see e.g. Section 15.5.2. The problem, however, also resides in the fact that those that wield the greatest power either consider it against their interest to facilitate rapid progress towards a global low carbon economy or insist that the accepted solutions must be aligned to increase their power and material gains (Sæverud and Skjaerseth, 2007; Giddens, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Lohmann, 2009, 2010; Okereke and McDaniels, 2012; Wittneben et al., 2012). The most notable effect of this is that despite some exceptions, the prevailing organizing of the global economy which confers significant power on actors associated with fossil fuel interests and with the financial sector has provided the context for the sorts of governance practices of climate change that have dominated to date (Newell and Paterson, 2010).

Many specific governance initiatives described in Sections 13.13 and 15.3, whether organized by states or among novel configurations of actors, have focused on creating new markets or investment opportunities. This applies, for example, to carbon markets (Paterson, 2009), carbon offsetting (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Lovell et al., 2009; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Corbera, 2012), investor-led governance initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (Kolk et al., 2008) or partnerships such as the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (Parthan et al., 2010). Some scholars find that carbon markets can contribute to achieving a low fossil carbon transition, but require careful designs to achieve environmental and welfare gains (Wood and Jotzo, 2011; Pezzey and Jotzo, 2012; Springmann, 2012; Bakam et al., 2012). Others note that such mechanisms are vulnerable to “capture” by special interests and against the original purposes for which they are conceived. Several authors have discussed this problem in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) (Lohmann, 2008; Clò, 2010; Okereke and McDaniels, 2012; Böhm et al., 2012).

Governing for SD and climate change requires close attention to some key questions. There is a need to understand current governance as encompassing more than the actors within formal government structures, and to understand their choices as being driven by more than optimal decision-making theory. It requires understanding the dynamics that determine whether and how policy options are legitimized, and then formally deliberated and adopted (or not). It is necessary to examine how these modes of governance are defined and established in the first place, by whom and for whose benefit, illuminating the relationship and tensions between effective governance and existing trends in political economy. There is a need to explore how different modes of governance translate into outcomes, affecting the decisions and actions of actors at multiple scales, and to draw lessons about their environmental effectiveness and distributional implications. While some argue that states should still be regarded as key agents in steering such transitions (Eckersley, 2004; Weale, 2009), most decision-making relevant to SD and climate remains fundamentally decentralized. A key challenge of governance is thus to recognize the political economy context of these decision-makers, to ensure procedurally equitable processes that address the allocation of responsibilities and ensure transparency and accountability in any transition towards SD.

4.3.3 Population and demography

Population variables, including size, density, growth rate as well as age, sex, education and settlement structures, play a determinant role in countries’ SD trajectories. Their drivers, in particular fertility, mortality and migration, are reciprocally influenced by development pathways, including evolving policies, socio-cultural trends, as well as by changes in the economy (Bloom,
2011). In the climate change context, population trends have been shown to matter both for mitigation efforts as well as for societies’ adaptive capacities to climate change (O’Neill et al., 2001).

Current demographic trends show distinct patterns in different parts of the world. While population sizes are on a declining trajectory in Eastern Europe and Japan, they are set for significant further increase in many developing countries (particularly in Africa and south-western Asia) due to a very young population age structure and continued high levels of fertility. As most recent projections show, the world’s population is almost certain to increase to between 8 and 10 billion by mid-century. After that period, uncertainty increases significantly, with the future trend in birth rates being the key determinant but also amplified by the uncertainty about future infectious disease mortality and the still uncertain consequences of climate change on future mortality trajectories (O’Neill et al., 2001; Lutz and KC, 2010; United Nations, 2011b; Lee, 2011; Scherbov et al., 2011). The population of Sub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly double and could still increase by a factor of three or more depending on the course of fertility over the coming decades, which depends primarily on progress in female education and the availability of reproductive health services (Bongaarts, 2009; Bloom, 2011; Bongaarts and Sinding, 2011).

Declining fertility rates together with continued increases in life expectancy result in significant population ageing around the world, with the current low fertility countries being most advanced in this process. Population ageing is considered a major challenge for the solvency of social security systems. For populations still in the process of fertility decline, the expected burden of ageing is a more distant prospect, and the declining birth rates are expected to bring some near term benefits. This phase in the universal process of any demographic transition, when the ratio of children to adults is already declining and the proportion of elderly has not yet increased, is considered a window of opportunity for economic development, which may also result in an economic rebound effect leading to higher per capita consumption and emissions (Bloom and Canning, 2000).

Low development is widely understood to contribute to high population growth, which declines only after the appearance of widespread access to key developmental needs such as perinatal and maternal healthcare, and female education and empowerment. Conversely, high population growth is widely regarded as an obstacle to SD, because it tends to make efforts such as the provision of clean drinking water and agricultural goods and the expansion of health services and school enrolment rates difficult (Dyson, 2006; Potts, 2007; Pimentel and Paoletti, 2009). This has given rise to the fear of a vicious circle of underdevelopment and gender inequity yielding high population growth and environmental degradation, in turn inhibiting the development necessary to bring down fertility (Caole and Hoover, 1958; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971; Dasgupta, 1993). However, history shows that countries can break this vicious circle with the right social policies, with an early emphasis on education and family planning, prominent examples being South Korea and Mauritius, used in the 1950s as textbook examples of countries trapped in such a vicious circle (Meade, 1967).

With respect to adaptation to climate change, the literature on population and environment has begun to explore more closely people’s vulnerability to climate stressors, including variability and extreme events, and to analyse their adaptive capacity and reliance on environmental resources to cope with adversities and adapt to gradual changes and shocks (Bankoff et al., 2004; Adger et al., 2009) - see also 4.6.1 and AR5 WGII. Generally speaking, not only the number of people matters, but also their composition by age, gender, place of residence and level of education, as well as the institutional context that influences people’s decision-making and development opportunities (Dyson, 2006). One widely and controversially discussed form of adaptation can be international migration induced by climate change. There is often public concern that massive migration of this sort could contribute to political instability and possibly conflict. However, a major recent review of our knowledge in this field has concluded that much environmentally induced migration is likely to be internal migration and there is very little science-based evidence for assessing possible consequences of environmental change on large international migration streams (UK Government Office for Science, 2011).
4.3.4 Values and behaviours
Research has identified a range of individual and contextual predictors of behaviours in favour or against climate mitigation, ranging from individuals’ psychological needs to cultural and social orientations towards time and nature (Swim et al., 2009) - see Sections 2.4, 3.10, and 5.5. Below we discuss some of these factors, focusing on human values that influence individual and collective behaviours and affect our priorities and actions concerning the pursuit of SD, equity goals and climate mitigation. Values have been defined as “enduring beliefs that pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events and are ordered by importance” (citing Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, p. 551; Pepper et al., 2009, p. 127). Values provide “guides for living the best way possible for individuals, social groups and cultures” (citing Rohan, 2000, p. 263; Pepper et al., 2009, p. 127) and so influence actions at all levels of society – including the individual, the household, the firm, civil society, and government.

Individuals acquire values through socialization and learning experience (Pepper et al., 2009) and values thus relate to many of the other determinants discussed in this section. Values may be rooted in cultural, religious and other belief systems, which may sometimes conflict with scientific understandings of environmental risks. In particular, distinct values may influence perceptions and interpretations of climate impacts and hence climate responses (Wolf et al., 2013).

The relevance of values to SD and, particularly, to ecologically conscious (consumer) behaviour, is related to ‘the nature of environmental issues as ‘social dilemmas’, where short-term narrow individual interests conflict with the longer term social interest’ (Pepper et al., 2009). Researchers have highlighted the role of non-selfish values that promote the welfare of others (including nature), noting that some but not all indigenous societies are known to focus on ‘collective’ as opposed to ‘individual’ interests and values, which often result in positive resource conservation strategies and wellbeing (Gadgil et al., 1993; Sobrevila, 2008; Watson et al., 2011). However, it is well known that a range of factors also mediate the impact of values on behaviour such that the link from values to ecologically conscious behaviour is often loose (Pepper et al., 2009).

In fact, this ‘value-action’ gap suggests that pursuing climate mitigation and SD globally may require substantial changes in behaviour in the short term along with a transformation of human values in the long term, e.g. progressively changing conceptions and attitudes toward biophysical systems and human interaction (Gladwin et al., 1995; Leiserowitz et al., 2005; Vlek and Steg, 2007; Folke et al., 2011a). Changing human values would require a better understanding of cross-cultural behavioural differences that in turn relate to environmental, economic and political histories (Norenzayan, 2011).

Behavioural change can be induced by changes in formal and civil institutions and governance, human values (Jackson, 2005a; Folke et al., 2011a; Fischer et al., 2012), perceptions of risk and causality, and economic incentives. Removing perverse subsidies for environmentally harmful products, favouring greener consumption and technologies, adopting more comprehensive forms of biophysical and economic accounting, and providing safer working conditions are considered central for achieving pro-SD behavioural change (Lebel and Lore, 2008; Le Blanc, 2010; Thøgersen, 2010).

Yet behaviour experiments (Osbaldeston and Schott, 2012) suggest there is no ‘silver bullet’ for fostering ecologically conscious behaviour, as favourable actions (e.g. to conserve energy) are triggered by different stimuli, including information, regulation or economic rewards, and influenced by the nature of the issue itself. Furthermore, people are able to ‘express both relatively high levels of environmental concern and relatively high levels of materialism simultaneously’ (Gatersleben et al., 2010). This suggests the need to be issue, context and culturally aware when designing specific actions to foster pro-SD behaviour, as both environmental and materialistic concerns must be addressed. These complexities underscore the challenges in changing beliefs, preferences, habits and routines (Southerton, 2012) - see Sections 4.4 and 5.5.2.
4.3.5 Human and social capital

Levels of human and social capital also critically influence a transition toward SD and the design and implementation of mitigation and adaptation strategies. Human capital results from individual and collective investments in acquiring knowledge and skills that become useful for improving wellbeing (Iyer, 2006). Such knowledge and skills can be acquired through formal schooling and training, as well as informally through customary practices and institutions, including communities and families. Human capital can thus be viewed as a critical component of a broader-encompassing human capability, i.e., a person’s ability to achieve a given list of “functionings” or achievements, which depend on a range of personal and social factors, including education, age, gender, health, income, nutritional knowledge and environmental conditions, among others (Sen, 1997, 2001). See Clark (2009) and Schokkaert (2009) for a review of Sen’s capability approach and its critiques.

Economists have long considered improvements in human capital a key explanatory reason behind the evolution of economic systems, in terms of growth and constant innovation (Schultz, 1961; Healy and Cote, 2001). Macro-economic research shows a strong correlation between levels of economic development and levels of human capital and vice versa (Schultz, 2003; Iyer, 2006), whilst micro-economic studies reveal a positive relationship between increases in the quantity and quality of formal education and future earnings (Duflo, 2001). Gains in human capital can be positively correlated to economic growth and efficiency, but also to nutritional, health and education standards (Schultz, 1995). As such, improvements in human capital provide a basis for SD, as they shape countries’ socio-economic systems and influence people’s ability to make informed choices.

Seemingly, human capital often also explains the development and survival of business ventures (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Patzelt, 2010; Gimmon and Levie, 2010), which are an important source of innovation and diffusion of principles and technologies that can contribute to SD and to ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation goals (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007; Terjesen, 2007).

However, a growing body of literature in economics, geography and psychology (reviewed in Sections 2.4, 2.6.6 and 3.10 as well as in WGII Chapter 2) has shown that the diversity of environmental, socio-economic, educational and cultural contexts in which individuals make decisions shape their willingness and/or ability to engage in mitigation and adaptation action (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). It is important to distinguish between formally acquired knowledge on climate change—often based on scientific developments—and traditional knowledge on climate-related issues (Smith and Sharp, 2012), as well as to recognize that the relative validity of both types of knowledge to different audiences, and the meaning and relevance of personal engagement, will be influenced by individual perceptions, preferences, values and beliefs. Therefore, knowledge on climate issues does not alone explain individual and collective responses to the climate challenge (Whitmarsh, 2009; Sarewitz, 2011; Wolf and Moser, 2011; Berkhout, 2012). There is evidence of cognitive dissonance and strategic behaviour in both mitigation and adaptation. Denial mechanisms that overrate the costs of changing lifestyles, blame others, and that cast doubt on the effectiveness of individual action or the soundness of scientific knowledge are well documented (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Norgaard, 2011; McCright and Dunlap, 2011), as is the concerted effort by opponents of climate action to seed and amplify those doubts (Jacques et al., 2008; Kolmes, 2011; Conway and Oreskes, 2011).

Among the different definitions of social capital, one of the most influential was proposed by Fukuyama (2002): the shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, which are founded in turn on actual social relationships, including trust and reciprocity. Social capital appears in the form of family bonds, friendship and collective networks, associations, and other more or less institutionalized forms of collective action. Social capital is thus generally perceived as an asset for both the individuals that recognize and participate in such norms and networks and for the respective group/society, insofar as they derive benefits from information, participating in decision-making and belonging to the group. Social capital can be linked to successful outcomes in education, employment, family relationships, and health (Gamarnikow and Green, 1999), as well as to...
economic development and participatory, democratic governance (Woolcock, 1998; Fukuyama, 2002; Doh and McNeeley, 2012). Indeed, social capital can also be sustained on unfair social norms and institutions that perpetuate an inequitable access to the benefits provided by social organisation (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), through social networks of corruption or criminal organisations, for example, that perpetuate the uneven distribution of public resources, and undermine societies' cohesion and physical security.

Scholarship suggests that social capital is supportive for SD (Rudd, 2000; Bridger and Luloff, 2001; Tsai, 2008; Ostrom, 2008; Jones et al., 2011), having shown that it can be instrumental to address collective action problems (Ostrom, 1998; Rothstein, 2005), combat injustices and conditions of poverty and vulnerability (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), and benefit from resources (Bebbington, 1999; Díaz et al., 2002), and to foster mitigation and adaptation (Adger, 2003; Wolf et al., 2010).

4.3.6 Technology
Technology has been a central element of human, social, and economic development since ancient times (Jonas, 1985; Mokyr, 1992). It can be a means to achieving equitable SD, by enabling economic and social development whilst using environmental resources more efficiently. The development and deployment of the overwhelming majority of technologies is mediated by markets, responding to effective demand of purchasers (Baumol, 2002), and carried out by private firms, where the pre-requisites of technological capacity and investment resources tend to be found. However, this process does not necessarily address the basic needs of those members of society with insufficient market demand to influence the decisions of innovators and investors, nor does it provide an incentive to reduce externalized costs, such as the costs of GHG pollution (Jaffe et al., 2005).

Fundamental objectives of equity and SD are still unmet. For example, the basic energy and nutritional needs of large parts of the world’s population remain unfulfilled. An estimated 1.4 billion people lacked access to electricity in 2010 and about 3 billion people worldwide relied on highly-polluting and unhealthy traditional solid fuels for household cooking and heating (Pachauri et al., 2012; IEA, 2013) (see Section 14.3.2.1). Similarly, the Food and Agricultural Organization indicates that almost 870 million people (mostly in developing countries) were chronically undernourished in 2010–12 (FAO, 2012). Achieving the objectives of equitable SD demands the fulfilment of such basic and other developmental needs. The challenge is therefore to design, implement, and provide support for technology innovation and diffusion processes that respond to social and environmental goals, which at present do not receive adequate incentives through conventional markets.

Scholars of technological change have, in recent years, begun to highlight the ‘systemic’ nature of innovation processes as well as the fundamental importance of social and technical interactions in shaping technological change (see Section 4.5.2.2). Accordingly, as a first step toward understanding how innovation could help meet social and environmental goals, a systematic assessment of the adequacy and performance of the relevant innovation systems would be helpful, including an examination of the scale of innovation investments, the allocation among various objectives and options, the efficiency by which investments yield outputs, and how effectively the outputs are utilized for meeting the diffusion objectives (Sagar and Holdren, 2002; Sanwal, 2011; Aitken, 2012). For example, many reports and analyses have suggested that investments in innovation for public goods such as clean energy and energy access are not commensurate with the nature and scale of these challenges (Nemet and Kammen, 2007; AEIC, 2010; Bazilian et al., 2010). Innovation in and diffusion of new technologies also require skills and knowledge from both developers and users, as well as different combinations of enabling policies, institutions, markets, social capital and financial means depending on the type of technology and the application being considered (Bretschger, 2005; Dinica, 2009; Blalock and Gertler, 2009; Rao and Kishore, 2010; Weyant, 2011; Jänicke, 2012). Appropriately harnessing these kinds of capabilities and processes may themselves require novel mechanisms and institutional forms (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2009; Sagar et al., 2009).
At the same time, the role of public policy in creating demand for technologies that have a public goods nature cannot be overstated (see also 3.11), although these policies need to be designed carefully to be effective. In the case of renewables, for example, it has been shown that intermittent policy subsidies, governments’ changing R&D support, misalignments between policy levels, sectors and institutions can greatly impede the diffusion of these technologies (Negro et al., 2012). Similarly, in agriculture, while there are many intersections between mitigation and SD through options such as ‘sustainable agriculture’, the potential for leveraging these synergies is contingent on appropriate and effective policies (Smith et al., 2007) -see also Sections 4.6.1 and 11.3.

Sometimes there may be a clear alignment between achieving equitable SD benefits and meeting climate goals such as the provision of clean energy to the rural poor. But in meeting multiple objectives, potential for conflicts and trade-offs can also arise. For example, our likely continued reliance on fossil fuels (IEA 2012) underlies the current exploration of new or well-established GHG mitigation options, such as biofuels or nuclear power, and other approaches like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and geo-engineering, including solar radiation management techniques, to avoid a dangerous increase of the Earth’s temperature (Crutzen, 2006; Rasch et al., 2008; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012b). While such technological options may help mitigate global warming, they also pose potential adverse environmental and social risks, and thus give rise to concerns about their regulation and governance (Mitchell, 2008; Pimentel et al., 2009; de Paula Gomes and Muylaert de Araujo, 2011; Shrader-Frechette, 2011; Jackson, 2011b; Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Scott, 2013; Díaz-Maurin and Giampietro, 2013) -see Sections 7.5 and 11.3.

The public perception and acceptability of technologies is country and context-specific, mediated by age, gender, knowledge, attitudes towards environmental risks and climate change, and policy procedures (Shackley et al., 2005; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Wallquist et al., 2010; Corner et al., 2011; Poumadere et al., 2011; Visschers and Siegrist, 2012) and therefore resolution of these kinds of trade-offs and conflicts may not be easy. Yet the trade-offs and synergies between the three dimensions of SD, as well as the impacts on socio-ecological systems across geographical scales will need to be systematically considered, which in turn will require the acknowledgement of multiple stakeholder perspectives. Assessment of energy technology options, for example, will need to include impact on landscapes’ ecological and social dimensions—accounting for multiple values—and on energy distribution and access (Wolsink, 2007; Zografos and Martinez-Alier, 2009).

Lastly, there are some crosscutting issues, such as regimes for technology transfer (TT) and intellectual property (IP) that are particularly relevant to international cooperation in meeting the global challenge of pursuing equitable SD and mitigation, although progress under the UNFCCC has been incomplete. For example, TT under the CDM has been limited to selective conditions and mainly to a few countries (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009; Seres et al., 2009; Wang, 2010). IP rights and patent laws have been shown as promoting innovation in some countries (Khan, 2005), although recent work suggests a more nuanced picture (Moser, 2013; Hudson and Minea, 2013). In fact, IP protection has also been regarded as a precondition for technology transfer but, again, reality has proven more complex (United Nations Environment Programme et al., 2010). A recent study shows that in the wind sector, there are “patent thickets”, which might restrain the extent and scope of dissemination of wind power technologies (Wang et al., 2013). In part, there are such divergent views on this issue since IP and TT also touch upon economic competitiveness (Ockwell et al., 2010).

As earlier, perspectives are shaped by perceived national circumstances, capabilities, and needs, yet these issues do need to be resolved—in fact, there may be no single approach that will meet all needs. Different IP regimes, for example, are required to meet development objectives at different stages of development (Correa, 2011). The importance of this issue and the lack of consensus provide impetus for further analysis of the evidence and for exploration to develop IP and TT regimes that further international cooperation to meet climate, SD, and equity objectives.
4.3.7 Natural resources

Countries’ level of endowment with renewable and/or non-renewable resources influences but does not determine their development paths. The location, types, quantities, long-term availability and the rates of exploitation of non-renewable resources, including fossil fuels and minerals, and renewable resources such as fertile land, forests, or freshwater affect national economies (e.g. in terms of GDP, trade balance and rent potential), agricultural and industrial production systems, the potential for civil conflict, and countries’ role in global geo-political and trade systems (Krausmann et al., 2009; Muradian et al., 2012; Collier and Goderis, 2012). Economies can evolve to reflect changes in economic trends, in policies or in consumption patterns, both nationally and internationally. In the context of climate change, natural resource endowments affect the level and profile of GHG emissions, the relative cost of mitigation, and the level of political commitment to climate action.

Resource-rich countries characterized by governance problems, including rent-seeking behaviour and weak judiciary and political institutions, have more limited capacity to distribute resource extraction rents and increase incomes (Mehlum et al., 2006; Pendergast et al., 2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012). Some have negative genuine savings, i.e. they do not fully reinvest their resource rents in foreign assets or productive capital, which in turn impoverishes present and future generations and undermines both natural capital and human development prospects (Mehlum et al., 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011). Furthermore, these countries also face risks associated with an over-specialization on agriculture and resource-based exports that can undermine other productive sectors, e.g. through increases in exchange rates and a reliance on importing countries economic growth trajectories (Muradian et al., 2012). In some countries, an increase in primary commodity exports can lead to the rise of socio-environmental conflicts due to the increasing exploitation of land, mineral and other resources (Martinez-Alier et al., 2010; Mitchell and Thies, 2012; Muradian et al., 2012).

Scholars have not reached definitive conclusions on the inter-relationships between resource endowment and development paths, including impacts on social welfare and conflict, and prospects for SD. Recent reviews, for example, note the need to continue investigating current resource booms and busts and documenting the latter’s effect on national economies, policies, and social well-being, and to draw historical comparisons across countries and different institutional contexts (Wick and Bulte, 2009; Deacon, 2011; van der Ploeg, 2011). It is clear though that the state and those actors involved in natural resources use play a determining role in ensuring a fair distribution of any benefits and costs (Banai et al., 2011). Further, economic valuation studies have noted that systematic valuations of both positive and negative externalities can inform policy-making relating to resource exploitation, in some cases showing that the exploitation of land and mineral resources may not always be socially optimal, i.e. the social and environmental costs of action may be higher than the economic benefits of exploitation (de Groot, 2006; Thampapillai, 2011).

These considerations are relevant for climate mitigation policy for at least three reasons. First, they raise questions about if and how countries invest resource rents across economic, social and environmental sectors for SD (see Section 4.3.8). Second, they suggest that nations or sub-national actors with abundant fossil fuel reserves have, in principle, strong economic interest in exploiting them, and thus in opposing the adoption of policies that constrain such exploitation. The timeliness of this issue is underscored by the growing financial sector attention (although not yet academic attention) to the potential impact of a global carbon constraint on the fossil sector (Grantham Institute and CTI 2013; HSBC Global Research, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2013). This raises the issue of how to compensate resource-rich countries for forgone benefits if necessary to win their participation in international mitigation efforts (Rival, 2010; Waisman et al., 2013). It similarly raises the issue of compensating (or circumventing) sub-national actors who are political powerful enough to impede domestic climate efforts. And third, they suggest that, if any given resource-rich country faces increased exposure to climate variability and extreme events, the forgone benefits of resource rents may undermine its ability to absorb increasing adaptation costs. In this regard, a recent analysis of the relationship between countries’ adoption of mitigation policies and their vulnerability
to climate change confirms that countries that may suffer considerable impacts of climate change in the future, which include many resource-rich developing countries, do not show a strong commitment to either mitigation or adaptation, whilst countries exhibiting strong political commitment and action towards mitigation are also active in promoting adaptation policies (Tubi et al., 2012).

4.3.8 Finance and investment

The financial system, comprising a large set of private and public institutions and actors, is the medium by which households, firms, and collectivities manage insurable risks and fund investments to secure future returns, thereby laying the foundations for future well-being. As such, it is a key determinant of society’s development pathway and thus its prospects for an SD transition.

The financial system is characterized by several structural tensions with the ideals of SD. First, its dominant private component (banks and financial markets) is focused on commercial returns and cannot spontaneously internalize environmental and social spillovers, even if some investors’ interest in “sustainable investment” is growing (UNPRI, 2012). Climate change, identified as the “greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen” (Stern and Treasury, 2007), is but one obvious example of a large societally important cost that is neglected by capital markets. Second, the private component of the financial system is also largely unattuned to distributive issues and particularly insensitive to “the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), even if foreign direct investments have contributed to overall growth in emerging economies. Third, the interests of future generations may be neglected (although over-investment is also possible —see Gollier Gollier, 2013), and within a generation, there are various governance, organizational and sociological mechanisms contributing to short-termism (Tonello, 2006; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). Fourth, the recent crisis has led some to analyze that the financial system itself is a source of economic instability (Farmer et al., 2012), an issue reinforced by the recent financialization of the global economy, with accelerated growth of the financial sector relative to the “real” economy, and an increasing role of the financial system in mediating short-term speculation as distinct from long-term investment (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Palley, 2007; Dore, 2008).

These inherent problems in the financial system are sometimes compounded by hurdles in the economic and institutional environment. The challenges are felt especially in many developing countries, which face several investment barriers that affect their capacity to mobilize private sector capital toward SD objectives and climate change mitigation and adaptation. These barriers include the comparatively high overall cost of doing business; market distortional policies such as subsidies for conventional fuels; absence of credit-worthy off-takers; low access to early-stage financing; lower public R&D spending; too few wealthy consumers willing to pay a premium for “green products”; social and political instability; poor market infrastructure, and weak enforcement of the regulatory frameworks. Establishing better mechanisms for leveraging private sector finance through innovative financing can help (EGTT, 2008), but there are also risks in relying on the private sector as market-based finance focuses on short term lending, and private financing during episodes of abundant liquidity may not constitute a source of stable long-term climate finance (Akyuz, 2012) —see Section 16.4 for further discussion and references on barriers, risks, and innovative mechanisms.

While some developing countries are able to mobilize domestic resources to finance efforts toward SD, the needs for many developing countries exceed their financial capacity. Consequently, their ability to pursue SD, and climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in particular, can be severely constrained by lack of finance. The international provision of finance, alongside technology transfer, can help to alleviate this problem, as well as accord with principles of equity, international commitments, and arguments of effectiveness —see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.6.2. Under international agreements, in particular Agenda 21 and the Rio Conventions of 1992, and reaffirmed in subsequent UN resolutions and programs including the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development...
(United Nations, 2012a), developed countries have committed to provide financial resources to developing countries that are new and additional to conventional development assistance.

### 4.4 Production, trade, consumption and waste patterns

The previous section has highlighted the role of behaviors and lifestyles and the complex interaction of the values, goals and interests of many actors in the political economy of SD and equity. In order to better understand the possibilities and difficulties to equitably sustain well-being in the future, this section examines the consumption of goods and services by households, consumption trends and disparities, and the relationship between consumption and GHG emissions. It also discusses the components and drivers of consumption, efforts to make consumption (and production) more sustainable, and how consumption affects well-being. In order to shed light on important debates about equity in mitigation, we also review approaches to consumption-based accounting of GHG emissions (carbon footprinting) and their relationship to territorial approaches. So while subsequent chapters analyze GHG emissions associated with specific sectors and transformation pathways, we focus here on a particular group (consumers) and examine their emissions in an integrated way.

The possibility of a SD pathway for the world hinges on “decoupling” (von Weizsäcker et al., 1997, 2009; Jackson, 2005b, 2009). We consider two types of decoupling at the global scale and in the long term: the decoupling of material resource consumption (including fossil carbon) and environmental impact (including climate change) from economic growth (“dematerialization”); and the decoupling of human well-being from economic growth and consumption. The first type (see Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.3) involves an increased material efficiency and environmental efficiency of production and is generally considered crucial for meeting SD and equity goals (UNEP, 2011); yet while some dematerialization has occurred, absolute levels of resource use and environmental impact have continued to rise, highlighting the important distinction between relative and absolute decoupling (Krausmann et al., 2009). This has inspired examination of the second type of decoupling (Jackson, 2005b, 2009; Assadourian, 2010), including the reduction of consumption levels in wealthier countries. We address this topic (in Section 4.4.4) by examining how income and income inequality affect dimensions of well-being. While the second type of decoupling represents a “stronger” form than the first, it is also a more controversial goal, even though the unsustainability of excessive consumption was highlighted by Chapter 4 of Agenda 21 (United Nations, 1992c).

#### 4.4.1 Consumption patterns, inequality and environmental impact

##### 4.4.1.1 Trends in resource consumption

Global levels of resource consumption and GHG emissions show strong historical trends, driven primarily by developments in industrialized countries and emerging economies (see Sections 5.2 and 14.3). The global annual use (extraction) of material resources – i.e., ores and industrial minerals, construction materials, biomass, and fossil energy carriers – increased eightfold during the 20th century, reaching about 55 Gt in 2000, while the average resource use per capita (the metabolic rate) doubled, reaching 8.5-9.2 tonnes per capita per year in 2005 (Krausmann et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011). The value of the global consumption of goods and services (the global GDP) has increased sixfold since 1960 while consumption expenditures per capita has almost tripled (Assadourian, 2010). Consumption-based GHG emissions (“carbon footprints” – see Section 4.4.2.2) increased between 1990 and 2009 in the world’s major economies, except the Russian Federation, ranging from 0.1-0.2% per year in the EU27, to 4.8-6.0% per year in China (Peters et al., 2012) (see Section 5.2.1).

Global resource consumption has risen slower than GDP, especially after around 1970, indicating some decoupling of economic development and resource use, and signifying an aggregate increase in resource productivity of about 1-2% annually (Krausmann et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011). While dematerialization of economic activity has been most noticeable in the industrialized countries, metabolic rates across countries remain highly unequal, varying by a factor of 10 or more due largely
to differences in level of development, although there is also significant cross-country variation in
the relation between GDP and resource use (Krausmann et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011).

4.4.1.2 Consumerism and unequal consumption levels

The spread of material consumption with rising incomes is one of the “mega-drivers” of global
resource use and environmental degradation (Assadourian, 2010). While for the world’s many poor
people, consumption is driven mainly by the need to satisfy basic human needs, it is increasingly
common across cultures that people seek meaning, contentment and acceptance in consumption.
This pattern is often referred to as “consumerism”, defined as a cultural paradigm where “the
possession and use of an increasing number and variety of goods and services is the principal
cultural aspiration and the surest perceived route to personal happiness, social status and national

Consumerist lifestyles in industrialized countries seem to be imitated by the growing elites (Pow,
2011) and middle-class populations in developing countries (Cleveland and Laroche, 2007; Gupta,
2011), exemplified by the increased demand for space cooling in emerging economies (Isaac and Van
Vuuren, 2009). Together with the unequal distribution of income in the world, the spread of
consumerism means that a large share of goods and services produced are “luxuries” that only the
wealthy can afford, while the poor are unable to afford even basic goods and services (Khor, 2011).

A disproportionate part of the GHG emissions arising from production are linked to the consumption
of products by a relatively small portion of the world’s population, illustrated by the great variation
in the per capita carbon footprint between countries and regions at different income levels
(Hertwich and Peters, 2009; Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011) (See Section 14.3.1). The
carbon footprint is strongly correlated with consumption expenditure. Across countries, Hertwich
and Peters (2009) found an expenditure elasticity of 0.57 for all GHGs: as nations become wealthier,
the per capita carbon footprint increases by 57% for each doubling of consumption. Within
countries, similar relationships have been found between household expenditure and carbon
footprint (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Hertwich, 2011). Because wealthier countries meet a higher
share of their final demand from (net) imports than do less wealthy countries, consumption-based
emissions are more closely associated with GDP than are territorial emissions, the difference being
the emissions embodied in trade (see Section 4.4.2 as well as 5.2 and 14.3).

4.4.1.3 Effect of non-income factors on per capita carbon footprint

Non-income factors such as geography, energy system, production methods, waste management
(GAIA, 2012; Corsten et al., 2013), household size, diet and lifestyle also affect per capita carbon
footprints and other environmental impacts (Tukker et al., 2010a) so that the effects of increasing
income varies considerably between regions and countries (Lenzen et al., 2006; Hertwich, 2011;
Homma et al., 2012), cities (Jones and Kammen, 2011) and between rural and urban areas (Lenzen
and Peters, 2010). In this regard, the environmental impact of specific consumption patterns has
been studied intensely in recent years (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Davis and Caldeira, 2010;
Tukker et al., 2010a; Hertwich, 2011). At the global level, Hertwich and Peters (2009) found that
food is the consumption category with the greatest climate impact, accounting for nearly 20% of
GHG emissions, followed by housing/shelter, mobility, services, manufactured products, and
construction (See Sections 8.2, 9.2, 10.3, 11.2, 12.2). Food and services were a larger share in poor
countries, while at high expenditure levels, mobility and the consumption of manufactured goods
caused the largest GHG emissions (Hertwich and Peters, 2009). The factors responsible for variations
in carbon footprints across households at different scales are further discussed in Sections 5.3, 5.5,
12.2 and 14.3.4.
4.4.2 Consumption patterns and carbon accounting

4.4.2.1 Choice of GHG accounting method

New GHG accounting methods have emerged and proliferated in the last decade, in response to interest in 1) determining whether nations are reducing emissions (Bows and Barrett, 2010; Peters et al., 2011, 2012), 2) allocating GHG responsibility (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; b; Bows and Barrett, 2010), 3) assuring the accountability of carbon markets (Stechemesser and Guenther, 2012), 4) determining the full implications of alternative energy technologies (von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007; Martinez et al., 2009; Cherubini et al., 2009; Soimakallio et al., 2011) and of outsourcing of industrial production (See Section 4.4.3.3) helping corporations become greener (Wiedmann et al., 2009), and 6) encouraging consumers to reduce their carbon footprints (Bolwig and Gibbon, 2010; Jones and Kammen, 2011). Methods differ on whether consumers or producers of products are responsible; whether emissions embedded in past or potential replacement of capital investments are included; and whether indirect emissions, for example, through global land-use change resulting from changing product prices, are included (Finkbeiner, 2009; Plevin et al., 2010; Plassmann et al., 2010). These methodological differences have normative implications.

Systems of GHG emissions accounting are constructed according to certain conventions and purposes (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). Better ways may be excessively expensive given the plausible importance of the value of better information in the decision process. Some interests will plead for standardized techniques based on past data because it favors them. Others will argue for tailored approaches that make their technologies or products look good. Producers favor responsibility being assigned to consumers, as do nations that are net exporters of industrial goods. Controversies over GHG emissions accounting approaches play into the broader issue of climate mitigation governance (see Section 4.4.2.4). And whether carbon markets are effective or not depends on good accounting and enforcement – but what will be enforced will depend on the accounting measures agreed upon. The next section discusses consumption-based GHG emissions accounting.

4.4.2.2 Carbon footprinting (consumption-based GHG emissions accounting)

Carbon (or GHG) accounting refers to the calculation of the GHG emissions associated with economic activities at a given scale or with respect to a given functional unit – including products, households, firms, cities, and nations (Peters, 2010; Pandey et al., 2011). GHG accounting has traditionally focused on emission sources, but recent years have seen a growing interest in analyzing the drivers of emissions by calculating the GHG emissions that occur along the supply chain of different functional units such as those just mentioned (Peters, 2010). The result of this consumption-based emissions accounting is often referred to as “carbon footprint” even if it involves other GHGs along with CO₂. Carbon footprinting starts from the premise that the GHG emissions associated with economic activity are generated at least partly as a result of people’s attempts to satisfy certain functional needs and desires (Lenzen et al., 2007; Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Bows and Barrett, 2010). These needs and desires carry the consumer demand for goods and services, and thereby the production processes that consume resources and energy and release pollutants. Emission drivers are not limited to individuals’ consumption behavior, however, but include also the wider contexts of consumption such as transport infrastructure, production and waste systems, and energy systems (see below and Sections 7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 10.3, 11.2, 12.2).

There is no single accepted carbon footprinting methodology (Pandey et al., 2011), nor is there one widely accepted definition of carbon footprint. Peters (2010) proposes this definition, which allows for all possible applications across scales: “The ‘carbon footprint’ of a functional unit is the climate impact under a specific metric that considers all relevant emission sources, sinks and storage in both consumption and production within the specified spatial and temporal system boundary” (p. 245). The emissions associated with the functional unit (but physically not part of the unit) are referred to as “embodied carbon”, “carbon flows” or similar terms. (Annex II of this report discusses different carbon footprint methodologies, including Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) and environmentally-
extended input-output (EIO models.) Carbon footprints have been estimated with respect to
different functional units at different scales. Most relevant to the analysis of consumption patterns
and mitigation linkages are the carbon footprints of products and nations, discussed in turn.

4.4.2.3 Product carbon footprinting

A product carbon footprint includes all emissions generated during the life-cycle of a good or service
– from production and distribution to end-use and disposal or recycling. Carbon footprinting of
products (and firms) can enable a range of climate mitigation actions and can have co-benefits
(Sinden, 2009; Bolwig and Gibbon, 2010). Informing consumers about the climate impact of products
through labeling or other means can influence purchasing decisions in a more climate-friendly
direction and at the same time enable product differentiation (Edwards-Jones et al., 2009; Weber
and Johnson, 2012). Carbon footprinting can also help companies reduce GHG emissions cost-
effectively by identifying the various emission sources within the company and along the supply
chain (Sinden, 2009; Sundarakani et al., 2010; Lee, 2012). Those emissions can be reduced directly,
or by purchasing offsets in carbon markets. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence of a
positive relationship between a company’s environmental and financial performance (Delmas and
Nairn-Birch, 2011; Griffin et al., 2012). The specific effect of carbon footprinting on company
financial performance and investor valuation is not well researched, however, and the results are
ambiguous: In the United Kingdom, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) found limited investor interest in
the climate change-related data provided by retailers, while a study from North America concludes
that investors do care about companies’ GHG emission disclosures, whether these occur through a
voluntary scheme or informal estimates (Griffin et al., 2012).\(^2\) (See also Section 15.5.5)

There are also risks associated with product carbon footprinting. It can affect competitiveness and
trade by increasing costs and demand for products made abroad, including in developing
countries, and it may violate WTO trade rules (Brenton et al., 2009; Edwards-Jones et al., 2009;
Erickson et al., 2012). A one-sided focus on GHG emissions in product development and consumer
choice could also involve trade-offs with other sustainability dimensions (Finkbeiner, 2009; Laurent
et al., 2012). So there are reasons to adopt more broadly encompassing concepts and tools to assess
and manage sustainability in relation to the consumption of goods and services.

4.4.2.4 Consumption-based and territorial approaches to GHG accounting

Consumption-based accounting of GHG emissions (carbon footprinting) at national level differs from
the production-based or territorial framework because of imports and exports of goods and services
that, directly or indirectly, involve GHG emissions (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011,
2012). The territorial framework allocates to a nation (or other jurisdiction) those emissions that are
physically produced within its territorial boundaries. The consumption-based framework assigns the
emissions released through the supply chain of goods and services consumed within a nation
irrespective of their territorial origin. The difference in inventories calculated based on the two
frameworks are the emissions embodied in trade (Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; Bows and Barrett,
2010). We emphasize that territorial and consumption-based accounting of emissions as such
represent pure accounting identities measuring the emissions embodied in goods and services that
are produced or consumed, respectively, by an individual, firm, country, region, etc. Responsibility
for these emissions only arises once it is assigned within a normative or legal framework, such as a
climate agreement, specifying rights to emit or obligations to reduce emission based on one of these
metrics. As detailed below, the two approaches function differently in a global versus a fragmented
climate policy regime.

\(^2\) In the United States, increasing carbon emissions was found to positively impact the financial performance of
firms when using accounting-based measures, while the impact was negative when using market-based
performance measures (Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2011).
Steckel et al. (2010) show that within a global regime that internalizes a cost of GHG emissions, the two approaches are theoretically equivalent in terms of their efficiency in inducing mitigation. For example, with a global cap-and-trade system with full coverage (i.e., an efficient global carbon market) and given initial emission allocations, countries exporting goods benefit from export revenues, with costs related to GHG emissions and any other negative impacts of production of those goods priced in, such that the choice of accounting system has no influence on the efficiency of production. Nor will it influence the welfare of countries, irrespective of being net exporters or importers of emissions, since costs associated with these emissions are fully internalized in product prices and will ultimately be borne by consumers. In practice, considerations such as transaction costs and information asymmetries would influence the relative effectiveness and choice of accounting system.

In the case of a fragmented climate policy regime, one argument put in favor of a consumption-based framework is that, unlike the territorial approach, they do not allow current emission inventories to be reduced by outsourcing production or relying more on imports to meet final demand. Hence, some authors (e.g. Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; Bows and Barrett, 2010) argue that this approach gives a fairer illustration of responsibility for current emissions. Carbon footprinting also increases the range of mitigation options by identifying the distribution of GHG emissions among different activities, final uses, locations, household types, etc. This enables a better targeting of policies and voluntary actions (Bows and Barrett, 2010; Jones and Kammen, 2011).

On the other hand, reducing emissions at the “consumption end” of supply chains requires changing deeply entrenched lifestyle patterns and specific behaviours among many actors with diverse characteristics and preferences, as opposed to among the much fewer actors emitting GHGs at the source. It has also been pointed out that – identical to the accounting of production-based emissions – there is no direct one-to-one relationship between changes in consumption-based and global emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2012). That is, if some goods or services were not consumed in a given country, global emissions would not necessarily decrease by the same amount of emissions generated for their production, as this country’s trade partners would adjust their consumption – as well as production – patterns in response to price changes resulting from its changed demand profile. This has been shown for China (Peters et al., 2007) and India (Dietzenbacher and Mukhopadhyay, 2007): while these countries are large net exporters of embodied carbon, territorial emissions would remain roughly constant or even increase if they were to withdraw from international trade (and produce their entire current consumption domestically instead). Hence, without international trade, consumption-based emissions of these countries’ trade partners would likely be reduced, but not global emissions.

It is for this reason that Jakob and Marschinski (2012) argue that a more detailed understanding of the underlying determinants of emissions is needed than what is currently provided by either territorial or consumption-based accounts, in order to guide policies that will effectively reduce global emissions in a fragmented climate policy regime. In particular, a better understanding of system interrelationships in a global economy is required in order to be able to attribute how, e.g., policy choices in one region affect global emissions by transmission via world market prices and associated changes in production and consumption patterns in other regions. Furthermore, as market dynamics and resource use are driven by both demand and supply, it is conceivable to rely on climate policies that target the consumption as well as the production side of emissions, as is done in some other policy areas.

### 4.4.3 Sustainable consumption and production – SCP

The concepts of “sustainable consumption” and “sustainable production” represent, respectively, demand- and supply-side perspectives on sustainability. The efforts by producers to improve the environmental or social impact of a product are futile if consumers do not buy the good or service (Moisander et al., 2010). Conversely, sustainable consumption behavior depends on the availability and affordability of such products in the marketplace. The idea of sustainable consumption and
production (SCP) was first placed high on the international policy agenda at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and was made part of Agenda 21. In 2003, a 10-year Framework of Programmes on SCP was initiated, which was formalized in a document adopted by the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2012b, p. 2). A great variety of public and private SCP policies and initiatives have developed alongside the UN-led initiatives (see Section 10.11.3), as has a large body of research that we report on below.

4.4.3.1 Sustainable consumption and lifestyle

A rich research literature on sustainable consumption has developed over the past decade, including several special issues of international journals (Tukker et al., 2010b; Le Blanc, 2010; Kilbourne, 2010; Black, 2010; Schrader and Thøgersen, 2011). Several books, such as Prosperity without Growth (Jackson, 2009), discuss the unsustainable nature of current lifestyles, development trajectories, and economic systems, and how these could be changed in more sustainable directions. Several definitions of sustainable consumption have been proposed within policy, business and academia (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). At a meeting in Oslo in 2005, a group of scientists agreed on the following broad and integrating conceptualization of sustainable consumption:

“The future course of the world depends on humanity’s ability to provide a high quality of life for a prospective nine billion people without exhausting the Earth’s resources or irreparably damaging its natural systems ... In this context, sustainable consumption focuses on formulating strategies that foster the highest quality of life, the efficient use of natural resources, and the effective satisfaction of human needs while simultaneously promoting equitable social development, economic competitiveness, and technological innovation” (Tukker et al., 2006, p. 10) (p.10)

This perspective encompasses both demand-side and production issues, and addresses all three pillars of SD (social, economic and environmental) as well as equity and well-being, illustrating the complexity of sustainable consumption and its connections to other issues.

Research has demonstrated that consumption practices and patterns are influenced by a range of economic, informational, psychological, sociological, and cultural factors, operating at different levels or spheres in society – including the individual, the family, the locality, the market, and the work place (Thøgersen, 2010). Furthermore, consumers’ preferences are often constructed in the situation (rather than pre-existing) and their decisions are highly contextual (Weber and Johnson, 2009) and often inconsistent with values, attitudes, and perceptions of themselves as responsible and green consumers and citizens (Barr, 2006; de Barcellos et al., 2011) (see below, as well as Sections 2.6.6 and 3.10).

The sustainable consumption of goods and services can be viewed in the broader context of lifestyle and everyday life. Conversely, sustainable consumption practices are bound up with perceptions of identity, ideas of good life, and so on, and considered alongside other concerns such as affordability and health. Ethical consumption choices are also negotiated among family members with divergent priorities and interpretations of sustainability. Choosing a simpler lifestyle (“voluntary simplifying”) seems to be related to environmental concern (Shaw and Newholm, 2002; Huneke, 2005), but frugality, as a more general trait or disposition, is not (Lastovicka et al., 1999; Pepper et al., 2009).

Other research draws attention to the constraints placed on consumption and lifestyle choices by factors beyond the influence of the individual, family or community, which tends to lock consumption into unsustainable patterns by reducing “green agency” at the micro level (Thøgersen, 2005; Pogutz and Micale, 2011). These structural issues include product availability, cultural norms and beliefs, and working conditions which favor a “work-and-spend” lifestyle (Sanne, 2002). Brulle and Young (2007) found that the growth in personal consumption in the USA during the 20th century is partly explained by the increase in advertising. According to this study, the effect of advertising on spending is concentrated on luxury goods (household appliances and supplies and automobiles)
while it is nonexistent in the field of basic necessities (food and clothes), while Druckman and Jackson (2010) found that in the UK, expenditures on food and clothes clearly exceeded ‘necessary’ levels.

The strength and pervasiveness of political economy factors such as those just mentioned, and the inadequate attention to them by policy, is an important cause of the lack of real progress towards more sustainable consumption patterns (Thøgersen, 2005; Tukker et al., 2006; Le Blanc, 2010). Furthermore, the unsustainable lifestyles in industrialized countries are being replicated by the growing elites (Pow, 2011) and middle-class populations in developing countries (Cleveland and Laroche, 2007; Gupta, 2011). Finally, most SC studies are done in a consumer culture context, which limits discussion of instances where sustainable consumption has pre-empted consumerism.

### 4.4.3.2 Consumer sustainability attitudes and the relation to behavior

Despite the overwhelming impact of structural factors on consumer practices, choices and behavior, it is widely agreed that the achievement of more sustainable consumption patterns also depends on how consumers value environmental quality and other dimensions of sustainability (Jackson, 2005a; Thøgersen, 2005; Bamberg and Möser, 2007). It also depends on whether people believe that their consumption practices make a difference to sustainability (Frantz and Mayer, 2009; Hanss and Böhm, 2010), which in turn is influenced by their value priorities and how much they trust the environmental information provided to them by scientists, companies, and public authorities (Kellstedt et al., 2008). The motivational roots of sustainable consumer choices seem to be substantially the same, although not equally salient in different national and cultural contexts (Thøgersen, 2009; Thøgersen and Zhou, 2012).

In a survey of European attitudes towards sustainable consumption and production (Gallup Organisation, 2008a), 84% of EU citizens said that the product’s impact on the environment is “very important” or “rather important” when making purchasing decisions. This attitude is rarely reflected in behavior, however. There is plenty of evidence demonstrating the presence of an “attitude-behavior” or “values-action” gap whereby consumers expressing “green” attitudes fail to adopt sustainable consumption patterns and lifestyles (Barr, 2006; Young et al., 2010; de Barcellos et al., 2011). To a large measure, this gap can be attributed to many other goals and concerns competing for the person’s limited attention (Weber and Johnson, 2009). This observation is reflected in the substantial difference in the level of environmental concern that Europeans express in opinion polls when the issue is treated in isolation, and when the environment is assessed in the context of other important societal issues. For example, in 2008, 64% of Europeans said protecting the environment was “very important” to them personally when the issue was presented in isolation (Gallup Organisation, 2008b) while only 4% pointed at environmental pollution as one of the two most important issues facing their country at the moment (Gallup Organisation, 2008a). When there are many important issues competing for the person’s limited attention and resources, those that appear most pressing in everyday life are likely to prevail.

The likelihood that a person will act on his or her environmental concern is further diminished by factors affecting everyday decisions and behavior, including the structural factors mentioned above, but also more specific factors such as habit, high transactions costs (i.e., time for information search and processing and product search), availability, affordability, and the influence of non-green criteria such as quality, size, brand, and discounts (Young et al., 2010). Some of these factors vary across different product categories and within sectors (McDonald et al., 2009). The impact of all of these impeding factors is substantial, calling into question the capacity of “the green consumer” to effectively advance sustainable consumption and production (Csutora, 2012) and, more generally, the individualistic view of the consumer as a powerful market actor (Moisander et al., 2010).

Third-party eco-labels and declarations have proven to be an effective tool to transform consumer sustainability attitudes into behavior in many cases (Thøgersen, 2002). One of the reasons is that a trusted label can function as a choice heuristic in the decision situation, allowing the experienced
consumer to make sustainable choices in a fast and frugal way (see Section 2.6.5 and Thøgersen et al., 2012). Labeling products with their carbon footprint may help to create new goals (e.g., to reduce CO₂ emissions) and to attract and keep attention on those goals, in the competition between goals (Weber and Johnson, 2012). In Europe, 72% of EU citizens thought that carbon labeling should be mandatory (Gallup Organisation, 2008a). In Australia, Vancly et al. (2010) found a strong purchasing response of 20% when a green-labeled product (indicating relatively low life-cycle CO₂ emissions) was also the cheapest, and a much weaker response when green-labeled products were not the cheapest. Hence, consumers, at least in developed countries, show interest in product carbon footprint information and many consumers would prefer carbon-labeled products and firms over others, other things being equal (Bolwig and Gibbon, 2010). Yet the impeding factors and the related “attitude-behavior” gap limit how far one can get towards sustainable consumption with labeling and other information-based means alone.

Research on these topics in the developing world is lacking. Considering the notion of a hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1970; Chai and Moneta, 2012) and the challenges facing consumers in developing countries, carbon footprints and other environmental declarations might be seen as a luxury concern that only developed countries can afford. Countering this view, Kvaløy et al. (2012) find environmental concern in developing countries at the same level as in developed countries. Furthermore, eco-labeled products increasingly appear at retail level in developing countries (Roitner-Schobesberger et al., 2008; Thøgersen and Zhou, 2012).

### 4.4.3.3 Sustainable production

Research and initiatives on sustainable production have been concerned with increasing the resource efficiency of, and reducing the pollution and waste from, the production of goods and services through technological innovations in process and product design at the plant and product levels, and, more lately, through system-wide innovations across value chains or production networks (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). Policies that incentivize certain product choices have also been developed (see Section 10.11.3). Eco-efficiency (Schmidheiny and WBSCD, 1992) is the main management philosophy guiding sustainable production initiatives among companies (Pogutz and Micale, 2011) and is expressed as created value or provided functionality per caused environmental impact. Moving towards a more eco-efficient production thus means creating the same or higher value or functionality while causing a lower environmental impact (relative or even absolute decoupling). This involves consideration of multiple impacts across scales, ranging from global impacts like climate change over regional impacts associated with air and water pollution, to local impacts caused by use of land or water.

A strong increase in the eco-efficiency of production is a pre-requisite for developing a sustainable society (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). The $I=PAT$ equation expresses the environmental impact $I$ as a product of the population number $P$, the affluence $A$ (value created or consumed per capita), and a technology factor $T$ perceived as the reciprocal of eco-efficiency. Considering the foreseeable growth in $P$ and $A$, and the current unsustainable level of $I$ for many environmental impacts it is clear that the eco-efficiency ($1/T$) must increase many times (a factor 4 to 20)³ to ensure a sustainable production. While a prerequisite, even this kind of increases in eco-efficiency may not be sufficient since $A$ and $T$ are not mutually independent due to the presence of rebound — including market effects; indeed, sometimes a reduction in $T$ (increased eco-efficiency) is accompanied by an even greater growth in $A$, thereby increasing the overall environmental impact $I$ (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). (A related concept to $I=PAT$ is the Kaya identity, see Section 5.3)

With its focus on the provided function and its broad coverage of environmental impacts, LCA is frequently used for evaluation of the eco-efficiency of products or production activities (Hauschild, 2011).

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³ Factor 4 to factor 20 increases can be calculated depending on the expected increases in $P$ and $A$ and the needed reduction in $I$ (von Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Schmidt-Bleek, 2008).
2005; Finnveden et al., 2009) (see Annex II.4.2). LCA has been standardized by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 14040 and ISO 14044) and is a key methodology underlying standards for eco-labeling and environmental product declarations. LCA is also the analytical tool underlying DFE (design for environment) methods (Bhandar et al., 2003; Hauschild et al., 2004).

With the globalization and outsourcing of industrial production, analyzing the entire product life cycle (or product chain) — from resource extraction to end-of-life — gains increased relevance when optimizing the energy and material efficiency of production. A life-cycle approach will reveal the potential problem shifting that is inherent in outsourcing and that may lead to increased overall resource consumption and GHG emissions of the product over its life cycle in spite of reduced impacts of the mother company (Shui and Harriss, 2006; Li and Hewitt, 2008; Herrmann and Hauschild, 2009). This is why a life cycle perspective is applied when calculating the carbon footprint. Indeed, a life cycle-based assessment is generally needed to achieve resource and emissions optimization across the product chain. Especially the use stage can be very important for products that use electricity or fuels to function (Wenzel et al., 1997; Samaras and Meisterling, 2008; Yung et al., 2011; Sharma et al., 2011). Improvement potentials along product chains can be large, in particular when companies shift from selling only products to delivering product-service systems, often increasing the number of uses of the individual product (Manzini and Vezzoli, 2003). Exchange of flows of waste materials or energy can also contribute to increasing eco-efficiency. Under the heading of “industrial symbiosis”, such mutually beneficial relationships between independent industries have emerged at multiple locations, generally leading to savings of energy and sometimes also materials and resources (Chertow and Lombardi, 2005; Chertow, 2007; Sokka et al., 2011) (See Section 10.5).

While the broad coverage of environmental impacts supported by LCA is required to avoid unnoticed problem shifting between impacts, a narrower focus on climate mitigation in relation to production would be supported by considering energy efficiency, which can be addressed at different levels: the individual process, the production facility, the product chain, and the industrial system (industrial symbiosis). At the process level, the operation of the individual process and consideration of the use stage energy efficiency in the design of the machine tools and production equipment would be addressed (see Section 10.4). Improvements in energy efficiency in manufacturing have focused on both the design and operation of a variety of processes (Gutowski et al., 2009; Duflou et al., 2010; Herrmann et al., 2011; Kara and Li, 2011), finding improvement potentials at the individual process level of up to 70% (Duflou et al., 2012), and at the plant level by re-using e.g. waste heat from one process for heating in another (Hayakawa et al., 1999). Exergy analysis and energy pinch analysis are used to identify potentials for reutilization of energy flows in other processes (Creys and Carey, 1999; Bejan, 2002).

Research on the social dimensions of production systems have addressed such issues as worker conditions (Riisgaard, 2009), farm income (Bolwig et al., 2009), small producer inclusion into markets and value chains (Bolwig et al., 2010; Mitchell and Coles, 2011) and the role of standards in fostering sustainability (Gibbon et al., 2010; Bolwig et al., 2013). Recently, the LCA methodology has been elaborated to include assessment of social impacts such as labor rights (Dreyer et al., 2010), in order to support the assessment of problem shifting and trade-offs between environmental and social dimensions (Hauschild et al., 2008).

### 4.4.4 Relationship between consumption and well-being

As noted earlier, global material resource consumption continues to increase despite substantial gains in resource productivity or eco-efficiency, causing further increases in GHG emissions and overall environmental degradation. In this light it is relevant to discuss whether human well-being or happiness can be decoupled from consumption or growth (Ahuja and Friedman, 1998; Jackson, 2005b; Tukker et al., 2006). We do this here by examining the relationship between different dimensions of well-being and income (and income inequality) across populations and over time.
Happiness is an ambiguous concept that is often used as a catchword for subjective well-being (SWB). SWB is multidimensional and includes both cognitive and affective components (Kahneman et al., 2003). Cognitive well-being refers to the evaluative judgments individuals make when they think about their life and is what is reported in life satisfaction or ladder-of-life data, whereas affective or emotional well-being refers to the emotional quality of an individual’s everyday experience as captured by surveys about the intensity and prevalence of feelings along the day (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). Emotional well-being has been defined as “the frequency and intensity of experiences of joy, fascination, anxiety, sadness, anger, and affection that makes one’s life pleasant or unpleasant” (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010, p. 16489). Camfield and Skevington (2008) examine the relationship between SWB and quality of life (QoL) as used in the literature. They find that SWB and QoL are virtually synonymous; that they both contain a substantial element of life satisfaction, and that health and income are key determinants of SWB or QoL, while low income and high inequality are both associated with poor health and high morbidity.

The “Easterlin paradox” refers to an emerging body of literature suggesting that while there is little or no relationship between SWB and the aggregate income of countries or long-term GDP growth, within countries people with more income are happier (Easterlin, 1973, 1995). Absolute income is, it is argued, only important for happiness when income is very low, while relative income (or income equality) is important for happiness at a wide range of income levels (Layard, 2005; Clark et al., 2008). These insights have been used to question whether economic growth should be a primary goal of government policy (for rich countries), instead of, for example, focusing on reducing inequality within countries and globally, and on maximizing subjective well-being. For instance, Assadourian (2010) argues against consumerism on the grounds that increased material wealth above a certain threshold does not contribute to subjective well-being.

The Easterlin paradox has been contested in comparisons across countries (Deaton, 2008) and over time (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Sacks et al., 2010), on the basis of the World Gallup survey of well-being. These works establish a clear linear relationship between average levels of ladder-of-life satisfaction and the logarithm of GDP per capita across countries, and find no satiation threshold beyond which affluence no longer enhances subjective well-being. Their time series analysis also suggests that economic growth is on average associated with rising happiness over time. On this basis they picture a strong role for absolute income and less for relative income comparisons in determining happiness.

These results contrast with studies of emotional well-being, which generally find a weak relationship between income and well-being at higher income levels. In the US, for example, Kahneman and Deaton (2010) find a clear satiation effect: beyond around $75,000 annual household income (just above the mean US household income) "further increases in income no longer improve individuals’ emotional well-being (including aspects such as spending time with people they like, avoiding pain and disease, and enjoying leisure)" (p. 16492). But even for life satisfaction, there is contrasting evidence. In particular, in Deaton (2008) there is a lot of variation of SWB between countries at the same level of development, and in Sacks et al. (2010) the long term positive relationship between income and life satisfaction is weakly significant and sensitive to the sample of countries (see also Graham (2009), Easterlin et al. (2010), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010)). An important phenomenon is that all components of SWB, in various degrees, adapt to most changes in objective conditions of life, except a few things, such as physical pain (Kahneman et al., 2003; Layard, 2005; Clark et al., 2008; Graham, 2009; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2010).

The great variability of SWB data across individuals and countries and the adaptation phenomenon suggest that these data do not provide indices of well-being that are comparable across individuals and over time. Respondents have different standards when they answer satisfaction questions at

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4 This result is based on cross-sectional data and do not refer to the effects of a change in a person’s income.
different times or in different circumstances. Therefore, the weakness of the observed link between
growth and SWB is not only debated, but it is quite compatible with a strong and firm desire in the
population for ever-growing material consumption (Fleurbaey, 2009). Decoupling growth and well-
being may be more complicated than suggested by raw SWB indicators.
Decoupling individual well-being from consumption may be fraught with controversies, but
decoupling social welfare from average consumption might be possible via inequality reduction. It
has been found that inequality in society has a marked negative effect on average SWB. For
example, Oishi et al. (2011) found that over a 37-year period, Americans were less happy on average
during years with greater income inequality. This was explained by the fact that lower-income
respondents "trusted other people less and perceived other people to be less fair in the years with
more national income inequality" (Oishi et al., 2011, p. 1095). The potential decoupling of social
welfare from average consumption is even more obvious if social welfare is defined in a way that
gives priority to those who are less well-off (Atkinson, 1970).

4.5 Development pathways

Sustainable development provides a framework for the evaluation of climate policies. This is
particularly useful in view of the fact that a given concentration pathway or climate objective can
typically be achieved through various policies and development pathways inducing different impacts
on the economy, the society, and other aspects of the environment. Integrated Assessment Models
(IAM) provide valuable tools for the analysis of pathways, though most models suffer from
limitations analysed in this section.

4.5.1 Definition and examples

Though widely used in the literature, the concept of development pathway has rarely been defined.\(^5\)
According to AR4, a development path is “an evolution based on an array of technological,
economic, social, institutional, cultural, and biophysical characteristics that determine the
interactions between human and natural systems, including consumption and production patterns in
all countries, over time at a particular scale” (IPCC, 2007, Glossary, p. 813). AR4 also indicates that
“alternative development paths refer to different possible trajectories of development, the
continuation of current trends being just one of the many paths”. Though AR4 defines development
pathways as global, the concept has also been used at regional (e.g., Li and Zhang, 2008), national
(e.g., Poteete, 2009) and subnational scales (e.g. Dusyk et al., 2009) at provincial scale and
(Yigitcanlar and Velibeyoglu, 2008) at city scale. In the present report, a development pathway
characterizes all the interactions between human and natural systems in a particular territory,
regardless of scale.
The concept of development pathway is holistic. It is broader than the development trajectory of a
particular sector, or of a particular group of people within a society. Thus, a wide range of economic,
social and environmental indicators are necessary to describe a development pathway, not all of
which may be amenable to quantitative representation. As defined by AR4, however, a “pathway” is
not a random collection of indicators. It has an internal narrative and causal consistency that can be
captured by the \textit{determinants} of the interactions between human and natural systems. The
underlying assumption is that the observed development trajectory—as recorded by various
economic, social and environmental indicators—can be explained by identifiable drivers. This roots
the concept of development pathway in the (dominant) intellectual tradition according to which
history has some degree of intelligibility (while another tradition holds that history is a chaotic set of
events that is essentially not intelligible (Schopenhauer, 1819)).

\(^{5}\) Development path and development pathway are synonymous.
The literature on development pathways has two main branches. A “backward-looking” body of work describes past and present development trajectories for given territories and explores their determinants. For example, most of the growth literature as well as a large part of the (macro) development literature fall into this category. This body of work is discussed in Section 4.3 as well as in several other chapters. In particular, Section 5.3.1 reviews the determinants of GHG emissions, Section 12.2 reviews past trajectories of human settlements, and Section 14.3 discusses past trajectories of development at regional scale. In addition, “forward-looking” studies construct plausible development pathways for the future and examine the ways by which development might be steered towards one pathway or another. Box 4.3 briefly reviews the main forward-looking development pathways published since AR4. Most of Chapter 6 is devoted to “forward-looking” studies.

Box 4.3. Forward-Looking Development Pathways: new developments since AR4

Forward-looking development pathways aim at illuminating possible futures, and at providing a sense of how these futures might be reached (or avoided). Forward-looking pathways can be constructed using various techniques, ranging from simulations with numerical models to qualitative scenario construction or group forecasting exercises (van Notten et al., 2003).

New sets of forward-looking development pathways have been proposed since the AR4 review (in Sathaye et al. (2007), Section 12.2.1.2). At the global scale, they include, inter alia, the climate smart pathway (World Bank, 2010), the Tellus Institute scenarios (Raskin et al. (2010)), and degrowth strategies (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010) or the scenarios developed under the Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium umbrella (Moss et al., 2010) to update the 2000 SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). Pathways have also been proposed for specific sectors, such as health (Etienne and Asamoa-Baah, 2010), agriculture (Paillard et al., 2010), biodiversity (Leadley et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010), and energy (Ayres and Ayres, 2009).

At the national and regional levels, the emergence of the “green growth” agenda (OECD, 2011) has spurred the development of many short- to medium-term exercises (e.g. Republic of Korea, 2009; Jaeger et al., 2011); as well as renewed discussions on SD trajectories (e.g. Jupesta et al., 2011). Similarly, there is growing research on the ways by which societies can transition towards a “low carbon economy”, considering not only mitigation and adaptation to climate change, but also the need for social, economic and technological (Shukla et al., 2008) (see 6.6.2 for a broader review). For instance, studies in China show that controlling emissions without proper policies to counteract the negative effects will have an adverse impact on the country’s economic development, reducing its per capita income and the living standards of both urban and rural residents (Wang Can et al., 2005; Wang Ke, 2008). China is developing indicators for low-carbon development and low-carbon society (UN (2010), with many citations) with specific indicators tested on selected cities and provinces (Fu, Jiafeng et al., 2010), providing useful data on challenges and gaps as well as the need for clearly defined goals and definitions of “low-carbon” and its SD context.

4.5.2 Transition between pathways

Backward-looking studies reveal that past development pathways have differed in many respects, notably in terms of GHG emissions because of differences in, inter alia, fuel supply mix, location

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6 This literature can itself be divided in two main groups: papers aimed at identifying individual mechanisms that drive development trajectories, and papers aimed at identifying broad patterns of development. One example of the former is the literature on the relationships between GDP and emissions, discussed in Chapter 5, section 4.1. One example of the latter is the so-called “investment development path” literature, which, following Dunning (1981), identifies stages of development for countries based on the direction of foreign direct investment flows and the competitiveness of domestic firms on international markets.
patterns, structure of economic activity, composition of household demand, etc.—even across
countries with otherwise very similar economic characteristics. Similarly, forward-looking studies
point to very contrasted, yet equally plausible, futures in terms of GHG emissions. Shifting from a
high- to a low-emissions development pathway require modifying the trajectory of the system that
generates (among others) GHG emissions. It thus requires time as well as action over multiple
dimensions of development (location, technology, lifestyles, etc.). Yet, shifting from a high- to a low-
emissions development pathway could potentially be as important for climate mitigation as
implementing “climate” policies (Halsnaes et al., 2011).

A central theme of the present report is to explore the conditions of a transition towards
development pathways with lower emissions, globally (Chapter 6), sectorally (Chapters 7-12) and
regionally (Chapters 13-15). To frame these subsequent discussions, the present section does two
things. First, it discusses the obstacles to changing course by introducing the key notions of path
dependence and lock-ins (4.5.2.1 ). Second, examples and lessons from the technology transition
literature are discussed (4.5.2.2 ). The policy and institutional aspects of building strategies to
transition between pathways are discussed in the subsequent chapters.7

4.5.2.1 Path dependence and lock-ins

Path dependence is the tendency for past decisions and events to self-reinforce, thereby diminishing
and possibly excluding the prospects for alternatives to emerge. Path dependence is important for
analyzing transitions between development pathways. For example, development of inter-city
highways may make further extension of the road network more likely (if only for feeder roads) but
also make further extension of rail networks less cost-effective by drawing out traffic and investment
financing (see Section 12.5), thereby diminishing the prospects for alternative transportation
investments.

Chief among the mechanisms that underlie path-dependence are “increasing returns” mechanisms
(Page, 2006) – in which an outcome in one period increases the probability of generating that same
outcome in the next period. Increasing returns is a large group which comprises, inter alia, increasing
returns to scale, learning by doing, induced technological change, or agglomeration economies. As
(Shalizi and Lecocq, 2013) note, the concept of increasing returns has a long tradition in economic
history, and the implications of increasing returns mechanisms have been systematically explored
over the past three decades or so, notably around issues of monopolistic competition (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977), international trade (Krugman, 1979), economic geography (Fujita et al., 1999),
economic growth (Romer, 1990), industrial organizations or adoption of technologies (Arthur, 1989).

Yet increasing returns are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate path-dependence. They are
not sufficient because competing increasing returns can cancel out. And they are not necessary
because other mechanisms might generate path-dependence. For example, decisions that involve
the use of scarce resources, such as land, labour or exhaustible natural resources constrain future
agents’ options, either temporarily (for labour) or permanently (for exhaustible resources). Similarly,
in the presence of switching costs – e.g., costs attached to premature replacement of long-lived
capital stock – decisions made at one point in time can partially or totally lock-in decision-makers’
subsequent choices (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). Also, path-dependence can emerge from
coordination failures in complex systems that require high degree of articulation between actors
(Yarime, 2009). The key message is that it is essential to look broadly for mechanisms that may
generate path-dependence when analyzing the determinants of pathways (past or anticipated)
(Shalizi and Lecocq, 2013).

7 The key point, as emphasized in AR4, is that a development pathway results from the interactions of
decisions by multiple agents, at all levels. Thus in general public policies7 alone cannot trigger changes in
pathways, and cooperation between governments, markets and civil societies are necessary (Sathaye et al.,
2007).
Lock-in is the most extreme manifestation of path dependence, when it becomes extremely costly or impossible to shift away from the current pathway. Lock-ins can emerge in many domains, with examples ranging from end-use technology standards (cf. the competition between the AZERTY and the QWERTY keyboards, or between the VHS and BETAMAX video standards), energy supply networks to expansion pathways of regions once initial choices are made (Fujita et al., 1999). Lock-ins are not “good” or “bad” per se (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2013), but identifying risks of “bad” lock-ins and taking advantage of possible “good” lock-ins matters for policy-making, so that ex ante decisions are not regretted ex post (Liebowitz and Margolis (1995)). The literature, however, underlines that lock-ins do not stem only for lack of information. There are also many cases in which rational agents might make decisions based only on part of the information available, because of, inter alia, differences between local and global optimum, time and resource constraints on the decision-making process or information symmetry (Foray, 1997); which points to the process of decision-making (See 4.3.2 on Governance and Political Economy).

4.5.2.2 Examples and lessons from the technology transition literature

Part of the literature on innovation (reviewed in Sections 3.11 and 4.3.6; technological change is reviewed in Section 5.6) adopts a broad, systemic perspective to try to explain how new technologies emerge. It thus provides examples of, and insights on how transition between pathways can occur. In fact, changes in technologies, their causes, and their implications for societies have been actively studied in social sciences since the late 18th century by historians, economists and sociologists. A common starting point is the observation that “technological change is not a haphazard process, but proceeds in certain directions” (Kemp, 1994). For example, processors tend to become faster, planes to become lighter, etc. To characterize these regularities, scholars have developed the concepts of technological regime (Nelson and Winter, 2002) and technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994). Technological regimes refer to shared beliefs among technicians about what is feasible. Technological paradigms refer to the selected set of objects engineers are working on, and to the selected set of problems they choose to address. How technological regimes may change (such as with the development of information technologies) is a subject of intense research. Radical innovations (e.g., the steam engine) are seen as a necessary condition. But the drivers of radical innovation themselves are not clearly understood. In addition, once an innovation is present, the shift in technological regime is not a straightforward process: The forces that maintain technological regimes (e.g., increasing returns to scale, vested interests, network externalities) are not easy to overcome – all the more so that new technologies are often less efficient, in many respects, than existing ones, and competing technologies may coexist for a while. History thus suggests that the diffusion of new technologies is a slow process (Kemp, 1994; Fouquet, 2010).

More recent research over the past 20 years has yielded two major perspectives on technology transitions (Truffer and Coenen, 2012): the multi-level perspective on socio-technical systems (Geels, 2002) and concept of technological innovations systems (Bergek et al., 2008). The multi-level perspective distinguishes three levels of analysis: niche innovations, socio-technical regimes, and socio-technical landscape (Geels, 2002). A technological niche is the micro-level where radical innovations emerge. Socio-technical regimes correspond to an extended version of the technological regime discussed above. And the socio-technical landscape corresponds to the regulatory, institutional, physical and behavioural environment within which innovations emerge. There is considerable inertia at this third level. Changes in socio-technical regimes emerge from the interactions between these three levels. According to Geels and Schot’s typology (2007), changes in socio-technical regimes can follow four different paths. Transformation corresponds to cases in which moderate changes in the landscape occur at a time when niche innovations are not yet developed, thus resulting in a relatively small change of direction of the development pathway. An example of transformation occurred when municipal sewer systems were implemented in Dutch cities (Geels, 2006). De-alignment and realignment correspond to sudden changes in the landscape.
that cause actors to lose faith in the regime. If no clear replacement is ready yet, a large range of
technologies may compete until one finally dominates and a new equilibrium is reached. One
example is the transition from horse-powered vehicles to cars. If new technologies are already
available, on the other hand, a transition substitution might occur, as in the case of the replacement
of sailing ships by steamships between 1850 and 1920. Finally, a reconfiguration occurs when
innovations initially adopted as part of the current regime progressively subvert it into a new one, an
example of which is the transition from traditional factories to mass production in the United States.

The technological innovation systems approach (Berger et al., 2008) adopts a systemic perspective
by considering all relevant actors, their interactions and the institutions relevant for innovation.
Early work in this approach argues that beside market failures, “system failures” such as, inter alia,
actor deficiencies, coordination deficits or conflicts with existing institutional structures (institutional
deficits) can explain unsuccessful innovation (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). More recent analysis
focus on core processes critical for innovation, such as presence of entrepreneurial activities,
learning, knowledge diffusion through networks, etc. The technological innovation systems concept
was developed to inform public policy on how to better support technologies deemed sustainable
with an increasing focus on “system innovations” as opposed to innovation in single technologies or
products (Truffer and Coenen, 2012).

4.5.2.3 Economic modeling of transitions between pathways
As noted above (4.5.1), economic modeling is a major tool for analyzing future development
pathways. Depending on their features and on how they are used, models do not provide the same
type of information about transition. This is what the present sub-section reviews. See Section 6.2
for a review of modeling tools for integrated assessment.

There are four, increasingly complex ways of using economic models to analyze transitions between
development pathways. The first option consists of building plausible images of the future at a given
date and comparing them (comparative statics). The focus is on the internal consistency of each
image, and on the distance between them. Models without explicit representation of time (e.g.,
input-output, partial equilibrium or static general equilibrium models) are sufficient. Static models
can provide insights on the sustainable character of the long-term images, to the extent that the
model captures critical variables for sustainability such as natural resources use or impact of
economic activity on the environment (e.g., GHG emissions). However, national accounts typically
add up multiple products with very different material content, very different energy contents, and
very different prices. Thus, constructing robust relationships between aggregate monetary indicators
and physical flows requires in-depth analysis. Similarly, static models can provide insights on the
social components of sustainability to the extent they include some form of representation of the
distribution of economic activity within the society, notably across income groups (see Section
4.4.1). Again, the associated data challenge is significant. By construction, on the other hand, static
models do not provide insights on the pathways from the present on to each possible future, let
alone on the transitions between pathways.

Thus one needs dynamic models to depict the pathway towards desirable (or undesirable) long-term
futures. Still, the relevance of dynamic models for discussing transitions depends on their structure,
content, and way they are used. A large part of the modelling literature on climate mitigation relies
on neoclassical growth models with exogenous (Swan, 1956; Solow, 1956) or endogenous
(Koopmans, 1965; Cass, 1965) savings rate. In those, long-term growth is ultimately driven by the
sum of population growth and exogenous total factor productivity growth (exogenous technical
change). In the simplest version of the neoclassical model, there is thus only one “pathway” to speak
of, as determined by human fertility and human ingenuity. Any departure from this pathway resorbs
itself endogenously through adjustment of the relative weights of capital and labor in the production
function, and through adjustment of the savings rate (when endogenous). Empirically, neoclassical
growth models have limited ability to explain observed short-term growth patterns (e.g. Easterly
(2002)).

Discussions about transitions are richer when models differentiate short-term economic processes
from long-term ones. The general point is that the technical, economic and social processes often
exhibit more rigidities in the short- than in the long-run. As Solow (2000) suggests, at short-term
scales, “something sort of ‘Keynesian’ is a good approximation, and surely better than anything
straight ‘neoclassical’. At very long time scales, the interesting questions are best studied in a
neoclassical framework and attention to the Keynesian side of things would be a minor distraction”
(p. 158). There is a long tradition of debates in economics on the degree to which production
technologies and wages should be considered flexible or rigid in the short- and medium-run, with
potentially very different results for the assessment of climate mitigation policies (Rezai et al., 2013),
(Guivarch et al., 2011). Other important rigidities include, inter alia, long-lived physical capital, the
premature replacement of which is typically very costly, and the dynamics of which have important
implications for the costs, timing and direction of climate policies (e.g. Lecocq et al., 1998; Wing,
1999); rigidities associated with the location of households and firms, changes of which take time; or
rigidities associated with preferences of individuals and with institutions. Presence of may also lead
to bifurcations towards different long-term outcome (i.e., equilibrium-dependence and not just
path-dependence as in section 4.5.2) (See e.g. Hallegatte et al., 2007).

A second key element for the analysis of transitions is to relax the full information hypothesis under
which many models are run. If information increases over time, there is a rationale for a sequential
decision-making framework (Arrow et al., 1996), in which choices made at one point can be re-
considered in light of new information. Thus, the issue is no longer to select a pathway once and for
all, but to make the best first-step (or short-term) decision, given the structure of uncertainties and
the potential for increasing information over time – factors which are especially relevant in the
context of climate change. Inertia plays an especially important role in this context, as the more
choices made at one point constrain future opportunity sets, the more difficult it becomes to make
advantage of new information (e.g., Ha-Duong et al., 1997). Another way by which uncertainty can
be captured in models is to abandon the intertemporal optimization objective altogether and use
simulation models instead, with decisions made at any time based on imperfect expectations
(Scrieciu et al., 2013). Such shift has major implications for the transition pathway (Sassi et al., 2010),
but results strongly depend on how expectations and decisions under uncertainty are represented.

Ideally, models that produce development pathways should thus (i) be framed in a consistent
macroeconomic framework (since a pathway is holistic), (ii) impose relevant technical constraints in
each sector, such as assumptions about the process of technical change, (iii) capture the key
relationships between economic activity and the environment, e.g., energy and natural resources
consumption or greenhouse gases emissions, (iv) have a horizon long enough to assess
“sustainability” – a long-term horizon which also implies, incidentally, that the model must be able
to represent structural and technical change – yet (v) recognize short-term economic processes
critical for assessing transition pathways, such as market imbalance and rigidities, all this while (vi)
providing an explicit representation of how economic activity is distributed within the society, and
how this retrofits into the growth pattern, and (vii) representing key uncertainties.

No model today meets all these specifications. Current models can be classified along two major
fault lines: bottom-up vs. top-down, and long-term vs. short-term. By design, computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models provide a comprehensive macroeconomic framework, and they can be
harnessed to analyze distributional issues, at least amongst income groups, but they typically fail to
incorporate key technical constraints. Conversely, bottom-up engineering models provide a detailed
account of technical potentials and limitations, but their macro-engine, if at all, is most often
rudimentary. Emerging “hybrid” models developed in the context of climate policy assessment are
steps towards closing this gap (Hourcade et al., 2006). A similar rift occurs with regard to time
horizon. Growth models like Solow’s are designed to capture key features of long-term development
pathways, but they do not include short- or medium-term economic processes such as market rigidities. On the other hand, short-term models (econometric or structural) will meet requirements but are not designed to look deep in the future. Again, emerging models include short-/medium-term processes into analysis of growth in the long-run (see e.g., (Barker and Serban Scrieciu, 2010), but this pretty much remains an open research field.

**Box 4.4. Characterizing the sustainability of development pathways**

Constructing and modelling forward-looking development pathways is one thing, evaluating how they fare in terms of sustainability within and beyond the time horizon of the modelling is another. Two questions can actually be distinguished (Asheim, 2007). One is to predict whether the current situation (welfare, environment) will be preserved in the future: Are we on a sustained development pathway, i.e., a pathway without downturn in welfare or environmental objectives? This question is answered by looking at the evolution of the target variables within the time horizon of the scenario, and what happens beyond the horizon remains undetermined. Another question is to determine whether the current generation’s decisions leave it possible for future generations to achieve a sustained pathway: Is a sustained development pathway possible given what the current generation does? Unlike the former question, the latter does not require predicting the future generations’ decisions, only their future constraints and opportunities. Showing the existence of a sustained pathway is then an argument in favour of the compatibility of current decisions with future sustainability. Some indicators of sustainability such as genuine savings (see Box 4.2) are meant to provide an answer based on the current evolution of (economic, social, environmental) capital stocks and can also be used for the evaluation of scenarios which depict these stocks. In practice, sustainability analysis (of either type) is not frequent in the scenario-building community, though multi-criteria analysis of scenarios has been gaining ground in recent years (See e.g., GEA, 2012).

### 4.6 Mitigative capacity and mitigation, and links to adaptive capacity and adaptation

#### 4.6.1 Mitigation and adaptation measures, capacities, and development pathways

Even though adaptation and mitigation are generally approached as distinct domains of scientific research and practice (Biesbroek et al., 2009) (as reflected, for example, in the IPCC separate Working Groups II and III), a recognition of the deep linkages between mitigation and adaptation has gradually emerged. Initially, mitigation and adaptation were analyzed primarily in terms of techno-economic considerations. But growing attention has been directed at the underlying capacities, first with respect to adaptation, and later-and less fully- with respect to mitigation, (Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Burch and Robinson, 2007; Winkler et al., 2007; Goklany, 2007; Pelling, 2010).

This attention has necessitated a broadening of the scope of analysis well beyond narrow techno-economic considerations, to the social, political, economic and cultural domains, as ultimately, this is where the underlying determinants of mitigative and adaptive capacity lie. Following the literature enumerated above, a non-exhaustive list of these underlying determinants include: the level and distribution of wealth, robustness and legitimacy of institutions, availability of credible information, existence and reliability of infrastructure, access to and adequacy of technologies and systems of innovation, effective governance, social cohesion and security, distribution of decision-making power among actors, conditions of equity and empowerment among citizens, the opportunity costs of action, as well as individual cognitive factors, including relevant skills, knowledge and cultural framings. The fact that mitigative and adaptive capacities share and are similarly affected by these underlying determinants highlights their similarity, blurring the distinction between them and leading some scholars to argue that there is simply “response capacity” (Tompkins and Adger, 2005; Wilbanks, 2005; Burch and Robinson, 2007). Because response capacity is directly shaped by these
underlying technological, economic, institutional, socio-cultural and political determinants, it is in other words directly shaped by the overall development pathway, which is the combined product of those same inter-related determinants. This dependence of response capacity on development pathway is underscored by the strong parallel between its determinants (outlined above) and the defining dimensions of a development pathway (discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.5). Indeed, response capacity is determined much more by the overall development pathway than by targeted climate-specific policies. The academic consensus on this point has been clearly reflected in the IPCC AR4 (2007), in WGI Chapter 12 in the case of mitigative capacity, and WGII Chapter 18 in the case of adaptive capacity. Of course, more nuanced and site-specific assessments of the determinants of such capacity can provide further useful insight; see e.g. (Keskitalo et al., 2011).

Moreover, there is consensus that an effective transition toward a SD pathway in particular can more effectively foster response capacity (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; Matthew and Hammill, 2009; Parry, 2009; Halsnaes et al., 2011; Harry and Morad, 2013). There are various elements of fostering a transition toward SD that naturally accord with the creation of mitigative and adaptive capacity, including, for example, the establishment of innovation systems that are supportive of environmental and social priorities, the support for adaptive ecosystem management and conservation, the strengthening of institutions and assets to support food and water security and public health, and the support for procedurally equitable systems of governance (Banuri, 2009; Barbier, 2011; Bowen et al., 2011; Bowen and Friel, 2012). Mitigation and adaptation outcomes can of course still be expected to depend on the extent to which explicit efforts are taken to implement and mainstream climate change policies and measures, as well as on the manner in which a particular SD approach may evolve -with more or less emphasis on economic, social or environmental objectives- (Giddings et al., 2002; Beg et al., 2002; Grist, 2008; Halsnaes et al., 2008).

The centrality of mitigative and adaptive capacity to SD is highlighted by the growing attention to the idea that the Earth system has moved from the Holocene into the Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2011), where societies are the most important drivers of the Earth’s dynamics. Mitigative and adaptive capacity can be seen in general terms, i.e., not just with respect to GHG emissions and climate impacts, but all anthropogenic environmental pressures and impacts from ecosystem degradation. In this view, mitigative and adaptive capacity are central to sustainable ecosystem management (Holling, 1978; Walters and Holling, 1990; McFadden et al., 2011; Williams, 2011), and thus fundamental to SD (Chapin et al., 2010; Folke et al., 2011b; Polasky et al., 2011; Biermann et al., 2012). Some scholars interpret this as a fundamental redefinition of development calling for transformational shifts based on re-imagining possibilities for future development pathways (Pelling, 2010; Jackson, 2011a; Kates et al., 2012; Ehrlich et al., 2012).

Scholarship exploring the links between mitigation, adaptation, socio-ecological resilience and SD more generally, has generally pointed toward the existence of (potential) synergies and trade-offs within and across policy sectors and across implementation measures (Gallopín, 2006; Rosenzweig and Tubiello, 2007; Vogel et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 2009; Thornton and Gerber, 2010; Adger et al., 2011; Warren, 2011; Lal et al., 2011; Vermeulen et al., 2012; Denton and Wilbanks, 2012; Hill, 2013). These studies show that, in spite of mitigative and adaptive capacities being so closely intertwined with each other and with SD, the relationship between mitigation and adaptation measures is more ambiguous and, in line with the IPCC AR4, suggest that outcomes are highly dependent on the measures and the context in which they are undertaken, with some policy sectors being more conducive to synergies than others.

In the agricultural sector, for example, scholars have for many years highlighted the potential of fostering both mitigation and adaptation by supporting traditional and biodiverse agro-ecological systems around the world (Campbell, 2011; Altieri and Nicholls, 2013, and see Sec 11.5)(and see Section 11.5). A recent modelling exercise suggests that investing substantially in adapting agriculture to climate change in some regions -Asia and North America- can result in substantial mitigation co-benefits, whilst the latter may be insignificant in Africa (Lobell et al., 2013). There are
empirical studies where interventions in agricultural systems have led to positive mitigation and adaptation outcomes or vice versa (Kenny, 2011; Wollenberg, 2012; Bryan et al., 2012), or where synergies between adaptation and mitigation have not materialized due to, for example, limited scientific and policy knowledge, as well as institutional and farmers' own financial and cognitive constraints (Haden et al., 2012; Arbuckle Jr. et al., 2013; Bryan et al., 2013). In forestry, the links between fostering mitigation strategies, e.g. through planting trees, developing agro-forestry systems or conserving diverse ecosystems, and the adaptation of both forests and people to climate change have been widely acknowledged and the possibility of effective linkages in policy and action have also been identified (Locatelli et al., 2011; Schoeneberger et al., 2012; Mori et al., 2013).

Methods for identifying trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation at policy and implementation levels and to foster legitimate decision-making have also been recently developed (Laukkonen et al., 2009; Janetos et al., 2012).

This evolving literature highlights the need to examine adaptation and mitigation for their SD implications, and ultimately to mainstream them in broader development policy. It also explains the parallel emergence of environmental governance research about reforming existing or developing institutions in different policy domains to meet this need (Folke et al., 2005; Folke, 2007; Brunner and Lynch, 2010). Recent studies highlight the organisational, institutional, financial and knowledge barriers to the development of effective governance for climate mitigation and adaptation in general government policy (Picketts et al., 2012), as well as in particular policy sectors, e.g. in forestry (Johnston and Hesseln, 2012); in health (Bowen et al., 2013); or in urban planning (Barton, 2013).

Others identify the multi-scale, inter-connected and dynamic nature of many climate issues and their associated responses as a key barrier to action, particularly at local level (Romero-Lankao, 2012). Analyses of the effectiveness of public-private partnerships and other forms of multi-actor cooperation to mainstream both mitigation and adaptation measures in a given sector and context also reveal the challenging nature of such endeavour (Pattberg, 2010; Pinkse and Kolk, 2012).

There is ample scope to improve response capacity in nations and communities by putting SD at the core of development priorities, despite the considerable governance challenges to mainstreaming mitigation and adaptation measures across policy sectors, collective and individual behaviour and to exploit possible synergies and confront trade-offs. Nonetheless, it remains the case that the variation of mitigative and adaptive capacity between different nations and communities within them is a function of the vast disparities in the determinants of such capacity. These differences in capacity are in turn driven to a significant degree by differences in development pathways and, specifically, level of development. This is a primary reason why the issue of burden sharing among nations features so prominently in consideration of international cooperation on climate change generally, and the UNFCCC in particular, as discussed further in the following section.

4.6.2 Equity and burden-sharing in the context of international cooperation on climate

Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2 to 3.5) introduced the general equity principles in the philosophical literature and their relevance to climate change including burden-sharing. This section briefly reviews the extensive literature regarding burden-sharing in a global climate regime. If focuses first on the equity principles as they are invoked in the literature, which emphasises those laid out in the UNFCCC. It then reviews several categories of burden-sharing frameworks. While the academic literature uses the term “burden-sharing,” it is understood that mitigation action entails not only burdens but also benefits.

4.6.2.1 Equity principles pertinent to burden-sharing in an international climate regime

The UNFCCC clearly invokes the vision of equitable burden-sharing among Parties toward achieving the Convention’s objective. While Parties had not articulated a specific burden-sharing arrangement in quantified detail, they had established an initial allocation of obligations among countries with explicit references to the need for equitable contributions. All Parties adopted general commitments to mitigate, adapt and undertake other climate-related actions, but distinct categories of countries
reflecting level of development were identified and assigned specific obligations. Developed
countries (listed in Annex I) were distinguished from developing countries and obliged to “take the
lead on combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” (Art. 3.1), noting “the need for
equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding [the
UNFCCC] objective” (Art. 4.2(a)). A subset of Annex I countries consisting of the wealthier developed
countries (listed in Annex II) were further obliged to provide financial and technological support “to
developing countries to enable them to effectively implement their UNFCCC commitments” (Art.
4.7), noting that they “shall take into account ... the importance of appropriate burden sharing
among the developed country Parties”.

While Parties’ equitable contributions are elaborated further in subsequent UNFCCC decisions and
under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, an explicit arrangement for equitable burden-
sharing remains unspecified. Because there is no absolute standard of equity, countries (like people)
will tend to advocate interpretations which tend to favour their (often short term) interests
(Heyward, 2007; Lange et al., 2010; Kals and Maes, 2011). It is thus tempting to say that no reasoned
resolution is possible and to advocate a purely procedural resolution (Müller, 1999). However, there
is a basic set of shared ethical premises and precedents that apply to the climate problem, and
impartial reasoning (as behind a Rawlsian (Rawls, 2000) “veil of ignorance”) can help put bounds on
the plausible interpretations of equity in the burden sharing context. Even in the absence of a
formal, globally agreed burden-sharing framework, such principles are important in establishing
expectations of what may be reasonably required of different actors. They influence the nature of
the public discourse, the concessions individuals are willing to grant, the demands citizens are
inclined to impose on their own governments, and the terms in which governments represent their
negotiating positions both to other countries and to their own citizens. From the perspective of an
international climate regime, many analysts have considered principles for equitable burden-sharing,
(Rose 1990; Hayes and Smith 1993; Baer et al. 2000; B. Metz et al. 2002; Ringius, Torvanger, and
Underdal 2002; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; Gherri, Hourcade, and Criqui 2003; Gardiner 2004;
Caney 2005; Caney 2009; Caney 2010; Heyward 2007; E. A. Page 2008; Vanderheiden 2008; Klinsky
and Dowlatabadi 2009; Winkler et al. 2011). Equitable burden-sharing has been most frequently
applied to costs of mitigation, though similar issues arise with regard to adaptation (Baer, 2006;
Paavola and Adger, 2006; Adger, 2006; Jagers and Duus-Otterstrom, 2008; Dellink et al., 2009;
Grasso, 2010; Hartzell-Nichols, 2011). Here these equity principles are given along four key
dimensions – responsibility, capacity, equality, and the right to sustainable development, expanding
on the philosophical arguments in Sections 3.2-3.4.

Responsibility
In the climate context, responsibility is widely taken as a fundamental principle relating
responsibility for contributing to climate change (via emissions of GHGs) to the responsibility for
solving the problem. The literature extensively discusses it, distinguishing moral responsibility from
causal responsibility, and considering the moral significance of knowledge of harmful effects
(Neumayer, 2000; Caney, 2005; Müller et al., 2009). Common sense ethics (and legal practice) hold
persons responsible for harms or risks they knowingly impose or could have reasonably foreseen,
and, in certain cases, regardless of whether they could have been foreseen. The notion of
responsibility is thus closely connected to the Polluter Pays principle, and burden-sharing principles
which derive from it hold that countries should be accountable for their greenhouse gas emissions.
This is a common interpretation of the UNFCCC phrase “common but differentiated responsibilities”
(Harris, 1999; Rajamani, 2000), given its similarity to the more explicit Rio Declaration (see sec 4.1).
Responsibility is taken by some to include present and past emissions (Grübler and Fujii, 1991;
Smith, 1991; Neumayer, 2000; Rive et al., 2006; Wei et al., 2012). This has been justified on three
main grounds. First, climate change results from the stock of accumulated historic emissions.
Second, the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted to the atmosphere must be
constrained (to a level determined by society’s choice of global climate stabilization goal (see IPCC
AR5 WGI), and thus constitutes a finite common resource (often loosely referred to as the
“atmospheric space” or the “carbon budget”). Users of this resource—whether current or historical—
should be accountable for depleting the resource and precluding the access of others. Third,
historical emissions reflect the use of a resource from which benefits have been derived, i.e., wealth,
fixed capital, infrastructure, and other assets. These benefits constitute a legacy based in part on
consuming a common resource that (a) should be paid for, and (b) provides a basis for mitigative
capacity (Shue, 1999; Caney, 2006, 2010). The latter argument carries the notion of responsibility
further back in time, assigning responsibility for the emissions of previous generations, to the extent
that present generations have inherited benefits. This argument links responsibility with the capacity
principle discussed below (Meyer and Roser, 2010; Gardiner, 2011a; Meyer, 2012). If conventional
development continues, the relative responsibility of some nations that currently have relatively low
cumulative emissions would match and exceed by mid-century the relative responsibility of some
nations who currently have high responsibility (Höhne and Blok, 2005; Botzen et al., 2008), on an
aggregate— if not per capita— basis. Such projections illustrate that the relative distribution of
responsibility among countries can vary substantially over time, and that a burden-sharing
framework must dynamically reflect evolving realities if they are to faithfully reflect ethical
principles. They also may provide a basis for understanding where mitigation might productively be
undertaken, though not necessarily who should be obliged to bear the costs.

Each nation’s responsibility for emissions is typically defined (as in IPCC inventory methodologies) in
terms of emissions within the nation’s territorial boundary. An alternative interpretation (Fermann,
1994) which has become more salient as international trade has grown more important, is to include
emissions embodied in internationally traded goods consumed by a given nation. Recent studies
(Lenzen et al., 2007; Pan et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2011) have provided a quantitative basis for
better understanding the implications of a consumption-based approach to assessing responsibility.
In general, at the aggregate level, developed countries are net importers of emissions, and
developing countries are net exporters (see Sections 5.3.3.2 and 14.3.4). The relevance of this to
burden-sharing may depend on further factors, such as the distribution between the exporting and
importing countries of the benefits of carbon-intensive production, and the presence of other
climate policies such as border carbon tariffs (see Section 13.8.1 and 14.4.1), as well as the
development of the relevant data sources (see also Sections 3.9 and 4.4). Many analysts have
suggested that all emissions are not equivalent in how they translate to responsibility, distinguishing
the categories of “survival emissions”, “development emissions”, and “luxury” emissions (Agarwal
and Narain, 1991; Shue, 1993; Baer et al., 2009; Rao and Baer, 2012).

Determining responsibility for emissions in order to allocate responsibility raises methodological
questions. In addition to the standard questions about data availability and reliability, there are also
equity-related questions. For instance, there are various rationales for determining how far in the
past to include historical emissions. One rationale is that the 1990s should be the earliest date,
reflecting the timing of the First IPCC Assessment Report and the creation of a global regime that
imposed obligations to curb emissions (Posner and Sunstein, 2007). Some argue that the date should
be earlier, corresponding to the time that climate change became reasonably suspected of being a
problem, and greenhouse gas emissions thus identifiable as a pollutant worthy of policy action. For
example, one might argue for the 1970s or 1960s, based on the published warnings issued by
scientific advisory panels to the United States presidents Johnson (U.S. National Research Council
Committee on Atmospheric Sciences, 1966; MacDonald et al., 1979) and Carter (MacDonald et al.,
1979), and the first G7 Summit Declaration highlighting climate change as a problem and seeking to
prevent further increases of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Group of 7 Heads of State, 1979).
Others argue that a still earlier date is appropriate because the damage is still caused, the stock
depleted, and the benefits derived, regardless of whether there is a legal requirement or knowledge.

Another issue is the question of accounting for the residence time of emissions into the atmosphere,
as an alternative to simply considering cumulative emissions over time. In the case of carbon
dioxide, responsibility could include past emissions even when they are no longer resident in the
atmosphere, on the grounds that those emissions (a) have contributed to the warming and climate
damages experienced so far, and upon which further warming and damages will be additive, and (b)
have been removed from the atmosphere predominantly to the oceans, where they are now causing
ocean acidification, which is itself an environmental problem (See AR5 WGI, Chapters 3 and 6).

**Capacity (or, Ability to Pay)**

A second principle for allocating effort arises from the capacity to contribute to solving the climate
problem (Shue, 1999; Caney, 2010). Generally, it is interpreted to mean that the more one can
afford to contribute, the more one should, just as societies tend to distribute the costs of preserving
or generating societal public goods; i.e., most societies have progressive income taxation. This view
can be apply at the level of countries, or at a lower level, recognizing inequalities between
individuals. Smith et al. (1993) suggested GDP as an income based measure of ability-to-pay, subject
to a threshold value, determined by an indicator of quality of life. This was developed in Kartha et al.
(2009) and Baer et al. (2010), taking into account intra-national disparities.

As discussed in Section 4.6.1, response capacity refers to more than just financial wherewithal,
comprising also other characteristics that affect a nation’s ability to contribute to solving the
climate problem. It recognizes that effective responses require not only financial resources, but also
technological, institutional, and human capacity. This issue has been treated by Winkler, Letete and
Marquard (2011) by considering Human Development Index as a complement to income in
considering capacity. Capacity, even in this broader sense, can be distinguished from mitigation
potential, which refers to the presence of techno-economic opportunities for reducing emissions
due to, for example, having renewable energy resources that can be exploited, a legacy of high-
carbon infrastructure that can be replaced, or a rapidly growing capital stock that can be built based
on low-carbon investments. Mitigation potential is a useful characteristic for determining where
emissions reductions can be located geographically for reasons of cost-effectiveness, but this can be
distinguished from burden-sharing per se, in the sense of determining on normative grounds which
country should pay for those reductions. This distinction is reflected in the economist’s notion that
economic efficiency can be decoupled from equity (Coase, 1960; Manne and Stephan, 2005).

**Equality**

Equality means many things, but a common understanding in international law is that each human
being has equal moral worth and thus should have equal rights. Some argue this applies to access to
common global resources, expressed in the perspective that each person should have an equal
right to emit (Grubb, 1989; Agarwal and Narain, 1991). This equal right is applied by some to current
and future flows, and by some to the cumulative stock as well. (See further below.)

Some analysts (Caney, 2009) have noted, however, that a commitment to equality does not
necessarily translate into an equal right to emit. Egalitarians generally call for equality of a total
package of "resources" (or "capabilities" or "opportunities for welfare") and thus may support
inequalities in one good to compensate for inequalities in other goods (Starkey, 2011). For example,
one might argue that poor people who are disadvantaged with respect to access to a resources such
as food or drinking water may be entitled to a greater than per capita share of emissions rights.
Second, some individuals may have greater needs than others. For example, poorer people may
have less access to alternatives to fossil fuels (or unsustainably harvested wood fuel) because of
higher cost or less available technologies, and thus be entitled to a larger share of emission rights.
Others have suggested that equality can be interpreted as requiring equal sacrifices, either by all
parties, or by parties who are equal along some relevant dimension. Then, to the extent that parties
are not equal, more responsibility (Gonzalez Miguez and Santithiago de Oliveira, 2011) or capacity
(Jacoby et al., 2009) would imply more obligation, all else being equal.
Right to development
The right to development appears in international law in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the Rio Declaration, and the Vienna Declaration, and is closely related to the notion of need as an equity principle, in that it posits that the interests of poor people and poor countries in meeting basic needs are a global priority (Andresen and Marks, 2007). The UNFCCC acknowledges a right to promote sustainable development, and “the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty” (UNFCCC, 2002) and recognizes that “economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties” (p. 3).

In the context of equitable burden-sharing, a minimalist interpretation of a right to development is a right to an exemption from obligations for poor Parties (Ringius et al., 2002) on the basis that meeting basic needs has clear moral precedence over the need to solve the climate problem, or, at the very least, it should not be hindered by measures taken to address climate change.

4.6.2.2 Frameworks for equitable burden-sharing
There are various ways of interpreting the above equity principles and applying them to the design of burden-sharing frameworks. It is helpful to categorize them into two broad classes. “Resource-sharing” frameworks are aimed at applying ethical principles to establish a basis for sharing the agreed global “carbon budget”. “Effort-sharing” frameworks are aimed at sharing the costs of the global climate response. The resource-sharing frame is the natural point of departure if climate change is posed as a tragedy of the commons type of collective action problem; if it is posed as a free-rider type of collective action problem, the effort-sharing perspective is more natural. Neither of these framings is objectively the “correct” one, just as neither collective action framing of the climate change problem is correct. Both can inform policymakers judgments in different ways. Indeed, the two approaches are complementary: any given resource-sharing framework implies a particular distribution of the effort, and conversely. In either case, burden-sharing frameworks are typically formulated as emission entitlements to be used in trading system or global climate fund, which enables a cost-effective distribution of the actual mitigation efforts. Through such mechanism, countries with obligations greater than their domestic mitigation potential can fund reductions in countries with obligations that are less than their domestic mitigation potential (see Sections 6.3.6 and 13.4.3).

One important dimension along which both resource-sharing and effort-sharing proposals can be compared is the number of categories into which countries are grouped. The UNFCCC in fact had three categories – Annex I, Annex II (the OECD countries within Annex I), and non-Annex I. Many of the proposals discussed below reproduce these distinctions. Others increase the number of “bins,” to as many as six (Winkler et al., 2006). Finally, many others eliminate any qualitative categories, instead allocating emissions rights or obligations on the basis of a continuous index.

Resource sharing approaches
The resource-sharing approach starts by acknowledging that the global “carbon budget” is bounded, with its size defined by the agreed climate stabilization target. The most straightforward resource-sharing approach is an equal per capita approach (Grubb, 1990; Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 2001), which is premised on the equal rights to the atmospheric commons to all individuals, and allocates emission allowances to each country in proportion to its population. In response to the concern that an equal per capita allocation would provide an incentive for more rapid population growth, some analysts have argued that the effect would be negligible in comparison to other factors affecting population, and others have proposed solutions such as holding population constant as of some agreed date (Jamieson, 2001), establishing standardized growth expectations (Cline, 1992), or allocating emission in proportion only to adult population (Grubb, 1990).
In response to the concern that unrealistically rapid reductions would be required in those countries whose current emissions are far above the global average, some have proposed a period of transition from grandfathered emission rights (i.e., allocated in proportion to current emissions) to equal per capita emission rights (Grubb and Sebenius, 1992; Welsch, 1993; Meyer, 2004). This rationale applies specifically to a framework intended to determine actual emission pathways, in which case an immediate per capita distribution would impose unrealistically abrupt changes from present emission levels. For a framework intended to assign transferable rights to emit, rather than actual emissions, the rationale is questionable: the opportunity to acquire additional allocations through emissions trading or some other transfer system would allow a cost-effective transition and lessen, though not eliminate, the political challenges of an immediate equal per capita allocation.

A variant on the above that aims to address the concern that many developing countries would have to reduce their emissions from already very low levels is “Common but Differentiated Convergence” (Höhne et al., 2006), under which a developing country is required to begin converging only once its per capita emissions exceed a specified (and progressively declining) threshold. Chakravarty et al. (2009) put forward a variant that looked beyond average national indicators of emissions by examining the distribution of emissions across individuals at different income levels within countries.

Extending the concept of equal per capita rights to include both the historical and future carbon budget gives the “equal cumulative per capita emission rights” family of frameworks (Bode, 2004; den Elzen et al., 2005; German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2009; Oberheitmann, 2010; Höhne et al., 2011; CASS/DRC Joint Project Team, 2011; Jayaraman et al., 2011; Pan et al., 2013). These frameworks vary, for example, in their choice of the initial date for historical emissions, the way they deal with growing populations, their treatment of luxury versus survival emissions, and their way of distributing a budget over time. As some countries (which tend to be higher income countries that industrialized earlier) have consumed more than their equal per capita share of the historical global budget, this excess use is offered as an argument for obliging them to provide financial and technological resources to other countries that have used less than their historical share. This obligation has been linked to the notion of a “carbon debt” or “climate debt” (Pickering and Barry, 2012), and framed as a subset of a larger “ecological debt” (Roberts and Parks, 2009; Goeminne and Paredis, 2010), which some analyses have attempted to quantify (Smith, 1991; Srinivasan et al., 2008; Cranston et al., 2010).

**Effort sharing approaches**

“Effort sharing” frameworks seek to fairly divide the costs of reducing emissions to an agreed level. (Effort sharing approaches can also be applied to adaptation costs whereas resource sharing approaches cannot.) Many of the philosophers engaged with the question of burden-sharing in the climate regime have argued that obligations should be proportional in some fashion to responsibility and capacity (see, for example the analyses of Shue (1993); or Caney (2005)).

An early effort-sharing approach was the Brazilian proposal using historic responsibility for emissions and thus global temperature rise as a basis for setting Kyoto targets. This approach has been quantitatively analyzed (Höhne and Blok, 2005) and discussed in the global political context recently (Gonzalez Miguez and Santhiago de Oliveira, 2011). Other approaches have used capacity based on indicators such as GDP per capita (Wada et al., 2012) as a basis for effort-sharing, or have combined capacity and responsibility (Winkler et al., 2006). Some have included minimal form of a right to development by identifying a threshold of development below which income and emissions are not included in a nation’s capacity or responsibility (Cao, 2008; Kartha et al., 2009; Yue and Wang, 2012).

The quantitative implications of a number of burden-sharing frameworks are presented for several regions in Section 6.3.6.6. The frameworks are grouped into six categories, corresponding either to one of the underlying burden-sharing principles (responsibility, capability, equality, right to development), or a combination of them. It is important to note that several of the approaches are based on considerations other than equity principles. For example, several allocate allowances...
based on grandfathered emissions levels, with a transition to an equity-based allocation only over several decades or in some cases with no such transition. Others allocate allowances in proportion to GDP, while others include mitigation potential as one basis in addition to equity principles.

4.7 Integration of framing issues in the context of sustainable development

Chapters 2 and 3 of this report review the framing issues related to risk and uncertainty (Chapter 2) and social, economic and ethical considerations guiding policy (Chapter 3). They examine how these issues bear on climate policy, both on the mitigation and on the adaptation side of our response to the challenge of climate change. Their general analysis is also directly relevant to the understanding of SD and equity goals. This section briefly examines how the concepts reviewed in these chapters shed light on the topic of the present chapter.

4.7.1 Risk and uncertainty in sustainability evaluation

The sustainability ideal seeks to minimize risks that compromise future human development (Sections 4.2 and 4.5). This objective is less ambitious than maximizing an expected value of social welfare over the whole future. It focuses on avoiding setbacks on development, and is therefore well in line with Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1) highlighting the difficulty of applying the standard decision model based on expected utility in the context of climate policy. It is directly akin to the methods of risk management listed there (Sections 2.5.2-2.5.7), in particular those focusing on worst-case scenarios. The literature on adaptation has similarly emphasized the concept of resilience, which is the ability of a system to preserve its functions in a risky and changing environment (WGII Section 2.5 and Sections 20.2-20.6, Folke et al. (2010), Gallopin (2006)).

This chapter has reviewed the actors and determinants of support for policies addressing the climate challenge (Sections 4.3 and 4.6). Among the relevant considerations, one must include how risk perceptions shape the actors’ understanding of threats to sustainability and willingness to take action. Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) has described how framing and affective associations can be effective and manipulative, how absence or presence of a direct experience of climate extremes makes individuals distort probabilities, and how gradual changes are easy to underestimate.

Risk and uncertainty are also relevant to the dimension of equity, in relation to sustainability, because various regions of the world and communities within those regions experience unequal degrees of climate risk and uncertainty. Better information about the distribution of risks between regions and countries would affect the policy response and negotiations. Lecocq and Shalizi (2007) argue that the absence of information about the location and extent of impacts raises incentives for mitigation, and Lecocq and Hourcade (2012) show that the optimal level of mitigation may also increase.

Incorporating risk in the evaluation of sustainability of a development pathway is challenging and has been analysed in a small literature. In particular, Baumgärtner and Quaas (2009) and Martinet (2011) propose to define thresholds for well-being or for various natural or man-made stocks and to assess sustainability by the probability that thresholds will be crossed in the foreseeable future. However, a decision-maker may not find it sufficient to check that the risk of unsustainability is below a given threshold, and may also want to know the likelihood of the bad scenarios and the harm incurred by the population in these scenarios.

4.7.2 Socio-economic evaluation

Chapter 3 has reviewed the principles of social and economic evaluation and equity in a general way. In 3.6.1 it recalls that there is now a consensus that methods of cost-benefit analysis that simply add up monetary-equivalent gains and losses are consistent and applicable only under very specific assumptions (constant marginal utility of income and absence of priority for the worse off) which are empirically dubious and ethically controversial. It is thus necessary to introduce weights in such
summations (see Eq. 3.6.2) that embody suitable ethical concerns and restore consistency of the
evaluation. Adler (2011) makes a detailed argument in favour of this “social welfare function”
approach to cost-benefit analysis. This approach is followed by Anthoff et al. (2009), refining
previous use of equity weights by Fankhauser et al. (1997) and Tol (1999). An advantage of a well-
specified methodology for the choice of equity weights is the ability to reach more precise
conclusions than when all possible weights are spanned. It also makes it possible to transparently
relate conclusions to ethical assumptions such as the degree of priority to the worse off.

Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2-3.4) describes the general concepts of social welfare and individual well-
being. In applications to the assessment of development paths and sustainability, empirical
measures are needed. Several methods are discussed in Stiglitz et al. (2009) and Adler (2011). In
particular, the capability approach (Sen, 2001, 2009) is well known for its broad measure of well-
being that synthesizes multiple dimensions of human life and incorporates considerations of
autonomy and freedom. Most applications of it do not directly rely on individual preferences (Alkire,
2010). Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) defend an approach that relies on individual preferences, in a
similar fashion as money-metric utilities. Some authors (e.g., Layard et al. (2008)) even propose to
use satisfaction levels obtained from happiness surveys directly as utility numbers. This is
controversial because different individuals use different standards when they answer questions
about their satisfaction with life (Graham, 2009).

One reason why well-being may be useful as a guiding principle in the assessment of sustainability,
as opposed to a more piecemeal analysis of each pillar, is that it helps evaluate the weak versus
strong sustainability distinction. As explained in Section 4.2, weak sustainability assumes that
produced capital can replace natural capital, whereas strong sustainability requires natural capital to
be preserved. From the standpoint of well-being, the possibility to substitute produced capital for
natural capital depends on the consequences on living beings. If the well-being of humans depends
directly on natural capital, if there is option value in preserving natural capital because it may have
useful properties that have yet to be discovered, or if non-human living beings depend on natural
capital for their flourishing, this gives powerful reasons to support a form of strong sustainability.

Additionally, Chapter 3 (in particular Sections 3.3 and 3.5) mentions other aspects of equity that are
relevant to policy debates and international negotiations on climate responses. Chapter 3 discusses
these issues at the level of ethical principles, and given the importance of such issues in policy
debates about mitigation efforts, Section 4.6 develops how these principles have been applied to the
issue of burden-sharing in climate regime.

4.8 Implications for subsequent chapters

The primary implication of this chapter as a framing for subsequent chapters is to underscore the
importance of explicitly scrutinizing the candidate mitigation technologies, measures and policies for
their broader equity and sustainability implications. Indeed, the relevant stakeholders and decision-
makers have various priorities, in particular regarding economic and human development, which
may align or conflict with prospective climate actions. Equitable and sustainable development
provides a broader overarching framework within which to examine climate strategies as one of the
multiple interacting challenges confronting society. Ultimately, it is a framework within which
society can consider the fundamental question of its development pathway.

4.8.1 Three levels of analysis of sustainability consequences of climate policy options

Various definitions and indicators of SD have been introduced in this chapter (in particular in
4.2, 4.5). This subsection offers a simple taxonomy of approaches for the assessment of
sustainability.
Long-term evolution of the three pillars. The outcomes of climate policy options can generally be observed in the three spheres related to the three pillars of SD: the economic, the social, and the environmental sphere. Sustainability in the economy refers to the preservation of standards of living and the convergence of developing economies toward the level of developed countries. Sustainability in the social sphere refers to fostering the quality of social relations and reducing causes of conflicts and instability, such as excessive inequalities and poverty, lack of access to basic resources and facilities, and discriminations. Sustainability in the environmental sphere refers to the conservation of biodiversity, habitat, natural resources, and to the minimization of ecosystem impacts more generally.

Long-term evolution of well-being. The way the three spheres (and pillars) flourish can be viewed as contributing to sustaining well-being for humans as well as for other living creatures. Human well-being depends on economic, social, and natural goods, and the other living beings depend on the quality of the ecological system. It may therefore be convenient to summarize the multiple relevant considerations by saying that the ultimate end result, for sustainability assessment, is the well-being of all living beings. Measuring well-being is considered difficult for humans because there are controversies about how best to depict individual well-being, and about how to aggregate over the whole population. However, as explained in Sections 3.4 and 4.7, many of the difficulties have been exaggerated in the literature, and practical methodologies have been developed. Truly enough, it still remains difficult to assess the well-being of all living beings, humans and non-humans together.

But, even if current methodologies fall short of operationalizing comprehensive measures of well-being of that sort, it is useful for experts who study particular sectors to bear in mind that a narrow notion of living standards for humans does not cover all the aspects of well-being for the purposes of assessing sustainability. It is also useful to try to assess how various interactions between the three spheres can impact on well-being. When there are trade-offs between different aspects of the economic, social, and ecological dimensions, one has to make an assessment of their relative priorities. Well-being is the overarching notion that helps thinking about such issues.

Current evolution of capacities. Sustainability can also be assessed in terms of capital or capacities, as suggested by some indicators such as genuine savings (Section 4.2). Preserving the resources transmitted to the future generation is a key step in guaranteeing a sustainable path. Again, it is useful to think of the capacities underlying the functioning of the three spheres: economic, social, environmental. The economic sphere needs various forms of productive capital and raw materials, infrastructures and a propitious environment, but also human capital, institutions, governance, and knowledge. The social sphere needs various forms of institutions and resources for sharing goods and connecting people, which involve certain patterns of distribution of economic resources, transmission of knowledge, and forms of interaction, coordination and cooperation. The ecological sphere needs to keep the bases of its health, including habitat, climate, and biological integrity. In general, climate policy options can affect capacities in all of these spheres, to varying degrees.

4.8.2 Sustainability and equity issues in subsequent chapters

As discussed in this chapter (Sections 4.2 and 4.5), sustainability is a property of a development pathway as a whole. And some of the literature reviewed in the subsequent chapters (6 to 16) actually discusses development pathways and the sustainability thereof. In addition, chapters 6 to 16 discuss individual issues relevant to SD and equity. Based on a detailed description of SD and equity issues (rooted in the “three pillars” approach for SD, see Section 4.8.1), this section provides a map and a reader’s guide for the report from the SD and equity perspective. Table 4.1 shows where those issues are addressed throughout the report. It is supplemented in this section by a brief outline of how each chapter from 6 to 16 deals with them.

The present section is broader than, and a complement to, Section 6.6 and Table 6.5, which sum up and discuss key co-benefits and adverse side-effects in chapters 7-12. It is broader in two ways. First, the present section covers all chapters, not just the sectoral ones. Second, the present section
reviews not only where co-benefits and adverse side-effects are discussed (the “development in the climate lens” approach as in Sathaye et al. (2007)), but also where the implications of key development policies for mitigation and mitigative capacity are discussed (“climate in the development lens”), and where integrated development paths, including but not limited to climate mitigation, are analysed. On the other hand, Section 6.6 and Table 6.5 provide a more detailed description of many sorts of co-benefits and adverse side-effects (not all of which directly bear on SD).

The review conducted in the present section leads to three key messages. First, SD and equity issues are pervasive throughout the chapters, reflecting growing literature and attention paid to the topic. Second, a large part of the discussion remains framed within the framework of co-benefits and adverse side-effects. Although extremely important and useful, it has been noted above (Section 4.2) that co-benefits and adverse side-effects are only a building block towards a full SD assessment—which is about integrating the different dimensions in a comprehensive pathway framework. Third, while some topics, such as health co-benefits and adverse side-effects associated with mitigation policies, appear already well covered in the literature, others remain scarcely addressed. In particular, distributional issues (both distributional implications of mitigation policies and implications of different distributional settings for climate policies), employment, and social cohesiveness, have limited coverage—despite being among the key SD goals that policymakers will consider.

The following paragraphs briefly describe how each chapter (from 5 to 16) deals with SD and equity issues. Chapter 5 analyzes the drivers of GHG emissions, and many of these drivers have to do with basic characteristics of the development pathway (population, economic growth, behaviors, technology) that impact sustainability perspectives (5.3, 5.5, 5.6). It also provides a brief overview of co-benefits (in particular in health) and adverse side-effects (5.7) and takes a system perspective to understand the linkages between emissions and the various drivers (5.8)—such a systemic view is congenial to the comprehensive approach to SD discussed in 4.2.

Chapter 6 analyses distributional consequences of different international burden-sharing regimes (6.3.6.6). This chapter also highlights the contrast between the literature suggesting that mitigation might increase the rural-urban gap and deteriorate the living standards of large sections of the population in developing countries, and the SD literature stating that policy and measures aligned to ‘development’ and ‘climate’ objectives can deliver substantial co-benefits [Box 6.2]. Section. 6.5.2 discusses underlying factors that enable or prevent mitigation. Section 6.6.1 summarizes Ch. 7-12 information on co-benefits and adverse side-effects, while 6.6.2 attempts to link transformation pathway studies with other key development priorities, including air pollution and health (6.6.2.1), energy security (6.6.2.2), energy access (6.6.2.3), employment (6.6.2.4), biodiversity (6.6.2.5), water use (6.6.2.6). Section 6.6.2.7 reviews scenario studies analysing the interactions between mitigation, air quality and energy security objectives.
### Table 4.1: Overview of SD and equity issues as addressed in Chapters 5-16 of the WGIII AR5 report.

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Chapter 7 reviews the literature on the co-benefits, risks and spillovers of mitigation in the energy sector, with emphasis on employment, energy security and energy access (7.9.1), and health and environmental issues (7.9.2 and 7.9.3). It also puts energy mitigation options into a broader development context, notably by examining how special mechanisms such as microfinance can help lifting rural populations out of the energy poverty trap and increase the deployment of low carbon energy technologies (7.10.2). It stresses that poverty itself is shaping energy systems in LDCs and creating obstacles (e.g., legal barriers, or vandalism, in informal settlements) to the distribution of electricity (7.10.3). It also highlights the implications of the long life duration of energy supply fixed capital stock (7.10.5).

Chapter 8 emphasizes the importance of the transport sector both for human development and for mitigation (8.1.1). There are many potential co-benefits associated with mitigation actions in the transport sector, with respect to equitable mobility access, health and local air pollution, traffic congestion, energy security, and road safety (8.7.1). But it is difficult to assess the social value of such benefits, and there are risks and uncertainties (8.7.2). The chapter analyzes the special uncertainties and concerns of developing countries, where efforts are made to develop or improve institutional effectiveness to support integrated planning (including transportation, land use, energy, agriculture and public health authorities) that uses transportation as a driver for developing economic and social resilience (8.9.3). Finally, Chapter 8 mentions the concerns with market-based policies having differential impacts across population groups (8.10.1).

Chapter 9 lists the co-benefits and adverse side-effects associated with buildings, notably in terms of employment (9.7.2.1), energy security (9.7.2.2), fuel poverty alleviation (9.7.2.5) and health (9.7.3.1 and 9.7.3.2). Detailed analysis is also conducted on path dependence and lock-in effects associated with the building stock (9.4.2) and with financing issues, as they relate to the particular situations of developing countries (9.10.3).

Chapter 10 discusses the co-benefits and adverse side-effects associated with mitigation actions in the industry sector, focusing mostly on macroeconomic and health benefits (10.8.1). The chapter also focuses on employment impacts of eco-innovation and investment, noting that substantial impacts require job support mechanisms, and that the distributional effects of these policies and across different countries remain unclear (10.10.2).

Chapter 11 frames the discussion of mitigation options in the AFOLU sector within a systemic development context (11.4.1). It thoroughly examines the socio-economic impacts of changes in land use (11.7.1). Increasing land rents and food prices due to a reduction in land availability for agriculture, and increasing inequity and land conflicts are serious concerns (11.7.1). Special care for small holders and equity issues, including gender, should accompany mitigation projects (Box 11.5). Bioenergy deployment can have strong distributional impacts, mediated by global market dynamics, including policy regulations and incentives, the production model and deployment scale, and place-specific factors such as land tenure security, labour and financial capabilities. It can raise and diversify farm incomes and increase rural employment, but can also cause smallholders, tenants and herders to lose access to productive land, while other social groups such as workers, investors, company owners, biofuels consumers, would benefit (bioenergy appendix).

Chapter 12 naturally adopts a systemic perspective in dealing with human settlements (12.1, 12.4, 12.5.1), and discusses procedural equity issues in the context of city governance (12.6). It notes that a high-density city, depending heavily upon land-based public-private financing, faces issues of real estate speculation and housing affordability (12.6.2). Adapted tax policies can help integrate market incentives with policy objectives such as sustainable transit financing, affordable housing, and environmental protection. Section 12.8 focuses more specifically on the co-benefits of mitigation options in human settlements, notably in terms of improved health, but also regarding quality of life (noise, urban heat island effect) and energy security and efficiency.
Chapter 13 provides a detailed examination of various international agreements and mechanisms through the lens of distributional impacts, noting the complex interaction between equity and participation in voluntary cooperation processes (13.2). The chapter discusses the distributional impacts of the Kyoto Protocol as well as various proposals for multilateral systems (global permit market, global tax, technology-oriented schemes) (13.13.2), linkages (13.7.2), and more decentralized initiatives such as trade sanctions (13.8) and geo-engineering (13.4.4). Chapter 13 further discusses advantages and limitations of linking negotiations on mitigation and negotiations on other development objectives (13.3.3). Links with policies and institutions related to other development goals are not discussed, except for relationships between mitigation and international trade regulation (13.8). Finally, human rights and rights of nature are discussed in so far as they might support legal challenges to greenhouse gas emissions (13.5.2.2).

Chapter 14 firmly embeds its analysis of climate policies at the regional level within the context of possible development paths, highlighting significant regional differences (14.1.2, 14.1.3). Given the heterogeneity of capacities between countries, it argues that regional cooperation on climate change can help to foster mitigation that considers distributional aspects. In particular, high inequalities in poor regions raise difficult distributional questions regarding the costs and benefits of mitigation policies (14.1.3). Mitigation opportunities are discussed in the context of the broader development objectives, with regard to energy access (14.3.2), urbanization (14.3.3), consumption patterns (14.3.4), agriculture and land-use (14.3.5) and technological development (14.3.6). Relationships between mitigation options and regional trade agreements—not a development objective per se but an instrument for achieving economic growth—are also examined (14.4.2). Finally, Chapter 14 examines the geographical concentration of CDM projects (14.3.7).

In analyzing policies at the national and subnational level, Chapter 15 provides a detailed analysis of the relationships between climate mitigation and other development goals. While it notes the practical importance of co-benefits in the design of climate policies (15.2.2), it also shows that certain measures set up with primarily other development objectives have important implications for climate mitigation, either directly in terms of emission reductions, or indirectly in terms of provision of public goods necessary for mitigation policies to be effective (15.3.4, 15.5.2, 15.5.6). In addition, the chapter highlights the importance of designing policy packages that jointly address different development objectives, and discusses in depth the opportunities but also the difficulties of such association (15.7.2, 15.11.3). Finally, Chapter 15 insists on the fact that whether a policy is adopted or not, and what outcome it finally has strongly depends on local circumstances (notably institutions), and on the process by which the decision is made (15.8.2, 15.9). Finally, this chapter notes that while the distributional incidence of taxes has been studied quite extensively, much less is known about the distributional incidence of other policies (15.13).

Availability of resources for investment is critical for supporting any development path. The literature reviewed in Chapter 16 notes that there are barriers to investment in many countries, not specific to mitigation—although mitigation activities have specific characteristics (size, perceived risks, etc.) that make their financing even more difficult (16.8). However, Chapter 16 notes that the literature on financing remains limited, and focuses quite narrowly on energy mitigation policies. There is very little evaluation, both at the micro and macro level, of how investment flows in other sectors (such as transportation or housing), could be redirected in relation with climate mitigation.

**4.9 Gaps in knowledge and data**

- The relationship between countries' human capital levels and their national and international engagement in climate change policy would benefit from additional studies.
- There are many open questions about how developing countries can best pull together the resources and capabilities to achieve SD and climate mitigation objectives and how to leverage international cooperation to support this process.
Not much is known about the desirability and feasibility of various economic and policy frameworks for the compensation of foregone benefits from exploiting fossil fuels in resource-rich countries.

In the efforts made toward an evaluation of funding necessary to implement UNFCCC mitigation and adaptation activities, harmonized and clear methodologies and processes are still missing as a basis for accurate estimates.

It is still difficult to assess the unrealized potential for reducing the environmental impact of economic activity and to understand how this potential can be realized.

For technology transitions, knowledge remains insufficient for a comparative assessment of alternative innovation and diffusion systems and an assessment of the interplay between property rights, markets and government action, taking account of local circumstances and constraints.

The relative importance in a SD transition of changes in values, as opposed to standard economic instruments influencing behaviors and economic activity, remains hard to assess.

Not much is known about the relative potential of frugality (life-styles and consumption patterns involving lower expenditures on goods and services) versus ecologically-conscious behaviour (lifestyles and consumption patterns involving fewer material resources and less environmental harm without necessarily reducing expenditure) for promoting SD and equity.

We still have an imperfect understanding of the non-economic motivations for climate-friendly behaviours, particularly regarding the respective role of social considerations or values (e.g. universalism regarding fellow human beings) versus ecological considerations (universalism regarding the environment), and the extent to which these drivers can be separated.

The predictive power of values regarding ecologically conscious consumer behaviour is often low, typically less than 20%, due to a range of factors operating at different levels. The causes of this ‘value-action gap’ regarding especially behaviours that increase or limit GHG emissions are not well understood.

The measurement of well-being, for the purpose of public policy, remains a controversial field, which suggests further exploring the potential uses of subjective data, and also seeking ways to improve the quality of data on well-being.

The empirical economic models used in the context of climate policy could substantially improve by integrating transition issues (short-medium term) into long-term analysis, and also by adopting a sequential structure compatible with the resolution of uncertainty over time.

The current methodologies for the construction of scenarios do not yet deliver sufficiently detailed and sufficiently long-term data in order to assess development paths at the bar of sustainability and equity. The studies of SD impacts of sectoral measures in terms of co-benefits are seldom integrated into a comprehensive assessment of sustainability of the general development path.

A better understanding of the distributional impacts of prospective climate policies would provide guidance for designing equitable policies, and insight into the present political economic landscape wherein some actors support climate action and others oppose it.
4.10 Frequently Asked Questions

**FAQ 4.1 Why does the IPCC need to think about sustainable development?**
Climate change is one among many (some of them longstanding) threats to SD, such as the depletion of natural resources, pollution hazards, inequalities, or geopolitical tensions. As policymakers are concerned with the broader issues of SD, it is important to reflect on how climate risks and policies fit in the general outlook. This report studies the interdependence between policy objectives via the analysis of co-benefits and adverse side-effects. More broadly, it examines how climate policy can be conceived as a component of the transition of nations toward SD pathways (Sections 4.2, 4.6, 4.8).

Many factors determine the development pathway. Among the main factors that can be influenced by policy decisions, one can list governance, human and social capital, technology, and finance.

Population size, behaviours and values are also important factors. Managing the transition toward SD also requires taking account of path dependence and potential favourable or unfavourable lock-ins (e.g. via infrastructures), and attention to the political economy in which all of these factors are embedded (Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5).

**FAQ 4.2 The IPCC and UNFCCC focus primarily on GHG emissions within countries. How can we properly account for all emissions related to consumption activities, even if these emissions occur in other countries?**
For any given country, it is possible to compute the emissions embodied in its consumption or those emitted in its productive sector. The consumption-based framework for GHG emission accounting allocates the emissions released during the production and distribution (i.e. along the supply chain) of goods and services to the final consumer and the nation (or another territorial unit) in which she resides, irrespective of the geographical origin of these products. The territorial or production-based framework allocates the emissions physically produced within a nation’s territorial boundary to that nation. The difference in emissions inventories calculated based on the two frameworks are the emissions embodied in trade. Consumption-based emissions are more strongly associated with GDP than are territorial emissions. This is because wealthier countries satisfy a higher share of their final consumption of products through net imports compared to poorer countries. (Section 4.4)

**FAQ 4.3 What kind of consumption has the greatest environmental impact?**
The relationship between consumer behaviours and their associated environmental impacts is well understood. Generally, higher consumption lifestyles have greater environmental impact, which connects distributive equity issues with the environment. Beyond that, research has shown that food accounts for the largest share of consumption-based GHG emissions (carbon footprints) with nearly 20% of the global carbon footprint, followed by housing, mobility, services, manufactured products, and construction. Food and services are more important in poor countries, while mobility and manufactured goods account for the highest carbon footprints in rich countries. (Section 4.4)

**FAQ 4.4 Why is equity relevant in climate negotiations?**
The international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC are working toward a collective global response to the common threat of climate change. As with any cooperative undertaking, the total required effort will be allocated in some way among countries, including both domestic action and international financial support. At least three lines of reasoning have been put forward to explain the relevance of equity in allocating this effort: (i) a moral justification that draws upon widely applied ethical principles, (ii) a legal justification that appeals to existing treaty commitments and soft law agreements to cooperate on the basis of stated equity principles, and (iii) an effectiveness justification that argues that an international collective arrangement that is perceived to be fair has greater legitimacy and is more likely to be internationally agreed and domestically implemented, reducing the risks of defection and a cooperative collapse. (Sections 4.2, 4.6)
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