

## Chapter 5. Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes at the Local Level

### Coordinating Lead Authors

Susan Cutter (USA), Balgis Osman-Elasha (Sudan)

### Lead Authors

John Campbell (New Zealand), So-Min Cheong (South Korea), Sabrina McCormick (USA), Roger Pulwarty (USA), Seree Supratid (Thailand), Gustavo Wilches-Chaux (Colombia), Gina Ziervogel (South Africa)

### Contributing Authors

Alex Arnall, Christopher Emrich, Stephane Hallegatte, Bettina Koelle, Noel Oettle, Pablo Suarez, Emily Polack, Hans-Georg Bohle, Margaret Arnold, Nicola Ranger

### Contents

Executive Summary

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Community Coping

5.2.1. Generation, Receipt, and Response to Risk Information

5.2.2. Individual/Collective Action

5.2.3. Structures and Structural Mitigation

5.2.4. Land Use and Ecosystem Protection

5.2.5. Surplus and Storage of Resources

5.2.6. Migration and other Population Movements

5.2.7. Emergency Assistance and Disaster Relief

5.3. Community-Based Risk Management in a Changing Climate

5.3.1. Local Climate Extremes

5.3.2. Assessing Coping in Light of Disaster Risk Management: What Leads to Proactive Behaviors?

5.3.3. Basic Development and Human Security

5.3.4. Recovery and Reconstruction Post Event

5.3.5. Components of Risk Management and Climate Adaptation

5.3.5.1. Anticipate Risks in a Climate Change Context

5.3.5.2. Communicating Disaster Risk

5.3.5.3. Community Empowerment and Leadership

5.3.5.4. Social Drivers

5.3.5.5. Integrating Local Knowledge

5.3.5.6. Local Government and Non-Government Initiatives and Practices

5.4. Challenges and Opportunities

5.4.1. Differences in Coping and Risk Management

5.4.1.1. Gender

5.4.1.2. Age

5.4.1.3. Wealth

5.4.1.4. Intersectionality of Gender, Class, Age, and Ethnicity

5.4.1.5. Livelihoods

5.4.1.6. Entitlements

5.4.1.7. Health and Disability

5.4.1.8. Urban/Rural

5.4.2. Costs of Managing Disaster Risk and Risk from Climate Extremes

5.4.2.1. Costs of Impacts, Costs of Post-Event Responses

- 1                   5.4.2.2. Adaptation and Risk Management-Present and Future
- 2                   5.4.2.3. Consistency and Reliability of Cost and Loss Estimations at Local Level
- 3           5.4.3. Limits to Adaptation
- 4
- 5   5.5. Management Strategies
- 6       5.5.1. Methods, Models, Assessment Tools
- 7       5.5.2. Social, Financial, and Risk Transfers
- 8           5.5.2.1. Social Transfers
- 9           5.5.2.2. Insurance
- 10          5.5.2.3. Social and Environmental Outcomes
- 11       5.5.3. Adaptation as a Process
- 12
- 13   5.6. Information, Data, and Research Gaps at the Local Level
- 14

## 15 References

## 18 Executive Summary

19  
20 Local refers to a range of places, social groupings, experience, management, institutions, conditions and sets of  
21 knowledge that exist at a scale below the national level. **Locales range from communities, villages, districts,**  
22 **suburbs, cities, metropolitan areas through to regions. Therefore they vary greatly in terms of disaster**  
23 **experience, nature of impact and responses, and stakeholders and decision-makers. [5.1]**

24  
25 Disasters triggered by extreme events are most acutely experienced at the local level and numerous strategies to deal  
26 with extreme events have been developed at this scale with varying degrees of effectiveness. **Most adaptation to**  
27 **climate change effects on extreme events will take place at the local level. Some places have considerable**  
28 **experience with short-term climatic variability and this may provide the basis for longer-term adaptation to**  
29 **climate extremes. Developing strategies for improving disaster risk reduction in the context of climate change**  
30 **will need to be tailored to local conditions and experiences. [5.1]**

31  
32 It is important to recognise that there is also great differentiation among locales at the same scale. In particular there  
33 are differences between those in developed and developing countries, and between those that are rural and urban.  
34 **These differences tend to exist across a continuum rather than being binary. Accordingly, developing**  
35 **strategies for disaster risk management in the context of climate change will require a considerable variety of**  
36 **approaches that reflect the respective local contexts. [5.1]**

37  
38 There has been an increase in vulnerability at the local level in recent decades. Much of this increase can be  
39 attributed to social, political and economic change as well as localised environmental degradation. This trend is  
40 particularly evident in developing countries. **This presents a major challenge for adaptation to climate change.**  
41 **Addressing climate change and changing extreme events will require addressing much wider issues relating**  
42 **to sustainable development. [5.1]**

43  
44 Measures adopted at the local level range from those that help individuals cope during or immediately before  
45 extreme events such as evacuation and taking shelter in place (often supported by the provision of early warnings),  
46 through structural measures that seek to ‘protect’ people and communities from extremes (e.g. levees, dykes or stop  
47 banks, river dredging and straightening, emergency sandbagging and sea walls, measures that seek to counter  
48 environmental degradation (such as watershed management) and approaches that seek to avoid (through land use  
49 planning and relocation, for example) or offset disaster losses such as surplus food production and its storage. **In**  
50 **many places there is a tendency to rely on structural measures, which encourage settlement and the**  
51 **intensification of livelihoods in places that are believed to be protected. In the event of supra-design events**  
52 **even greater disasters unfold and there is a greater dependence upon relief and reconstruction, and reliance**  
53 **on external sources of assistance [5.2, 5.3].**

54

1 Disaster relief and reconstruction may be seen as activities that are required to make up for failures of disaster risk  
2 reduction measures to be effective. **Relief plays an important humanitarian role but it does have associated**  
3 **problems including inappropriate forms of assistance, removal of local autonomy in post-disaster decision**  
4 **making and the undermining of local disaster reduction measures. [5.2]**  
5

6 Following disasters the recovery and reconstruction phases offer opportunities to ‘build back better’. However  
7 experience indicates that this is difficult for many localities where there are limited spatial options for relocation or  
8 limited financial resources for improving structural and livelihood resilience. **Successful adaptation to climate**  
9 **change will need to address these issues. [5.3]**  
10

11 There is a strong and complex link between local livelihood security and extreme events. **While communities with**  
12 **secure sustainable livelihoods are likely to be better placed to cope with climate change and changing patterns**  
13 **of climatic variability, extreme events may also undermine local sustainability and increase vulnerability.**  
14 **Building sustainable livelihoods is an important adaptation to climate change. [5.3]**  
15

16 Managing risk in the context of climate change offers a range of opportunities and challenges at the local level. **The**  
17 **mix of opportunities and challenges is likely to be unique for each locality or community. For this reason**  
18 **generic approaches are likely to be unsuccessful. [5.3]**  
19

20 Components of localised disaster risk management in the context of climate change include: anticipating risks as  
21 affected by climate change; communicating likely changes in disaster risk to enable local action; empowering local  
22 communities to enable them to use their local knowledge and information supplied to them to develop locally  
23 appropriate strategies; encouraging, strengthening and or building on existing local social networks (and drawing on  
24 local social capital) as a basis for sustainable risk management; integrating and valuing local knowledge which for  
25 many localities is much more place specific than other forms of knowledge including that derived from climate  
26 models; and facilitating local government and non-government initiatives and practices. **Many of these components**  
27 **of localised disaster risk management in the context of climate change are consistent with the building of local**  
28 **capacities and sustainable livelihoods. [5.3]**  
29

30 There are significant challenges to disaster risk management with certain groups experiencing greater levels of  
31 vulnerability. **These inequalities reflect gender, age, wealth (class), ethnicity, health and disabilities. For many**  
32 **individuals and communities these may coalesce further intensifying vulnerability. They may also be reflected**  
33 **in differences in access to livelihoods and entitlements, or declining access also lead to reductions in**  
34 **vulnerability. [5.4]**  
35

36 The rapid urbanisation of the global population and the growth of megacities, especially in developing countries,  
37 have led to the emergence of highly vulnerable urban communities, especially those in informal settlements.  
38 **Addressing these critical vulnerabilities will require addressing their social, political and economic driving**  
39 **forces. These include rural to urban migration, changing livelihoods and wealth inequalities. [5.4]**  
40

41 The costs of disasters at the local level are difficult to estimate. Similarly, the identification of climate change effects  
42 at the local level is complicated. Accordingly, estimating the costs of adapting to changes in climate extremes is also  
43 difficult to estimate. **There is a need for further development of tools to enable such costs to be assessed. [5.4]**  
44

45 Adapting to climate extremes may not be possible in all local settings. **There are many locations that are**  
46 **currently exposed to frequent disruption from extremes and from which displaced people temporarily or**  
47 **permanently migrate. If climate extremes occur more frequently or with greater magnitude (or duration in**  
48 **the case of droughts) in situ adaptation may become ineffective or impossible without severe hardship and**  
49 **suffering. In such cases local places may be rendered uninhabitable with the resulting migration of**  
50 **individuals or relocation of whole communities. For at least some of these migrants there will be serious**  
51 **dislocation and disadvantage as a result of their forced migration. [5.2, 5.4]**  
52

53 Managing disaster risk at the local level can be achieved using a variety of approaches. There are three key elements  
54 including: assessment of local exposure taking into account community location and the suite of likely extreme

1 events and their characteristics such as frequency and magnitude; vulnerability analyses which identify community  
2 sensitivities; and post disaster assessment. **Many of these activities can be conducted at the community level,**  
3 **using community resources and local knowledge. It may also be beneficial for local knowledge to be combined**  
4 **(though not subsumed by) with other information such as may be generated by climate researchers, disaster**  
5 **reduction agencies and development practitioners (including both governmental and non-governmental**  
6 **organisations). [5.5]**  
7

8 There is also considerable potential for transfers within communities, among communities and between  
9 communities and other levels (national and international). **These include social transfers such as through kinship**  
10 **networks, social protection programmes that seek to assist poorer community members and reduce**  
11 **vulnerability, insurance and micro insurance which spreads losses from extreme events both temporarily and**  
12 **spatially. [5.2, 5.5]**  
13

14 Disaster risk management in the context of climate change is a process. **Adaptation to changing climate extremes,**  
15 **together with changing mean conditions, is not a set of finite actions but an ongoing process incorporating**  
16 **long-term learning, changing scenarios, and incorporating changes that are not climate related. There is a**  
17 **need for institutional change from top-down approaches to ones that increase local capacities and build**  
18 **resilience. Accordingly adaptation strategies need to be comprehensive, set in the context of sustainable**  
19 **development and flexible. Financial support for adaptation may be required for long periods of time. [5.5]**  
20

21 There remains a need for a comprehensive database or inventory of disaster occurrence, disaster effects and disaster  
22 response. **While there is a vast amount of information about specific events at different scales very little is**  
23 **coordinated at levels below the national.** Geospatial and other technologies exist for the management of sub-  
24 national disaster data and these should be carefully utilised. **[5.6]**  
25

## 26 5.1. Introduction

27  
28  
29 As we enter into the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, human and economic losses from weather-related  
30 catastrophes continues to increase. In terms of overall losses, 2005, 1995, and 2008 rank among the most expensive  
31 years for natural hazard monetary losses worldwide (Geo Risks Research, 2009). Climate variability and change is  
32 probably contributing to these weather-related extremes (see Chapter 3) and in combination with human settlement  
33 patterns, increasing the exposure to loss throughout the world. However, such losses will not be uniformly  
34 distributed across the globe, nor will their impacts. Some communities will be able to cope with disaster risks, while  
35 others have limited disaster resilience and capacity to cope with and adapt to climate variability and extremes. This  
36 is the topic of this chapter: to present evidence on where disasters are experienced, how disaster risks are managed at  
37 present, and the variability in coping mechanisms and capacity in the face of climate variability and change, all from  
38 the perspective of local places and local actors.  
39

40 The impacts of disasters are most acutely felt at the local level. However, the word local has many connotations, and  
41 the definition of local influences the context for disaster risk management, the experience of disasters, and  
42 conditions, actions and adaptation to climate changes. For the purposes of this report, we define local as the set of  
43 experiences and management that arise from grass roots actions; indigenous knowledge, skills, and resources about  
44 the place; and formal and informal governance structures. Local includes the set of institutions that maintain and  
45 protect social relations that are below state and province levels such as local government, local judiciary, or local  
46 licensing authorities which normally have some administrative control over space or resources. Local includes the  
47 set of conditions and knowledge that are geographically and historically bounded and where choices and actions for  
48 disaster risk management and adaptation to climate extremes are initially independent of national interventions.  
49 Local includes functional or physical units such as watersheds, ecological zones, or economic regions, and the  
50 institutions that govern their use and management. Within the local level, there are many different locales (the  
51 explicit spatial boundaries of different settings or collectives where social interactions occur). These locales can  
52 range from a community, village, district, suburb, city, metropolitan area, region—all with distinct spatial and  
53 jurisdictional boundaries, and different needs, identities, and voices. The differences in scale not only influence who

1 and what is at risk, but more importantly the potential geographical extent of the likely impact, and the likely  
2 stakeholders and decision-makers.  
3

4 One particular type of locale of interest to this chapter is community. A community is a group of people (larger than  
5 households) who interact with one another and who live in a common location (community of location) (Johnston,  
6 2000). But a community is also defined as a group of people organized around a set of common values or ideals  
7 such as religious values, ethnic identities, professional practice, etc. We use the term community to refer to both: a  
8 spatially-defined entity with social interaction among residents; and the collection of relationships or social bonds  
9 that are a-spatial (communities of propinquity or communities of culture), but which influence opportunities and  
10 actions at the local level. Community-based management includes both the community of location and the  
11 communities of culture.  
12

13 Local places have considerable experience with short-term coping responses and adjustments to disaster risk  
14 (UNISDR, 2004). Climate sensitive hazards such as flooding, tropical cyclones, drought, heat, and wildfires  
15 regularly affect many localities with frequent, yet low level losses (UNISDR, 2009). Because of their frequent  
16 occurrence, many localities have developed extensive disaster risk management practices, suggesting a form of  
17 climate-sensitive coping that is already in place. On the other hand, response and long term adaptation to climate  
18 extremes will require disaster risk management that acknowledges the role of climate variability in fostering  
19 sustainable and disaster resilient places in the face of climate change and uncertainties. This can mean a  
20 modification and expansion of local disaster risk management principles and experience through innovative  
21 organizational, institutional, and governmental measures at all jurisdictional levels (local, national, international).  
22 However, such arrangements may constrain or impede local actions and ultimately limit the coping capacity and  
23 adaptation of local places.  
24

25 In preparing this chapter we have been struck by the considerable range of climate-sensitive risk experience at the  
26 local level and the great variety of strategies that have been developed to reduce risk. Climate risks are mediated by  
27 culture, class, society, economy, politics and local environmental conditions. The structure of this chapter is  
28 thematic rather than regional or based on development status. However, it is important to keep these factors in mind.  
29

30 While the differences in the effects of natural disasters among countries is usually demonstrated using data at the  
31 national level (e.g, EM-Dat; IFRC), the differential effects are experienced at the local level and many measures to  
32 reduce disaster risk will also be applied at this scale. One of the most striking differences in vulnerability is that  
33 which distinguishes communities in developing countries from those in the industrialized nations. In this chapter we  
34 have addressed the issue of local disaster risk and disaster risk reduction using a variety of sources of information  
35 (see Box 5-1). However, given the wide differences between developing and developed countries it is clear that  
36 single solutions for risk reduction are unlikely to be possible. Moreover, it is possible that the processes of  
37 development as currently practiced, in addition to a history of colonial exploitation, may be increasing, rather than  
38 reducing disaster vulnerability at the local level. Those choosing strategies for reducing disaster risk and adapting to  
39 climate change in developing countries need to take these processes into account. Similarly, there are differences  
40 between urban and rural communities in terms of disaster and climate change vulnerability and disaster risk and  
41 adaptation options. For example, in many rural areas livelihoods have a strong subsistence component (i.e. the  
42 producer is the consumer) and climate impacts may have considerably more direct effects than upon some urban  
43 dwellers whose livelihoods may be less dependent upon climatic conditions. Conversely, the effects of heat waves  
44 are often more severe in urban than rural areas.  
45

46 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-1 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
47

#### 48 **Box 5-1. Capturing Local Knowledge: The Use of Grey Literature** 49

50 *What is grey literature?* Grey literature non-journal based sources of information, data, and analyses that have not  
51 gone through the traditional scientific peer review process that is the norm for refereed journal publications.  
52 According to the Sixth International Conference on Grey Literature, it is “information produced on all levels of  
53 government, academics, business and industry in electronic or print formats not controlled by commercial  
54 publishing, i.e. where publishing is not the primary activity of the producing body” ([www.greynet.org](http://www.greynet.org), accessed

1 May 18 2010). Grey literature is formal, unpublished scientific and technical communication ((Sondergaard *et al.*,  
2 2003)) and includes reports (policy statements, technical reports, government documents, project reports, annual  
3 reports), working papers, conference proceedings and papers, theses and dissertations, brochures and pamphlets,  
4 audiovisual materials, and internet-based materials. The use of grey literature varies widely by scientific field. In  
5 economics, for example working paper series are quite common, but their impact (based on citations) is similar to  
6 low impact journals ((Frandsen, 2009)). Much disaster risk management literature, especially in, or relating to  
7 developing countries falls into this categories. Such literature includes key themes in disaster risk management such  
8 as those produced by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), national level reports by  
9 governmental agencies, country reports, and project reports at various local levels. While the grey literature is not  
10 always peer reviewed in an academic sense, much of it is subjected to some form of review ranging from  
11 widespread consultation with peers outside the agency or entity to in house checking. In some instances, such as  
12 with IPCC reports and World Bank reports, it is often more rigorously peer reviewed than some journals.  
13

14 In recent years grey literature has made critical contributions to a number of projects on environmental change  
15 ((Chavez *et al.*, 2007; Costello, 2007)(Thatje *et al.*, 2007);) including intergovernmental scientific research  
16 ((MacDonald *et al.*, 2007) ) This includes the IPCC, where the Fourth Assessment clearly states, “Its emphasis is on  
17 new knowledge acquired since the IPCC Third Assessment (2001). This requires a survey of all published literature,  
18 including non-English language and ‘grey’ literature such as government and NGO reports ((Parry *et al.*, 2007)).”  
19 However, use of grey literature is challenged by some scientists and other observers who are concerned by its lack  
20 of rigor. The advent of the internet has changed the accessibility and availability of grey literature, giving it much  
21 wider circulation and in many cases increased status.  
22

23 *Why Use Grey Literature?* There are a number of reasons why grey literature is used. First, there is a dearth of peer-  
24 reviewed research covering community/local level disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. This is  
25 especially true for developing countries. While a small amount of refereed literature is emerging, it may not be  
26 published in sufficient quantity or in a timely fashion to be included in this report. Second, much of the community  
27 based work is not conducted by researchers motivated to publish in peer-reviewed journals. Instead, the motivation  
28 for the research is action-oriented (focus on doing, not observing). In many instances the career paths of the  
29 researchers are not dependent on peer-reviewed research, but rather actionable results. Third, in many developing  
30 countries there is less of a tradition of publishing in scientific journals, oftentimes due to the qualitative nature of the  
31 work. Instead, most of the literature on disaster risk appears in reports from governments and organizations. Finally,  
32 there is a concern on the part of many field investigators that research interferes with the ethos of participatory and  
33 action research approaches. Failure to include the grey literature will bias our findings toward developed country  
34 disaster risk management and adaptation.  
35

36 *Who Writes Grey Literature?* Grey literature is created by a very wide range of actors including research scientists,  
37 especially but not exclusively those working in non-academic institutions, and researchers working as private  
38 consultants. A great deal of grey literature is generated by governments including international (e.g. ISDR, UNDP,  
39 World Bank) and regional (Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program) intergovernmental  
40 organizations and national and local government agencies. In addition to these sources grey literature may also be  
41 prepared by non-governmental organizations and civil society (at the international, regional, national and local  
42 levels). The authors of GL also range in qualification from those with PhDs and/or those with considerable practical  
43 or policy experience through to some with little or no tertiary education at all. A significant proportion of the grey  
44 literature accessed for this chapter has been written by individuals with PhDs and strong (refereed) publication  
45 records and there is a steady contribution from researchers retired from their institutional bases that work on  
46 contract.  
47

48 *How Do We Assess Quality?* A major concern with grey literature is the assessment of quality given that it often has  
49 not been subject to an academic process of peer review as is the case with journal articles. How can we assess the  
50 quality as good?  
51

52 The following are a set of approaches that were utilized in this report. First, we can apply our own internal peer  
53 review. Most of the working group members have experience at peer review and have been involved in assessment  
54 of journal articles and other research products and can apply the same standards. This could be assisted by the

1 provision of guidelines (see Table 5-1). Second, we could send reports to other members of report team who have  
2 relevant expertise for a secondary evaluation. For example, the requesting chapter team would need to be explicit  
3 about the qualities of the report and why it has been included to the secondary reviewer, who would then conduct an  
4 independent evaluation of that section of the document to be used. In order to ensure transparency of the process, the  
5 secondary review would ideally be conducted by someone outside the immediate chapter writing team such as the  
6 review editor. Third, a process of triangulation could be employed using separate reports that reinforce the same  
7 issue although it is important to ensure that they are not related (emanating from the same organisation or author).  
8 Fourth, grey literature should only be used where peer reviewed material is not available. Figure 5-1 indicates a  
9 possible flow path for accepting grey literature for this chapter and the special report.

10  
11 [INSERT TABLE 5-1 HERE:

12 Table 5-1: Guidelines for grey literature inclusion.]

13  
14 [INSERT FIGURE 5-1 HERE:

15 Figure 5-1: Procedure for assessing grey literature.]

16  
17 Practitioner experience and local knowledge are key components in understanding disaster risk management and  
18 climate change adaptation at the local level. Failure to include the grey literature in this assessment will result in a  
19 great majority of vulnerable communities being excluded from the IPCC process as their voices and experiences will  
20 not be heard, nor represented in the assessment.

21  
22 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-1 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

23  
24 Finally, it is also very important not to treat these considerations in a binary manner (see Figure 5-2). The wealth,  
25 level of industrialization or development status of communities ranges in a continua from those in least countries to  
26 those in the wealthiest of nations. Similarly, the rural-urban divide is blurred, and the size of urban areas ranges  
27 from mega cities to small towns. Along these continua lie a great variety of vulnerabilities, experiences and  
28 possibilities for adaptation (represented by the grey area).

29  
30 [INSERT FIGURE 5-2 HERE:

31 Figure 5-2: The continuum of development and urbanization.]

32  
33 There are a number of key themes and messages in the chapter. First, some local places have considerable  
34 experience with short-term climate-sensitive hazards on a fairly routine basis. This knowledge can provide the basis  
35 for longer-term adaptation to climate variability and extremes. Second, improvements in any type of disaster risk  
36 management may have local benefits independent of climate change and such improvements will help foster disaster  
37 resilience in the short- and long-term. Finally, long-term adaptation to climate will require that disaster risk  
38 management explicitly consider climate variability and change. Strong and flexible climate and disaster risk  
39 management agencies may not require new institutional structures, although there will be exceptions. Shared  
40 responsibilities for coping and adaptation are needed to harness local knowledge, experience, and action and  
41 integrate this into the more top-down strategies emanating from national and international disaster risk management  
42 and adaptation to climate change strategies. A one-size strategy will certainly not fit all at the local level.

## 43 44 45 **5.2. Community Coping**

46  
47 Communities everywhere have developed ways of interacting with their environment. Often these interactions are  
48 beneficial and provide the livelihoods that community members depend on. At the same time communities have  
49 developed ways of responding to disruptive environmental events. These coping mechanisms include measures  
50 which seek to modify the impacts of disruptive events, modify some of the attributes or environmental aspects of the  
51 events themselves, and/or actions to share or reduce the disaster risk burdens (Burton *et al.*, 1993). It is important to  
52 acknowledge that while climate change may alter the magnitude and/or frequency of some climatic extremes, other  
53 social, political, or economic processes (many of them also global in scale) are reducing the abilities of communities  
54 to cope with disaster risks and climate-sensitive hazards. Accordingly, disaster losses have increased significantly in

1 recent decades ((UNDP, 2004; UNISDR, 2004)). These social, economic, and political processes are complex and  
2 deep seated and present major obstacles to reducing disaster risk, and are likely to constrain efforts to reduce  
3 community vulnerabilities to extreme events under conditions of climate change.  
4

5 There are a variety of existing measures that local communities utilize in coping with disaster risk. These include  
6 pre-event activities such as disaster risk education and early warning systems; individual and collective protective  
7 actions such as evacuation; prevention strategies such as structural measures (seawalls and levees); non-structural  
8 measures such as land use and ecosystem protection; population displacements (both temporary and permanent), and  
9 disaster relief.  
10

### 11 12 **5.2.1. Generation, Receipt, and Response to Risk Information** 13

14 The disaster research and emergency management communities have shown that warnings of impending hazards  
15 need to be complemented by information on the risks actually posed by the hazards and likely strategies and  
16 pathways to mitigate the damage in the particular context in which they arise. Effective “early warning” implies  
17 information interventions into an environment in which much about vulnerability is assumed ((Olson, 2000)(Olson,  
18 2000)). This backdrop is reinforced through significant lessons that have been identified from the use of seasonal  
19 climate forecasts over the past 15 years ((Podestá *et al.*, 2002; Pulwarty, 2007)) It is now widely accepted that the  
20 existence of predictable climate variability and impacts are necessary but not sufficient to achieve effective use of  
21 climate information, including seasonal forecasts. The practical obstacles to using information about future  
22 conditions are diverse, ranging from limitations in modeling the climate system’s complexities (e.g. projections  
23 having coarse spatial and temporal resolution, limited predictability of some relevant variables, and forecast skill  
24 characterization), to procedural, institutional, and cognitive barriers in receiving or understanding climatic  
25 information, and the capacity and willingness of decision-makers to modify actions ((Kasperson *et al.*, 1988; Marx  
26 *et al.*, 2007; Patt and Gawa, 2002; Roncoli *et al.*, 2001; Stern and Easterling, 1999)). In addition functional,  
27 structural, and social factors inhibit joint problem identification and collaborative knowledge production between  
28 providers and users. These include divergent objectives, needs, scope, and priorities; different institutional settings  
29 and standards, as well as differing cultural values, understanding, and mistrust ((Pulwarty *et al.*, 2004; Rayner *et*  
30 *al.*, 2005; Weichselgartner and Kasperson, 2010)).  
31

32 The generation and receipt of risk information occurs through a diverse array of channels. Policies and actions  
33 affecting communications and advanced warning have a major impact on the adaptive capacity and resilience of  
34 livelihoods with for example, access to reliable and low cost telecommunications services are central factors  
35 influencing the ability of local populations to diversify their income strategies. The collection and transmittal of  
36 weather (and climate)-related information is, often a governmental function while communications systems such as  
37 cell phone networks tend to be private.  
38

39 Examples of risk information generation and diffusion efforts within disasters research and response communities  
40 including- interpersonal contact with particular researchers, planning and conceptual foresight (Red Cross/Red  
41 Crescent brochures), outside consultation on the planning process (FEMA), user-oriented transformation of  
42 information and individual and organizational leadership ((NRC (National Research Council), 2006)) (see Box 5-2  
43 for additional sources of risk information).  
44

45 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-2 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
46

### 47 **Box 5-2. Selected Sources of Risk Information** 48

49 There are many sources of risk, vulnerability, and warning information. Among them are the Asia Disaster  
50 Preparedness Centre, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, at the University of  
51 Colorado, South Carolina Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute, Caribbean Disaster Emergency  
52 Management Agency, Latin America Vulnerability Project, National Early Warning Units, in Southern Africa,  
53 National Weather Service (NWS) Warning Program and the NOAA/Columbia University International Research  
54 Institute for Climate and Society. More generally the space in which problem definition, information needs

1 assessments, and knowledge co-production is usually takes the form of:

- 2 • Workshops and meetings (shared scenario construction including agro-climatic decision calendars
- 3 • Presentations and briefings (incl. locally organized events, e.g. hearings)
- 4 • One-on-one technical assistance and training
- 5 • Coordination with other ongoing projects
- 6 • Web site development and maintenance
- 7 • Courses on climate impacts and adaptation (see below)
- 8 • Media (local and mass media and information telenovelas etc.)

9 ( (Perarnaud *et al.*, 2004; Pulwarty, 2007; Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008))

10  
11 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-2 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

12  
13 Significant advancements in warning systems in terms of improved monitoring, instrumentation, and data  
14 collection have occurred, but the management of the information and its dissemination to at risk populations is still  
15 problematic ((Sorensen, 2000)). Researchers have identified several aspects of information communication, such  
16 as, communication channels, stakeholder awareness, key relationships, and language and terminology, which are  
17 socially contingent in addition to the nature of the predictions themselves. More is known about the effects of these  
18 message characteristics on warning recipients, than is known about the degree to which generators and providers of  
19 information including hazards researchers address them in their risk communication messages. For example,  
20 warnings may be activated (such as the tsunami early warning system), yet fail to reach potentially affected  
21 communities ((Oloruntoba, 2005)). Similarly, many communities do not have access to climate-sensitive hazard  
22 warning systems such as tone alert radio, emergency alert system, reverse 911, and thus never hear the warning  
23 message, let alone act upon the information ((Sorensen, 2000)). On the other hand, Valdes ((Valdes, 1997))  
24 demonstrated that flood warning systems based on community operation and participation in Costa Rica make a  
25 difference as to whether early warnings are acted upon to save lives and property.

### 26 27 28 **5.2.2. Individual/Collective Action**

29  
30 At the individual and household level, individuals engage in protective actions to minimize the impact of extreme  
31 events on themselves and their families. The range and choice of actions are often event specific and time  
32 dependent, but they are also constrained by location, adequate infrastructure, socioeconomic characteristics, and  
33 access to disaster risk information (Tierney *et al.*, 2001). For example, evacuation is used when there is sufficient  
34 warning to temporarily relocate out of harm's way such as for tropical storms, flooding, and wildfires. Collective  
35 evacuations are not always possible given the location, population size, transportation networks, and the rapid onset  
36 of the event. At the same time, individual evacuation may be constrained by a host of factors ranging from access to  
37 transportation, monetary resources, health impairment, job responsibilities, and the reluctance to leave home. There  
38 is a consistent body of literature on hurricane evacuations in the U.S., for example which finds that 1) individuals  
39 tend to evacuate as family units, but they often use more than one private vehicle to do so; 2) social influences  
40 (neighbors, family, friends) are key to individual and households evacuation decision-making; if neighbors are  
41 leaving then the individual is more likely to evacuate and vice versa; 3) risk perception, especially the  
42 personalization of risk by individuals is a more significant factor in prompting evacuation than prior adverse  
43 experience with hurricanes; and 4) social and demographic factors (age, presence of children, elderly, or pets in  
44 households, gender, income, disability, and race or ethnicity) either constrain or motivate evacuation depending on  
45 the particular context ((Adeloa, 2009; Bateman and Edwards, 2002; Dash and Gladwin, 2007; Dow, K. and Cutter,  
46 S. L., 2002; Dow and Cutter, 1998; Dow and Cutter, 2000; Edmonds and Cutter, 2008; Lindell *et al.*, 2005;  
47 McGuire *et al.*, 2007; Perry and Lindell, 1991; Sorensen *et al.*, 2004; Sorensen and Sorensen, 2007; Van Willigen *et al.*,  
48 *et al.*, 2002; Whitehead *et al.*, 2000)).

49  
50 A different protective action, shelter-in-place occurs when there is little time to act in response to an extreme event  
51 or when leaving the community would place individuals more at risk (Sorensen *et al.*, 2004). Seeking higher ground  
52 or moving to higher floors in residential structures to get out of rising waters is one example. Another is the  
53 movement into interior spaces within buildings to seek refuge from strong winds. In the case of wildfires, shelter in  
54 place becomes a back-up strategy when evacuation routes are restricted because of the fire and then include

1 protecting the structure or finding a safe area such as a water body (lake or backyard swimming pool) as temporary  
2 shelter ((Cova *et al.*, 2009)). In Australia, the shelter in place action is slightly different. Here there is local  
3 community engagement with wildfire risks with stay and defend or leave early (SDLE) policy. In this context, the  
4 decisions to remain are based on social networks, prior experience with wildfires, and involvement with the local  
5 fire brigade ((McGee and Russell, 2003)). The study also found that rural residents were more self-reliant and  
6 prepared than suburban residents ((McGee and Russell, 2003)).

7  
8 The social organization of societies dictates the flexibility in the choice of protective actions—some are engaged in  
9 voluntarily (such as in the U.S., Australia, and Europe), while other protective actions for individuals or households  
10 are imposed by state authorities such as Cuba and China. Planning for natural disasters is a way of life for Cuba,  
11 where everyone is taught at an early age to mobilize quickly in the case of a natural disaster ((Bermejo, 2006; Sims  
12 and Vogelmann, 2002). The organization of civil defense committees at block, neighborhood, and community levels  
13 working in conjunction with centralized governmental authority makes the Cuban experience unique ((Bermejo,  
14 2006)(Sims and Vogelmann, 2002)).

15  
16 In many traditional or pre-capitalist societies it appears that mechanisms existed, which protected community  
17 members from periodic shocks such as natural hazards. These mechanisms which are sometimes referred to as the  
18 *moral economy*, were underpinned by reciprocity, often linked to kinship networks, and served to redistribute  
19 resources to reduce the impacts on those who had sustained severe losses and were identified by Scott ((Scott,  
20 1976)) in Southeast Asia, Watts ((Watts, 1983)) in Western Africa and Paulson ((Paulson, 1993)) in the Pacific  
21 Islands. The moral economy incorporated social, cultural, political and religious arrangements which ensured that all  
22 community members had a minimal level of subsistence (see Box 5-3).

23  
24 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-3 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 25 26 **Box 5-3. Collective Behavior and the Moral Economy at Work**

27  
28 One example of such a system is the *Suge*, or graded society, which existed in northern Vanuatu. In the *Suge* 'big  
29 men' achieved the highest status by accumulating surpluses of valued goods such as shell money, specially woven  
30 mats and pigs. Men increased their grade within the system by making payments of these goods to men of higher  
31 rank. In accumulating the items men would also accumulate obligations to those they had borrowed from.  
32 Accordingly networks and alliances emerged among the islands of northern Vanuatu. When tropical cyclones  
33 destroyed crops, the obligations could be called in and assistance given from members of the networks who lived in  
34 islands that escaped damage ((Campbell, 1990)). A variety of socio-political networks, that were used to offset  
35 disaster losses, existed throughout the Pacific region prior to colonization ((Campbell, 2006) (Paulson, 1993;  
36 Paulson, 1993; Sahlins, 1962)). A number of processes associated with colonialism, the introduction of the cash  
37 economy and conversion to Christianity, as well as the provision of post-disaster relief has caused a number of  
38 elements of the moral economy to fall into disuse ((Campbell, 2006)).

39  
40 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-3 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

41  
42 There is some controversy over the significance of the notion of moral economy with some writers claiming that it  
43 oversimplified intra- and inter-community linkages in pre-capitalist settings. In doing so it does not recognize the  
44 inequalities in some of the social systems that enabled such practices to be sustained and tended to perhaps provide  
45 an unrealistic notion of a less risky past. In addition kinship based sharing networks may foster freeloading among  
46 some members ((diFalco and Bulte, 2009)). Nevertheless, a reduction in traditional coping mechanisms including  
47 the moral economy is reflected in growing disaster losses and increasing dependency on relief ((Campbell, 2006)).

48  
49 Collective action to prepare for or respond to disaster risk and extreme climate impacts can also be driven by  
50 localized organizations and social movements. Many such groups represent networks or first-responders for climate-  
51 sensitive disasters. However, there are many constraints that these movements face in building effective coalitions  
52 including the need to connect with other movement organizations and frame the problem in an accessible way  
53 ((McCormick, 2010)).

### 5.2.3. Structures and Structural Mitigation

Structural interventions to reduce the effects of extreme events generally refer to engineering work like dykes, embankments, seawalls, river channel modification, flood gates, and reservoirs, etc. Although these structural interventions can achieve success in reducing disaster impacts, they can also fail due to lack of maintenance or due to extreme events. Most structural measures are short-term solutions. Furthermore, technical considerations should not preclude socio-economic considerations ((WMO, 2003)). Implementing structural measures that involve participatory approaches from communities who are proactively involved often leads to more sustainable outcomes. One of the key reasons why local projects are often ineffective is that they are approved on the basis of technical information alone, rather than based on both technical information and local wisdom ((ActionAid, 2005)). In addition, national legislation can have important influences on the choice of disaster risk reduction strategies at the local level as can local and national institutional arrangements that often favor technocratic responses over other non-structural approaches ((Burby, 2006)).

The method of protecting an entire area by building a dyke has been in use for thousands of years and is still being applied by communities in flood-prone countries. Embankments, dykes, levees and floodwalls are all designed to protect areas from flooding by confining the water to a river channel, thus protecting the areas immediately behind them. Building dykes is one of the most economical means of flood control ((Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2005)). Dykes built by communities normally involve low technology and traditional knowledge (such as earth embankments as shown in Figure 5-3). Sand bagging is also very popular for flood-proofing in Asia. Generally, structures that are built of earth are highly susceptible to erosion leading to channel siltation and reduced water conveyance on the wet side and slope instability and failure on the dry side. It can also reduce the height of the structure making it less effective. Slopes can be stabilized by various methods, including turfing by planting vegetation such as Catkin grass and Vetiver grass in Bangladesh and Thailand, respectively.

[INSERT FIGURE 5-3 HERE:

Figure 5-3: Earth embankment along the river (left) with stabilization (right) (ADPC, 2005).]

Large scale structural measures are often implemented using cost-benefit analyses and technical approaches. In many cases, particularly in developed countries, structural measures are subsidized by national governments and local governments and communities are required to cover only partial costs. In New Zealand this led to a preponderance of structural measures despite planning legislation that enabled non-structural measures. As a result the catastrophic potential was increased and development intensified in ‘protected’ areas only to be seriously devastated by supra-design events ((Ericksen, 1986)). This so-called “levee effect”, actually increases disaster risk rather than decreasing it ((Montz and Tobin, 2008; Tobin, 1995)). Reduction of centralized subsidies in the mid-1980s and changes in legislation saw greater responsibility for the costs of disaster risk management falling on the communities affected and a move towards more integrated disaster risk reduction processes within New Zealand ((Ericksen *et al.*, 2000)).

Building codes closely align with engineering and architectural structural approaches to disaster risk reduction ((Kang *et al.*, 2009)(Petal *et al.*, 2008)). This is accompanied by the elevation of buildings and ground floor standards in the case of flooding ((Kang *et al.*, 2009)). One dilemma with building codes is their implementation at the local level. Instances of earthquake and inundation-generated building damages occur because of noncompliance ((Burby *et al.*, 1998)).

### 5.2.4. Land Use and Ecosystem Protection

Changes in land use not only contribute to global climate change but they are equally reflective of adaptation to the varying signals of economic, policy, and environmental change ((Brown, D., A. Agrawal, S. Cheong, R. Chowdhury, C. Polsky, ; Lambin, E. F., B. L. Turner, H. J. Geist, S. B. Agbola, A. Angelsen, J. W. Bruce, O. T. Coomes, R. Dirzo, G. Fischer, C. Folke, P. S. George, K. Homewood, J. Imbernon, R. Leemans, X. Li, E. F. Moran, M. Mortimore, P. S. Ramakrishnan, J. F. Richards, H. Skånes, W. Steffen, G. D. Stone, U. Svedin, T. A. Veldkamp,

1 C. Vogel, J. Xu, 2001)). Disaster management through local land use planning embedded in zoning, local  
2 comprehensive plans, and retreat and relocation policies is a popular approach to disaster risk management, although  
3 some countries and rural areas may not have formal land use regulations that restrict development or settlement. As  
4 land use management regulates the movement of people and industries in hazard-prone zones, it faces development  
5 pressures and real estate interests accompanied by property rights and the takings issue ((Burby, 2000; Thomson,  
6 2007; Titus, J., D. Hudgens, D. Trescott, M. Craghan, W. Nuckols, C. Hershner, J. Kassakian, C. Linn, P. Merritt, T.  
7 McCue, J. O'Connell, J. Tanski, J. Wang, 2009)). Buffer zones, setback lines in coastal zones, and inundation zones  
8 based on flood and sea-level rise projections can result in controversies and lack of enforcement that bring about  
9 temporary resettlement, land speculation, and creation of new risks ((Jha *et al.*, 2010)(Ingram *et al.*, 2006)).

10  
11 Formal approaches to land use planning as a means of disaster risk management are often less appropriate for many  
12 rural areas in developing countries where traditional practices and land tenure systems operate. Similar restrictions  
13 are found in regard to slums and squatter settlements. Poverty and the lack of infrastructure and services increase the  
14 vulnerability of urban poor to adverse impacts from disasters and national governments and international agencies  
15 have had little success in reversing such trends. Most successful efforts to bring about reductions in exposure have  
16 been those that have been locally led and that build on successful local initiatives ((Satterthwaite *et al.*, 2007)).

17  
18 Land acquisition is another means for protecting property and people by relocating them away from hazardous areas  
19 ((Olshansky and Kartez, 1998)). Many jurisdictions have the power of eminent domain to purchase property but this  
20 is rarely used as a form of disaster risk reduction ((Godschalk *et al.*, 2000)). Voluntary acquisition of land, for  
21 example, requires local authorities to purchase exposed properties, which in turn enables households to obtain less  
22 risky real estate elsewhere without suffering large economic losses in the process ((Handmer, 1987)). Given the  
23 large number and high value of exposed properties in coastal zones in developed countries such as the United States  
24 and Australia this buy out strategy is cost-prohibitive and thus, rarely used ((Anning and Dominey-Howes, 2009)).  
25 Similarly, voluntary acquisition schemes for developing countries are equally fraught with problems as people have  
26 strong ties to the land, and land is held communally in places like the Pacific Islands where community identity  
27 cannot be separated from the land to which its members belong ((Campbell, 2010b)). Land use planning alone,  
28 therefore, may not be successful as a singular strategy but when coupled with related policies such as tax incentives  
29 or disincentives, insurance, and drainage and sewage systems it could be effective ((Cheong, 2011; Yohe and  
30 Newmann, 1997)).

31  
32 Ecosystem conservation offers long-term protection from climate extremes. The mitigation of soil erosion,  
33 landslides, waves, and storm surges are some of the ecosystem services to protect people and infrastructure from  
34 extreme events and disasters ((Sudmeier-Rieux, K., H. Masundire, A. Rizvi, S. Rietbergen (eds.), 2006)). The 2005  
35 Asian tsunami, for example, attests to the utility of mangroves, coral reefs, and sand dunes in alleviating the influx  
36 of large waves to the shore ((Das and Vincent, 2009)). The use of dune management districts to protect property  
37 along developed shorelines has achieved success in many places along the U.S. eastern shore and elsewhere  
38 ((Nordstrom, 2000; Nordstrom, 2008)). While the extent of their protective ecosystem functions is still debated  
39 ((Gedan, K. B., M. L. Kirwan, E. Wolanski, E. B. Barbier, B. R. Silliman, 2011)), the merits of the ecosystem services  
40 in general are proven, and development of quantified models of the services is well under way ((Nelson, E., G.  
41 Mendoza, J. Regetz, S. Polasky, H. Tallis, D. R. Cameron, K. M. A. Chan, G. C. Daily, J. Goldstein, P. M. Kareiva,  
42 E. Lonsdorf, R. Naidoo, T. H. Ricketts, M. R. Shaw, 2009)). These nonstructural measures are considered to be less  
43 intrusive and more sustainable, and the necessity for integrating engineering responses and vegetation barriers as  
44 responses to climate extremes have begun to be recognized ((Cheong, 2011; Francis, R. A., S. Falconi, R. Nateghi,  
45 S. D. Guikema, in Ed, S. Cheong, 2011)).

#### 46 47 48 **5.2.5. Surplus and Storage of Resources**

49  
50 Communities may take a range of approaches to cope with disaster induced shortages. These include production of  
51 surpluses and their storage. And if these fail, rationing of food may occur. In pre-colonial times many communities  
52 produced food surpluses which enabled them to manage during periods of seasonal or disaster initiated disruptions  
53 to their food supplies. In Pacific Island communities food crops such as taro and breadfruit were often ensiled in  
54 leaf-lined pits, yams could be stored for several years in dry locations, and most communities maintained famine

1 foods such as wild yams (*dioscorea* spp.), swamp taro (*cyrtosperma* spp.) and sago (*metroxyton* spp.) which were  
2 only harvested during times of food shortage ((Campbell, 2006)). The provision of disaster relief among other  
3 factors has seen these practices decline ((Campbell, 2010)). Stockpiling and prepositioning of emergency response  
4 equipment, materials, foods and pharmaceuticals and medical equipment is also an important form of disaster  
5 preparedness at the local level, especially for indigenous communities.

6  
7 Rationing at the local level is often instituted at the level of households, particularly poor ones without the ability to  
8 accumulate wealth or surpluses, in the face of disaster induced declines in livelihoods. Most rationing takes place in  
9 response to food shortages and is for most poor communities, the first response to the disruption of livelihoods  
10 ((Baro and Deubel, 2006; Barrett, 2002; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Walker, 1989)). In many cases  
11 increases in food prices force those with insufficient incomes to ration as well.

12  
13 Rationing may be seen as the initial response to food shortages at or near the onset of a famine. However, in many  
14 cases rationing is needed on a seasonal basis. This rationing is done at the level of households and communities.  
15 When the shortage becomes too severe, households may reduce future security by eating seeds or selling livestock,  
16 followed by severe illness, starvation and death if the shortages persist. While climate change may alter the  
17 frequency and severity of droughts, the causes of famine are multi-factoral and often lie in social, economic and  
18 political processes in addition to climatic variability ((Bohle *et al.*, 1994; Sen, 1981; Wisner *et al.*, 2004)).

19  
20 Food rationing is unusual in developed countries where most communities are not based on subsistence production  
21 and welfare systems and NGO agencies respond to needs of those with livelihood deficits. However, other forms of  
22 rationing do exist particularly in response to drought events. Reductions in water use can be achieved through a  
23 number of measures including: metering, rationing (fixed amounts, proportional reductions, or voluntary  
24 reductions), pressure reduction, leakage reduction, conservation devices, education, plumbing codes, market  
25 mechanisms (e.g. transferable quotas, tariffs, pricing) and water-use restrictions ((Froukh, 2001; Lund and Reed,  
26 1995)).

27  
28 Electricity supplies may also be disrupted by disaster events resulting in partial or total blackouts. Such events cause  
29 considerable disruption to other services, domestic customers and to businesses. Rose *et al.* ((Rose *et al.*, 2007))  
30 show that many American businesses can be quite resilient in such circumstances adapting a variety of strategies  
31 including conserving energy, using alternative forms of energy, using alternative forms of generation, rescheduling  
32 activities to a future date or focussing on the low or no energy elements of the business operation. Rose and Liao  
33 ((Rose and Liao, 2005)) had similar findings for water supply disruption. Electricity rationing may also be required  
34 when low precipitation reduces hydroelectricity production, a possible scenario in some places under some climate  
35 projections ((Boyd and Ibararán, 2009; Vörösmarty *et al.*, 2000)). In some cases there may be competition among a  
36 range of sectors including industry, agriculture, electricity production and domestic water supply ((Vörösmarty *et al.*,  
37 2000)) that may have to be addressed through rationing and other measures such as those listed above. However,  
38 using fossil fuels to generate electricity as an alternative to hydro production may be considered a maladaptive  
39 option.

40  
41 Other elements that may be rationed as a result of natural hazards or disasters include medical and health services  
42 (often referred to as triage) where disasters may simultaneously cause large a spike in numbers requiring medical  
43 assistance and a reduction in medical facilities, equipment, pharmaceuticals and personnel. Triage is a process of  
44 classifying patients and prioritizes those with the greatest need and the highest likelihood of a positive outcome.  
45 From this perspective triage seeks to achieve the best results for the largest number of people ((Alexander, 2002)  
46 (Iserson and Moskop, 2007)).

#### 47 48 49 **5.2.6. Migration and other Population Movements**

50  
51 Natural disasters are linked with population mobility in a number of ways. Evacuations (see 5.2.2.) occur before,  
52 during and after some disaster events. Longer-term relocation of affected communities sometimes occurs.  
53 Relocations can be both temporary (a few weeks to months), or longer, in which case they become permanent. These  
54 different forms of population movements have quite different implications for the communities concerned. They

1 may also be differentiated on the basis of whether the mobility is voluntary or forced and whether or not  
2 international borders are crossed. Most contemporary research views population mobility as a continuum from  
3 completely voluntary movements to completely forced migrations ((Laczko, 2009)).  
4

5 Community relocation schemes are those in which whole communities are relocated to a new non-exposed site.  
6 Perry and Lindell ((Perry and Lindell, 1997)) examine one such instance in Allenville, Arizona. They developed a  
7 set of five principles for achieving positive outcomes in relocation projects: 1) The community to be relocated  
8 should be organised; 2) All potential relocatees should be involved in the relocation decision-making process; 3)  
9 Citizens must understand the multi-organisational context in which the relocation is to be conducted; 4) Special  
10 attention should be given to the social and personal needs of the relocatees; and 5) Social networks need to be  
11 preserved ((Perry and Lindell, 1997)). For many communities relocation is difficult, especially in those communities  
12 with communal land ownership. In the Pacific Islands, for example, relocation within one's own lands is least  
13 disruptive but leaving it completely is much more difficult, as is making land available for people who have been  
14 relocated ((Campbell, 2010b)).  
15

16 Where climate change increases the marginality of livelihoods and settlements beyond a sustainable level,  
17 communities may be forced to migrate. This may be caused by changing mean conditions or through changes in  
18 extreme events. Extremes often serve as precipitating events ((Hugo, 1996)). Myers' ((Myers, 2002)) prediction that  
19 there would be as many as 200 million environmentally forced migrants by mid 21<sup>st</sup> century has been widely  
20 reported. Brown ((Brown, 2008)) provides a range of estimates from an increase of five to ten per cent over current  
21 migration flows under a favourable projection upwards to a figure that may exceed Myer's prediction under the  
22 worst case scenario. These efforts to quantify climate migration do not distinguish the climatic causes of migration  
23 which typically has many causative factors ((Hugo, 1996)). Many researchers have raised doubts about such a  
24 magnitude of migration and many consider that climate related migration may not necessary be a problem and  
25 indeed may be a positive adaptive response ((Barnett and Webber, 2009)).  
26

27 These figures are global estimations and provide little insight into the likely local implications of such large-scale  
28 migratory patterns. Migration will have local effects, not only for the communities generating the migrants, but  
29 those communities where they may settle. Barnett and Webber (2009) also note that the less voluntary the migration  
30 choice is, the more disruptive it will become. In the context of dam construction, for example Hwang *et al.* ((Hwang  
31 *et al.*, 2007)) found that communities anticipating forced migration experienced stress. Hwang *et al.* ((Hwang *et al.*,  
32 2010)) also found that forced migration directly led to increased levels of depression and the weakening of social  
33 safeguards in the relocation process. One outcome of climate change may be that entire communities may be  
34 required to relocate and in some cases, such as those living in atoll countries, the relocation may have to be  
35 international. It is likely that such relocation will have significant social, cultural and psychological impacts  
36 ((Campbell, 2010b)).  
37

### 38 39 **5.2.7. Emergency Assistance and Disaster Relief** 40

41 Relief often is unsuitable or inappropriate because people affected by disasters are not completely helpless or  
42 passive ((Cuny, 1983)(De Ville de Groyet, 2000)). This view is sustained by commonplace definitions of disasters  
43 as situations where communities or even countries cannot cope without external assistance ((Cuny, 1983)). In some  
44 cases, relief serves to remove agency from disaster 'victims' so that 'ownership' of the event and control over the  
45 recovery phase is lost at the local level ((Hillhorst, 2002)).  
46

47 It is important to realise that the first actors providing assistance during and after disasters are members of the  
48 affected community ((De Ville de Groyet, 2000)). In isolated communities such as those in outer islands, external  
49 assistance may be subject to considerable delay and self-help is an important element of response. Typically,  
50 emergency assistance and disaster relief in developed countries comes in the form of assistance from national and  
51 state/provincial level governments to local communities. For developing countries international relief is more  
52 commonly distributed, although quite often heavy costs also fall on developing country governments. In all disasters  
53 initial assistance comes from local sources ((Development Initiatives, 2009)). International relief may come from a  
54 range of sources including multilateral institutions (common actors are UNOCHA, UNDP, WHO and UNICEF),

1 bilateral arrangements, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and numerous NGOs  
2 such as Oxfam, Save the Children Fund and the like ((Beamon and Balcik, 2008)). The disaster relief process has  
3 become highly sophisticated and much broader in scope over the past two decades and includes such things as  
4 assistance in post-disaster assessment, food provision, water and sanitation, medical assistance and health services,  
5 household goods, temporary shelter, transport, tools and equipment, security, logistics, communications and  
6 community services ((Cahill, 2007)(Bynander *et al.*, 2005)).  
7

8 Much disaster assistance takes place at the local level through local charities, kinship networks and local  
9 governments. There is also a considerable amount of relief that tends to be organised at more of a national and  
10 international scale than local scale, although distribution and use of relief occur at the local level. From this  
11 perspective it is vital to understand what is locally appropriate in terms of the type of relief provided, and how it is  
12 distributed ((Kováč and Spens, 2007)). Similarly, local resources and capacities should be utilised as much as  
13 possible (Beamon and Baclik, 2008). There has also been a recent trend towards international humanitarian  
14 organisations working with local partners, although this can result in the imposition of external cultural values  
15 resulting in resentment or resistance ((Hillhorst, 2002)).  
16

17 While relief is often a critically important strategy for coping, there are problems associated with it. Relief can  
18 undermine local coping capacities and reduce resilience and sustainability ((Susman *et al.*, 1983; Waddell, 1989))  
19 and it may reinforce the status quo that was characterized by vulnerability ((O'Keefe *et al.*, 1976)). Relief is often  
20 inequitably distributed and in some disasters there is insufficient relief. Corruption is also a factor in some disaster  
21 relief operations with local elites often benefiting more than others ((Pelling and Dill, 2010)).  
22

23 Not all disasters engender the same response as local communities receive different levels of assistance. For  
24 example, those people most affected by a small event can suffer just as much as a globally publicised big event but  
25 are often overlooked by relief agencies. Fast onset and unusual disasters such as tsunamis generate much more  
26 public interest and contributions from governments, NGOs, and the public, sometimes referred to as the CNN factor  
27 ((Schmid, 1998){}). Disasters that are overshadowed by other newsworthy or media events, such as coverage of  
28 the Olympic Games, are often characterised by lower levels of relief support ((Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007)).  
29 Where there is widespread media coverage, NGOs and governments are often pressured to respond quickly with the  
30 possibility of an oversupply of relief and personnel. This has worsened in recent times when reporters are  
31 'parachuted' into disaster sites often in advance of relief teams (who have more than a camera and satellite  
32 transmitter to transport and distribute) but who have little understanding of the contextual factors that often underlie  
33 vulnerability to disasters ((Silk, 2000)). Such media coverage often perpetrates disaster myths such as the prevalence  
34 of looting, helplessness and social collapse putting pressure on interveners to select military options for relief when  
35 humanitarian assistance would be more helpful ((Tierney *et al.*, 2006)).  
36

37 Relief is politically more appealing than disaster risk reduction (DRR) ((Seck, 2007)) and it often gains much  
38 greater political support and funding than measures that would help offset the need for it in the first place. Providing  
39 relief reflects well on politicians (both in donor and recipient countries) who are seen to be caring, and taking action,  
40 and responding to public demand ((Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007)).  
41

42 Major shares of the costs of disaster relief and recovery still fall on the governments of disaster affected countries.  
43 Bilateral relief is often tied and is limited to materials from donor countries and most relief is subject to relatively  
44 strict criteria to reduce perceived levels of corruption. In both of these cases flexibility is heavily restricted. Relief  
45 can also produce local economic distortions such as causing shops to lose business as the market becomes flooded  
46 with relief supplies. At the same time, there is the view that disaster relief can create a culture of dependency and  
47 expectation at the local level ((Burby, 2006)), where disaster relief becomes viewed as an entitlement program as  
48 local communities are not forced to bear the responsibility for their own locational choices, land use, and lack of  
49 mitigation practices.  
50  
51  
52

### 5.3. Community-Based Risk Management in a Changing Climate

Community-based risk management has traditionally dealt with climate events without considering the long-term trajectories presented by a changing climate. This section provides examples of adaptations to disaster risk and how such proactive behaviors at the community level by local government and NGOs can provide guidance for reducing the longer term impacts of climate change. Although reacting to extreme events and their impacts is important, it is crucial to focus on building the resilience of communities, cities and sectors in order to ameliorate the impacts of extreme events now and into the future.

#### 5.3.1. Local Climate Extremes

Local communities routinely experience natural hazards many from climate-related events (see Chapter 3). Drought has affected local communities from Africa to the Americas, to Australia and New Zealand. Tropical and extra-tropical windstorms are seasonal events for many regions. A compendium of extreme hazard events related to climate illustrates the pervasive nature of hazards on communities, according to one data source (see Table 5-2). All regions and many of the local communities within them have experienced a disaster event (defined by thresholds of more than 10 people killed or 100 affected, or a call for international assistance, or a declaration of a state of emergency) during the past decade. Flooding and windstorms (cyclones and hurricanes) are among the most prevalent, with the impacts measured in economic losses as well as human losses (see Table 5-3). However, local communities routinely experience hazards that do not rise to the same level of impact as a disaster. These include snow and ice events; severe storms, flooding, and hail events. Heat waves and wildfires are more frequent events in the northern latitudes ((Alcamo *et al.*, 2007); (Field *et al.*, 2007)). More intense rainfall producing flooding and mud slides in mountainous are becoming the norm rather than the exception in many parts of the world ((Solomon *et al.*, 2007)). Communities affected by drought persist in Africa, India, and China. Coastal communities worldwide are experiencing more erosion due to stronger storms. What is now different is that these hazards are relatively new for many communities. For example, Hurricane Catarina, the first South Atlantic hurricane which made landfall as a category 1 storm just north of Porto Alegre, Brazil, in March 2004 ((McTaggart-Cowan *et al.*, 2006)), the region's first local experience with a hurricane.

[INSERT TABLE 5-2 HERE:

Table 5-2: Local experience with climate extreme hazards based on number of reported disasters, 1999-2008.]

[INSERT TABLE 5-3 HERE:

Table 5-3: Top five climate extreme hazards events, 1950-2009.]

#### 5.3.2. Assessing Coping in Light of Disaster Risk Management: What Leads to Proactive Behaviors?

Capacity investments necessarily involve decisions based on prior disaster experiences and future disaster expectations, including those related to emergency response and disaster recovery. Birkland ((Birkland, 1997), Pulwarty and Melis ((Pulwarty and Melis, 2001)) and others, have identified some of the physical and social characteristics that allow for the prior adoption of effective partnerships and implementation practices during events. These include the occurrence of previous strong focusing events (such as catastrophic extreme events) that generate significant public interest and the personal attention of key leaders, a social basis for cooperation including close inter-jurisdictional partnerships, and the existence of a supported collaborative framework between research and management. Although loss of life from natural hazards has been declining, the property and livelihood losses from those causes have been increasing. Factors conditioning this outcome have been summed up by Burton *et al.* ((Burton *et al.*, 2001)) as “knowing better and losing even more”. For instance researchers have understood the consequences of a major hurricane hitting New Orleans with a fairly detailed understanding of planning and response needs. This knowledge appears to have been ignored at all levels of government including the local level ((Kates *et al.*, 2006)). Burton *et al.* ((Burton *et al.*, 2001)) offer four explanations for why such conditions exist from an information standpoint: 1) knowledge continues to be flawed by areas of ignorance; 2) knowledge is available but not used effectively; 3) knowledge is used effectively but takes a long time to have an impact; and 4) knowledge is

1 used effectively in some respects but is overwhelmed by increases in vulnerability and in population, wealth, and  
2 poverty.  
3

4 The impacts and changes that some focusing events engender can only defined retrospectively ((Barton, 1969;  
5 Barton, 2005; Fritz, 1961; Turner, 1978)). For example, a 30-year drought-induced famine ultimately becomes  
6 defined as a multiple disaster. Such a disaster exists in social time only when changing historical conditions over  
7 decades have been collectively reconstructed to define them as acute. Individuals can make choices to reduce their  
8 risk but social relations, context, and certain structural features of the society in which they live and work mediate  
9 these choices and their effects. A growing acknowledgement that aid cannot cover more than a small fraction of the  
10 costs of disasters is leading to new approaches, priorities and institutional configurations. The realization that  
11 dealing with risk and insecurity is a central part of how poor people develop their livelihood strategies has begun to  
12 position disaster mitigation and preparedness within many poverty alleviation agendas ((Olshansky and Kartez,  
13 1998)(Cuny, 1983; UNISDR, 2009)). A number of long-standing challenges remain as the larger and looser  
14 coalitions of interests that sometimes emerge after great catastrophes rarely last long enough to sustain the kind of  
15 efforts needed to reduce hazards and disaster risk.  
16

17 Another pro-active behavior is the use of spatial hazard information by planners. However, such as is likely only if  
18 the information is clearly mapped, comes from an authoritative source and provides specific guidelines for action  
19 and ease of implementation, and the community is provided with evidence that the approaches have worked in  
20 other places ((Olshansky and Kartez, 1998)). Berke and Beatley ((Berke and Beatley, 1992)) examined a range of  
21 hazard mitigation measures and ranked them according to effectiveness and ease of enforcement. The most  
22 effective measures are land acquisition, density reduction, clustering of development, building codes for new  
23 construction, and mandatory retrofit of existing structures. The high costs land acquisition programs can make them  
24 unattractive to small communities (see 5.2.4). There has been limited systematic scientific characterization of the  
25 ways in which different hazard agents vary in their threats and characteristics and, thus, requiring different pre-  
26 impact interventions and post-impact responses by households, businesses, and community hazard management  
27 organizations.  
28

29 Short-term risk reduction strategies can actually produce greater vulnerability to future events as shown in diverse  
30 contexts such as ENSO-related impacts in Latin America, induced development below dams or levees in the U.S.,  
31 and flooding in the UK ((Bowden, 1981)(Berube and Katz, 2005; Penning-Rowell *et al.*, 2006; Pulwarty *et al.*,  
32 2004)). One important finding about community protection works such as dams and levees is that they are  
33 commonly misperceived as providing complete protection, so they actually increase development—and thus  
34 vulnerability—in hazard-prone areas ((Burby, 2006)). A more general statement of this proposition is found in the  
35 safe development paradox in which increased safety induces increased development leading to increased losses.  
36 The conflicting policy goals of rapid recovery, safety, betterment, and equity and their relative strengths and  
37 weaknesses largely reflect experience with large disasters in other places and times. The actual decisions and  
38 rebuilding undertaken to date clearly demonstrate the rush by government at all levels and the residents themselves  
39 to rebuild the familiar ((Kates *et al.*, 2006)). Similarly, in drought prone areas provision of assured water supplies  
40 encourages the development of intensive agricultural systems – and for that matter, domestic water use habits – that  
41 are poorly suited to the inherent variability of supply and will be even more so in areas projected to become  
42 increasingly arid in a changing climate.  
43

44 Burby and May *et al.* ((Burby *et al.*, 1997)) have found evidence for some communities that previous occurrence of  
45 a disaster did not have a strong effect on the number of hazard mitigation techniques subsequently employed.  
46 Agendas are unstable over time and disasters can affect them by serving as focusing events ((Anderson, 1994;  
47 Birkland, 1997; Kingdon, 1984)), concentrating public and official attention for a certain time, resulting in a  
48 window of opportunity.  
49

50 On the other hand, extreme events have been identified as offering “windows of opportunity” for including both  
51 retrofitting and long term risk reduction plans, such as for climate change adaptation, after particularly severe or  
52 visible events such as Hurricane Katrina or severe, sustained drought. A policy window opens when the opportunity  
53 arises to change policy direction and is thus an important part of agenda setting ((Anderson, 1994; Kingdon, 1984)).  
54 Policy windows can be created by triggering or focusing events, such as disasters, as well as by changes in

1 government and shifts in public opinion. Immediately following a disaster, the political climate may be conducive  
2 to much needed legal, economic and social change which can begin to reduce structural vulnerabilities, for example  
3 in such areas as mainstreaming gender issues, land reform, skills development, employment, housing and social  
4 solidarity. The assumptions behind the utility of policy windows are that: 1) new awareness of risks after a disaster  
5 leads to broad consensus; 2) development and humanitarian agencies are ‘reminded’ of disaster risks; and 3)  
6 enhanced political will and resources become available ((Christoplos, 2006; Michaels *et al.*, 2006)). However,  
7 during the post-recovery phase, reconstruction requires weighing, prioritizing, and sequencing of policy  
8 programming, and there are multiple sometimes competing mainstreaming agendas for most decision-makers and  
9 operational actors to digest with attendant lobbying for resources for various actions. The most significant is the  
10 pressure to quickly return to conditions prior to the event rather than incorporate longer term development policies  
11 ((Christoplos, 2006; Kates *et al.*, 2006)). How long such a window will stay open or precisely what factors will  
12 make it close under a given set of conditions is not well-known, even though 3-6 months has been recognized in  
13 specific cases ((Kates *et al.*, 2006)).

14  
15 The active participation of women has been shown to increase the effectiveness of prevention, disaster relief,  
16 reconstruction and transformation of communities ((Enarson and Morrow, 1997)) (see Box 5-4). There is also  
17 research which suggests that children can be effective conveyors of risk information and become active agents for  
18 building preparedness and resilience to disasters and climate change, but such a role has been neglected or  
19 underestimated ((Bartlett, 2008; Manyena *et al.*, 2008; Mitchell *et al.*, 2008; Peek, 2008)).

20  
21 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-4 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

#### 22 23 **Box 5-4. The Role of Women in Proactive Behavior**

24  
25 Women's involvement in running shelters and processing food was crucial to the recovery of families and  
26 communities after Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras. A third of the shelters were run by women, and this figure rose to  
27 42% in the capital. The municipality of La Masica in Honduras, with a mostly rural population of 24,336 people,  
28 stands out in the aftermath of Mitch because, unlike other municipalities in the northern Atlanta Department, it  
29 reported no mortality. This outcome can be directly attributed to a process of community emergency preparedness  
30 that began about six months prior to the disaster, Gender lectures were given and, consequently, the community  
31 decided that men and women should participate equally in all hazard management activities. When Mitch struck,  
32 the municipality was prepared and vacated the area promptly, thus avoiding deaths. Women participated actively in  
33 all relief operations. They went on rescue missions, rehabilitated local infrastructure (such as schools), and along  
34 with men, distributed food. They also took over from men who had abandoned the task of continuous monitoring of  
35 the early warning system. The experience shows that preparedness is an important step in saving lives. The  
36 incorporation of women from the start, on an equal footing with men, contributed to the success in saving lives  
37 ((Enarson and Morrow, 1997)).

38  
39 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-4 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

#### 40 41 42 **5.3.3. Basic Development and Human Security**

43  
44 The physical trends and changing patterns in the climate are projected to increase in the future in terms of intensity  
45 and frequency leading to more frequent and severe climatic events (see Chapter 3). Developing countries including  
46 LDCs and SIDS are generally characterized by certain socio-economic trends high rates of population growth  
47 (especially in hazard prone areas); urbanization; food insecurity; high levels of poverty; conflicts; and  
48 mismanagement of natural resources) that render them more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Chapter  
49 2). For the LDCs in Africa and Asia, climate change is expected to result in flooding of low-lying coastal areas,  
50 increased water scarcity, decline in agricultural yields and fisheries resources, and loss of biological resources  
51 (Osman-Elasha and Downing, 2007)). People exposed to the most severe climate-related hazards are often those  
52 least able to cope with the associated impacts, due to their limited adaptive capacity; a situation that is likely to  
53 impose additional threats to economic development, efforts to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium  
54 Development Goals ((Stern, 2007; UNDP, 2007)). Similar to droughts, floods have a significant impact on African

1 development as recurrent floods in some countries are linked with El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events  
2 resulting in major economic and human losses in e.g. Mozambique ((Mirza, 2003); (Obasi, 2005)) and Somalia  
3 ((Kabat *et al.*, 2002)). The impacts of droughts and floods are often further exacerbated by health problems, such as  
4 diarrhea, cholera and malaria ((Kabat *et al.*, 2002)).  
5

6 Climate change effects will not happen in hypothetical scenarios, but in local territories where many hazards already  
7 occur and where ecosystems and communities are already facing multiple risks. It is possible that some new and  
8 unknown hazards may appear, but in most cases climate change will make the existing hazards more complex and  
9 harmful ((Parry *et al.*, 2007; Solomon *et al.*, 2007)). For example, in places already affected by crisis situations such  
10 as political violence producing trans-border refugees as well as internally displaced people, climate change may  
11 exacerbate the situation. Climate change causes environmental stress and is therefore is a potential cause of conflict  
12 along with local unsustainable behavior ((Osman-Elasha, 2008)). Environmental stress feeds the tensions between  
13 communities as they compete for land to support their livelihoods ((Barnett, 2001; Kates, 2000; Osman-Elasha and  
14 El Sanjak, 2009)). Such complex relations can easily lead to a vicious circle of deprivation with more and more  
15 displaced people, new and added pressures on the environment, leading to its deterioration and ultimately the  
16 destruction of livelihoods, and increasing conflict.  
17

18 The effective reduction of vulnerabilities to current natural hazards and to climate change requires coordination  
19 across different levels and sectors and the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders beginning at the local level  
20 ((Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007; DFID, 2006; UNISDR, 2004)). To strengthen the link between disaster risk  
21 management and adaptation to climate change, it is important to understand when, and at what level, coordination is  
22 required, and who should take the lead ((Mitchell and Van Aalst, 2008)). Many adaptation strategies, such as large-  
23 scale agriculture, irrigation and hydroelectric development, will benefit large groups or the national interests but  
24 they may harm local, indigenous and poor populations ((Kates, 2000)(Kates, 2000)). Therefore, any new disaster  
25 reduction or climate change adaptation strategies must be build on strengthening local actors and enhancing their  
26 livelihoods ((Osman-Elasha, 2006a)). It is equally important to identify the differentiated social impacts of climate  
27 change based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, geographical location, livelihood, and migrant status ((Tanner and  
28 Mitchell, 2008)). The problem is in identifying those adaptations that favor these most vulnerable groups, and to  
29 address these problems using an integrated management approach, with different stakeholders ((Sperling and  
30 Szekely, 2005)). Win-win solutions are unlikely with climate change, as there will always be winners and losers  
31 from extreme events ((Adger, 2001)). It is increasingly recognized that adaptation and DRR must be integral  
32 components of development planning and implementation, to increase sustainability ((Thomalla *et al.*, 2006)). In  
33 other words, adaptation and DRR should be mainstreamed into national development plans, poverty reduction  
34 strategies, sectoral policies and other development tools and techniques ((UNDP, 2007)). Efforts to forge greater and  
35 more equitable capacity at the local scale have to be supported by policies at the national level to increase the ability  
36 of local institutions and communities to cope with present and future risks from climate-sensitive hazards  
37 ((Tearfund., 2006)).  
38  
39

#### 40 **5.3.4. Recovery and Reconstruction Post Event**

41  
42 Recovery and reconstruction include actions that seek to establish ‘everyday life’ of the community affected by  
43 disaster ((Hewitt, 1997)). Often reconstruction enables communities to return to the same conditions that existed  
44 prior to the disaster, and in so doing create the potential for further similar losses, thus reproducing the same  
45 exposure that resulted in disaster in the first place ((Jha *et al.*, 2010)). There are a number of obstacles to effective  
46 and timely reconstruction including lack of labour, lack of capacity among local construction companies, material  
47 shortages, resolution of land tenure considerations, and insufficiency of funds ((Keraminiyage *et al.*, 2008)). While  
48 there is urgency to have people re-housed and livelihoods re-established, long-term benefits may be gained through  
49 carefully implemented reconstruction ((Hallegatte and Dumas, 2009)(Hallegatte, 2008)).  
50

51 Recovery and reconstruction (especially housing rehabilitation and rebuilding) are among the more contentious  
52 elements of disaster response. One of the major issues surrounding recovery in the scientific literature is the lack of  
53 clarity between recovery as a process and recovery as an outcome. The former emphasizes betterment processes  
54 where pre-existing vulnerability issues are addressed. The latter focuses on the material manifestation of recovery

1 such as building houses or infrastructure. Often following large disasters large-scale top down programmes result in  
2 rebuilding houses but failing to provide homes ((Petal *et al.*, 2008)). Moreover, haste in reconstruction, while  
3 achieving short-term objectives, often results in unsustainable outcomes and increasing vulnerability ((Ingram *et al.*,  
4 2006)I(Ingram *et al.*, 2006)). As seen in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there are measureable local disparities  
5 in recovery, leading to questions of recovery for whom and recovery to what ((Curtis *et al.*, 2010; Finch *et al.*, 2010;  
6 Stevenson *et al.*, 2010)).  
7

8 Most reporting on recovery and reconstruction has tended to focus on housing and the so-called lifelines of  
9 infrastructure: electricity, water supply and transport links. However, equally important, if indeed not more so, is the  
10 rehabilitation of livelihoods, especially in developing countries. Accordingly, it is important to include those climate  
11 related disaster events, such as droughts, that don't just destroy the built environment in evaluating recovery and  
12 reconstruction. Indeed post-disaster recovery that takes the need to re-establish livelihoods, in particular sustainable,  
13 livelihoods is an important aspect of disaster risk reduction and development ((Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004)).  
14

15 As with relief, major problems occur where planning and implementation of recovery and reconstruction is taken  
16 from the hands of the local communities concerned. Moreover, the use of inappropriate (culturally, socially or  
17 environmentally) materials and techniques may render rebuilt houses as unsuitable for their occupants ((Jha *et al.*,  
18 2010)). However, as Davidson *et al.* ((Davidson *et al.*, 2007)) found, this is often the case and results in local  
19 community members having little involvement in decision making and being; instead they are used to provide labor.  
20 It is also important to acknowledge that post-disaster recovery often does not reach all community members and in  
21 many recovery programmes, the most vulnerable, those who have suffered the greatest losses, often do not recover  
22 from disasters, and endure long-term hardship (Wisner *et al.*, 2004: 358).  
23

24 Post-disaster rehabilitation provides a critical opportunity for reducing risk in the face of further events. In  
25 reconstructing livelihoods damaged or destroyed by disaster it is important to take into account the diversity of  
26 livelihoods in many communities, to work with community members to develop strategies and to work towards  
27 producing sustainable livelihoods that are likely to be more resilient in the face of future events ((Pomeroy *et al.*,  
28 2006)).  
29  
30

### 31 **5.3.5. Components of Risk Management and Climate Adaptation**

32

33 There are many different components to risk management and climate adaptation. Each presents a unique set of  
34 opportunities and challenges for disaster risk management and climate adaptation. This section covers some of the  
35 most important locally-based components including anticipating risks, communicating risk information,  
36 empowerment and leadership, social drivers, integrating risk knowledge into practice, and local government  
37 initiatives and practices.  
38  
39

#### 40 **5.3.5.1. Anticipate Risks in a Climate Change Context**

41

42 Climate change presents a challenge for existing good practice of disaster risk reduction because it introduces  
43 changes in climate risks over time. In order to anticipate the risks and surprise associated with climate change there  
44 are two emerging responses at the local level. The first is to integrate information about changing climate risks into  
45 disaster planning and the second is to focus on community-based adaptation (CBA), where the effected community  
46 helps to define solutions for managing risks whilst considering climate change.  
47

48 Contextualizing disaster response within a climate change continuum requires information and knowledge about  
49 both slow and fast onset events ((Ensor and Berger, 2009)) . Weather information is critical for responding to  
50 flashfloods and cyclones, seasonal climate information can help to respond to drought and above normal rainfall  
51 predictions and longer-term decadal forecasts can help to understand shifts in the seasons. Although early warning  
52 systems that draw on weather information have been used to manage disasters, there has not been much experience  
53 in using seasonal climate forecast information to prepare for extreme events although there is experience on using  
54 seasonal forecasts as a means for dealing with annual variability that is expected to shift with climate change (see

1 Box 5-5) ((Hellmuth *et al.*, 2007)(Patt *et al.*, 2009)). A response by the IFRC in the West/Central Africa Zone  
2 (WCAZ) shows how they issued the first emergency appeal based on a seasonal forecast of expected intense rainfall  
3 and pre-positioned relief items, developed flood contingency plans and launched pre-emergency funding requests  
4 ((IFRC),International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2009; Suarez, 2009)). Setting up  
5 plans in advance enabled communication systems to be strengthened before the extreme event struck, so that when it  
6 did information was passed from national headquarters to regional focal points, to the districts, to community  
7 leaders and on to communities ((IFRC),International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,  
8 2009)).  
9

10 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-5 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
11

12 **Box 5-5. Case Study – Small-Scale Farmers Adapting to Climate Change (Northern Cape, South Africa):**  
13 **Taking Collective Action to Improve Livelihoods Strategies**  
14

15 The Northern Cape Province, South Africa, is a harsh landscape, with frequent and severe droughts and extreme  
16 conditions for the people, animals and plants living there. This has long had a negative impact on small-scale  
17 rooibos farmers living in some of the more marginal production areas. Rooibos is an indigenous crop that is well  
18 adapted to the prevailing hot, dry summer conditions, but is sensitive to prolonged drought. Rooibos tea has become  
19 well-accepted on world markets, but this success has brought little improvement to marginalised small-scale  
20 producers.  
21

22 In 2001 a small group of farmers decided to take collaborative action to improve their livelihoods and founded the  
23 Heiveld Co-operative Ltd. Initially established as a trading co-operative to help the farmers produce and market their  
24 tea jointly, it subsequently became apparent that the local organisation was also an important vehicle for social  
25 change in the wider community ((Oetlé *et al.*, 2004)). The Heiveld became a repository and source of local and  
26 scientific knowledge related to sustainable rooibos production.  
27

28 Adaptation that builds on local knowledge, responds to local conditions and is driven by the positive energy of  
29 affected communities creates sustained resilience in the face of environmental, economic and social change. Local  
30 capacities have been strengthened, and the local organisation (the Heiveld Co-operative) has been able to expand its  
31 networks – an important and necessary aspect of increasing resilience in challenging times.  
32

33 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-5 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
34

35 In order to strengthen the integration of climate information at the local level, better systems are necessary. A  
36 systematic restructuring is needed in order for the humanitarian community to absorb and act on climate information  
37 that is currently available ((Suarez, 2009)). Part of the challenge is in translating output from climate change  
38 scenarios and seasonal climate forecasts into decisions on whether humanitarian organizations should act or not.  
39 Climate information has a complex set of data including figures, tables and technical statements, yet at the local  
40 level organisations determine their response if probability of the hazard is high enough and if too many people are at  
41 risk. Communication strategies are needed to ensure that climate information about impending threats can be  
42 synthesized and translated into decisions and actions ((Suarez, 2009)).  
43

44 The second response to strengthening community-based disaster risk management in a climate change context has  
45 been to focus on community-based adaptation (CBA), where the community is involved in deciding how they want  
46 to prepare for climate risks and coordinate community action to achieve adaptation to climate change ((Ebi, 2008)).  
47 Part of this entails community risk assessment (CRA) for climate change adaptation that assesses the hazards,  
48 vulnerabilities and capacities of the community ( (Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008)), which has also been called community  
49 based disaster preparedness (CBDP) among other names ((Allen, 2006)). The intention is to foster active  
50 participation in collecting information that is rooted in the communities and enables affected people to participate in  
51 their own recovery through enhancing resilience by strengthening social-institutional measures including social  
52 relations ((Allen, 2006)). In assessing short and long term climate risks, the input from and needs of vulnerable  
53 groups are often excluded, which is clearly seen in the NAPAs where the urban poor seldom feature ((Douglas *et al.*,  
54 2009)). The tools for engaging vulnerable groups in the process include transect walks and risk maps that capture the

1 climate related hazards and risks ((Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008)) and storylines about possible future climate change  
2 impacts ((Ebi, 2008)), although these tools often require input from participants external to the community with  
3 long-term climate information ((Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008)).  
4

5 The challenges in using community-based adaptation approaches include the challenge of scaling up information,  
6 the fact that it is resource-intensive ((Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008; Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008)) and that unintended  
7 disempowerment does occur at times ((Allen, 2006)). The integration of climate change information increases this  
8 challenge as it introduces an additional layer of uncertainty ((Allen, 2006)) and may conflict with the principle of  
9 keeping CBA simple ((Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008)). There is little evidence that secondary data on climate change has  
10 been used in CBA, partly because of the challenge of limited access to downscaled climate change scenarios  
11 relevant at the local level ((Ziervogel and Zermoglio, 2009)) and because of the uncertainty of projections.  
12

13 Examples of CBA illustrate some of the processes involved. In northern Bangladesh, a Practical Action flooding  
14 adaptation project helped to establish early warning committees within villages that linked to organizations outside  
15 the community, with which they did not usually interact and that have historically blocked collective action and  
16 resource distribution ((Ensor and Berger, 2009)). Through this revised governance structure the building of small  
17 roads, digging culverts and planting trees to alleviate flood impacts was facilitated. In Portland, Oregon, the City  
18 Repair project engaged a range of actors to reduce the impact of urban heat islands through engaging neighborhoods  
19 and linking them to experts to install green roofs, urban vegetation and fountains that simultaneously increased a  
20 sense of ownership in the improvements ((Ebi, 2008)(Ebi, 2008)). In the Philippines, the CBDP approach enabled a  
21 deeper understanding of local-specific vulnerability than previous disaster management contexts, which they argue  
22 is critical because of the diverse impacts of climate change as compared to isolated disaster events ((Allen, 2006)).  
23 However, these community-based approaches should be viewed as part of a wider system that addresses multiple  
24 scales.  
25

26 Under climate change, CBA responses are likely to be beneficial and need increased support ). The need for  
27 coordinated collective action was seen in Kampala, where land cover change and changing climate is increasing the  
28 frequency and severity of urban flooding ((Douglas *et al.*, 2009)). Existing activities were uncoordinated although  
29 some collective action was undertaken to clear drainage channels. However, residents felt that much could be done  
30 to adapt to frequent flooding including increasing awareness of roles and responsibilities in averting floods,  
31 improving the drainage system, garbage and solid waste disposal as well as strengthening the building inspection  
32 unit and enforcing bylaws on the construction of houses and sanitation facilities. Similarly, in Accra, residents felt  
33 that municipal laws on planning and urban design need to be enforced suggesting that strong links are needed  
34 between community responses and municipal responses.  
35  
36

#### 37 5.3.5.2. *Communicating Disaster Risk* 38

39 Both anticipating and responding to risk entails communications between communities, public officials, and experts  
40 (see 5.2.1). However, communicating the extreme impacts of climate change presents an important and difficult  
41 challenge ((Moser and Dilling, 2007)). A burgeoning field of research explores the barriers to communicating the  
42 impacts of climate change to motivate constructive behaviors and policy choices ((Frumkin and McMichael, 2008)).  
43 Research has shown that when delivering messages, those targeted to specific audiences are more likely to be  
44 effective ((Maibach *et al.*, 2008)). In addition, communication is likely to be more effective when the information  
45 regarding risk does not exceed the capacity for coping and therefore galvanizes resilience ((Fritze *et al.*, 2008)).  
46 Some research has suggested that a focus on personal risk of specific damages of climate change is a central element  
47 in motivating interest and behavior change ((Leiserowitz, 2007)). In addition, indicating threats to future generations  
48 may generate more concern than mentioning other climate change impacts ((Maibach *et al.*, 2008)(Maibach *et al.*,  
49 2008)).  
50

51 The characteristics of messages within risk communications that have a significant impact on local adoption of  
52 adjustments involve information quality (specificity, consistency, and source certainty) and information  
53 reinforcement (number of warnings) (; (Mileti and O'Brien, 1992; Mileti and Fitzpatrick, 1993; O'Brien and Mileti,  
54 1992)). As used here, the term *risk communication* refers to intentional efforts on the part of one or more sources

1 (e.g., international agencies, national governments, local government) to provide information about hazards and  
 2 hazard adjustments through a variety of channels to different audience segments (e.g., the general public, specific  
 3 at-risk communities). Researchers have long recognized different sources as being peers (friends, relatives,  
 4 neighbors, and coworkers), news media, and/or authorities ((Drabek, 1986)). These sources systematically differ in  
 5 terms of such characteristics as perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility ((Lindell and  
 6 Perry, 1992; Lindell and Whitney, 2000; Pulwarty, 2007)). Risk area residents use channels for different purposes:  
 7 the internet, radio and television are useful for immediate updates; meetings are useful for clarifying questions; and  
 8 newspapers and brochures are useful for retaining information that might be needed later.  
 9

10 Risk messages also vary in threat specificity, guidance specificity, repetition, consistency, certainty, clarity,  
 11 accuracy, and sufficiency ((Lindell and Perry, 2004; Mileti and Sorensen, 1990; Mileti and Peek, 2002)). The need  
 12 to understand the usability of scientific information, especially at the local level, has received much attention from  
 13 a communications perspective but little from an organizational perspective. There has been little systematic  
 14 investigation, for example, on message effectiveness in prompting action based on differing characteristics such as  
 15 the precision of message dissemination, penetration into normal activities, message specificity, message distortion,  
 16 rate of dissemination over time, receiver characteristics, sender requirements, and feedback ((Lindell and Perry,  
 17 1992; NRC (National Research Council), 2006)). Receiver characteristics include previous hazard experience,  
 18 preexisting beliefs about the hazard and protective actions, and personality traits. In addition, demographic  
 19 characteristics—such as gender, age, education, income, ethnicity, marital status, and family size play strong roles.  
 20 Within several countries (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland) it was found that timely issuance remains a key  
 21 weakness in climate information systems especially for communication passed on to communities from the national  
 22 early warning units. There was also too much reliance on one-way devices for communication (such as the radio),  
 23 which were felt to be inadequate for agricultural applications (for example, farmers are not able to ask further  
 24 questions regarding the information provided) ((Ziervogel, 2004)). Within many rural communities, low bandwidth  
 25 and poor computing infrastructure pose serious constraints to risk message receipt.  
 26

27 The degree of acceptability of information and trust in the providers, dictate the context of communicating climate  
 28 information (see Box 5-6). Lindell and Perry ((Lindell and Perry, 2004)4) summarized the available research as  
 29 indicating message effects include pre-decisional processes (reception, attention, and comprehension). Several  
 30 studies have identified the characteristics of pre-decisional practices that lead to effective communication over the  
 31 long-term ((Cutter, 2001; Fischhoff, 1992; Pulwarty, 2007)). These include: 1) Understanding of the goals,  
 32 objectives, and constraints of communities in the target system; 2) Mapping practical pathways to different  
 33 outcomes can be carried out as a co-production strategy among research, extension and farmer communities; 3)  
 34 Bringing the delivery persons (e.g. extension personnel), research community etc.) to an understanding of what has  
 35 to be done to translate current information into usable information; 4) Interacting with actual and potential users to  
 36 better understand informational needs, desired formats of information, timeliness of delivery etc.; 5) Assessing  
 37 impediments and opportunities to the flow of information including issues of credibility, legitimacy, compatibility  
 38 (appropriate scale, content, match with existing practice) and acceptability; and 6) Relying on existing  
 39 stakeholders' networks and organizations to disseminate and assess climate information and forecasts.  
 40

41 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-6 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
 42

### 43 **Box 5-6. Successful Communication of Local Risk-Based Climate Information**

44  
 45 The following questions have been identified as shaping the successful communication of risk-based climate  
 46 information ((Ascher, 1978; Fischhoff, 1992; Pulwarty, 2003)).  
 47

48 What do people already know and believe about the risks being posed?

49 What has been the past experience/outcomes of information use?

50 Is the new information *relevant* for decisions in the particular community?

51 Are the sources/providers of information *credible* to the intended user?

52 Are practitioners (e.g. farmers) *receptive* to the information and to research?

53 Is the information *accessible* to the decision maker?

54 Is the information *compatible* with existing decision models e.g. for farming practice?

1 Does the community (or individuals in the community) have the *capacity* to use information?  
2

3 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-6 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
4

5 Communications that include social, interpersonal, physical environmental, and policy factors can foster civic  
6 engagement and social change fundamental to reducing risk ((Brulle, 2010). A participatory approach highlights the  
7 need for two-way communication that engenders credibility, trust and cooperation ((NRC (National Research  
8 Council), 1989)(Frumkin and McMichael, 2008)), which are especially important in high-stress situations such as  
9 extreme impacts of climate change ((NRC (National Research Council), 1989)). For example, participatory video  
10 production is effective in communicating the extreme impacts of climate change ((Suarez *et al.*, 2008)).  
11 Participatory video involves a community or group in creating their own videos through story-boarding and  
12 production ((Lunch, N. and Lunch, C., 2006)). Such projects are traditionally used in contexts, such as poor  
13 communities, where there are constraints to accurate climate information ((Patt and Gawa, 2002)). Engaging with  
14 community leaders or opinions leaders in accessing social networks through which to distribute information is  
15 another approach, traditionally used by health educators but also applicable to the translation of climate risks in a  
16 community context ((Maibach *et al.*, 2008)). These types of communication projects can motivate community action  
17 necessary to promote preparedness ((Jacobs *et al.*, 2009; Semenza, 2005)).  
18

19 Visualizing methods such as mapping, cartographic animations, and graphic representations are also used to engage  
20 with stakeholders who may be impacted by extreme events ((Shaw *et al.*, 2009)). Many programs are developing  
21 ways to use visualizations to help decision-makers adapt to a changing environment, suggesting that such tools can  
22 increase climate literacy ((Niepold *et al.*, 2008)). Visualizations can be powerful tools, but issues of validity,  
23 subjectivity, and interpretation must be seriously considered in such work ((Nicholson-Cole, 2004)). These  
24 communications are most effective when they take local experiences or points of view and locally-relevant places  
25 into account ((O'Neill and Ebi, 2009)). Little evaluation has been done of visualization projects, therefore leaving a  
26 gap in understanding of how to most effectively communicate future risks of extreme events.  
27

28 Part of the research gap regarding communication stems from the lack of communication projects that can be tested  
29 and shown to affect preparedness. On the most basic level, there is considerable understanding of the information  
30 needed for preparing for disasters, but less specific understanding of what information is necessary to generate  
31 community preparedness for climate change ((Fischhoff, 2007)). As observed by Finan ((Finan and Nelson, 2001)),  
32 the very discussion of climate forecasts and projections within potentially impacted communities has served as a  
33 vehicle for democratizing the drought discourse in Ceara (Northeast Brazil). Developing a seamless continuum  
34 across emergency responses, preparedness, and coping and adaptation requires insight into the demands that  
35 different types of disasters will place upon the community and the need to perform basic emergency functions--pre-  
36 event assessments, proactive hazards mitigation, incident management ((Lindell and Perry, 1996)). Preparing for  
37 short-term disasters enhances the capacity to adapt to longer term climate change.  
38

#### 39 40 5.3.5.3. *Community Empowerment and Leadership* 41

42 A critical factor in community based disaster risk reduction is that community members are empowered to take  
43 control of the processes involved. Marginalization ((Adger and Kelly, 1999); (Polack, 2008)(Mustafa, 1998)) and  
44 disempowerment ((Hewitt, 1997); (Mustafa, 1998)) are critical factors in creating vulnerability and efforts to reduce  
45 these characteristics play an important role in building resilient communities. Empowerment refers to giving  
46 community members control over their lives with support from outside ((Sagala *et al.*, 2009)). This requires external  
47 facilitators to respect community structures, traditional and local knowledge systems, to assist but not take a  
48 dominating role, to share knowledge and to learn from community members ((Petal *et al.*, 2008)). A key element in  
49 empowering communities is building trust between the community and the external facilitators ((Sagala *et al.*,  
50 2009)). It is also important to note that communities have choices from a range of disaster management options  
51 ((Mercer *et al.*, 2008)). Empowerment in community based disaster risk management may also be applied to groups  
52 within communities whose voice may otherwise not be heard or who are in greater positions of vulnerability  
53 ((Wisner *et al.*, 2004)). These include women ((Bari, 1998); (Clifton and Gell, 2001); (Polack, 2008)(Wiest *et al.*,  
54 1994)) and disabled people ((Wisner, 2002)).

1  
2 Another key element of empowerment is ownership of the issue ((Buvinić *et al.*, 1999)). This applies to all aspects  
3 of disaster management, from the ownership of a disaster itself so that the community has control of relief and  
4 reconstruction, to a local project to improve preparedness. Empowerment and ownership ensure that local needs are  
5 met, that community cohesion is sustained and a greater chance of success of the disaster management process.  
6

#### 7 8 5.3.5.4. *Social Drivers* 9

10 Localized social norms, social capital, and social networks shape behaviors and actions before, during, and after  
11 extreme events. Each of these factors both operates on their own and in some cases also intersects with the others.  
12 As vulnerability to disasters and climate change is socially-constructed (Chapter 2) ((Adger and Kelly, 1999)), the  
13 breakdown of collective action often leads to increased vulnerability. For example, coastal Northern Vietnam's  
14 institutional breakdown due to its economic transition has led to greater vulnerability to climate extremes ((Adger,  
15 1999)).  
16

17 Social norms are rules and patterns of behavior that reflect expectations of a particular social group ((Horne, 2001)).  
18 Norms structure many different kinds of action regarding climate change ((Pettenger, 2007)). Norms are embedded  
19 in formal institutional responses, as well as to smaller, informal groups that encounter disasters ((Raschky, 2008)).  
20 Norms of reciprocity, trust, and associations that bridge social divisions are a central part of social cohesion that  
21 fosters community capacity ((Kawachi and Berkman, 2000)). In the occurrence of extreme events, affected groups  
22 interact with one another in an attempt to develop a set of norms appropriate to the situation, otherwise known as  
23 emergent norm theory of collective behavior ((NRC (National Research Council), 2006)). This is true of those first  
24 affected at the local level whose norms and related social capital affect capacity for response ((Dolan and Walker,  
25 2004)).  
26

27 Social capital is a multifaceted concept that captures a variety of social engagement within the community that  
28 bonds people and generates a positive collective value. It is suggested as an important element in the face of climate  
29 extremes because community social resources such as networks, social obligations, trust, and shared expectations  
30 create social capital to prevent, prepare, and cope with disasters ((Dynes, 2006)). In climate change adaptation,  
31 scholars and policymakers increasingly promote social capital as a long-term adaptation strategy ((Adger, 2003;  
32 Pelling and High, 2005)). Social capital, however, can be driven by internal social networks and is oftentimes a  
33 function of the extent of community know-how and networks, which could become self-referential and insular  
34 ((Dale and Newman, 2010; Portes and Landolt, 1996)). This results in a closed society that lacks of innovation and  
35 diversity essential for climate change adaptation. Disaster itself is overwhelming, and can lead to the erosion of  
36 social capital and the demise of the community ((Ritchie and Gill, 2007)). This invites external engagement beyond  
37 local-level treatment of the disaster and extreme events ((Brondizio *et al.*, 2009)(Cheong, 2010)). The inflow of  
38 external aids, expertise, and the emergence of new groups to cope with disaster are indicative of the necessity of  
39 bridging and linking social capital beyond local boundaries.  
40

41 Social capital is embedded in social networks ((Lin, 2001)), or the social structure composed of individuals and  
42 organizations through multiple types of dependency, such as kinship, financial exchange, or prestige ((Wellman and  
43 Berkowitz, 1988)). Social networks provide a diversity of functions, such as facilitate sharing of expertise and  
44 resources across stakeholders ((Crabbé, 2006)). Networks can function to promote messages within communities  
45 through preventive advocacy, or the engagement of advocates in promoting preventive behavior ((Weibel,  
46 1988)(Weibel, 1988)). Information about health risks has often been effectively distributed through a social network  
47 structure using opinion leaders as a guide ((Valente and Davis, 1999; Valente *et al.*, 2003)), and has promising  
48 application for changing behavior regarding climate adaptation ((Maibach *et al.*, 2008)). It is important to note that  
49 more potential has been shown in influencing behavior through community-level interventions than through  
50 individual-level directives at the population level ((Kawachi and Berkman, 2000)). Therefore, communities with  
51 stronger social networks are more likely to be prepared for extreme climate impacts because of access to information  
52 and social support ((Buckland and Rahman, 1999)).  
53

1 At the same time, it is important to note that social networks can also function to discourage effective adaptation to  
2 extreme events. External support, such as financial resources, may actually create inequalities amongst community  
3 members resulting in contention and weakened social networks ((Ford *et al.*, 2006)). The utilization of social  
4 networks can also be prevented by the status of particular social groups, such as illegal and legal settlers or  
5 immigrants ((Wisner *et al.*, 2004)). Other social and environmental contextual factors must be considered when  
6 conceptualizing the role of social networks in managing extreme events. For example, strong social networks have  
7 facilitated adaptability in Inuit communities, but are being undermined by the dissolution of traditional ways of life  
8 ((Ford *et al.*, 2006)).  
9

#### 10 11 5.3.5.5. *Integrating Local Knowledge* 12

13 Local and traditional knowledge is increasingly valued as important information to include when preparing for  
14 disasters ((McAdoo *et al.*, 2009; Shaw *et al.*, 2009)). It is embedded in local culture and social interactions and  
15 transmitted orally over generations ((Berkes, 2008)). Place-based memory of vulnerable areas, know-how for  
16 responding to recurrent extreme events, and detection of abnormal environmental conditions manifest the power of  
17 local knowledge. Because local knowledge is often tacit and invisible to outsiders, it is used to reveal and enhance  
18 community participation in disaster management ((Battista and Baas, 2004)). Turner *et al.* ((Turner and Clifton,  
19 2009)) state that participation of indigenous peoples provides local knowledge, and other alternative adaptation  
20 approaches. Local knowledge is also an important anchor for communities in relating to external knowledge such as  
21 scientific knowledge and national policies. In many places where local knowledge is used, communities set up  
22 trusted intermediaries to transfer and communicate external knowledge such as a technology-based early warning  
23 system and incorporate into the local knowledge system ((Bamdad, 2005; Kristjanson *et al.*, 2009)).  
24

25 Within a climate change context, indigenous people, who are long-term residents who have often conserved their  
26 resources *in situ*, provide important information about changing environmental conditions ((Salick and Ross,  
27 2009)(Turner and Clifton, 2009)) as well as actively adapting to the changes ((Macchi *et al.*, 2008; Salick and Byg,  
28 2007)). Research is emerging in helping to document changes that indigenous people (people living with local and  
29 traditional cultures)((Salick and Ross, 2009)) are experiencing ((Ensor and Berger, 2009)(Ensor and Berger, 2009)).  
30 Although this evidence might be similar to scientific observations from external researchers, the fact that local  
31 communities are observing it is initiating discussions existing and potential adaptation to these changes from within  
32 the community ((Byg and Salick, 2009)). In six villages in eastern Tibet, near Mt. Khawa Karpo, documentation of  
33 changes experienced by local indigenous groups were consistent across areas, such as warmer temperatures, less  
34 snow, and glacial retreat, whereas other observations were more varied, including those for river levels and landslide  
35 incidences ((Byg and Salick, 2009)). In Gitga'at (Coast Tsimshian) Nation of Hartley Bay, British Columbia,  
36 indigenous people are noticing the decline of some species but also new appearances of others, anomalies in weather  
37 patterns and declining health of forests and grasslands that have affected their ability to harvest food ((Turner and  
38 Clifton, 2009)).  
39

40 One of the challenges of biodiversity changes related to the climate is that many indigenous people depend on the  
41 variety of wild plants, crops and their environments particularly in times of disaster ((Turner and Clifton, 2009)).  
42 Changes in biodiversity are threatening historical coping strategies. There are numerous other challenges that  
43 indigenous people have to face in coping with climate change. In dryland areas such as in Namibia and Botswana  
44 one of the indigenous strategies best adapted to frequent droughts is livestock herding, including nomadic  
45 pastoralism ((Ericksen *et al.*, 2008)). Decreased access to water sources through fencing and privatization has  
46 inhibited this robust strategy. Also in Botswana, it has been suggested that government policies have weakened  
47 traditional institutions and practices, as they have not adequately engaged with local community institutions and  
48 therefore the mechanisms for redistributing resources have not been strengthened sufficiently ((Dube and Sekhwela,  
49 2008)).  
50  
51  
52

### 5.3.5.6. Local Government and Non-Government Initiatives and Practices

Governance structures are pivotal as they help shape efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy of responses ((Adger *et al.*, 2003)). Current climate change management practices have tended to be centralized at the national level. This may be, in part, due to the ways in which many climate extremes affect environmental systems that cross political boundaries resulting in discordance if solely locally managed ((Cash and Moser, 2000)). Actions generated within and managed by communities, however, can be most effective since they are context-specific and tailored to local environments. If multiple levels of planning are to be implemented, mechanisms for facilitation and guidance on the local level are needed in order that procedural justice is guaranteed during the implementation of national policies at the local scale ((Thomas and Twyman, 2005)). In this light, local governments play an important role as they are responsible for providing infrastructure, preparing and responding to disasters, developing and enforcing planning, and connecting national government programs with local communities ((Huq *et al.*, 2007; UNISDR, 2009)). The quality and provision of these services have an impact on disaster and climate risk ((Tanner *et al.*, 2009)). Effective localized planning, for example, can minimize both the causes and consequences of climate change ((Bulkeley, 2006)). (Tanner *et al.*, 2009)

Though local government–led climate adaptation policies and initiatives are less pronounced than climate change mitigation measures, a growing number of cities are developing adaptation plans, though few have implemented their strategies ((Heinrichs, 2009); (Birkmann *et al.*, in press; Birkmann *et al.*, in press)). The Greater London Authority ((Greater London Authority, 2010)), for example, has prepared a Public Consultation Draft of their climate change adaptation strategy for London. The focus of this is on the changing risk of flood, drought and heat waves through the century and actions for managing them. Some of the actions include improvement in managing surface water flood risk, an urban greening program to buffer the impacts from floods and hot weather, and retrofitting homes to improve the water and energy efficiency.

An assessment of the current state of progress on adaptation in eight cities (Bogotá, Cape Town, Delhi, Perl River Delta, Pune, Santiago, Sao Paulo and Singapore) suggests that adaptation tend to support existing disaster management strategies ((Heinrichs, 2009)). Another study comparing adaptation plans in nine cities including Boston, Cape Town, Halifax, Ho Chi Minh City, London, New York, Rotterdam, Singapore, and Toronto suggests that these cities' adaptation plans focus mostly on risk reduction and the protection of citizens and infrastructure, with Rotterdam seeing adaptation as opportunity for transformation ((Birkmann *et al.*, in press)). Most of these strategies have been led by Mayor's offices or environment departments. These nine cities have focused more on expected biophysical impacts than on socio-economic impacts and have not had a strong focus on vulnerability and the associated susceptibility or coping capacity. Although they aim to be integrated, they tend to have sectoral responses. Unfortunately with many of these cases, there is a good understanding of the impacts associated but the implementation of policy and outcomes on the ground are harder to see ((Bulkeley, 2006); (Burch and Robinson, 2007)).

In these adaptation strategies, the size of the local government is important, and it varies depending on the population and location. Primate and large cities exert more independence, whereas smaller municipalities depend more on higher levels of the government units, and often form associations to pool their resources ((Lundqvist, 2008)). In the latter case, state mandated programs and state-generated grants are the main incentives to formulate mitigation policies ((Aall, C., K. Groven, G. Lindseth, 2007)) and can be applicable to adaptation policies. Lack of resources and capabilities lead to outsourcing of local adaptation plans, and can generate insensitive and unrefined local solutions and technological fixes ((Crabbé, 2006)). To address this problem, participatory approaches are used to generate integrated assessments at the local level of vulnerabilities and formulate adaptation action plans.

The history and process of decentralization are also significant in the capacity of the local government to formulate and implement adaptation policies. Aligning local climate adaptation policies with the state/provincial and national/federal units is a significant challenge for local governments ((Van Aalst *et al.*, 2008)). Instead of the scaling up from localized assessments to national-level plans, communities often adopt mainstream climate change into the existing national and local policies ((Roberts, 2008)).

1 Although government actors play a key role, it is evident that non-government actors are crucial as well. While  
2 international agencies and NGOs play a norm-setting agenda at provincial, state, and national levels, community-  
3 based organizations (CBOs) often have greater capacity to mobilize at the local scale ((Milbert, 2006)). NGO and  
4 CBO networks play a critical role in capturing the realities of local livelihoods, facilitating sharing information, and  
5 identifying the role of local institutions that lead to strengthened local capacity ((Bull-Kamanga *et al.*, 2003)).  
6 Strong city-wide initiatives are often based on strategic alliances and local community organizations are essential to  
7 operationalizing city planning ((Hasan, 2007)(Hasan, 2007)).

8  
9 Many non-government actors charged with managing climate risks use community risk assessment tools to engage  
10 communities in risk reduction efforts and influence planning at local and sub-national levels ((van Aalst, 2006)).  
11 NGO engagement in risk management activities ranges from demonstration projects, training and awareness-raising,  
12 legal assistance, alliance building, small-scale infrastructure, socio-economic projects, and mainstreaming and  
13 advocacy work ((Luna, 2001) (Shaw, 2006)). Bridging citizen-government gaps is a recognised role of civil society  
14 organisations and NGOs often act as social catalysts or social capital, an essential for risk management in cities  
15 ((Wisner, 2003)). Conversely, the potential benefits of social capital are not always maximised due to mistrust, poor  
16 communications or dysfunctionalities either within municipalities or non-government agencies. This has major  
17 implications for risk reduction ((Wisner, 2003)) and participation of the most vulnerable in non-government  
18 initiatives at municipal or sub-national level is not guaranteed ((Tanner *et al.*, 2009)).

#### 21 **5.4. Challenges and Opportunities**

22  
23 There are two key principles in disaster risk reduction that are applicable to climate change adaptation: 1)  
24 mainstreaming disaster prevention and mitigation into normal policies addressing social welfare, quality of life,  
25 infrastructure, and livelihoods; and 2) incorporating an all-hazards approach into planning and action. Disaster  
26 reduction is not only about reducing risks and exposure, but also includes systematic efforts to analyze and manage  
27 the causal factors of disasters by lessening societal vulnerability, improving land and environmental stewardship,  
28 improving preparedness, and enhancing societal resilience ((Bohle and Warner, 2008; Wisner, 2003)). Each presents  
29 challenges and opportunities for adaptation to climate extremes.

##### 32 **5.4.1. Differences in Coping and Risk Management**

33  
34 There are significant differences among communities and population groups in the ability to prepare for, respond to,  
35 recover from and adapt to disasters and climate extremes. For nearly sixty years, social science researchers have  
36 examined those factors that influence coping responses by households and communities through post-disaster field  
37 investigations as well as pre-disaster assessments ((Mileti, 1999; NRC (National Research Council), 2006)). Among  
38 the most significant individual characteristics are gender, age, wealth, ethnicity, livelihoods, entitlements, and health  
39 in the context of urban/rural divide. However, it is not only these characteristics operating individually, but also their  
40 synergistic effects that give rise to variability in coping and managing risks.

##### 43 **5.4.1.1. Gender**

44  
45 The literature suggests that at the local level gender makes a difference in vulnerability (Chapter 2), but it is also  
46 important in coping and risk management. In disasters, women tend to have different coping strategies and  
47 constraints on actions than men ((Peacock *et al.*, 2000)(Morrow and Enarson, 1996)(Fothergill, 1996)). These are  
48 due to the social position (class), marital status, education, wealth, and their caregiver roles. At the local level for  
49 example, women's lack of mobility and social isolation found in many places across the globe tend to augment risk,  
50 exposure, and vulnerability ((League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1991; League of Red Cross and Red  
51 Crescent Societies, 1991; Mutton and Haque, 2004; Mutton and Haque, 2004; Schroeder, 1987)). Relief and  
52 recovery operations are often insensitive to gender issues, and so the provision of such supplies and services also  
53 influences the differential capacities to cope ((Enarson, 2000)(Fulu, 2007); (Ariyabandu, 2006; Wachtendorf *et al.*,  
54 2006)).

#### 5.4.1.2. Age

Age acts as an important factor in coping with disaster risk ((Cherry, 2009)). In North America, for example, retired people often choose to live in hazardous locations such as Florida or Baja California because of warmer weather and lifestyles, which in turn increases their potential exposure to climate-sensitive hazards. At the same time, older people are more prone to ill health, isolation, disabilities, and immobility ((Dershem and Gzirishvili, 1999; Ngo, 2001)), which negatively influence their coping capacities in response to extreme events (see Heat Case Study in Chapter 9). Often because of lack of declining hearing, mental capabilities, or mobility, older persons are less likely to receive warning messages, take protective actions, and are more reluctant to evacuate ((Hewitt, 1997; O'Brien and Mileti, 1992)). However, older people have more experience and wisdom with accumulated know-how on specific disasters/extreme events as well as the enhanced ability to transfer their coping strategies arising from life experiences.

At the other end of the age spectrum are children ((Peek, 2008)). Research has shown significant diminishment of coping skills (and increases in post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychosocial effects) among younger children following Hurricane Katrina ((Weems and Overstreet, 2008) (Barrett *et al.*, 2008). In addition to physical impacts and safety ((Lauten and Lietz, 2008; Weissbecker, I., Sephton, S.E. *et al.*, 2008)(Lauten and Lietz, 2008; Weissbecker, I., Sephton, S.E. *et al.*, 2008)), research also suggests that emotional distress caused by fear of separation from the family, and increased workloads following disasters affects coping responses of children ((Babugura, 2008; Ensor, 2008)). However, the research also suggests that children are quite resilient and can adapt to environmental changes thereby enhancing the adaptive capacity of households and communities ((Pfefferbaum *et al.*, 2008; Williams *et al.*, 2008) (Bartlett, 2008; Manyena *et al.*, 2008; Mitchell *et al.*, 2008; Ronan *et al.*, 2008)).

#### 5.4.1.3. Wealth

The level of wealth at the local level affects the ability of a person/community to prepare for, respond to, and rebound from disaster events ((Masozera *et al.*, 2007)). Wealthier communities have a greater potential for large monetary losses, but at the same time, they have the resources (insurance, income, political cache) to cope with the impacts and recover from extreme events. In Asia, for example, wealth shifted construction practices from wood to masonry which made many of the cities more vulnerable and less able to cope with disaster risk ((Bankoff, 2007)). Poorer communities and populations often live in cheaper hazard-prone locations, and face challenges not only in responding to the event, but also recovering from it. Poverty also enhances disaster risk ((Carter *et al.*, 2007)). In some instances, it is neither the poor nor the rich that face recovery challenges, but rather communities that are in-between such as those not wealthy enough to cope with the disaster risk on their own, but not poor enough to receive full federal or international assistance. The recovery of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina provides one example ((Finch *et al.*, 2010)).

#### 5.4.1.4. Intersectionality of Gender, Class, Age, and Ethnicity

The key characteristics that seem to influence social vulnerability were noted in Chapter 2 and elsewhere (Cutter *et al.*, 2003). However, the individual characteristics of a person/family/community do not, indeed cannot, determine vulnerability to hazard events alone or how the family or community will cope with disaster risk. Rather, it is the interaction between all of these factors across space and through time results in a complicated system of stratification of wealth, power and status ((Heinz Center, 2002)). One of the best examples of this is the human experience with Hurricane Katrina (see Box 5-7): the intersection of race, class, age, and gender influenced differential decision making and perception of hazards; an uneven distribution of vulnerability and exposure resulting in disproportionate disaster losses; diverse types of hazard preparedness and disaster mitigation; and variable access to post-event aid, recovery and reconstruction(Elliott and Pais, 2006; Elliott and Pais, 2006; Hartman and Squires, 2006; Tierney, 2006)).

1 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 5-7 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 3 **Box 5-7. Case Study – Hurricane Katrina Recovery and Reconstruction**

4  
5 Evacuation can protect people from injury and death, but extended evacuations (or temporary displacements lasting  
6 weeks to months) can have negative effects. Prolonged periods of evacuation can result in a number of physical and  
7 mental health problems ({{(Curtis *et al.*, 2007; Mills *et al.*, 2007)}). Furthermore, separation from family and  
8 community members and not knowing when a return home will be possible also adds to stress among evacuees  
9 ((Curtis *et al.*, 2007)Curtis *et al.*, 2007). DeSalvo *et al.* ((DeSalvo *et al.*, 2007)) found that long periods of  
10 displacement were among the key causes of post traumatic stress disorder in a study of New Orleans workers. These  
11 temporary displacements can also lead to permanent outmigration by specific social groups as shown by the  
12 depopulation of New Orleans five years after Hurricane Katrina ((Myers *et al.*, 2008)).

13  
14 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 5-7 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

#### 17 5.4.1.5. *Livelihoods*

18  
19 Livelihood is the generic term for all the capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living. Livelihood  
20 influences how families and communities cope with and recover from stresses and shocks ((Carney, 1998)). For  
21 poor communities living on fragile and degraded lands deteriorating environmental conditions undermine their  
22 livelihoods and capacity to cope with disasters. For example in areas where extreme climates are expected to  
23 increase in duration and frequency, certain community-based development activities, in particular, those that are  
24 characterized as sustainable livelihoods (SL) activities serve to build adaptive capacity and resilience to shocks  
25 ((Osman-Elasha, 2006b)).

26  
27 Protecting and enhancing the natural services that buffer communities from climate impacts and provide them with a  
28 range of assets for coping with shocks will not only address immediate development priorities, but could improve  
29 local capacities to adapt to climate change ((Osman-Elasha, 2008; Spanger-Siegfried *et al.*, 2005)). Sustainable  
30 strategies for disaster reduction help improve livelihoods (UNISDR, 2004)); while social capital, such as community  
31 networks support adaptation and disaster risk reduction by reducing the need for emergency relief in times of  
32 drought and/or crop failure ((Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007)) (see 5.2.5). A research study in South Asia suggests  
33 that adaptive capacity and livelihood resilience depend on social capital at the household level (i.e. education and  
34 other factors that enable individuals to function within a wider economy), the presence or absence of local enabling  
35 institutions (local cooperatives, banks, self-help groups), and the larger physical and social infrastructure that  
36 enables goods, information, services and people to flow. Interventions to catalyze effective adaptation are important  
37 at all these multiple levels ((Moench and and Dixit, 2004)).

#### 40 5.4.1.6. *Entitlements*

41  
42 Extreme climate events generally lead to entitlement decline in terms of the rights and opportunities that local  
43 people have to access and command the livelihood resources that enable them to deal with and adapt to climate  
44 stress. Entitlement decline can affect environmental entitlements ((Leach *et al.*, 1999)), food entitlements ((Sen,  
45 1981)) and, more generally, all the material, social, political and cultural resources that are the basic building blocks  
46 of any coping and adaptation options towards disaster risk and climate stress.

47  
48 The buffering capacities of local people's livelihoods and their institutions are critical for their adaptation to extreme  
49 climate stress. More specifically, adaptive capacities rest on the ability of communities to generate potentials for  
50 self-organization, for social learning and innovations ((Adger *et al.*, 2006)), with a focus on social actors, their  
51 practices and their agency that allow for resilient transformations ((Bohle, H.-G., B. Etzold,M.Keck, 2009)).  
52 Community institutions regulate the access to adaptation resources. Institutions, as purveyors of the rules of the  
53 game ((North, 1990)), mediate the socially differential command over livelihood assets, thus determining protection  
54 or loss of entitlements. These rules are constantly made and remade through local people's social practices, but they

1 are also contested and struggled over ((Bohle, H.-G., B. Etzold, M. Keck, 2009)). Entitlement protection thus requires  
2 adaptive types of institutions and patterns of behaviour ((Bohle, H.-G., B. Etzold, M. Keck, 2009)), with a focus on  
3 local people's agency within specific configurations of power relations. The challenge is therefore, to empower the  
4 most vulnerable to pursue livelihood options that strengthen their entitlements and protect what they themselves  
5 consider the social sources of adaptation and resilience in the face of extreme climate stress.  
6  
7

#### 8 5.4.1.7. *Health and Disability* 9

10 Climate change contributes to 160,000 annual deaths globally due to vector borne diseases, food insecurity, heat  
11 waves and other problems ((Campbell-Lendrum *et al.*, 2003)). The extreme impacts of climate change (Chapters 3  
12 and 4) are likely to directly or indirectly affect the health of many populations. Mortality rates may increase, and  
13 morbidity of a diversity of illnesses can increase. Extreme temperature rise leads to heatstroke, while  
14 cardiopulmonary problems and respiratory illness are linked to shifts in air pollution concentrations such as ozone  
15 ((Bernard *et al.*, 2001)). Extreme heat events differentially affect populations based on their race, gender, age ((Díaz  
16 *et al.*, 2002)), and medical and socioeconomic status (McGeehin and Mirabelli 2001), consequently raising concerns  
17 about health inequalities (see Chapter 9 case study). Vector-borne illnesses are projected to increase in geographic  
18 reach and severity as temperatures increase ((McMichael *et al.*, 2006)). As seasons lengthen, mosquitoes and other  
19 vectors begin to inhabit areas previously free from such vectors of transmission. A range of vector-borne illnesses  
20 has been linked to climate, including malaria, dengue, Hantavirus, Bluetongue, Ross River Virus, and cholera (Patz  
21 *et al.* 1996).  
22

23 The disaster literature generally discusses public health and disability as important in the response (post event) phase  
24 of the event cycle ((Shoaf and Rottmann, 2000)). Literature in the public health field also suggests that pre-existing  
25 health conditions can exacerbate the impact of disaster events since these populations are more susceptible to  
26 additional injuries from disaster impacts ((Brauer, 1999); (Brown, 1999; Parati *et al.*, 2001)). Pre-event health  
27 conditions/disabilities can also lead to subsequent communicable diseases and illnesses in the short term, to lasting  
28 chronic illnesses, and to longer term mental health conditions ((Shoaf and Rottmann, 2000)(Bourque *et al.*, 2006;  
29 Few and Matthies, 2006)).  
30

31 There are few consistent databases for monitoring mortality from natural hazards ((Borden and Cutter, 2008;  
32 Thacker *et al.*, 2008)). However, two recent all-hazards studies for the U.S. found from 1970-2004, climate-sensitive  
33 hazards (severe weather in the summer and winter, and heat) accounted for the majority of recorded fatalities from  
34 natural hazards. Geographically, fatalities were greatest in the coastal counties bordering the Gulf of Mexico and  
35 South Atlantic (the U.S. hurricane coast), in rural counties, and in the American South ((Borden and Cutter, 2008)).  
36  
37

#### 38 5.4.1.8. *Urban/Rural* 39

40 Settlement patterns are another factor that influences disaster risk management and coping with extremes. In many  
41 countries, rural livelihoods and poverty are the drivers of disaster risk and this will intensify under climate extremes.  
42 Poverty, resource scarcity, and access to resources constrains disaster risk management and when coupled with  
43 climate variability, conflict, and health issues further compounds the coping capacity of rural places ((UNISDR,  
44 2009)). At the other extreme are the concentrated settlements of cities where the disaster risks are magnified because  
45 of population densities, poor living conditions including overcrowded and substandard housing, lack of sanitation  
46 and clean water, and health impairments from pollution among others issues ((Bull-Kamanga *et al.*, 2003; De  
47 Sherbinin *et al.*, 2007)). Strengthening local capacity in terms of housing, infrastructure, and disaster preparedness is  
48 one mechanism shown to improve urban resilience, and the adaptive capacity of cities to climate-sensitive hazards  
49 ((Pelling, 2003)).  
50

51 Given the rapid rate of growth in the largest of the world's cities, called megacities and mega-regions, the disaster  
52 risks will increase in the next decade placing more people in harm's way with untold billions of dollars in  
53 infrastructure located in highly exposed areas ((Wenzel *et al.*, 2007); (Kraas *et al.*, 2005);(Munich Re Group,  
54 2004)). The complex and dynamic interaction between social, economic, political, and environmental processes

1 insures that when a disaster strikes one of these megacities or mega-regions, there will be catastrophic losses of  
2 lives, property, and economic wealth resulting in major humanitarian crises ((Mitchell, 1999)).  
3

4 For many regions, the ability to limit exposure has already been achieved through building codes, land management,  
5 and structural mitigation, yet losses keep increasing. For disaster reduction to become more effective, megacities  
6 will need to address their societal vulnerability and the driving forces that produce it (rural to urban migration,  
7 livelihood pattern changes, wealth inequities). Many megacities have reached their tipping points, and are seriously  
8 compromised in their ability to prepare for and respond to present disasters, let alone adapt to future ones influenced  
9 by climate change ((Heinrichs, 2009; World Bank, 2009);(Fuchs, 2009)).  
10

#### 11 12 **5.4.2. *Costs of Managing Disaster Risk and Risk from Climate Extremes*** 13

14 Large-scale disasters can cause considerable economic damage, on the order of magnitude of one percentage point  
15 of total wealth or several percentage points of GDP, which could threaten economic growth ((ADB, 2003); (Stern,  
16 2007; Stern, 2007)(Cummins and Mahul, 2008)). Studies demonstrated that disaster prevention and mitigation can  
17 pay high dividends. For example Mechler (Mechler, 2005) found that for every Euro invested broadly in risk  
18 management, 2 to 4 Euros were returned in terms of avoided or reduced disaster impacts on life, property, the  
19 economy and the environment). In the United States, the Multihazard Mitigation Council found that for every dollar  
20 invested in pre-impact mitigation activities, four dollars were saved in potential losses ((Multihazard Mitigation  
21 Council, 2005)). There is a growing recognition of the potential role of social protection as a response to the  
22 multiple risks and stressors associated with disaster management and climate extremes, however little is known  
23 about local practices and cost-savings.  
24

##### 25 26 **5.4.2.1. *Costs of Impacts, Costs of Post-Event Responses*** 27

28 It is extremely difficult to assess the total cost of a large scale event, such as Hurricane Katrina, especially at the  
29 local scale. Direct and indirect losses are two ways to account for the costs of impact (see Chapter 4). Direct losses  
30 can be separated into direct market losses and direct non-market losses (intangible losses). They include health  
31 impacts, loss of lives, natural asset damages and ecosystem losses, and damages to historical and cultural assets.  
32 Indirect losses [also labelled higher-order losses ((Rose, 2004) or hidden costs ((Heinz Center, 1999))] include all  
33 losses that are not provoked by the disaster itself, but by its consequences. Measuring indirect losses is important as  
34 it evaluates the overall economic impact of the disaster on society. The assessment of indirect losses is difficult at  
35 the local scale because of the limited availability of economic data at this level. In addition, the relationship between  
36 the affected area and the world beyond can complicate the assessment. For example, local losses can be  
37 compensated from various inflows of goods, workers, and capital from outside the area to assist with reconstruction,  
38 along with governmental or foreign aid ((Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007)). At the same time, local disasters can  
39 provide ripple effects and influence world markets, such as Hurricane Katrina's impact on the world oil market,  
40 when most of the Gulf of Mexico oil rigs were shut down for weeks. Trade-offs in business loss and gain at different  
41 spatial scales need to be considered in accounting for indirect losses at the local level.  
42

43 Despite the difficulties noted above, many local studies exist. For example, Strobl ((Strobl, 2008)) provided an  
44 econometric analysis of the impact of the hurricane landfall on county-level economic growth in the U.S. This  
45 analysis showed that a county struck by at least one hurricane over a year saw its economic growth reduced on  
46 average by 0.79%, and increased by 0.22% the following year. The economic impacts of the 1993 Mississippi  
47 flooding in the U.S. showed significant spatial variability within the affected regions. In particular, states with a  
48 strong dependence on the agricultural sector had a disproportionate loss of wealth compared to states that had a  
49 more diversified economy ((Hewings and Mahidhara, 1996; Hewings and Mahidhara, 1996)). Noy and Vu ((Noy  
50 and Vu, 2009)) investigated the impact of disasters on economic growth in Vietnam at the provincial level, and  
51 found that fatal disasters decreased economic production while costly disasters increased short-term growth. Studies  
52 also found that regional indirect losses increase nonlinearly with direct losses ((Hallegatte, 2008)), and can be  
53 compensated by importing reconstruction means (workers, equipment, finance) from outside the affected regions.  
54

#### 5.4.2.2. *Adaptation and Risk Management-Present and Future*

Adaptation cost estimates are based on various assumptions about the baseline scenario and the optimality of adaptation measures. The difference between these assumptions makes it impossible to compare or aggregate results. Yohe *et al.* ((Yohe, G., J. Neumann, P. Marshall, H. Ameden, 1996; Yohe, G., J. Neumann, H. Ameden, 1995; Yohe *et al.*, 2011)) and West *et al.* ((West, J., Small, MJ, and Dowlatabadi, H., 2001)), for example, assess the economic cost of the sea-level rise in the United States for two baselines. The first baseline (perfect foresight) presumed that efficient coastal real estate markets would internalize impending inundation from rising seas and depreciate the economic value of any structure that would not be protected to zero, just as the waters arrived. The second baseline (no-foresight) assumes that property owners would maintain their properties as long as possible (for various reasons including imperfect anticipation and moral hazard linked to likely public support). Estimates of the economic cost of rising seas including the cost of adaptation were significantly higher in the no-foresight baseline.

In another study involving the water sector, Venkatesh and Hobbs ((Venkatesh, 1999)) investigated the role of uncertainty on future climate change in investment decision-making, and demonstrated the value of deferring decision to wait for additional information to avoid the consequences of inadequate adaptation. In the agriculture sector, estimates have been done using various assumptions on adaptation behavior ((Schneider, S.H., K. Kuntz-Duriseti, C. Azar, 2000)), from the farmers who do not react to observed changes in climate conditions (especially in studies that use crop yield sensibility to weather variability ((Deschenes, 2007; Lobell, D.B., M. B. Burke, C. Tebaldi, M. D. Mastrandrea, W. P. Falcon, R.L. Naylor, 2008; Schlenker, 2010)) to the introduction of selected adaptation measures within crop yield models ( (IFRI, 2009; Rosenzweig, 1994)) to the assumption of perfect adaptation with Ricardian approaches ((Kurukulasuriya, 2008a; Kurukulasuriya, 2008b; Mendelsohn, 1999; Seo, 2008)). Realistic assessments fall between these extremes, and a realistic representation of future adaptation pattern depend on the in-due-time detection of the climate change signal ((Hallegatte, 2009; Schneider, S.H., K. Kuntz-Duriseti, C. Azar, 2000)); the inertia in adoption of new technologies ((Reilly, 2000)); the existence of price signals ((Fankhauser *et al.*, 1999)); and non-rational behavior.

Adaptation choices to climate extremes at the city scale often employed simplified catastrophe risk assessments. Jacob *et al.* ((Jacob, K., V. Gornitz, C. Rosenzweig, L. McFadden, R. Nicholls, E. Penning-Rowsell (eds.), 2007)) investigated the vulnerability of the New York City metropolitan area to coastal hazards and sea level rise and found that without any adaptation a 1-meter sea level rise would increase mean annual losses due to storm surges by a factor of three. A different study of New York City by Rosenzweig and Solecki ((Rosenzweig, 2001)) used historical analogues to derive annualised losses for different storm frequencies. They calculated projected damages of approximately 0.1% of Gross Regional Product, annualised, and a probable maximum loss of 10-25% of GRP for one event. Hallegatte *et al.* ((Hallegatte, S., N. Ranger, O. Mestre, P. Dumas, J. Corfee-Morlot, C. Herweijer, R. Muir Wood, 2010)) and Ranger *et al.* ((Ranger, N., S. Hallegatte, S. Bhattacharya, M. Bachu, S. Priya, K. Dhore, F. Rafique, P. Mathur, N. Naville, F. Henriot, C. Herweijer, S. Pohit, J. Corfee-Morlot, 2010)) coupled direct economic impact analyses with an economic input-output (IO) model to assess losses for Copenhagen and Mumbai, respectively. The output is an assessment of the direct and indirect economic impacts of storm surge under climate change including production, job losses, reconstruction time, and the benefits of investment in upgraded coastal defences. In Copenhagen, mean annual losses are currently negligible, but would soar even with only a limited rise in sea level in the absence of upgraded protection; protection that is relatively inexpensive in financial terms. Ranger *et al.* ((Ranger, N., S. Hallegatte, S. Bhattacharya, M. Bachu, S. Priya, K. Dhore, F. Rafique, P. Mathur, N. Naville, F. Henriot, C. Herweijer, S. Pohit, J. Corfee-Morlot, 2010)) found that losses from the 1-in-100 year rainfall flood in Mumbai could be multiplied by a factor of 3 under a pessimistic climate change scenario. However adaptation could significantly reduce those future losses by as much as 70%.

Studies on the costs of local disaster risk management are scarce, fragmented, and conducted mostly in rural areas. One study estimated the cost/benefit ratio of disaster management and preparedness programs in villages of Bihar and Andra Pradesh, India to be 3.76 and 13.38, respectively ((Venton and Venton, 2004)). Research undertaken by the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition (ISET) on a number of cases in India, Nepal and Pakistan also consistently demonstrated positive benefit to cost ratios and notes that return rates are particularly robust for lower-cost, local level interventions (including such actions as raising house plinths and fodder storage units, community

1 based early warning, establishing community grain or seed banks, and local maintenance of key drainage points)  
2 when compared to embankment infrastructure strategies that require capital investment ((Moench, M., and the Risk  
3 to Resilience Study Team, 2008)). The studies demonstrated a sharp difference in the effectiveness of the two  
4 approaches, concluding that the embankments historically have not had an economically satisfactory performance.  
5 In contrast, the benefit/cost ratio for the local level strategies indicated economic efficiency over time and for all  
6 climate change scenarios ((Dixit, A., Pokhrel, A, and Marcus Moench, M, 2008)).

#### 9 5.4.2.3. *Consistency and Reliability of Cost and Loss Estimations at Local Level*

11 There are inconsistencies in present disaster risk loss data at all levels—local, national, global—which ultimately  
12 influences the accuracy of such estimates (Downton and Pielke Jr., 2005; Guha-Sapir and Below, 2002; Pielke Jr. *et al.*,  
13 2008). The reliability of disaster economic loss estimates is especially problematic at the local level due to: 1)  
14 the spatial coverage and resolution of databases that are global in coverage, but only at the national level with no  
15 consistent sub-national data; 2) thresholds for inclusion where only large economically-significant disasters are  
16 included, thus biasing the data toward singular events with large losses, rather than multiple, smaller events with  
17 fewer losses; and 3) what gets counted varies between databases (e.g. insured vs. uninsured losses; direct vs.  
18 indirect)((Gall *et al.*, 2009)).

19  
20 Similarly, there is a large uncertainty on impact and adaptation costs, again for multiple reasons. First, there is a  
21 large uncertainty in future emissions of greenhouse gases, which translates into a large uncertainty in the amplitude  
22 of future global climate change ((Solomon *et al.*, 2007)). Second, there are uncertainties in the magnitude and  
23 pattern of local climate change, and of local climate variability and extremes (see Chapter 3). Third, the assessment  
24 of climate change impacts at the local scale is difficult, especially the lack of consensus on the discount rate ((Heal,  
25 1997; Tol, 2003); (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2007; Weitzman, 2007)) and on the evaluation of non-market costs,  
26 especially the value of biodiversity or cultural heritage ((Pearce, 1994)). Finally, the possibility of low-probability  
27 high-consequence climate change is not fully included in most analysis ((Lonsdale *et al.*, 2008; Nicholls *et al.*, 2008;  
28 Stern, 2007; Weitzman, 2009)).

#### 31 5.4.3. *Limits to Adaptation*

33 If extreme events happen more frequently and/or with greater intensity/magnitude some locations may be  
34 uninhabitable for lengthy and repeated periods rendering sustainable development impossible. In such a situation,  
35 not all communities will be able to adapt without considerable disruption and costs (economic, social, cultural and  
36 psychological) and in some cases forced migration may be the only alternative ((Brown, 2008)). Changes in mean  
37 conditions may cause the effects of extreme events to be magnified. For example, sea level rise may cause storm  
38 surges to reach greater heights and move increased distances inland from the shore. On atolls, such changes may  
39 lead to complete inundation during storm events, occurrences which already occur during major tropical cyclones.  
40 Such inundation renders the ghyben-herzberg freshwater lens, critical for water supply and agriculture, saline and  
41 unusable for extended periods of time ((Anderson, 2002; Burns, 2003)). Water supplies on atolls may be  
42 increasingly tenuous if climate change causes increased incidence or duration of drought events ((Barnett and  
43 Adger, 2003)). These conditions may be exacerbated by coastal erosion ((World Bank, 2000)), with many atolls  
44 becoming increasingly uninhabitable. The only adaptation option may be the migration of whole communities and in  
45 the cases of countries comprising only atolls such relocation would need to be international in scale ((Campbell,  
46 2010b)).

48 Densely populated regions in developing countries suffer the brunt of natural disasters ((UNISDR, 2004)). More  
49 than half of the global population now lives in urban areas with an increasing population exposed to multiple risk  
50 factors ((UNFPA, 2009)). Risk is increasing in urban agglomerations of different size due to unplanned urbanization  
51 and accelerated migration from rural areas or smaller cities ((UN-HABITAT, 2007)). The 2009 Global Assessment  
52 Report on Disaster Risk Reduction ((UNISDR, 2009)) lists unplanned urbanization and poor urban governance as  
53 two main underlying factors accelerating disaster risk. It highlighted that the increase in global urban growth of  
54 informal settlements in hazard prone areas reached 900 millions in informal settlements, increasing by 25 million

1 per year. Urban hazards exacerbate disaster risk by the lack of investment in infrastructure as well as poor  
2 environmental management, thus limiting the adaptive capacity of these areas.  
3

4 Local actions on adaptation face many types of constraints depending on the type of hazard and degree of exposure  
5 as well as the availability and accessibility to information and knowledge. For example, communities living in areas  
6 prone to climate extremes such as frequent drought have developed certain coping/survival responses that assisted  
7 them to survive harsh conditions. Over time, these coping responses proved inadequate due to the magnitude of the  
8 problem ((Ziervogel *et al.*, 2006)). The information gap is particularly evident in many developing countries with  
9 limited capacity to collect, analyze and use demographic and mortality data on mortality and demographic trends, as  
10 well as evolving environmental conditions ((IDRC, 2002; National Research Council, 2007); (Carraro *et al.*, 2003)).  
11 Based on Fischer *et al.* ((Fischer *et al.*, 2001)) closing the information gap is critical to reduce climate change  
12 related threats to rural livelihoods and food security in Africa. Moreover, the lack of access to information by local  
13 people has reduced improvements in knowledge, understanding and skills, needed elements to help communities  
14 undertake improved measures to protect themselves against disasters and climate change impacts ((Agrawal *et al.*,  
15 2008)). Improving community access to information and control over resources will have a great bearing on their  
16 capacity to prepare, mitigate, manage, and respond and recover from any future disaster.  
17

18 Lack of capacities and skills, particularly by women also has been identified as a limiting factor for effective local  
19 adaptation actions ((Osman-Elasha *et al.*, 2006)). Reducing community's vulnerabilities particularly women's  
20 through capacity-building and instilling new skills and knowledge proved an effective approach for improving the  
21 local adaptive capacity. A successful initiative in Mali involves empowering women and giving them the skills to  
22 diversify their livelihoods, thus linking environmental management, disaster risk reduction, and the position of  
23 women as key resource managers (UN, 2008).  
24

25 In developed countries, household decisions regarding disaster risk reduction, and by extension, adaptation, are  
26 often guided by factors other than cost. For example, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan ((Kunreuther *et al.*, 2009))  
27 found that most individuals underestimate the risk and do not make cost-benefit trade-offs in their decisions to  
28 purchase hazard insurance and/or have adequate coverage. They also found empirical evidence to suggest that the  
29 hazard insurance purchase decision was driven not only by the need to protect assets, but also to reduce anxiety,  
30 satisfy mortgage requirements, and social norms (p. 120). For other types of mitigation activities, households do not  
31 voluntarily invest in cost-effective mitigation because of underestimating the risk, taking a short-term rather than  
32 long-term view, and not learning from previous experience (p. 247). However, they found social norms significant:  
33 if homeowners in the neighborhood installed hurricane shutters, most would follow suit; the same was true of  
34 purchasing insurance ((Kunreuther *et al.*, 2009)). For municipal governments, adoption of building codes in  
35 hurricane prone areas reduces damages by \$10 a square foot for homes built between 1996-2004 in Florida  
36 ((Kunreuther *et al.*, 2009)). However, enforcement of building codes by municipalities is highly variable and  
37 becomes a limiting factor in disaster risk management and adaptation.  
38  
39

## 40 **5.5. Management Strategies**

41  
42 There are a variety of strategies for managing disaster risk and adaptation to climate extremes at the local level.  
43 These range from baseline assessments of disaster risk to vulnerability assessments to social transfers. A few of the  
44 most utilized strategies by local actors and for local places are described.  
45  
46

### 47 **5.5.1. Methods, Models, Assessment Tools**

48  
49 Prior to the development and implementation of management strategies and adaptation alternatives, local entities  
50 need baseline assessments on disaster risk and the likely impacts of climate extremes. The assessment of local  
51 disaster risk includes three distinct elements: 1) Exposure (risk) assessment, or the identification of hazards and their  
52 potential magnitudes/severities as they relate to specific local places; 2) Vulnerability assessments that identify the  
53 sensitivity of the population to such exposures and the capacity of the population to cope with and recover from  
54 them; and 3) Damage assessments that determine direct and indirect losses from particular events (either *ex -post* in

1 real events or *ex-ante* through scenarios or modeling for hypothetical events). Each of these plays a part in  
2 understanding the hazard vulnerability of a particular locale or characterizing not only who is at risk but also the  
3 driving forces behind the differences in disaster vulnerabilities in local places.  
4

5 There are numerous examples of exposure and vulnerability assessment methodologies and metrics ((Birkmann,  
6 2006)). Of particular note are those studies focused on assessing the sub-national exposure to coastal hazards  
7 ((Gornitz *et al.*, 1994; Hammer-Klose and Thieler, 2001)), drought ((Alcamo *et al.*, 2008; Kallis, 2008; Wilhelm  
8 and Wiilhte, 2002)), or multiple hazards such as FEMA's multi-hazard assessment for the United States ((FEMA,  
9 1997)).  
10

11 Vulnerability assessments highlight the interactive nature of disaster risk exposure and societal vulnerability. While  
12 many of them are qualitative assessments ((Birkmann, 2006) (Bankoff *et al.*, 2004)), there is an emergent literature  
13 on quantitative metrics in the form of vulnerability indices. The most prevalent vulnerability indices, however, are  
14 national in scale ((Cardona, 2007; Cardona, 2007; Cardona, 2007; SOPAC and UNEP, 2005)) and compare  
15 countries to one another, not places at sub-national geographies. The exceptions are the empirically-based Social  
16 Vulnerability Index (or SoVI<sup>TM</sup>) ((Cutter *et al.*, 2003)) and extensions of it ((Fekete, 2009)).  
17

18 Vulnerability assessments are normally hazard specific and many have focused on climate-sensitive threats such  
19 extreme storms in Revere, Massachusetts ((Clark *et al.*, 1998), sea level rise in Cape May, New Jersey((Wu *et al.*,  
20 2002)) or flooding in Germany ((Fekete, 2009)) and the U.S. ((Burton and Cutter, 2008);(Zahran *et al.*, 2008)).  
21 Research focused on multi-hazard impact assessments range from locally-based county level assessments for all  
22 hazards in Georgetown County, South Carolina ((Cutter *et al.*, 2000)) to sub-national studies such as those involving  
23 all hazards for Barbados and St. Vincent ((Boruff and Cutter, 2007)) to those involving a smaller subset of climate-  
24 related threats ((Alcamo *et al.*, 2008; O'Brien *et al.*, 2004); (Brenkert and Malone, 2005)). The intersection of local  
25 exposure to climate-sensitive hazards and social vulnerability was recently assessed for the northeast ((Cox *et al.*,  
26 2007)) and southern region of the US ((Oxfam, 2009; Oxfam, 2009)).  
27

28 However, the full integration of risk exposure and social vulnerability into a comprehensive vulnerability assessment  
29 for the local area or region of concern is often lacking for many places. Part of this is a function of the bifurcation of  
30 the science inputs (e.g. natural scientists provide most of the relevant data and models for exposure assessments  
31 while social scientists provide the inputs for the populations at risk) and the difficulties of working across  
32 disciplinary or knowledge boundaries.  
33  
34

### 35 5.5.2. *Social, Financial, and Risk Transfers*

#### 36 5.5.2.1. *Social Transfers*

37  
38  
39 Social protection (SP) describes all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the  
40 poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised  
41 ((Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004)). These initiatives have the overall objectives of extending the benefits of  
42 economic growth, and reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups.  
43 These can be divided into *core* SP interventions, such as asset transfers, income transfers and public works, or  
44 *complementary* interventions, such as micro-credit services, social development, skills training and market  
45 enterprise programmes.  
46

47 SP has risen significantly up the international policy agenda in recent years, partly due to the impacts of the global  
48 financial crises in the late 1990 and early and late 2000s on poor and marginalised people ((Davies and McGregor,  
49 2009)(G20, 2009)). It is now becoming increasingly recognised that SP can play an important role in the delivery of  
50 pro-poor climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) assistance to vulnerable populations in  
51 developing countries ((Heltberg *et al.*, 2010)(Stern, 2007; Stern, 2007)). Table 5-4 provides a summary of the SP  
52 measures and instruments, and associated adaptation and DRR benefits ((Davies *et al.*, 2009a)).  
53  
54

1 [INSERT TABLE 5-4 HERE:

2 Table 5-4: Social protection measures and instruments, and associated adaptation benefits.]

3  
4 As Table 5-4 shows, SP offers a wide range of benefits for adaptation and DRR, both in response to short-term  
5 climate disasters, as well as long-term risks posed by climate change. The concept of Adaptive Social Protection  
6 (ASP) provides a framework for the integration of SP, climate change adaptation and DRR into one coherent  
7 approach ((Davies and Leavy, 2007)). However, in spite of these conceptual advancements, there are only a few  
8 studies on the implications of SP implementation for dealing better with climate events. Of the studies that do exist,  
9 most have been conducted in South Asia ((Arnall *et al.*, 2009; Heltberg *et al.*, 2009)), although a number have also  
10 been completed in relation to individual safety net programmes in sub-Saharan Africa ((Devereux *et al.*,  
11 2006)(Slater *et al.*, 2006)). According to Heltberg ((Heltberg *et al.*, 2009)), SP has formed an important part of the  
12 World Bank’s disaster response in several major recent climate-related disasters in south Asia. Such support  
13 included direct cash to affected households, and workfare (cash-for-work). In Africa, preliminary lessons from  
14 Ethiopia’s nation-wide Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which assists the most chronically impoverished  
15 with cash transfers and cash-for-work schemes, reveal a positive effect on household food consumption ((Devereux  
16 *et al.*, 2006)) and a reduction in ‘distress selling’ of assets as well as the protection of household assets ((Slater *et al.*,  
17 2006)). In these situations, proactive safety nets in the form of cash transfers and work programmes appear to  
18 present a viable alternative to traditional post-disaster relief responses. However, it is important to have such  
19 programmes in place before the onset of disasters, with flexible targeting, financing and implementation  
20 arrangements for scaling up as appropriate ((Alderman and Haque, 2006)), and prevention and risk management  
21 measures already integrated in ((Bockel *et al.*, 2009)).  
22

23 Other social protection instruments used occasionally in disasters in south Asia are conditional cash transfers, near-  
24 cash instruments such as vouchers and fee waivers, social funds, and specific services such as child protection,  
25 orphanages, and rehabilitation for persons with disabilities ((Heltberg *et al.*, 2009)). In Bangladesh, recent  
26 experiences of asset restocking following disasters ((Marks, 2007)(Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007);(Tanner *et al.*,  
27 2007)) demonstrate that such approaches can contribute to reducing vulnerability to climate shocks by providing  
28 liquidity and alternative sources of income during times of household stress ((Davies *et al.*, 2009b)). In addition,  
29 starter packs and seed fairs have revealed success in boosting food production at the national and household level  
30 ((Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007)). These have been more commonly used in Africa, although concern has been  
31 expressed that inputs sourced through commercial seed and fertiliser companies are sometimes inappropriate to local  
32 cropping patterns and agro-ecological conditions ((Davies *et al.*, 2009b)). Microcredits are another social protection  
33 measure (Ray-Bennett, 2010).  
34  
35

#### 36 5.5.2.2. Insurance

37  
38 Two types of insurance – formal/traditional and micro – serve the local population to spread stochastic losses  
39 geographically and temporally, and can assure timely liquidity for the recovery and reconstruction process.  
40 Insurance is an effective disaster risk reduction tool especially when combined with other risk management  
41 measures. For example, in most industrialized countries, insurance is utilized in combination with early warning  
42 systems, risk information and disaster preparation, and disaster mitigation. Where insurance is applied without  
43 adequate risk reduction, it can be a disincentive for adaptation, as individuals rely on insurance entirely to manage  
44 their risks and are left totally exposed to impacts ((Rao and Hess, 2009)). Furthermore, insurance can provide the  
45 necessary financial security to take on productive but risky investments ((Höppe and Gurenko, 2006)). Examples  
46 include a pilot project in Malawi where microinsurance is bundled with loans that enable farmers to access  
47 agricultural inputs that increase their productivity ((Hess and Syroka, 2005)), and a project in Mongolia that protects  
48 herders’ livestock from extreme winter weather ((Skees *et al.*, 2008)).  
49

50 Formal insurance is utilized extensively in the industrialized countries, where it covers around 40 percent of disaster  
51 losses ((Höppe and Gurenko, 2006)) to residents and businesses. In 2008, premiums as a percentage of GDP  
52 typically exceeded 5% in industrialized countries and up to as high as 15%. However, coverage is heterogeneous  
53 across countries and lines of business ((Vellinga, P., E. Mills, G. Berz, L. Bouwer, S. Huq, L.A. Kozak, J. Palutikof,  
54 B. Schanzenbacher, G. Soler, 2001)). This results from differential levels of exposure, regulatory and economic

1 conditions and market characteristics, all of which affect local communities. In many industrialized countries, the  
2 public sector plays some role in insuring risks, either by taking a slice of the risk, for example providing a backstop  
3 or ‘insurer of last resort’ for the most extreme catastrophe risks, or by covering lines that are uninsurable at an  
4 affordable rate by the private market ((Vellinga, P., E. Mills, G. Berz, L. Bouwer, S. Huq, L.A. Kozak, J. Palutikof,  
5 B. Schanzenbacher,G.Soler, 2001)). The U.S., for example, has a federally-backed National Flood Insurance  
6 Program (NFIP) although it continues to run at a deficit.  
7

8 Typically insurance coverage expands with economic growth. Penetration is currently growing rapidly in the  
9 emerging economies, where the rate of growth in insurance premiums (+15% per year between 1998 and 2008) has  
10 far outstripped that in the developed world ((Swiss Re, 2009)). In 2008, total premiums from emerging economies  
11 stood at just over \$0.5 trillion USD. Swiss Re ((Swiss Re, 2008)) describes that in developing countries, insurance is  
12 most common among the commercial and industrial sectors and higher income groups. In the non-life industry, the  
13 bulk of premium volumes come from the motor sector, with property insurance a relatively low proportion (e.g. 20  
14 percent in India). The penetration of agricultural insurance in developing countries is low despite its economic  
15 importance, with premiums accounting for only 0.01 percent of GDP. In 2008, global annual non-life premiums  
16 (which include property and casualty lines) stood at \$1.8 trillion USD ((Swiss Re, 2009)). Insurance has a much  
17 lower penetration in developing countries; here it covers only around 3 percent of disaster losses ((Höppe and  
18 Gurenko, 2006)). This results from a lack of affordability and distribution channels, but also socio-cultural factors  
19 (e.g. many poorer societies utilize informal social safety nets). New types of insurance are being designed to service  
20 these lower income groups; for example, micro-insurance.  
21

22 Microinsurance is a financial arrangement to protect low-income people against specific perils in exchange for  
23 regular premium payments ((Churchill, 2006; Churchill, 2007)). Several pilot projects have yielded promising  
24 outcomes, yet experience is too short to judge if microinsurance schemes are viable in the long haul for local places.  
25 Many of the ongoing microinsurance initiatives are index-based: a relatively new approach whereby the insurance  
26 contract is not against the loss itself, but against an event that causes loss, such as insufficient rainfall during critical  
27 stages of plant growth ((Turvey, 2001)). Weather index insurance is largely at a pilot stage, with several projects  
28 operating around the globe, including in Mongolia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania ((Hellmuth *et al.*, 2009)).  
29 In India, a weather insurance program grew from covering just 1,100 farmers in 2004 to insuring over 700,000  
30 farmers by 2008. Index insurance for agriculture is more developed in India, where the Agricultural Insurance  
31 Company of India (AIC) has extended coverage against inadequate rainfall to 700,000 farmers.  
32

33 Index-based contracts as an alternative to traditional crop insurance have the advantages of greatly limiting  
34 transaction costs (from reduced claims handling) and eliminating moral hazard (as there are no incentives to  
35 negligent behavior because claims are independent of the farmers’ practices). A disadvantage is their potential of a  
36 mismatch between yield and payout, a critical issue given the current lack of density of meteorological stations in  
37 vulnerable regions – a challenge that remote sensing may help address ((Skees and Barnett, 2006)). Participants’  
38 understanding of how insurance operates, as well as their trust in the product and the stakeholders involved may also  
39 be a problem for scaling up index insurance pilots, although simulation games and other innovative communication  
40 approaches are yielding promising results ((Patt *et al.*, 2009)). Affordability can also be a problem: because disasters  
41 can affect whole communities or regions (co-variant risks), insurers must be prepared for meeting large claims all at  
42 once, with the cost of requisite backup capital potentially raising the premium far above the client’s expected losses  
43 – or budget. While valuable in reducing the long-term effects on poverty and development, insurance instruments,  
44 particularly if left entirely to the market, are not appropriate in all contexts ((Linnerooth-Bayer, 2010)).  
45

46 The insurance industry itself is vulnerable to climate change. Eighty-seven percent of insured losses events between  
47 1985 and 1999 were weather-related ((Munich Re Group, 2000)). Research by the Association of British Insurers  
48 ((Association of British Insurers (ABI), 2005)) concluded that an increase of just 6 per cent in wind speeds could  
49 increase average annual insured property losses in the United States from hurricanes from US\$5.5 billion to around  
50 US\$9.5 billion. The continuing exit of private insurances is seen with the increasingly catastrophic local losses in the  
51 U.S. ((Lecomte and Gahagan, 1998)), UK ((Priest *et al.*, 2005)) and Germany ((Botzen and van den Bergh,  
52 2008)(Thieken *et al.*, 2006)). Climate change could be particularly problematic in communities, which begin to see  
53 new types of risks for which they are unprepared. Vellinga *et al.* 2001 ((Vellinga, P., E. Mills, G. Berz, L. Bouwer,  
54 S. Huq, L.A. Kozak, J. Palutikof, B. Schanzenbacher,G.Soler, 2001)) overview a number of dimensions of insurer

1 vulnerability that could be impacted by climate change, including: the probable maximum loss; and pressures from  
2 regulators responding to changing prices and coverage ((Kunreuther *et al.*, 2009)).

3  
4 One response to rising levels and volatility of risk has been to increase insurance and reinsurance capacity through  
5 new alternative risk transfer instruments, such as index-linked securities (including catastrophe bonds) ((Vellinga,  
6 P., E. Mills, G. Berz, L. Bouwer, S. Huq, L.A. Kozak, J. Palutikof, B. Schanzenbacher, G. Soler, 2001)). Kunreuther  
7 and Michel-Kerjan ((Kunreuther *et al.*, 2009)) and others suggest that these tools could play an increasingly  
8 important role in a new era of elevated catastrophe risks. Another approach is to reduce risks through societal  
9 adaptation ((Herweijer, C., N. Ranger, R.E.T. Ward, 2009)). For example, Lloyds of London (2008) demonstrates  
10 that in exposed coastal regions communities increase in average annual losses and extreme losses due to sea level  
11 rise in 2030 could be offset through investing in property-level resilience to flooding or sea walls. Similarly, RMS  
12 ((RMS, 2009)) shows that wind-related losses in Florida could be significantly reduced through strengthening  
13 buildings. Given the clear benefits of adaptation for insurance, Ward et al. 2008 ((Ward, R.E.T., C. Herweijer, N.  
14 Patmore, R. Muir-Wood, 2008)) describes a number of ways in which insurers themselves can help to promote  
15 adaptation through risk communication and financial incentives.

### 16 17 18 5.5.2.3. *Social and Environmental Outcomes*

19  
20 One of the key issues in examining outcomes of local strategies for disaster risk management and climate change  
21 adaptation is the principle of fairness and equity. There is a burgeoning research literature on the climate justice  
22 looking at the differential impacts of adaptation policies ((Adger *et al.*, 2006); (Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001)) at  
23 local, national, and global scales. The primary considerations at the local level are the differential impacts of policies  
24 on communities, subpopulations, and regions from present management actions (or inactions) ((Thomas and  
25 Twyman, 2005)). There is also concern regarding the impact of present management (or inactions) in transferring  
26 the vulnerability of disaster risk from one local place to another (spatial inequity) or from one generation to another  
27 (intergenerational equity) ((Cooper and McKenna, 2008)).

### 28 29 30 5.5.3. *Adaptation as a Process*

31  
32 Experience in planning and implementing adaptation reveals that adaptation is a socio-institutional process bringing  
33 together a set of inter-twined elements ((Downing and Dyzynski, In press; Tschakert and Dietrich, In press)).  
34 O'Brien *et al.* ((O'Brien *et al.*, 2009)) focus on the process of adaptation and suggest an adaptation continuum (see  
35 Figure 5-4), where the first stage is to focus on the impacts. As local capacity increases, the progression from  
36 vulnerability to adaptation to development, to resilience ensues. Throughout the process, learning increases and  
37 institutions change and a paradigmatic transformation occurs—the community moves away from an impact-focus  
38 perspective to a resilience-centric one where there is an expectation of risk and where good governance and key  
39 partnerships are the norm.

40  
41 [INSERT FIGURE 5-4 HERE:

42 Figure 5-4: Dimensions of the adaptation continuum (O'Brien *et al.*, 2009).]

43  
44 A key component of the adaptation process is the ability to learn ((Armitage *et al.*, 2008; Lonsdale *et al.*, 2008;  
45 Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2007)). This focus on learning partly derives from the fields of social-ecological resilience and  
46 sustainability science ((Berkes, 2009; Kristjanson *et al.*, 2009)). The extension of social, participatory, and  
47 organizational learning to climate change adaptation has emphasized the significance of identifiable climate change  
48 signals, informal networks, and boundary organizations to enhance the preparation of people and organizations to  
49 the changing climate ((Berkhout, F., J. Hertin, D. Gann, 2006; Pelling, M., C. High, J. Dearing, D. Smith, 2008)).  
50 Participatory learning is especially emphasized ((Berkhout, 2002; Shaw, A., S. Sheppard, S. Burch, D. Flanders, A.  
51 Wiek, J. Carmichael, J. Robinson, S. Cohen, 2009; Shaw, A., S. Sheppard, S. Burch, D. Flanders, A. Wiek, J.  
52 Carmichael, J. Robinson, S. Cohen, 2009)). Focusing on what can be learnt from managing current climate risk is a  
53 good starting point particularly for poor and marginalized communities ((Someshwar, 2008)). As scenarios combine  
54 quantitative indicators of climate, demographic, biophysical, and economic change as well as qualitative storylines

1 of socio-cultural changes at the local level, the participation of local stakeholders is essential to generate values and  
2 understandings of climate extremes.  
3

4 If adaptation is a process rather than an end-point it requires a focus on the institutions and policies that enable or  
5 hinder this process ((Inderberg and Eikeland, 2009)) and the acknowledgement that there are often competing  
6 stakeholder goals ((Ziervogel and Ericksen, 2010)). Fostering better adaptive capacity for disaster and climate risk  
7 will help to accelerate future adaptation ((Inderberg and Eikeland, 2009; Moser, 2009; Patt, 2009)). However, there  
8 are barriers. These include lack of coordination between actors, and the complexity of the policy field hampering  
9 innovative approaches ((Mukheibir and Ziervogel, 2007; Winsvold *et al.*, 2009)). Limited human capacity to  
10 implement policies can also hamper adaptation ((Ziervogel *et al.*, 2010)), although individuals' perceptions of risk  
11 and adaptive capacity can determine whether adaptation responses are initiated or not ((Grothmann and Patt, 2005)).  
12  
13

#### 14 **5.6. Information, Data, and Research Gaps at the Local Level**

15

16 The causal processes by which disasters produce systemic effects in chronological and social time is reasonably  
17 well-known and has been outlined by Kreps and others ((Cutter, 1996; Kreps, 1985; Lindell and Prater, 2003)(NRC  
18 (National Research Council), 2006; NRC (National Research Council), 2006)). Yet, local emergency management  
19 communities have by and large paid little attention to the links between climate change and natural hazards  
20 ((Bullock *et al.*, 2009)). As a result, state and local mitigation plans, even when required by law, usually fail to  
21 include climate change, sea level rise, or extreme precipitation in hazard assessments or do so in entirely  
22 deterministic ways.  
23

24 Decisions about development, hazard mitigation, and emergency preparedness in the context of climate change give  
25 rise to critical social and economic adaptation questions. For example  
26 Do increased levels of hazard mitigation and disaster preparedness increase risk taking by individuals and social  
27 systems? Do cumulative impacts of smaller events over time compare to single high impact events? How do short-  
28 term adjustments or coping strategies enable or constrain long-term vulnerabilities? What are the tradeoffs among  
29 decision acceptability versus decision quality?  
30

31 The hurricane recovery process includes ample evidence of how efforts to ensure that the rush to "return to normal"  
32 have also led to depletion of natural resources and increased risk. How decisions regarding the right to migrate  
33 (even temporarily), the right to organize and the right of access to information are made will, as a result, have major  
34 implications for the ability of different groups to adapt successfully to floods, droughts, storms and the other  
35 consequences anticipated as a result of climatic change. The idea of linking place-based recovery, preparedness,  
36 and resilience to adaptation is intuitively appealing. However, the constituency that supports improved disaster risk  
37 management has historically proven too small to bring about many of the changes that have been recommended by  
38 researchers, especially those that focus on strengthening the social fabric to decrease vulnerability. Behind the  
39 specific questions of the transparency of risk, are broader questions about the public sphere. What public goods will  
40 be provided by governments at all levels (and how will they be funded), what public goods will be provided by  
41 private or organizations in civil society, what will be provided by market actors, and what will not? How will these  
42 influence local-level disaster risk management, especially to climate-sensitive hazards?  
43

44 While there has been increasing focus on the processes by which knowledge has been produced, less time has been  
45 spent examining the capacity of local communities to critically assess knowledge claims made by others for their  
46 reliability and relevance to those communities ((Pulwarty, 2007)Fischhoff, 1996). There is the need to move beyond  
47 the integration of physical and societal impacts to focus on practice and evaluation. How are impediments to the  
48 flow information created? Is a focus on communication adequate to ensure effective response? How are these nodes  
49 defined among differentially vulnerable groups e.g. based on economic class, race, gender? However, there is little  
50 research on the extent to which local jurisdictions have adopted policy options and practice and the ways in which  
51 it is being implemented. Most of the studies to date have addressed factors that lead to policy adoption and not  
52 necessarily successful implementation.  
53

1 Beyond infrastructure and retrofitting concerns, successful adaptation strategies integrate urban planning, water  
2 management, early warning systems and preparedness. One widely-acknowledged goal is to address, directly, the  
3 problem of an inadequate fit between what the research community knows about the physical and social dimensions  
4 of uncertain environmental hazards and what society chooses to do with that knowledge. An even larger challenge  
5 is to consider how different systems of knowledge about the physical environment, and competing systems of  
6 action can be brought together in pursuit of diverse goals that humans wish to pursue ((Mitchell, 2003)). Several  
7 sources (Comfort, et al 2009; (Bullock *et al.*, 2009; McKinsey Group, 2009)(McKinsey Group, 2009)) have  
8 identified key requirements for addressing these challenges, including developing:

- 9 1) Multi-way information exchange systems-effective adaptation will always be locally-driven. Communities  
10 need reliable measurements and assessment tools, integrated information about risks that those tools reveal  
11 and best approaches to minimize those risks. The goal is to develop a coordinated effort to improve the  
12 assessment and transparency of risk in a geographic place-based approach to vulnerable regions. Better  
13 locally-based data on economic losses, disaster and adaptation costs, and human losses (fatalities) will  
14 ensure improved empirically-based baseline assessments.
- 15 2) Maps of the decision processes for disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery and guidance  
16 for using such decision support tools. Hazard maps are the simplest and often most powerful form of risk  
17 information. They capture the likelihood and impact of a peril and are important for informing risk  
18 reduction and risk transfer. Such devices would identify: specific segments of threatened social systems  
19 that could suffer disproportionate disaster impacts; critical actors at each jurisdictional level; their risk  
20 assumptions; their different types of information needs; and the design of an information infrastructure  
21 that would support their decisions at critical entry points Comfort ((Comfort, 1993)).
- 22 3) People who face hazards should be assisted to manage their own environments more responsibly and  
23 equitably over the long term by joining in a global structure that supports informed, responsible,  
24 systematic actions to improve local conditions in vulnerable regions. Governments and institutions can  
25 support, provide incentives, and legitimize successful approaches to increasing capacity and action.
- 26 4) Methodologies and measurement of progress in reducing vulnerability and enhancing community capacity  
27 at the local is under researched. Locally-based risk management, cost-effectiveness methodologies and  
28 analyses, investigation of societal impacts of catastrophic events at local to national scales, and research  
29 on implementation of risk management and mitigation programs are all needed. Similarly, there is a  
30 critical need for the assessment and coordination of multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral efforts to help  
31 avoid the unintended consequences of actions.
- 32 5) Underserved people require to access to the social and economic security that comes from sharing risk,  
33 through financial risk transfer mechanisms such as insurance. There is a paucity of studies at the local  
34 level to assess the efficacy of alternative risk reduction or transfer methods, analysis of benefits and costs  
35 to various stakeholder groups, analysis of complementary roles of mitigation and insurance, and analysis  
36 of safeguards against insurance industry insolvency.

37  
38 Previous studies have identified community hazard vulnerability, community resources, and especially, strategies  
39 and structures that emergency managers and other hazards professionals can adopt at low cost. The knowledge to  
40 construct regional geographic information systems that provide the information base for indices is already available  
41 ((Maskrey, 1989; National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), 1998)(Maskrey, 1989; National Academy  
42 of Public Administration (NAPA), 1998)). Nonetheless, most studies have relied on limited samples and need  
43 further work to replicate and extend their findings. Interdisciplinary collaboration is clearly needed to prioritize and  
44 address research tasks for bridging knowledge gaps in our understanding. These gaps include: analyses of  
45 vulnerability that integrate into their assessment the extent to which knowledge is framed, co-produced and utilized;  
46 factors that promote the adoption of more effective community level hazard mitigation measures and assessments  
47 of the effectiveness of hazard mitigation programs; development and local calibration of better models to guide  
48 long-term protective action decision making in emergencies; understanding impacts, response and recovery for  
49 near-catastrophic and catastrophic disaster events at the local level; research and support for risk-pooling  
50 mechanisms for small-scale production units; and understanding the role and benefits of ecosystems services in  
51 providing buffers for uncertain risks.

52  
53 The experiences of extreme events and sequences of events considered in this chapter validate the notion of socially  
54 constructed disasters. Risk reduction and hazard mitigation strategies must address the underlying practices that

1 contribute to vulnerability. The goal is to be clearer about existing conditions and projected changes e.g. weakening  
2 of bridges, levees and other structures due to long exposure to water of changing quality and other corrosives. These  
3 actions will situate the scientific understanding of hazard within a broader discourse about different forms of  
4 knowledge, and increase the likelihood of public actions that are better grounded in scientific knowledge and  
5 customized for the local context.

## 6 7 8 **References** 9

- 10 (IFRC), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2009: Early Warning, Early Action:  
11 An Evaluation of IFRC West and Central Africa Zone Flood Preparedness and Response, 2008, .
- 12 Aall, C., K. Groven, G. Lindseth, 2007: The scope of action for local climate policy: The case of Norway. *Global*  
13 *Environmental Politics*, **2(7)**, 83-101.
- 14 ActionAid, 2005: People-Centered Governance: Reducing Disaster for Poor and Excluded People, ActionAid  
15 International, Johannesburg, .
- 16 ADB, 2003: *VARG Multi Development Agency Paper*. Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of  
17 the Poor through Adaptation, .
- 18 Adelo, F.O., 2009: Katrina cataclysm: Does duration of residency and prior experience affect impacts, evacuation,  
19 and adaptation behavior among survivors? *Environment and Behavior*, **4(41)**, 459-489.
- 20 Adger, N.W., 2001: Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and mitigation of climate change.  
21 *Journal of International Development*, **(13)**, 921-931.
- 22 Adger, W.N., J. Paavola, S. Huq, and M.J. Mace (eds.), 2006: *Fairness in adaptation to climate change*. MIT Press,  
23 Cambridge, MA, .
- 24 Adger, W.N., 1999: Social vulnerability to climate change and extremes in coastal Vietnam. *World Development*,  
25 **2(27)**, 249-269.
- 26 Adger, W.N., 2003: Social capital, collective action, and adaptation to climate change. *Economic Geography*, **4(79)**,  
27 387-404.
- 28 Adger, W.N., K. Brown, J. Fairbrass, A. Jordan, J. Paavola, S. Rosendo, and G. Seyfang, 2003: Governance for  
29 sustainability: Towards a 'thick' analysis of environmental decision-making. *Environment and Planning A*, **(35)**,  
30 1095-1110.
- 31 Adger, W.N. and P.M. Kelly, 1999: Social vulnerability to climate change and the architecture of entitlements.  
32 *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*, **3-4(4)**, 253-266.
- 33 Agrawal, A., C. McSweeney, and P. Nicolas, 2008: *Social Development Notes*. Local Institutions and Climate  
34 Change Adaptation - the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, World Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 35 Alcamo, J., L. Acosta-Michlik, A. Carius, F. Eierdanz, R. Klein, D. Krömker, and D. Tänzler, 2008: A new  
36 approach to quantifying and comparing vulnerability to drought. *Regional Environmental Change*, **4(8)**, 137-  
37 149.
- 38 Alcamo, J., J.M. Moreno, B. Nováky, M. Bindi, R. Corobov, R.J.N. Devoy, C. Giannakopoulos, E. Martin, J.E.  
39 Olesen, and A. Shvidenko, 2007: Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. contribution of  
40 working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. In: *Europe*  
41 [Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. Van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson(eds.)]. Cambridge University  
42 Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 541-580.
- 43 Alderman, H. and T. Haque, 2006: Countercyclical safety nets for the poor and vulnerable. *Food Policy*, **4(31)**, 372-  
44 383.
- 45 Alexander, D., 2002: *Principles of emergency planning and management*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New  
46 York, .
- 47 Allen, K., 2006: Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation: Local capacity-building in the  
48 Philippines. *Disasters*, **1(30)**, 81-101.
- 49 Anderson, W.B., 1994: *Disaster Prevention for Sustainable Development: Economic and Policy Issues, A Report*  
50 *from the Yokohama World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, May 23-27, 1994*. Vulnerability to  
51 Disaster and Sustainable Development: A General Framework for Assessing Vulnerability, .
- 52 Anderson, W.P.J., 2002: Aquifer salinization from storm overwash. *Journal of Coastal Research*, **3(18)**, 413-420.
- 53 Anning, D. and D. Dominey-Howes, 2009: Valuing climate change impacts on Sydney beaches to inform coastal  
54 management decisions: A research outline. *Management of Environmental Quality*, **4(20)**, 408-421.

- 1 Ariyabandu, M.M., 2006: Gender issues in recovery from the december 2004 indian ocean tsunami: The caes of sri  
2 lanka. *Earthquake Spectra*, **3(22)**, 759-775.
- 3 Armitage, D., M. Marschke, and R. Plummer, 2008: Adaptive co-management and the paradox of learning. *Global*  
4 *Environmental Change*, **(18)**, 86-98.
- 5 Arnall, A., K. Oswald, T. Mitchell, D. M., and C. Coirolo, 2009: Integrating Social Protection, Disaster Risk  
6 Reduction and Climate Adaptation: Mapping the Evidence and Policy Context in the Agriculture Sector in  
7 South Asia, Institute of Development Studies, .
- 8 Ascher, W., 1978: *Forecasting: An appraisal for policy-makers and planners*. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD,  
9 pp. 256.
- 10 Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2005: A Primer. Integrated Flood Risk Management in South East Asia, .
- 11 Association of British Insurers (ABI), 2005: Summary Report - Financial Risks of Climate Change, Association of  
12 British Insurers, .
- 13 Babugura, A.A., 2008: Vulnerability of children and youth in drought disasters: A case study of botswana. *Children,*  
14 *Youth and Environments*, **1(18)**, 126-157.
- 15 Bamdad, N., 2005: The Role of Community Knowledge in Disaster Management: The Bam Earthquake Lesson in  
16 Iran, Institute of Management and Planning Studies, Tehran, Iran, .
- 17 Bankoff, B., 2007: Living with risk: Coping with disasters. *Education about Asia*, **2(12)**, 26-29.
- 18 Bankoff, G., G. Frerks, and D. Hilhorst (eds.), 2004: *Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, development and people*.  
19 London, Earthscan, .
- 20 Bari, F., 1998: The gendered terrain of disaster: Through women's eyes. In: *Gender, disaster and empowerment: A*  
21 *case study from pakistan* [Enarson, E.P. and B.H. Morrow(eds.)]. Praeger, Westport, CT, pp. 125-132.
- 22 Barnett, J., 2001: Security and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Norwich, .
- 23 Barnett, J. and N.W. Adger, 2003: Climate dangers and atoll countries. *Climatic Change*, **3(61)**, 321-337.
- 24 Barnett, J. and M. Webber, 2009: Accomodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change, Commission  
25 on Climate Change and Development, Stockholm, .
- 26 Baro, M. and T. Deubel, 2006: Persistent hunger: Perspectives on vulnerability, famine, and food security in sub-  
27 saharan africa. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, **(35)**, 521-538.
- 28 Barrett, C.B., 2002: Handbook of agricultural economics. In: *Food security and food assistance programs* [Gardner,  
29 B. and G. Rausser(eds.)]. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, .
- 30 Barrett, E.J., M. Martinez-Cosio, and C.Y.B. Ausbrooks, 2008: The school as a source of support for katrina-  
31 evacuated youth. *Children, Youth and Environments*, **1(18)**, .
- 32 Bartlett, S., 2008: The implications of climate change for children in lower-income countries. *Children, Youth and*  
33 *Environments*, **1(18)**, 71-98.
- 34 Barton, A.H., 1969: *Communities in disaster: A sociological analysis of collective stress situations*. Anchor,  
35 Doubleday, Garden City, NY, pp. 352.
- 36 Barton, A.H., 2005: What is a disaster? new answers to old questions. In: *Disaster and colective stress* [Perry, R.  
37 and E. Quarantell(eds.)]. Xlibris, Philadelphia, pp. 100-130.
- 38 Bateman, J.M. and B. Edwards, 2002: Gender and evacuation: A closer look at why women are more likely to  
39 evacuate for hurricanes. *Natural Hazards Review*, **3(3)**, 107-117.
- 40 Battista, F. and S. Baas, 2004: *Consolidated Report on Case Studies and Workshop Findings and Recommendations*.  
41 The Role of Local Institutions in Reducing Vulnerability to Recurrent Natural Disasters and in Sustainable  
42 Livelihoods Development. Rural Institutions and Participation Service, Food and Agriculture Organization  
43 (FAO), Rome, .
- 44 Beamon, B.M. and B. Balcik, 2008: Performance measurement in humanitarian supply chains. *International Journal*  
45 *of Public Sector Management*, **1(21)**, 4-25.
- 46 Berke, P.R. and T. Beatley, 1992: A national assessment of earthquake mitigation: Implications for land use  
47 planning and public policy. *Earthquake Spectra*, **(8)**, 1-17.
- 48 Berkes, F., 2008: *Sacred ecology*. Routledge, New York, 2nd ed., .
- 49 Berkes, F., 2009: Evolution of co-management: Role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and social  
50 learning. *Journal of Environmental Management*, **5(90)**, 1692-1702.
- 51 Berkhout, F., J. Hertin,D.Gann, 2006: Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation to climate change impacts.  
52 *Climatic Change*, **1(78)**, 135-156.
- 53 Berkhout, F., 2002: Technological regimes, path dependency and the environment. *Global Environmental Change,*  
54 *Part A: Human and Policy Dimensions*, **1(12)**, 1-4.

- 1 Bermejo, P.M., 2006: Preparation and response in case of natural disasters: Cuban programs and experience. *J.*  
2 *Public Health Policy*, **1(27)**, 13-21.
- 3 Bernard, S.M., J.M. Samet, A. Grambsch, K.L. Ebi, and I. Romieu, 2001: The potential impacts of climate  
4 variability and change on air pollution-related health effects in the united states. *Environmental Health*  
5 *Perspectives*, **(109)**, 199-209.
- 6 Berube, A. and 2. Katz, 2005: Katrina's Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America, The  
7 Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, Washington D.C., .
- 8 Birkland, T.A., 1997: *After disaster: Agenda setting, public policy, and focusing events*. Georgetown University  
9 Press, Washington D.C., .
- 10 Birkmann, J., M.A. Garschagen, F. Krass, and N. Quang, in press: Adaptive urban governance-new challenges for  
11 the second generation of urban adaptation strategies to climate change. *Sustainability Science*, .
- 12 Birkmann, J., 2006: *Measuring vulnerability to natural hazards: Towards disaster resilient societies*. United  
13 Nations Publications, New York, .
- 14 Bockel, L., M. Thoreux, and S.D. Savagh, 2009: Resilience of Rural Communities to Climatic Accidents: A Need to  
15 Scale Up Socio-Environmental Safety Nets, .
- 16 Bohle, H., T. Downing, and M. Watts, 1994: Climate change and social vulnerability: Toward a sociology and  
17 geography of food insecurity. *Global Environmental Change*, **1(4)**, 371-396.
- 18 Bohle, H.-G., B. Etzold, M. Keck, 2009: Resilience as agency. *IHDP Update 2, Magazine of the International Human*  
19 *Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change*, 8-13.
- 20 Bohle, H. and K. Warner, 2008: Megacities: Resilience and Social Vulnerability, United Nations University Institute  
21 for Environment and Human Security, Bonn, Germany, .
- 22 Borden, K.A. and S.L. Cutter, 2008: Spatial patterns of natural hazards mortality in the united states. *International*  
23 *Journal of Health Geographics*, **6(7)**, .
- 24 Boruff, B.J. and S.L. Cutter, 2007: The environmental vulnerability of caribbean island nations. *Geographical*  
25 *Review*, **1(97)**, 24-45.
- 26 Botzen, W.J.W. and J.C.J.M. van den Bergh, 2008: The insurance against climate change and flooding in the  
27 netherlands: Present, future, and comparison with other countries. *Risk Analysis*, **2(28)**, 413-426.
- 28 Bourque, L., J. Siegel, M. Kano, and M. Wood, 2006: Weathering the storm: The impact of hurricanes on physical  
29 and mental health. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, **(604)**, 129-151.
- 30 Bowden, M.e.a., 1981: Climate and history: Studies in past climates and their impact on man. In: *The effect of*  
31 *climatic fluctuations on human populations: Two hypotheses* [Wigley, T.M., M.J. Ingrams, and G.  
32 Farmer(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 479-513.
- 33 Boyd, R. and M.E. Ibarraán, 2009: Extreme climate events and adaptation: An exploratory analysis of drought in  
34 mexico. *Environment and Development Economics*, **3(14)**, 371-396.
- 35 Brauer, M., 1999: Health guidelines for vegetation fire events. In: *Health impacts of biomass air pollution* [Schwela,  
36 D.H., J.G. Goldammer, L.H. Morawska, and O. Simpson(eds.)]. Institute of Environmental Epidemiology,  
37 Ministry of Health, Singapore, .
- 38 Brenkert, A.L. and E.L. Malone, 2005: Modeling vulnerability and resilience to climate change: A case study of  
39 india and indian states. *Climatic Change*, **1-2(72)**, 57-102.
- 40 Brondizio, E., E. Ostrom, and O. Young, 2009: Connectivity and the governance of multilevel social-ecological  
41 systems: The role of social capital. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, **(34)**, 253-278.
- 42 Brown, D., A. Agrawal , S. Cheong , R. Chowdhury, C.Polsky, Land change and climate adaptation. *Land use*  
43 *Policy*, under revision.
- 44 Brown, O., 2008: Migration and Climate Change, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, .
- 45 Brown, D.L., 1999: Disparate effects of the 1989 loma prieta and 1994 northridge earthquakes on hospital  
46 admissions for acute myocardial infarction: Importance of superimposition of triggers. *American Heart Journal*,  
47 **5(7)**, 830-836.
- 48 Brulle, R., 2010: From environmental campaigns to advancing the public dialogues: Environmental communication  
49 for civic engagement. *Environmental Communications*, .
- 50 Buckland, J. and M. Rahman, 1999: Community-based disaster management during the 1997 red river flood in  
51 canada. *Disasters*, **3(23)**, 174-191.
- 52 Bulkeley, H., 2006: A changing climate for spatial planning? *Planning Theory and Practice*, **2(7)**, 203-214.

- 1 Bull-Kamanga, L., K. Diagne, A. Lavell, E. Leon, F. Lerise, H. MacGregor, A. Maskrey, M. Meshack, M. Pelling,  
2 H. Reid, D. Satterthwaite, J. Songsore, K. Westgate, and A. Yitambe, 2003: From everyday hazards to disasters:  
3 The accumulation of risk in urban areas. *Environment and Urbanization*, **1(15)**, 193-203.
- 4 Bullock, J., G. Haddow, and K. Haddow, 2009: *Global warming, natural hazards, and emergency management*.  
5 CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, pp. 282.
- 6 Burby, R.J., 2000: Creating hazard resilient communities through land-use planning. *Natural Hazards Review*, **2(1)**,  
7 99-106.
- 8 Burby, R.J., 2006: Hurricane katrina and the paradoxes of government disaster policy: Bringing about wise  
9 government decisions for hazardous areas. *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, **1(604)**,  
10 171-191.
- 11 Burby, R.J., May, P.J. with Berke, P. R., L.C. Dalton, S.P. French, and E.J. Kaiser, 1997: *Making government plan:*  
12 *State experiments in managing land use*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, .
- 13 Burby, R., S. French, and A. Nelson, 1998: Plans, code enforcement, and damage reduction: Evidence from the  
14 northridge earthquake. *Earthquake Spectra*, **1(14)**, 59-74.
- 15 Burch, S. and J. Robinson, 2007: A framework for explaining the links between capacity and action in response to  
16 global climate change. *Climate Policy*, **4(7)**, 304-316.
- 17 Burns, W.C.G., 2003: *The world's water, 2002-2003: The biennial report on freshwater resources*. In: *Pacific island*  
18 *developing country water resources and climate change* [Gleik, P.H. (ed.)]. pp. 113-131.
- 19 Burton, C. and S.L. Cutter, 2008: Levee failures and social vulnerability in the sacramento-san joaquin delta area,  
20 california. *Natural Hazards Review*, **3(9)**, 136-149.
- 21 Burton, I., R.W. Kates, and G.F. White, 2001: Knowing better and losing even more: The use of knowledge in  
22 hazards management. *Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards*, **(3)**, 81-92.
- 23 Burton, I., R.W. Kates, and G.F. White, 1993: *The environment as hazard*. Guilford Press, New York, 2nd ed., .
- 24 Buvinić, M., G. Vega, M. Bertrand, A. Urban, R. Grynspan, and G. Truitt, 1999: *Sustainable Development*  
25 *Department Technical Papers Series*. Hurricane Mitch: Women's Needs and Contributions, Inter-American  
26 Development Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 27 Byg, A. and J. Salick, 2009: Local perspectives on a global phenomenon - climate change in eastern tibetian  
28 villages. *Global Environmental Change*, **(19)**, 156-166.
- 29 Bynander, F., L. Newlove, and B. Ramberg, 2005: Sida and the Tsunami of 2004--A Study of Organizational Crisis  
30 Response, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm, .
- 31 Cahill, K., 2007: *The pulse of humanitarian assistance*. Fordham University Press, New York, .
- 32 Campbell, J.R., 1990: Disasters and development in historical context: Tropical cyclone response in the banks  
33 islands of northern vanuatu. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, **3(8)**, 401-424.
- 34 Campbell, J.R., 2010b: *Climate change and displacement: Multidisciplinary perspectives*. In: *Climate-induced*  
35 *community relocation in the pacific: The meaning and importance of land* [McAdam, J. (ed.)]. Hart Publishing,  
36 Oxford, UK, pp. 57-79.
- 37 Campbell, J.R., 2006: Traditional Disaster Reduction in Pacific Island Communities, Institute of Geological and  
38 Nuclear Sciences Ltd. (GNS Science), Avalon, New Zealand, .
- 39 Campbell, J.R., 2010: An overview of natural hazard planning in the pacific island region. *The Australasian Journal*  
40 *of Disaster and Trauma Studies*, forthcoming.
- 41 Campbell-Lendrum, D., A. Pruss-Ustun, and C. Corvalan, 2003: Climate change and health: Risks and responses.  
42 In: *How much disease could climate change cause?*[Campbell-Lendrum, D., C. Corvalan, K. Ebi, A. Githeko,  
43 and J. Scheraga(eds.)]. World Health Organization, Geneva, .
- 44 Cardona, O.D., 2007: Indicators of Disaster Risk and Risk Management: Program for Latin America and the  
45 Caribbean: Summary Report, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 46 Carney, E. (ed.), 1998: *Sustainable rural livelihoods: What contributions can we make?* Department for  
47 International Development, London, UK, .
- 48 Carraro, L., S. Khan, S. Hunt, G. Rawle, M. Robinson, and M.e.a. Antoninis, 2003: Monitoring the Millennium  
49 Development Goals: Current Weaknesses and Possible Improvements, Oxford Policy Management, Department  
50 for International Development, Glasgow, .
- 51 Carter, M.R., P.D. Little, T. Mogue, and W. Negatu, 2007: Poverty traps and natural disasters in ethiopia and  
52 honduras. *World Development*, **5(35)**, 835-856.
- 53 Cash, D.W. and S.C. Moser, 2000: Linking global and local scales: Designing dynamic assessment and management  
54 processes. *Global Environmental Change*, **2(10)**, 109-120.

- 1 Chavez, T., A. Perrault, P. Reehling, and C. Curummett, 2007: The impact of grey literature in advancing global  
2 karst research. *Publishing Research Quarterly*, **1(23)**, 3-18.
- 3 Cheong, S., 2011: Policy solutions. (**Special issue: Coastal adaptation**), in press.
- 4 Cheong, S., 2010: Initial responses to the MT hebei-spirit oil spill. *Marine Technology Society Journal*, (**Feb issue**),  
5 .
- 6 Cheong, S., 2011: Editorial: Coastal adaptation. *Climatic Change (Special Issue: Coastal Adaptation)*, in press.
- 7 Cherry, K.E. (ed.), 2009: *Lifespan perspectives on natural disasters: Coping with katrina, rita, and other storms*.  
8 Springer, New York, .
- 9 Christoplos, I., 2006: The Elusive "Window of Opportunity: For Risk Reduction in Post-Disaster Recovery,  
10 ProVention Consortium Forum 2006, Bangkok, .
- 11 Churchill, C. (ed.), 2006: *Protecting the poor: A microinsurance compendium*. International Labor Organization  
12 (ILO), Geneva, .
- 13 Churchill, C., 2007: Insuring the low-income market: Challenges and solutions for commercial insurers. *Geneva*  
14 *Papers on Risk and Insurance--Issues and Practice*, **3(32)**, 401-412.
- 15 Clark, G., S. Moser, S. Ratick, K. Dow, W. Meyer, S. Emani, W. Jin, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson, and H. Schwartz,  
16 1998: Assessing the vulnerability of coastal communities to extreme storms: The case of revere, MA, USA.  
17 *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*, **1(3)**, 59-82.
- 18 Clifton, D. and F. Gell, 2001: Saving and protecting lives by empowering women. *Gender and Development*, **1(9)**,  
19 8-18.
- 20 Comfort, L.K., 1993: Integrating information technology into international crisis management and policy. *Journal of*  
21 *Contingencies and Crisis Management*, **(1)**, 15-26.
- 22 Cooper, J.A.G. and J. McKenna, 2008: Social justice in coastal erosion management: The temporal and spatial  
23 dimensions. *Geoforum*, **(39)**, 294-306.
- 24 Costello, G., 2007: Louisiana coastal wetlands and louisiana coastal grey literature: Vanishing treasures. *Publishing*  
25 *Research Quarterly*, **1(23)**, 19-29.
- 26 Cova, T.J., F.A. Drews, L.K. Siebeneck, and A. Musters, 2009: Protective actions in wildfires: Evacuate or shelter in  
27 place? *Natural Hazards Review*, **4(10)**, 151-162.
- 28 Cox, J.R., C. Rosenzweig, W.D. Solecki, R. Goldberg, and P.L. and Kinney, 2007: Social Vulnerability to Climate  
29 Change: A Neighborhood Analysis of the Northeast U.S. Megaregion, Union of Concerned Scientists,  
30 Cambridge, MA, .
- 31 Crabbé, P.,M.Robin, 2006: Institutional adaptation of water resource infrastructures to climate change in eastern  
32 ontario. *Climatic Change*, **1(78)**, 103-133.
- 33 Cummins, J.D. and O. Mahul, 2008: *Catastrophe risk financing in developing countries: Principles for public*  
34 *intervention*. World Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 35 Cuny, F., 1983: *Disasters and development*. New York, Oxford University Press, .
- 36 Curtis, A., A. Duval-Diop, and J. Novak, 2010: Identifying spatial patterns of recovery and abandonment in the  
37 post-katrina holy cross neighborhood of new orleans. *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, **1(37)**,  
38 45-56.
- 39 Curtis, A., J.W. Mills, and M. Leitner, 2007: Katrina and vulnerability: The geography of stress. *Journal of Health*  
40 *Care for the Poor and Underserved*, **2(18)**, 315-330.
- 41 Cutter, S.L., 1996: Vulnerability to environmental hazards. *Progress in Human Geography*, **(20)**, 529-539.
- 42 Cutter, S.L. (ed.), 2001: *American hazardscapes: The regionalization of hazards and disasters*. Joseph Henry  
43 Press/National Academies of Science, Washington D.C., .
- 44 Cutter, S.L., B.J. Boruff, and W.L. Shirley, 2003: Social vulnerability to environmental hazards. *Social Science*  
45 *Quarterly*, **1(84)**, 242-261.
- 46 Cutter, S.L., J.T. Mitchell, and M.S. Scott, 2000: Revealing the vulnerability of people and places: A case study of  
47 georgetown county, south carolina. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, **4(90)**, 713-737.
- 48 Dale, A. and L. Newman, 2010: Social capital: A necessary and sufficient condition for sustainable community  
49 development? *Community Development Journal*, **1(45)**, 5-21.
- 50 Das, S. and J. Vincent, 2009: Mangroves protected villages and reduced death toll during indian super cyclone.  
51 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, **18(106)**, 7357-7360.
- 52 Dash, N. and H. Gladwin, 2007: Evacuation decision making and behavioral responses: Individual and household.  
53 *Natural Hazards Review*, **3(8)**, 69-77.

- 1 Davidson, C.H., C. Johnson, L. Gonzalo, N. Dikmen, and A. Sliwinski, 2007: Truths and myths about community  
2 participation in post-disaster housing projects. *Habitat International*, **1(31)**, 100-115.
- 3 Davies, M., B. Guenther, J. Leavy, T. Mitchell, and T. Tanner, 2009a: Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk  
4 Reduction and Social Protection: Complimentary Roles in Agriculture and Rural Growth? Institute of  
5 Development Studies, Brighton, .
- 6 Davies, M., B. Guenther, J. Leavy, T. Mitchell, and T. Tanner, 2009b: Adaptive social protection: Synergies for  
7 poverty reduction. *IDS Bulletin*, **4(39)**, .
- 8 Davies, M. and J. Leavy, 2007: Connecting social protection and climate change adaptation. *IDS in Focus*, **2**.
- 9 Davies, M. and J.A. McGregor, 2009: Social protection responses to the financial crisis: What do we know? *IDS in*  
10 *Focus Policy Briefing*, **7**.
- 11 De Sherbinin, A., A. Schiller, and A. Pulsipher, 2007: The vulnerability of global cities to climate hazards.  
12 *Environment and Urbanization*, **1(19)**, 39-64.
- 13 De Ville de Groyet, C., 2000: Stop propagating disaster myths. *Lancet*, **9231(356)**, 762-764.
- 14 Dershem, L. and D. Gzirishvili, 1999: Informal social support networks and household vulnerability: Empirical  
15 findings from georgia. *World Development*, **10(26)**, 1827-1838.
- 16 DeSalvo, K., D. Hyre, D. Ompad, A. Menke, L. Tynes, and P. Muntner, 2007: Symptoms of posttraumatic stress  
17 disorder in a new orleans workforce following hurricane katrina. *Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New*  
18 *York Academy of Medicine*, **2(84)**, 142-152.
- 19 Deschenes, O., M. Greenstone, 2007: The economic impacts of climate change: Evidence from agricultural output  
20 and random fluctuations in weather. *American Economic Review*, **1(97)**, 354-385.
- 21 Development Initiatives, , 2009: *Global Humanitarian Assistance*, Development Initiatives, Wells, Somerset, UK, .
- 22 Devereux, S. and S. Coll-Black, 2007: *DFID Social Transfers Evaluation*. Review of Evidence and Evidence Gaps  
23 on the Effectiveness and Impacts of DFID-Supported Pilot Social Transfer Schemes, IDS, Brighton, .
- 24 Devereux, S. and R. Sabates-Wheeler, 2004: *Transformative Social Protection*, Institute of Development Studies,  
25 Brighton, .
- 26 Devereux, S., R. Sabates-Wheeler, M. Tefera, and H. Taye, 2006: Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme:  
27 Trends in PSNP Transfers within Targeted Households, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, .
- 28 DFID, 2006: *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor: A White Paper on International*  
29 *Development*, Department for International Development, London, .
- 30 Díaz, J., C. López, J.C. Alberdi, A. Jordán, R. García, E. Hernández, and A. Otero, 2002: Heat waves in madrid  
31 1986-1997: Effects on the health of the elderly. *International Archives of Occupational and Environmental*  
32 *Health*, **163-170(75)**, .
- 33 diFalco, S. and E. Bulte, 2009: *Social Capital and Weather Shocks in Ethiopia: Climate Change and Culturally-*  
34 *Induced Poverty Traps*, London School of Economics, London, .
- 35 Dixit, A., Pokhrel, A, and Marcus Moench, M, 2008: From risk to resilience: Costs and benefits of flood mitigation  
36 in the lower bagmati basin: Case of nepal terai and north bihar. *Provention and ISET*, .
- 37 Dolan, A.H. and I.J. Walker, 2004: Understanding vulnerability of coastal communities to climate change related  
38 risks. *Journal of Coastal Research*, **(SI39)**, .
- 39 Douglas, I., K. Alam, M. Maghenda, Y. McDonnell, L. Mclean, and J. Campbell, 2009: Adapting cities to climate  
40 change. In: *Unjust waters: Climate change, flooding and the urban poor in africa* [Bicknell, J., D. Dodman, and  
41 D. Satterthwaite(eds.)]. Earthscan, London, pp. 201-224.
- 42 Dow, K. and Cutter, S. L., 2002: Emerging hurricane evacuation issues: Hurricane floyd and south carolina. *Natural*  
43 *Hazards Review*, **1(3)**, 12-18.
- 44 Dow, K. and S.L. Cutter, 1998: Crying wolf: Repeat responses to hurricane evacuation orders. *Coastal*  
45 *Management*, **4(26)**, 237-252.
- 46 Dow, K. and S.L. Cutter, 2000: Public orders and personal opinions: Household strategies for hurricane risk  
47 assessment. *Environmental Hazards*, **4(2)**, 143-155.
- 48 Downing, T.E. and J. Dyszynski, In press: Frontiers in adaptation economics: Scaling from the full social costs of  
49 carbon to adaptation processes. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, .
- 50 Downton, M.W. and R.A. Pielke Jr., 2005: How accurate are disaster loss data? the case of U.S. flood damage.  
51 *Natural Hazards*, **(35)**, 211-228.
- 52 Drabek, T.E., 1986: *Human system responses to disaster: An inventory of sociological findings*. Springer Verlag,  
53 New York, .

- 1 Dube, O.P. and S. Sekhwela, 2008: Climate change and adaptation. In: *Indigenous knowledge, institutions and*  
2 *practices for coping with variable climate in the limpopo basin of botswana* [Leary, N., J. Adejuwon, and V.  
3 Barros(eds.)]. Earthscan, Sterling, pp. 71-89.
- 4 Dynes, R., 2006: Social capital: Dealing with community emergencies. *Homeland Security Affairs*, **2(2)**, 1-26.
- 5 Ebi, K.L., 2008: Community-based adaptation to the health impacts of climate change. *American Journal of*  
6 *Preventive Medicine*, **5(35)**, 501-507.
- 7 Edmonds, A. and S.L. Cutter, 2008: Planning for pet evacuations during disasters. *Journal of Homeland Security*  
8 *and Emergency Management*, **1(5)**, .
- 9 Eisensee, T. and D. Stromberg, 2007: News droughts, news floods, and U.S. disaster relief. *The Quarterly Journal*  
10 *of Economics*, **2(122)**, 693--728.
- 11 Elliott, J.R. and J. Pais, 2006: Race, class, and hurricane katrina: Social differences in human responses to disaster.  
12 *Social Science Research*, **(35)**, 295-321.
- 13 Enarson, E., 2000: We will make meaning out this: Women's cultural responses to the red river valley flood.  
14 *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, **1(18)**, 39-64.
- 15 Enarson, E. and B.H. Morrow, 1997: *A gendered perspective: The voices of women* [Peacock, W.G., B.H. Morrow,  
16 and H. Gladwin(eds.)]. Routledge, London, pp. 116-140.
- 17 Ensor, M.O., 2008: Displaced once again: Honduran migrant children in the path of katrina. *Children, Youth and*  
18 *Environments*, **1(18)**, 280-302.
- 19 Ensor, J. and R. Berger, 2009: *Understanding climate change adaptation: Lesson from community-based*  
20 *approaches*. Practical Action Publishing, Bourton-on-Dunsmore, .
- 21 Ericksen, N.J., J. Dixon, and P. Berke, 2000: Environmental planning and management in new zealand. In:  
22 *Managing natural hazards under the resource management act* [Memon, A. and Perkins, H. (ed.)]. Dunmore  
23 Press, Palmerston North, pp. 123-132.
- 24 Ericksen, N.J., 1986: Creating Flood Disasters?: New Zealand's Need for a New Approach to Urban Flood Hazard,  
25 Ministry of Works and Development, Wellington, .
- 26 Ericksen, N.J., K. O'Brien, and L. Rosentrater, 2008: *GECHS Report*. Climate Change in Eastern and Southern  
27 Africa: Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, .
- 28 Fankhauser, S., J.B. Smith, and R.S.J. Tol, 1999: Weathering climate change. some simple rules to guide adaptation  
29 investments. *Ecological Economics*, **1(30)**, 67-78.
- 30 Fekete, A., 2009: Validation of a social vulnerability index in context to river-floods in germany. *Natural Hazards*  
31 *and Earth Systems Science*, **(9)**, 393403.
- 32 FEMA, 1997: *Multi hazard identification and risk assessment*. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., .
- 33 Few, R. and F. Matthies, 2006: *Flood hazards and health*. Earthscan, London, UK, .
- 34 Field, C.B., L.D. Mortsch, M. Brklacich, D.L. Forbes, P. Kovacs, J.A. Patz, S.W. Running, and M.J. Scott, 2007:  
35 Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. contribution of working group II to the fourth  
36 assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. In: *North america* [Parry, M.L., O.F.  
37 Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. Van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  
38 UK, pp. 617-652.
- 39 Finan, T.J. and D.R. Nelson, 2001: Making rain, making roads, making do: Public and private responses to drought  
40 in ceará, brazil. *Climate Research*, **(19)**, 97-108.
- 41 Finch, C., C.T. Emrich, and S.L. Cutter, 2010: Disaster disparities and differential recovery in new orleans.  
42 *Population and Environment*, **(31)**, 179-202.
- 43 Fischer, G., M. Shah, H. van Velthuisen, and F.O. Nachtergaele, 2001: Global Agro-Ecological Assessment for  
44 Agriculture in the 21st Century, .
- 45 Fischhoff, B., 2007: Nonpersuasive communication about matters of greatest urgency: Climate change.  
46 *Environmental Science and Technology*, **(41)**, .
- 47 Fischhoff, B., 1992: What forecasts (seem to) mean. *International Journal of Forecasting*, **(10)**, 387-403.
- 48 Ford, J., B. Smit, and J. Wandel, 2006: Vulnerability to climate change in the arctic: A case study from arctic bay,  
49 canada. *Global Environmental Change*, **2(16)**, 145-160.
- 50 Fothergill, A., 1996: Gender, risk, and disaster. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, **1(14)**,  
51 33-56.
- 52 Francis, R.A. , S. Falconi, R. Nateghi, S.D. Guikema, in Ed,S.Cheong, 2011: Probabilistic life cycle analysis model  
53 for electric power infrastructure risk mitigation in hurricane-prone coastal areas. *Climatic Change (Special*  
54 *Issue: Coastal Adaptation)*, in press.

- 1 Frandsen, T.F., 2009: The effects of open access on un-published documents: A case study of economics working  
2 papers. *Journal of Informetrics*, **(3)**, 124-133.
- 3 Fritz, C.E., 1961: Social problems. In: *Disasters* [Merton, R.K. and R. Nisbet(eds.)]. Harcourt, Brace and World,  
4 New York, pp. 651-694.
- 5 Fritze, J., G. Blashki, S. Burke, and J. Wieseman, 2008: Hope, despair and transformation: Climate change and the  
6 promotion of mental health and well-being. *International Journal of Mental Health Systems*, **(2)**, 1-12.
- 7 Froukh, M.L., 2001: Decison-support system for domestic water demand forecasting and management. *Water*  
8 *Resources Management*, **6(15)**, 363-382.
- 9 Frumkin, H. and A.J. McMichael, 2008: Climate change and public health: Thinking, communicating, acting.  
10 *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, **5(35)**, 403-410.
- 11 Fuchs, R., 2009: Cities at Risk: Developing Adaptive Capacity for Climate Change in Asia's Coastal Megacities, .
- 12 Fulu, E., 2007: Gender, vulnerability, and the experts: Responding to the maldives tsunami. *Development and*  
13 *Change*, **5(38)**, 843-864.
- 14 G20, 2009: Global plan for recovery and reform. In: Proceedings of G20 summit 2009, London, .
- 15 Gall, M., K.A. Borden, and S.L. Cutter, 2009: When do losses count? six fallacies of natural hazards loss data.  
16 *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*, **6(90)**, 799-809.
- 17 Gedan, K. B., M. L. Kirwan, E. Wolanski, E. B. Barbier, B.R. Silliman, 2011: Coastal vegetation's present and future  
18 role in protecting shorelines: An answer to recent challenges to the paradigm. *Climatic Change*, **Special Issue:**  
19 **Coastal Adaptation** in press.
- 20 Geo Risks Research, , 2009: Topics Geo: Natural Catastrophes 2009: Analyses, Assessments, Positions, Munich Re,  
21 Munich, Germany, .
- 22 Godschalk, D.R., R. Norton, C. Richardson, and D. Salvesen, 2000: Avoiding coastal hazard areas: Best state  
23 mitigation practices. *Environmental Geosciences*, **1(7)**, 13-22.
- 24 Gornitz, V.N., R.C. Daniels, T.W. White, and K.R. Birdwell, 1994: The development of a coastal assessment  
25 database: Vulnerability to sea-level rise in the U.S. southeast. *Journal of Coastal Research*, **(12)**, 327-338.
- 26 Greater London Authority, 2010: *The draft climate change adaptation strategy for london: Public consultation draft*  
27 .
- 28 Grothmann, T. and A. Patt, 2005: Adaptive capacity and human cognition: The process of individual adaptation to  
29 climate change. *Global Environmental Change, Part A: Human and Policy Dimensions*, **3(15)**, 199-213.
- 30 Guha-Sapir, D. and R. Below, 2002: The Quality and Accuracy of Disaster Data: A Comparative Analysis of Three  
31 Global Data Sets, ProVention Consortium, .
- 32 Hallegatte, S., 2009: Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate. *Global Environmental Change*, **(19)**, 240-247.
- 33 Hallegatte, S., N. Ranger, O. Mestre, P. Dumas, J. Corfee-Morlot, C. Herweijer, R. Muir Wood, 2010: Assessing  
34 climate change impacts, sea level rise and storm surge risk in port cities: A case study on copenhagen, climatic  
35 change. *OECD Environment Working Paper 3*, .
- 36 Hallegatte, S. and P. Dumas, 2009: Can natural disasters have positive consequences? investigating the role of  
37 embodied technical change. *Ecological Economics*, **3(68)**, 777-786.
- 38 Hallegatte, S., 2008: An adaptive regional input-output model and its application to the assessment of the economic  
39 cost of katrina. *Risk Analysis*, **3(28)**, 779-799.
- 40 Hammer-Klose, E. and R. Thieler, 2001: *Coastal vulnerability to sea-level rise: A preliminary database for the US*  
41 *atlantic, pacific and gulf of mexico coasts*. USGS, Woods Hole, MA, .
- 42 Handmer, J.W., 1987: Guidelines for floodplain acquisition. *Applied Geography*, **3(7)**, 203-221.
- 43 Hartman, C. and G.D. Squires (eds.), 2006: *There is no such thing as a natural disaster: Race, class, and hurricane*  
44 *katrina*. Routledge, New York, .
- 45 Hasan, A., 2007: The urban resource center, karachi. *Environment and Urbanization*, **1(19)**, 275-292.
- 46 Heal, G., 1997: Discounting and climate change; an editorial comment. *Climatic Change*, **2(37)**, 335-343.
- 47 Heinrichs, D., 2009: *Fifth Urban Research Symposium, Marseilles, France*. Adapting Cities to Climate Change:  
48 Opportunities and Constraints (Findings from Eight Cities), World Bank, Washington D.c., .
- 49 Heinz Center, 1999: *The hidden costs of coastal hazards: Implications for risk assessment and mitigation*. Island  
50 Press, Washington D.C., .
- 51 Heinz Center, 2002: *Human Links to Coastal Disasters*, The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and  
52 the Environment, Washington D.C., .

- 1 Hellmuth, M.E., O. D.E., U. Hess, A. Moorhead, and H. Bhojwani (eds.), 2009: Climate and society no. 2. In: *Index*  
2 *insurance and climate risk: Prospects for development and disaster management*. International Research  
3 Institute for Climate and Society (IRI), Columbia University, New York, USA, .
- 4 Hellmuth, M.E., A. Moorhead, M.C. Thomson, and J. Williams (eds.), 2007: *Climate risk management in africa:*  
5 *Learning from practice*. International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI), Columbia University,  
6 New York, NY, .
- 7 Heltberg, R., P.B. Siegel, and S.L. Jorgensen, 2009: Addressing human vulnerability to climate change: Toward a  
8 'no-regrets' approach. *Global Environmental Change*, **(19)**, 89-99.
- 9 Heltberg, R., P.B. Siegel, and S.L. Jorgensen, 2010: Social dimensions of climate change: Equity and vulnerability  
10 in a warming world. In: *Social policies for adaptation to climate change* [Mearns, R. and A. Norton(eds.)].  
11 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 12 Herweijer, C., N. Ranger,R.E.T.Ward, 2009: Adaptation to climate change: Threats and opportunities for the  
13 insurance industry. *The Geneva Papers*, **3(34)**, 360-380.
- 14 Hess, U. and J. Syroka, 2005: Weather-Based Insurance in Southern Africa: The Case of Malawi, World Bank,  
15 Washington, D.C., .
- 16 Hewings, G.J.D. and R. Mahidhara, 1996: *The great flood of 1993: Causes, impacts, responses*. In: *Economic*  
17 *impacts: Lost income, ripple effects, and recovery* [Changnon, S.A. (ed.)]. Westview, Boulder, CO, pp. 205-  
18 217.
- 19 Hewitt, K., 1997: *Regions of risk: A geographical introduction to disasters*. Longman, Harlow, pp. 389.
- 20 Hillhorst, D., 2002: Being good or doing good? quality and accountability of humanitarian NGOs. *Disasters*, **3(26)**,  
21 193-212.
- 22 Hölpe, P. and E. Gurenko, 2006: Scientific and economic rationales for innovative climate insurance solutions.  
23 *Climate Policy*, **Special Issue on Insurance and Climate Change**.
- 24 Horne, C., 2001: Social norms. In: *Sociological perspectives on the emergence of norms* [Opps, M.H.a.K.-. (ed.)].  
25 Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY, .
- 26 Hugo, G., 1996: Environmental concerns and international migration. *The International Migration Review*, **1(30)**,  
27 105-131.
- 28 Huq, S., S. Kovats, H. Reid, and D. Satterthwaite, 2007: Reducing risks to cities from disasters and climate change.  
29 *Environment and Urbanization*, **1(19)**, 39-64.
- 30 Hwang, S., Y. Cao, and J. Xi, 2010: Project-induced migration and depression: A panel analysis. *Social Science and*  
31 *Medicine*, **11(70)**, 1765-1772.
- 32 Hwang, S., J. Xi, Y. Cao, X. Feng, and X. Qia, 2007: Anticipation of migration and psychological stress and the  
33 three gorges dam project, china. *Social Science and Medicine*, **5(65)**, 1012-1024.
- 34 IDRC, 2002: Population and Health in Developing Countries-Volume 1: Population, Health and Survival at  
35 INDEPTH Sites, International Development Research Centre, .
- 36 IFRI, 2009: Climate Change. Impact on Agriculture and Cost of Adaptation, International Food Policy Research  
37 Institute, Washington D.C., 30 pp.
- 38 Inderberg, T., H. and P.O. Eikeland, 2009: Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values and governance. In:  
39 *Limits to adaptation: Analysing institutional constraints* [Adger, W.N., I. Lorenzoni, and K. O'Brien(eds.)].  
40 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 433-447.
- 41 Ingram, J., G. Franco, C.R. Rio, and B. Khazai, 2006: Post-disaster recovery dilemmas: Challenges in balancing  
42 short-term and long-term needs for vulnerability reduction. *Environmental Science and Policy*, **7-8(9)**, 607-613.
- 43 Iserson, K.V. and J.C. Moskop, 2007: Triage in medicine, part I: Concept, history, and types. *Annals of Emergency*  
44 *Medicine*, **3(49)**, 275-281.
- 45 Jacob, K., V. Gornitz, C. Rosenzweig, L. McFadden, R. Nicholls,E.Penning-Rowell (eds.), 2007: Managing coastal  
46 vulnerability. In: *Vulnerability of the new york city metropolitan area to coastal hazards, including sea-level*  
47 *rise: Inferences for urban coastal risk management and adaptation policies*. Elsevier Publishing, Oxford, pp.  
48 139-156.
- 49 Jacobs, L., F. Cook, and M. and Carpini, 2009: *Talking together: Public deliberation and political participation in*  
50 *america*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, .
- 51 Jha, A.K., J.D. Barenstein, P.M. Phelps, D. Pittet, and S. Sena, 2010: *Safer homes, stronger communities: A*  
52 *handbook for reconstructing after natural Disasters*. World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 370.
- 53 Johnston, R.J., 2000: The dictionary of human geography. In: *Community* [Gregory, D., G. Pratt, and M.  
54 Watts(eds.)]. Blackwell, Oxford UK and Malden MA, pp. 101-102.

- 1 Kabat, P., R.E. Schulze, M.E. Hellmuth, and J.A. Veraart, 2002: *Dialogue on Water and Climate*. Coping with  
2 Impacts of Climate Variability and Climate Change in Water Management: A Scoping Paper, Wageningen, 114  
3 pp pp.
- 4 Kallis, G., 2008: Droughts. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, **(33)**, 85-118.
- 5 Kang, S.J., S.J. Lee, and K.H. Lee, 2009: A study on the implementaion of non-structural measures to reduce urban  
6 flood damage. *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering*, **2(8)**, 385-392.
- 7 Kasperson, R.E. and J.X. Kasperson, 2001: *Risk and Vulnerability Program*. Climate Change, Vulnerability, and  
8 Social Justice, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, Sweden, .
- 9 Kasperson, R.E., O. Renn, P. Slovic, H.S. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J.X. Kasperson, and S. Ratick, 1988: The  
10 social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. *Risk Analysis*, **(2)**, 177-187.
- 11 Kates, R.W., C.E. Colten, S. Laska, and S.P. Leatherman, 2006: Reconstruction of new orleans after hurricane  
12 katrina: A research perspective. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, **(103)**, 14653-14660.
- 13 Kates, R.W., 2000: Cautionary tales: Adaptation and the global poor. *Climatic Change*, **(45)**, 5-17.
- 14 Kawachi, I. and L. Berkman, 2000: Social epidemiology. In: *Social cohesion, social capital, and health* [Kawachi, I.  
15 and L. Berkman(eds.)]. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, .
- 16 Keraminiyage, K., S. Jayasena, R. Haigh, and D. Amaratunga (eds.), 2008: A joint publication of CIB task group 53  
17 (postgraduate research training in building and construction) and CIB task group 63 (disasters and the built  
18 environment). In: *Post disater recovery challenges in sri lanka*. School of the Built Environment, University of  
19 Salford, UK, .
- 20 Kingdon, J.W., 1984: *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. Little Brown, Boston, .
- 21 Kovác, G. and K.M. Spens, 2007: Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations. *International Journal of*  
22 *Physical Distribution and Lobistics Management*, **2(37)**, 99-114.
- 23 Kraas, F., S. Aggarwal, M. Coy, G. Heiken, E. de Mulder, B. Marker, K. Nenonen, and W. Yu, 2005: Megacities--  
24 our Global Urban Future, Earth Sciences for Society Foundation, International Year for Planet Earth, Leiden,  
25 The Netherlands, .
- 26 Kreps, G.A., 1985: Disaster and the social order. *Sociological Theory*, **(3)**, 49-64.
- 27 Kristjanson, P., R. Reid, N. Dickson, W. Clark, D. Romney, R. Puskur, S. MacMillan, and D. Grace, 2009: Linking  
28 international agricultural research knowledge with action for sustainable development. *Proceedings of the*  
29 *National Academy of Sciences*, **13(106)**, 5047-5052.
- 30 Kunreuther, H.C., Michel-Kerjan, E.O. with Doherty, N.A., M.F. Grace, R.W. Klein, and M.V. Pauly, 2009: *At war*  
31 *with the weather: Managing large-scale risks in a new era of catastrophes*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, .
- 32 Kurukulasuriya, P.,R.Mendelsohn, 2008a: Switching as an adaptation strategy to climate change. *African Journal*  
33 *Agriculture and Resource Economics*, **(2)**, 105-126.
- 34 Kurukulasuriya, P.,R.Mendelsohn, 2008b: A ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on african cropland.  
35 *African Journal Agriculture and Resource Economics*, **(2)**, 1-23.
- 36 Laczko, F., C. Aghazarm (ed.), 2009: *Migration, environment and climate change: Assessing the evidence*.  
37 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva, .
- 38 Lambin, E. F., B. L. Turner, H. J. Geist, S. B. Agbola, A. Angelsen, J. W. Bruce, O. T. Coomes, R. Dirzo, G.  
39 Fischer, C. Folke, P. S. George, K. Homewood, J. Imbernon, R. Leemans, X. Li, E. F. Moran, M. Mortimore, P.  
40 S. Ramakrishnan, J. F. Richards, H. Skånes, W. Steffen, G. D. Stone, U. Svedin, T. A. Veldkamp, C.  
41 Vogel,J.Xu, 2001: The causes of land-use and land-cover change: Moving beyond the myths. *Global*  
42 *Environmental Change*, **4(11)**, 261-269.
- 43 Lauten, A.W. and K. Lietz, 2008: A look at standards gap: Comparing child protection responses in the aftermath of  
44 hurricane katrina and the indian ocean tsunami. *Children, Youth and Environmets*, **1(18)**, 158-201.
- 45 Leach, M., R. Mearns, and I. Scoones, 1999: Environmental entitlements: Dynamics and institutions in community-  
46 based natural resource management. *World Development*, **2(27)**, 225-247.
- 47 League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1991: Working with Women in Emergency Relief and  
48 Rehabilitation Programmes, League of Red Cross, Geneva, .
- 49 Lecomte, E. and K. Gahagan, 1998: *Paying the price: The status and role of insurance against natural disasters in*  
50 *the united states*. In: *Hurricane insurance protection in florida* [Kunreuther, H. and R. Roth Sr.(eds.)]. Joseph  
51 Henry Press, Washington D.C., pp. 97-124.
- 52 Leiserowitz, A., 2007: *Communicating the risks of global warming: American risk perceptions, affective images and*  
53 *interpretive communities* [Moser, S. and Dilling, L. (ed.)]. Cambridge University Press, New York, .

- 1 Lin, N., 2001: Social capital: Theory and research. In: *Building a social network theory of social capital* [Lin, N.,  
2 K.S. Cook, and R.S. and Burt(eds.)]. Transaction Press, New Brunswick, .
- 3 Lindell, M.K. and R.W. Perry, 1992: *Behavioral foundations of community emergency management*. Hemisphere  
4 Publishing Corp., Washington D. C., .
- 5 Lindell, M.K. and R.W. Perry, 1996: Identifying and managing conjoint threats. *Journal of Hazardous Materials*,  
6 **(50)**, 31-46.
- 7 Lindell, M.K. and R.W. Perry, 2004: *Communicating environmental risk in multiethnic communities*. Sage  
8 Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, .
- 9 Lindell, M.K. and C.S. Prater, 2003: Assessing community impacts of natural disasters. *Natural Hazards Review*,  
10 **(4)**, 176-185.
- 11 Lindell, M.K. and D.J. Whitney, 2000: Correlates of household seismic hazard adjustment adoption. *Risk Analysis*,  
12 **(20)**, 13-25.
- 13 Lindell, M.K., J. Lu, and C.S. Prater, 2005: Household decision making and evacuation in response to hurricane lili.  
14 *Natural Hazards Review*, **4(6)**, 171-179.
- 15 Linnerooth-Bayer, J., 2010: .
- 16 Lobell, D.B., M. B. Burke, C. Tebaldi, M. D. Mastrandrea, W. P. Falcon, R.L. Naylor, 2008: Prioritizing climate  
17 change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. *Science*, **(319)**, 607-610.
- 18 Lonsdale, K.G., T. Downing, R. Nicholls, D. Parker, M.C. Uyarra, R. Dawson, and J. Hall, 2008: Plausible  
19 responses to the threat of rapid sea-level rise for the thames estuary. *Climatic Change*, **1-2(91)**, 145-169.
- 20 Luna, E., 2001: Disaster mitigation and preparedness: The case of NGOs in the philippines. *Disasters*, **3(25)**, 216-  
21 226.
- 22 Lunch, N. and Lunch, C., 2006: *Insights into participatory video: A handbook for the field*. Insight, Oxford, .
- 23 Lund, J.R. and R.U. Reed, 1995: Drought water rationing and transferable rations. *Journal of Water Resources*  
24 *Planning and Management*, **6(121)**, 429-437.
- 25 Lundqvist, L.J., C.V. Borgstede, 2008: Whose responsibility? swedish local decision makers and the scale of climate  
26 change abatement. *Urban Affairs Review*, **3(43)**, 299-324.
- 27 Macchi, M., O. G., S. Gotheil, K. Cross, A. Boedihartono, C. Wolfangel, and M. Howell, 2008: *IUCN Issues*  
28 *Paper*. Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Climate Change, .
- 29 MacDonald, B., R. Cordes, and P. Wells, 2007: Assessing the diffusion and impact of grey literature published by  
30 intergovernmental scientific groups: The case of the gulf of maine council on the marine environment.  
31 *Publishing Research Quarterly*, **1(23)**, 30-46.
- 32 Maibach, E., C. Roser-Renouf, and A. Leiserowitz, 2008: Communication and marketing as climate change -  
33 intervention assets: A public health perspective. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, **5(35)**, 488-500.
- 34 Manyena, S.B., M. Fordham, and A. Collins, 2008: Disaster resilience and children: Managing food security in  
35 zimbabwe's binga district. *Children, Youth and Environments*, **1(18)**, 303-331.
- 36 Marks, M., 2007: Economic Impact of Cattle Transfers during the CLP's Asset Transfer Programme, Chars  
37 Livelihood Programme, Dhaka, .
- 38 Marx, S., E. Wever, B. Orlove, A. Leiserowitz, D. Krantz, C. Roncoli, and J. Phillips, 2007: Communication and  
39 mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information. *Global Environmental*  
40 *Change*, **(17)**, 47-58.
- 41 Maskrey, A., 1989: Community Based Mitigation, Oxfam, Oxford, UK, .
- 42 Masozera, M., M. Bailey, and C. Kerchner, 2007: Distribution of impacts of natural disasters across income groups:  
43 A case study of new orleans. *Ecological Economics*, **2-3(63)**, 299-306.
- 44 McAdoo, B., A. Moore, and J. Baumwoll, 2009: Indigenous knowledge and the near field population. *Natural*  
45 *Hazards*, **(48)**, 73-82.
- 46 McCormick, S., 2010: Social movements and health care in the united states. In: *Hot or not?: Obstacles to the*  
47 *emergence of climate-induced illness movements* [Zald, J.B.-a.S.L.M. (ed.)]. Oxford University Press, Oxford, .
- 48 McGee, T.K. and S. Russell, 2003: "It's just a natural way of life..." an investigation of wildfire preparedness in rural  
49 australia. *Environmental Hazards*, **1-2(5)**, 1-12.
- 50 McGuire, L., E. Ford, and C. Okoro, 2007: Natural disasters and older US adults with disabilitiesL implications for  
51 evacuation. *Disasters*, **1(31)**, 49-56.
- 52 McKinsey Group, , 2009: Shaping Climate Resilient Development: A Framework for Decision Making, Climate  
53 Works Foundation, Global Environment Facility, European Commission, McKinsey and Company, The  
54 Rockefeller Foundation, Swiss Re, 164 pp.

- 1 McMichael, A.J., R.E. Woodruff, and S. Hales, 2006: Climate change and human health: Present and future risks.  
2 *Lancet*, **(367)**, 859-869.
- 3 McTaggart-Cowan, R., L.F. Brosart, C.A. Davis, E.H. Atallah, J.R. Gyakum, and K.A. Emanuel, 2006: Analysis of  
4 hurricane catarina (2004). *Monthly Weather Review*, **11(134)**, 3029-3053.
- 5 Mechler, R., 2005: *Working Paper*. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Natural Disaster Risk Management in Developing  
6 Counties, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, .
- 7 Mendelsohn, R.,A.Dinar, 1999: Climate change, agriculture, and developing countries: Does adaptation matter? *The*  
8 *World Bank Research Observer*, **(14)**, 277-293.
- 9 Mercer, J., I. Kelman, K. Lloyd, and S. Suchet-Pearson, 2008: Reflections on use of participatory research for  
10 disaster risk reduction. *Area*, **2(40)**, 172-183.
- 11 Michaels, S., N. Goucher, and D. McCarthy, 2006: Policy windows, policy change and organizational learning:  
12 Watersheds in the evolution of watershed management. *Environmental Management*, **(38)**, 983-992`.
- 13 Milbert, E., 2006: Slums, slum dwellers and multilevel governance. *European Journal of Development Research*,  
14 **2(18)**, 299-318.
- 15 Mileti, D.D. and P.W. O'Brien, 1992: Warnings during disaster: Normalizing communicated risk. *Social Problems*,  
16 **(39)**, 40-57.
- 17 Mileti, D.S. and C. Fitzpatrick, 1993: *The great earthquake experiment: Risk communication and public action*.  
18 Westview Press, Boulder, CO, .
- 19 Mileti, D.S. and L.A. Peek, 2002: New tools for environmental protection: Education, information, and voluntary  
20 measures. In: *Understanding individual and social characteristics in the promotion of household disaster*  
21 *preparedness* [Dietz, T. and P.C. Stern(eds.)]. The National Academies Press, Washington D.C., pp. 125-140.
- 22 Mileti, D.S. and J.H. Sorensen, 1990: *Communication of emergency public warnings: A social science perspective*  
23 *and state-of-the-art assessment*. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, .
- 24 Mileti, D.S., 1999: *Disasters by design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the united states*. Joseph Henry Press,  
25 Washington, D.C., .
- 26 Mills, M.A., D. Edmonson, and C.L. Park, 2007: Trauma and stress response among hurricane katrina evacuees.  
27 *American Journal of Public Health*, **S1(97)**, S116-S123.
- 28 Mirza, M.M.Q., 2003: Climate change and extreme weather events: Can developing countries adapt? *Climate*  
29 *Policy*, **(3)**, 233-248.
- 30 Mitchell, J.K. (ed.), 1999: *Crucibles of hazard: Mega-cities and disasters in transition*. United Nations University  
31 Press, Tokyo, .
- 32 Mitchell, J.K., 2003: European river floods in a change world. *Risk Analysis*, **(23)**, 567-574.
- 33 Mitchell, T., K. Haynes, W. Choong, N. Hall, and K. Oven, 2008: The role of children and youth in communicating  
34 disaster risk. *Children, Youth and Environments*, **1(18)**, 254-279.
- 35 Mitchell, T. and M. Van Aalst, 2008: Convergence of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation, UK  
36 Department for International Development, .
- 37 Moench, M.,and the Risk to Resilience Study Team, 2008: From Risk to Resilience: Understanding the Costs and  
38 Benefits of Disaster Risk Reduction Under Changing Climatic Conditions (Working Paper 9), ProVention and  
39 ISET, .
- 40 Moench, M. and A. and Dixit (eds.), 2004: *Adaptive capacity and livelihood resilience: Adaptive strategies for*  
41 *responding to floods and droughts in south asia*. Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, Kathmandu,  
42 .
- 43 Montz, B.E. and G.a. Tobin, 2008: Livin large with levees: Lessons learned and lost. *Natural Hazards Review*, **3(9)**,  
44 150-157.
- 45 Morrow, B.H. and E. Enarson, 1996: Hurricane andrew through women's eyes: Issues and recommendations.  
46 *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, **1(14)**, 5-22.
- 47 Moser, S.C., 2009: Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values, governance. In: *Whether our are levers are long*  
48 *enough and the fulcrum strong? exploring the soft underbelly of adaptation decisions and actions* [Adger,  
49 N.W., I. Lorenzoni, and K. O'Brien(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 313-334.
- 50 Moser, S. and L. Dilling, 2007: *Creating a climate for change: Communicating climate change and facilitating*  
51 *social change*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, .
- 52 Mukheibir, P. and G. Ziervogel, 2007: Developing a municipal adaptation plan (MAP) for climate change: The city  
53 of cape town. *Environment and Urbanization*, **1(19)**, 143-158.

- 1 Multihazard Mitigation Council, 2005: Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Assess Future  
2 Savings from Mitigation Activities, National Institute of Building Sciences, Washington D.C., .
- 3 Munich Re Group, , 2000: Topics – Annual Review of Natural Disasters 1999, Munich Reinsurance Group, Munich,  
4 46 pp.
- 5 Munich Re Group, , 2004: Megacities-Megarisks: Trends and Challenges for Insurance and Risk Management,  
6 Munich Re Group, Munich, Germany, .
- 7 Mustafa, D., 1998: Structural causes of vulnerability to flood hazard in pakistan. *Economic Geography*, **3(74)**, 289-  
8 305.
- 9 Mutton, D. and C.E. Haque, 2004: Human vulnerability, dislocation and resettlement: Adaptation processes of river-  
10 bank erosion-induced displacees in bangladesh. *Disasters*, **1(28)**, 41-62.
- 11 Myers, C.A., T. Slack, and J. Singlemann, 2008: Social vulnerability and migration in the wake of disaster: The case  
12 of hurricanes katrina and rita. *Population and Environment*, **(29)**, 271-291.
- 13 Myers, N., 2002: Environmental refugees: A growing phenomenon of the 21st century. *Philosophical Transactions  
14 of the Royal Society of London Series Biological Sciences*, **1420(357)**, 609-613.
- 15 Nakagawa, Y. and R. Shaw, 2004: Social capital: A missing link to disaster recovery. *International Journal of Mass  
16 Emergencies and Disasters*, **1(22)**, 5-34.
- 17 National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), 1998: *Geographic information for the 21st century: Building  
18 a strategy for the nation*. National Academy Press, Washington D.C., .
- 19 National Research Council, 2007: *Tools and methods for estimating populations at risk from natural disasters and  
20 complex humanitarian crises*. National Academies Press, Washington D.C., .
- 21 Nelson, E., G. Mendoza, J. Regetz, S. Polasky, H. Tallis, D. R. Cameron, K. M.A. Chan, G. C. Daily, J. Goldstein,  
22 P. M. Kareiva, E. Lonsdorf , R. Naidoo, T. H. Ricketts, M.R. Shaw, 2009: Modeling multiple ecosystem  
23 services, biodiversity conservation, commodity production, and tradeoffs at landscape scales. *Frontiers in  
24 Ecology and Environment*, **1(7)**, 4-11.
- 25 Ngo, E.B., 2001: When disasters and age collide: Reviewing vulnerability of the elderly. *Natural Hazards Review*,  
26 **2(2)**, 80-89.
- 27 Nicholls, R., R.S.J. Tol, and A. Vafeidis, 2008: Global estimates of the impact of a collapse of the west antarctic ice  
28 sheet: An application of FUND. *Climatic Change*, **1-2(91)**, 171-190.
- 29 Nicholson-Cole, S., 2004: Representing climate change futures: A critique on the use of images for visual  
30 communication. *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems*, **(29)**, 255-273.
- 31 Niepold, F., D. McConville, and D. and Herring, 2008: The role of narrative and geospatial visualization in fostering  
32 climate literate citizens. *Physical Geography*, **(29)**, 255-273.
- 33 Nordhaus, W.D., 2007: Review: A review of the "stern review on the economics of climate change. *Journal of  
34 Economic Literature*, **3(45)**, 686-702.
- 35 Nordstrom, K.F., 2000: *Beaches and dunes of developed coasts*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, .
- 36 Nordstrom, K.F., 2008: *Beach and dune restoration*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, .
- 37 North, D.C., 1990: *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press,  
38 Cambridge, , ed., .
- 39 Noy, I. and T. Vu, 2009: The Economics of Natural Disasters in Vietnam, .
- 40 NRC (National Research Council), , 1989: *Improving risk communication*. National Academies Press, Washington,  
41 D.C., .
- 42 NRC (National Research Council), , 2006: *Facing hazards and disasters: Understanding human dimensions*.  
43 National Academy Press, Washington D.C., .
- 44 Obasi, G.O.P., 2005: Climate change and africa. In: *The impacts of ENSO in africa* [Low, P.S. (ed.)]. Cambridge  
45 University Press, Cambridge, pp. 218-230.
- 46 O'Brien, K., B. Hayward, and F. Berkes, 2009: Rethinking social contracts: Building resilience in a changing  
47 climate. *Ecology and Society*, **2(14)**, .
- 48 O'Brien, K., R. Leichenko, U. Kelkar, H. Venema, G. Aandahl, H. Tompkins, A. Javed, S. Bhadwal, S. Barg, L.  
49 Nygaard, and J. West, 2004: Mapping vulnerability to multiple stressors: Climate change and globalization in  
50 india. *Global Environmental Change*, **4(14)**, 303-313.
- 51 O'Brien, P. and D.S. Mileti, 1992: Citizen participation in emergency response following the loma prieta earthquake.  
52 *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, **1(10)**, 71-89.

- 1 Oettlé, N., A. Arendse, B. Koelle, and A. Van Der Poll, 2004: Community exchange and training in the suid  
2 bokkeveld: A UNCCD pilot project to enhance livelihoods and natural resource management. *Environmental*  
3 *Monitoring and Assessment*, **1-3(99)**, 115-125.
- 4 O'Keefe, P., K. Westgate, and B. Wisner, 1976: Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters. *Nature*, **5552(260)**,  
5 566-567.
- 6 Oloruntoba, R., 2005: A wave of destruction and the waves of relief: Issues, challenges and strategies. *Disaster*  
7 *Prevention and Management*, **4(14)**, 506-521.
- 8 Olshansky, R.B. and J.D. Kartz, 1998: Cooperating with nature: Confronting natural hazards with land use  
9 planning for sustainable communities. In: *Managing land use to build resilience* [Burby, R. (ed.)]. Joseph Henry  
10 Press, Washington D.C., pp. 167-201.
- 11 Olson, R., 2000: Towards a politics of disaster: Losses, values, agendas and blame. *International Journal of Mass*  
12 *Emergencies and Disasters*, **(18)**, 265-287.
- 13 O'Neill, M.S. and K.L. Ebi, 2009: Temperature extremes and health: Impacts of climate variability and change in the  
14 united states. *Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine*, **1(51)**, 13-25.
- 15 Osman-Elasha, B., 2006b: Human Resilience to Climate Change: Lessons for Eastern and Northern Africa,  
16 International START Secretariat, Washington D.C., .
- 17 Osman-Elasha, B., 2008: Nile development forum. In: *Climate variability and change/impacts on peace and*  
18 *stability in sudan and the region* Khartoum, .
- 19 Osman-Elasha, B. and T.E. Downing, 2007: *SEI Oxford Working Paper*. Lessons Learned in Preparing National  
20 Adaptation Programmes of Action in Eastern and Southern Africa, Stockholm Environment Institute, Oxford,  
21 UK, .
- 22 Osman-Elasha, B. and A. El Sanjak, 2009: Environment and conflict in africa: Reflections on darfur. In: *Global*  
23 *climate changes: Impacts on water resoruces and human security in africa* [Leroy, M. (ed.)]. University for  
24 Peace/Africa Programme, pp. 406-427.
- 25 Osman-Elasha, B., N. Goutbi, E. Spanger-Siegfried, W. Dougherty, A. Hanafi, S. Zakieldeem, A. Sanjak, H.A. Atti,  
26 and H.M. Elhassan, 2006: Adaptation Strategies to Increase Human Resilience Against Climate Variability and  
27 Change: Lessons from the Arid Regions of Sudan, AIACC, .
- 28 Osman-Elasha, B., 2006a: *Project AF14,-Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change*.  
29 Environmental Strategies to Increase Human Resilience to Climate Change: Lessons for Eastern and Northern  
30 Africa, Final Report, International START Secretariat, Washington D.C., .
- 31 Oxfam, , 2009: Exposed: Social Vulnerability and Climate Change in the US Southeast, Oxfam America, Boston,  
32 MA, .
- 33 Pahl-Wostl, C., J. Sendzimir, P. Jeffrey, J. Aerts, G. Berkamp, and K. Cross, 2007: Managing change toward  
34 adaptive water management through social learning. *Ecology and Society*, **2(12)**, 23/06/2010-30.
- 35 Parati, G., R. Antonicelli, F. Guazzarotti, E. Paciaroni, and G. Mancia, 2001: Cardiovascular effects of an  
36 earthquake: Direct evidence by ambulatory blood pressure monitoring. *Hypertension*, **5(38)**, 1093-1095.
- 37 Parry, M.L., O.F. O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson (eds.), 2007:  
38 *Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. contribution of working group II to the fourth*  
39 *assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  
40 UK., pp. 982.
- 41 Patt, A.G., 2009: Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values, governance. In: *Learning to crawl: How to use*  
42 *seasonal climate forecasts to build adaptive capacity* [Adger, W.N., I. Lorenzoni, and K. O'Brien(eds.)].  
43 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, .
- 44 Patt, A.G. and C. Gawa, 2002: Effective seasonal forecast applications: Examining constraints for subsistence  
45 farming in zimbabwe. *Global Environmental Change--Human and Policy Dimensions*, **(12)**, 185-195.
- 46 Patt, A.G., N. Peterson, M. Carter, M. Velez, U. Hess, and P. Suarez, 2009: Making index insurance attractive to  
47 farmers. *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*, **(14)**, 737-757.
- 48 Paulson, D.D., 1993: Hurricane hazard in western samoa. *Geographical Review*, **1(83)**, 43-53.
- 49 Peacock, W., B.H. Morrow, and H. Gladwin (eds.), 2000: *Hurricane andrew and the reshaping of miami: Ethnicity,*  
50 *gender, and the socio-political ecology of disasters*. Florida International University, International Hurricane  
51 Center, Miami, .
- 52 Pearce, D.,D.Moran, 1994: *The economic value of biodiversity*. Earthscan Publications Ltd., London, , ed., pp. 172.
- 53 Peek, L., 2008: Children and disasters: Understanding vulnerability, developing capacities, and promoting  
54 resilience--an introduction. *Children, Youth and Environments*, **1(18)**, 1-29.

- 1 Pelling, M., 2003: *The vulnerability of cities: Natural disasters and social resilience*. Earthscan, London ed., .
- 2 Pelling, M., C. High, J. Dearing, D. Smith, 2008: Shadow spaces for social learning: A relational understanding of  
3 adaptive capacity to climate change within organisations. *Environment and Planning A*, **4(40)**, 867-884.
- 4 Pelling, M. and K. Dill, 2010: Disaster politics: Tipping points for change in the adaptation of sociopolitical  
5 regimes. *Progress in Human Geography*, **1(34)**, 21-37.
- 6 Pelling, M. and C. High, 2005: Understanding adaptation: What can social capital offer assessments of adaptive  
7 capacity? *Global Environmental Change*, **(15)**, 308-319.
- 8 Penning-Rowsell, E.C., C. Johnson, and S.M. Tunstall, 2006: Signals from pre-crisis discourse: Lessons from UK  
9 flooding for global environmental policy change? *Global Environmental Change*, **(16)**, 323-339.
- 10 Perarnaud, V., A. Bootsma, P. Isabirye, and B. Lee, 2004: Communication of Agrometeorological Information,  
11 Commission for Agricultural Meteorology, WMO/TD No. 1254, Geneva, .
- 12 Perry, R.W. and M.K. Lindell, 1991: The effects of ethnicity on evacuation decision making. *International Journal*  
13 *of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, **1(9)**, 47-68.
- 14 Perry, R.W. and M.K. Lindell, 1997: Principles for managing community relocation as a hazard mitigation measure.  
15 *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, **1(5)**, 49-59.
- 16 Petal, M., R. Green, I. Kelman, R. Shaw, and A. Dixit, 2008: Hazards and the built environment: Attaining built-in  
17 resilience. In: *Community-based construction for disaster risk reduction* [Bosher, L. (ed.)]. Routledge, London  
18 and New York, .
- 19 Pettenger, M.E., 2007: *The social construction of climate change: Power, knowledge, norms, discourses*. Ashgate  
20 Publishers, Hampshire, England, .
- 21 Pfefferbaum, B., J.B. Houston, K.F. Wyche, R.L. Van Horn, G. Reyes, H. Jeon-Slaughter, and C.S. North, 2008:  
22 Children displaced by hurricane katrina: A focus group study. *Journal of Loss and Trauma*, **4(13)**, 303-318.
- 23 Pielke Jr., R.A., J. Gratz, C.W. Landsea, D. Collins, M.A. Saunders, and R. Musulin, 2008: Normalized hurricane  
24 damage in the united states: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review*, **(9)**, 29-42.
- 25 Podestá, G., D. Letson, C. Messina, F. Royce, and and 6 others, 2002: Use of ENSO-related climate information in  
26 agricultural decision making in argentina: A pilot experience. *Agricultural Systems*, **(74)**, 371-392.
- 27 Polack, E., 2008: A right to adaptation: Securing the participation of marginalized groups. *IDS Bulletin*, **4(39)**, 16-  
28 23.
- 29 Pomeroy, R.S., B.D. Ratner, S.J. Hall, J. Pimoljind, and V. Vivekanandan, 2006: Coping with disaster:  
30 Rehabilitating coastal livelihoods and communities. *Marine Policy*, **6(30)**, 786-793.
- 31 Portes, A. and P. Landolt, 1996: The downside of social capital. *The American Prospect*, **(26)**, 18-21.
- 32 Priest, S.J., M.J. Clark, and E.J. Treby, 2005: Flood insurance: The challenge of the uninsured. *Area*, **3(37)**, 295-  
33 302.
- 34 Pulwarty, R.S., 2003: Climate and water in the west: Science, information and decision making. *Water Resources*,  
35 **(124)**, 4-12.
- 36 Pulwarty, R.S. and T. Melis, 2001: Climate extremes and adaptive management on the colorado river. *Journal of*  
37 *Environmental Management*, **(63)**, 307-324.
- 38 Pulwarty, R., T. Broad, and T. Finan, 2004: Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, development and people. In: *ENSO*  
39 *forecasts and decision making in peru and brazil* [Bankoff, G., G. Frerkes, and T. Hilhorst(eds.)]. Earthscan,  
40 London, pp. 83-98.
- 41 Pulwarty, R.S., 2007: Communicating Agroclimatological Information, Including Forecasts for Agricultural  
42 Decision. Guide to Agrometeorological Practices, World Meteorological Organization, .
- 43 Ranger, N., S. Hallegatte, S. Bhattacharya, M. Bachu, S. Priya, K. Dhore, F. Rafique, P. Mathur, N. Naville, F.  
44 Henriot, C. Herweijer, S. Pohit, J. Corfee-Morlot, 2010: A preliminary assessment of the potential impact of  
45 climate change on flood risk in mumbai. *Climatic Change*, .
- 46 Rao, K. and U. Hess, 2009: Index insurance and climate risk: Prospects for development and disaster management.  
47 In: *Scaling up with india: The public sector* [Hellmuth, M.E., D.E. Osgood, U. Hess, A. Moorhead, and H.  
48 Bhojwani(eds.)]. International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI), New York, USA, .
- 49 Raschky, P.A., 2008: Institutions and the losses from natural disasters. *Natural Hazards Earth Systems Science*, **(8)**,  
50 627-634.
- 51 Ray-Bennett, N., 2010: The role of microcredit in reducing women's vulnerabilities to multiple disasters. *Disasters*,  
52 **1(34)**, 240-260.
- 53 Rayner, S., H. Ingram, and D. Lach, 2005: Weather forecasts are for wimps: Why water resource managers do not  
54 use climate forecasts. *Climatic Change*, **(69)**, 197-227.

- 1 Reilly, J.,D.Schimmelpfennig, 2000: Irreversibility, uncertainty, and learning: Portraits of adaptation to long-term  
2 climate change. *Climatic Change*, **1(45)**, 253-278.
- 3 Ritchie, L. and D. Gill, 2007: Social capital theory as an integrating theoretical framework in technological disaster  
4 research. *Sociological Spectrum*, **1(27)**, 103-129.
- 5 RMS, 2009: *RMS Special Report. Summary of Analysis Prepared for the Florida Department of Financial Services.*  
6 Analyzing the Effects of the 'my Safe Florida Home' Program on Florida Insurance Risk, Risk Management  
7 Solutions, .
- 8 Roberts, S., 2008: Effects of climate change on the built environment. *Energy Policy*, **12(36)**, 4552-4557.
- 9 Ronan, K.R., K. Crellin, D.M. Johnston, J. Becker, K. Finnis, and D. Paton, 2008: Promoting child and family  
10 resilience to disasters: Effects, interventions and prevention effectiveness. *Children, Youth and Environments*,  
11 **1(18)**, 332-353.
- 12 Roncoli, C., K. Ingram, and P. Kirshen, 2001: The costs and risks of coping with drought: Livelihood impacts and  
13 farmers' responses in burkina faso. *Climate Research*, **(19)**, 119-132.
- 14 Rose, A., 2004: Modeling spatial and economic impacts of disasters. In: *Economic principles, issues, and research*  
15 *priorities in hazard loss estimation* [Okuyama, Y. and S. Chang(eds.)]. Springer, pp. 14-36.
- 16 Rose, A. and S. Liao, 2005: Modeling regional economic resilience to disasters: A computable general equilibrium  
17 analysis of water service disruptions. *Journal of Regional Science*, **(45)**, 75-112.
- 18 Rose, A., G. Oladosu, and S. Liao, 2007: Business interruption impacts of a terrorist attack on the electric power  
19 system of los angeles: Customer resilience to a total blackout. *Risk Analysis*, **3(27)**, 513-531.
- 20 Rosenzweig, C.,M.L.Parry, 1994: Potential impact of climate change on world food supply. *Nature*, **(367)**, 133-138.
- 21 Rosenzweig, C.,W.D.Solecki, 2001: *Climate change and a global city: The metropolitan east coast regional*  
22 *assessment*. Columbia Earth Institute, New York, , ed., pp. 24.
- 23 Sagala, S., N. Okada, and D. Paton, 2009: Predictors of intention to prepare for volcanic risks in mt. merapi,  
24 indonesia. *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology*, **2(3)**, 47-54.
- 25 Sahlins, M.D., 1962: *Moala: Culture and natur on a fujian island*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,  
26 Michigan, .
- 27 Salick, J. and A. Byg (eds.), 2007: *Indigenous peoples and climate change*. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change  
28 Research, Oxford, UK, .
- 29 Salick, J. and N. Ross, 2009: Traditional peoples and climate change. *Global Environmental Change*, **(19)**, 137-139.
- 30 Satterthwaite, D., S. Huq, M. Pelling, H. Reid, and P. Lankao, 2007: Adapting to Climate Change in Urban Areas:  
31 The Possibilities and Constraints in Low-and Middle-Income Nations, IIED (International Institute for  
32 Environment and Development), London, .
- 33 Schlenker, W.,D.Lobell, 2010: Robust negative impacts of climate change on african agriculture. *Environmental*  
34 *Research Letters*, **(5)**, .
- 35 Schmid, A.P., 1998: *Thesaurus and glossary of early warning and conflict prevention terms (abridged version)*.  
36 FEWER Secretariat, London, .
- 37 Schneider, S.H., K. Kuntz-Duriseti,C.Azar, 2000: Costing non-linearities, surprises, and irreversible events. *Pacific*  
38 *and Asian Journal of Energy*, **1(10)**, 81-106.
- 39 Schroeder, R.A., 1987: Gender Vulnerability to Drought: A Case Study of the Hausa Social Environment,  
40 University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, .
- 41 Scott, J.C., 1976: *The moral economy of the peasant rebellion and subsistence in southeast asia*. Yale University  
42 Press, New Haven, CT, .
- 43 Seck, P., 2007: Links between Natural Disasters, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk Reduction: A Critical  
44 Perspective, United Nations Development Programme, New York, .
- 45 Semenza, J.C., 2005: Handbook of urban health. In: *Building healthy cities: A focus on interventions* [S.A.V. Galea,  
46 D. (ed.)]. Spring Science and Business Media, New York, NY, .
- 47 Sen, A., 1981: *Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation*. Clarendon, Oxford, UK, .
- 48 Seo, N.,R.Mendelsohn, 2008: Measuring impacts and adaptation to climate change: A structural ricardian model of  
49 african livestock management. *Agricultural Economics*, **(38)**, 150-165.
- 50 Shaw, A., S. Sheppard, S. Burch, D. Flanders, A. Wiek, J. Carmichael, J. Robinson,S.Cohen, 2009: Making local  
51 futures tangible—Synthesizing, downscaling, and visualizing climate change scenarios for participatory  
52 capacity building. *Global Environmental Change*, **(19)**, 447-463.

- 1 Shaw, R., 2006: Multiple dimension of global environmental changes. In: *Community-based climate change*  
2 *adaptation in vietnam: Inter-linkages of environment, disaster, and human security* [Sonack, S. (ed.)]. TERI  
3 Publication, pp. 521-547.
- 4 Shaw, R., A. Sharma, and Y. Takeuchi, 2009: *Indigenous knowledge and disaster risk reduction: From practice to*  
5 *policy*. Nova Science Publishers, Inc., Hauppauge, NY, pp. 409.
- 6 Shoaf, K. and S. Rottmann, 2000: The public health impact of disasters. *Australian Journal of Emergency*  
7 *Management*, 58-63.
- 8 Silk, J., 2000: Caring at a distance: (im)partiality, moral motivation, and the ethics of representation - introduction.  
9 *Ethics, Place and Environment*, **3(3)**, 303-309.
- 10 Sims, H. and K. Vogelmann, 2002: Popular mobilization and disaster management in cuba. *Public Administration*  
11 *and Development*, **(22)**, 389-400.
- 12 Skees, J.R. and B.J. Barnett, 2006: Enhancing microfinance using index-based risk-transfer products. *Agricultural*  
13 *Finance Review*, **2(66)**, 235-250.
- 14 Skees, J.R., B.J. Barnett, and A.G. Murphy, 2008: Creating insurance markets for natural disaster risk in lower  
15 income countries: The potential role for securitization. *Agricultural Finance Review*, **(68)**, 151-157.
- 16 Slater, R., S. Ashley, M. Tefera, M. Buta, and D. Esubalew, 2006: Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Programme  
17 (PSNP): PSNP Policy, Programme, and Institutional Linkages, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London,  
18 .
- 19 Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H.L. Miller (eds.), 2007:  
20 Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. contribution of working group I to the fourth assessment  
21 report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. In: *Summary for policymakers*. Cambridge University  
22 Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, .
- 23 Someshwar, S., 2008: Adaptation as 'Climate-smart' development. *Development*, **(51)**, 366-374.
- 24 Sondergaard, T.F., J. Andersen, and B. Huroland, 2003: Documents and the communication of scientific and  
25 scholarly information, revising and updating the UNISIST model. *Journal of Documentation*, **3(59)**, 278-320.
- 26 SOPAC, and UNEP, 2005: Building Resilience in SIDS: The Environmental Vulnerability Index, South Pacific  
27 Applied Geoscience Commission, Suva, Fiji, .
- 28 Sorensen, J.H., 2000: Hazard warning systems: Review of 20 years of progress. *Natural Hazards Review*, **2(1)**, 119-  
29 125.
- 30 Sorensen, J.H., B.L. Shumpert, and B.M. Vogt, 2004: Planning for protective action decision making: Evacuate or  
31 shelter-in-place. *Journal of Hazardous Materials*, **1-3(109)**, 1-11.
- 32 Sorensen, J.H. and B.V. Sorensen, 2007: *Community processes: Warning and evacuation* [Rodriguez, H., E.L.  
33 Quarantelli, and R.R. Dynes(eds.)]. Springer, New York, pp. 183-199.
- 34 Spanger-Siegfried, E., W. Dougherty, and B. Osman-Elasha, 2005: Methodological Framework an Internal Scoping  
35 Report of the Project Strategies for Increasing Human Resilience in Sudan: Lessons for Climate Change  
36 Adaptation in North and East Africa, .
- 37 Sperling, F. and F. Szekely, 2005: Disaster Risk Management in a Changing Climate, VARG, Washington D.C., .
- 38 Stern, P. and W. Easterling (eds.), 1999: *Making climate forecasts matter*. National Academies Press, Washington  
39 D.C., pp. 175.
- 40 Stern, N., 2007: *The economics of climate change: The stern review*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, .
- 41 Stevenson, J.R., C.T. Emrich, J.T. Michtell, and S.L. Cutter, 2010: Using building permits to monitor disaster  
42 recovery: A spatio-temporal case study of coastal mississippi following hurricane katrina. *Cartography and*  
43 *Geographic Information Science*, **1(37)**, 57-68.
- 44 Strobl, E., 2008: *IZA Discussion Papers Series*. The Economic Growth Impact of Hurricanes: Evidence from US  
45 Coastal Counties, .
- 46 Suarez, P., F. Ching, G. Ziervogel, I. Lemaire, D. Turnquest, J.M. de Suarez, and B. Wisner, 2008: Video-Mediated  
47 Approaches for Community-Level Climate Adaptation, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex,  
48 Brighton, .
- 49 Suarez, P., 2009: *The Pardee Papers*. Humanitarian Relief in a Changing Future: The Challenges of Climate  
50 Adaptation, .
- 51 Sudmeier-Rieux, K., H. Masundire, A. Rizvi, S. Rietbergen (eds.), 2006: *Ecosystems, livelihoods and disasters: An*  
52 *integrated approach to disaster risk management*. International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural  
53 Resources, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK, , ed., pp. 56.

- 1 Susman, P., P. O'Keefe, and B. Wisner, 1983: Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology. In:  
2 *Global disasters, a radical reinterpretation* [Hewitt, K. (ed.)]. Allen and Unwin, Boston, pp. 263-283.
- 3 Swiss Re, 2008: Insurance in emerging markets: Overview and prospects for  
4 islamic insurance.
- 5 Swiss Re, 2009: *Sigma Report 3*. World Insurance in 2008: Life Premiums Fall in Industrialized Countries – Strong  
6 Growth in the Emerging Economies, Swiss Reinsurance Group, .
- 7 Tanner, T., T. Mitchell, E. Polack, and B. Guenther, 2009: Urban Governance for Adaptation: Assessing Climate  
8 Change for Resilience in Ten Asian Cities, .
- 9 Tanner, T.M., A. Hassan, K.M.N. Islam, D. Conway, R. Mechler, R.U. Ahmed, and M. Alam, 2007: ORCHID:  
10 Piloting Climate Risk Screening in DFID Bangladesh - Research Report, Institute of Development Studies,  
11 Brighton, .
- 12 Tanner, T.M. and T. Mitchell (eds.), 2008: IDS bulletin. In: *Poverty in a changing climate*. IDS, Brighton, .
- 13 Tearfund., 2006: Adapting to Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities for the Development Community,  
14 Institute of Development Studies, .
- 15 Thacker, M.T.F., R. Lee, R.I. Sabogal, and A. Henderson, 2008: Overview of deaths associated with natural events,  
16 united states, 1979-2004. *Disasters*, **2(32)**, 303-315.
- 17 Thatje, S., J. Laudien, O. Heilmeyer, and C. Nauen, 2007: Understanding el niño--the importance of grey literature  
18 in coastal ecosystem research and management. *Marine Policy*, **1(31)**, 85-93.
- 19 Thielen, A.H., T. Petrow, and H.e.a. Kreibich, 2006: Insurability and mitigation of flood losses in private  
20 households in germany. *Risk Analysis*, **2(26)**, 383-395.
- 21 Thomalla, F., T. Downing, E. Spanger-Siegfried, G. Han, and J. Rockström, 2006: Reducing hazard vulnerability:  
22 Towards a common approach between disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation. *Disasters*, **1(30)**, 39-48.
- 23 Thomas , D.S.G. and C. Twyman, 2005: Equity and justice in climate change adaptation amongs natural-resource-  
24 depedent societies. *Global Environmental Change*, **(15)**, 115-124.
- 25 Thomson, R., 2007: Cultural models and shoreline social conflict. *Coastal Management*, **(35)**, 211-237.
- 26 Tierney, K., 2006: *On risk and disaster: Lessons from hurricane katrina*. In: *Social inequality, hazards, and*  
27 *disasters* [Daniels, R.J., D.F. Kettl, and H. Kunreuther(eds.)]. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,  
28 pp. 109-128.
- 29 Tierney, K., C. Bevc, and E. Kuligowski, 2006: Metaphors matter: Disaster myths, media frames, and their  
30 consequences in hurricane katrina. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, **1(604)**, 57-  
31 81.
- 32 Tierney, K.J., M.K. Lindell, and R.W. Perry, 2001: *Facing the unexpected: Disaster preparedness and response in*  
33 *the united states*. National Academies Press, Washington D.C., .
- 34 Titus, J., D. Hudgens, D. Trescott, M. Craghan, W. Nuckols, C. Hershner, J. Kassakian, C. Linn, P. Merritt, T.  
35 McCue, J. O'Connell, J. Tanski, J. Wang, 2009: State and local governments' plan for development of most land  
36 vulnerable to rising sea level along the US atlantic coast. *Environmental Research Letters*, **4(4)**, .
- 37 Tobin, G.A., 1995: The levee love affair: A stormy relationship. *Water Resources Bulletin*, **(31)**, 359-367.
- 38 Tol, R.S.J., 2003: Is the uncertainty about climate change too large for expected cost-benefit analysis? *Climatic*  
39 *Change*, **3(56)**, .
- 40 Tschakert, P. and K. Dietrich, In press: Anticipatory learning for climate change adaptation and resilience. *Ecology*  
41 *and Society*, .
- 42 Turner, B.L., 1978: *Man-made disasters: The failire of foresight*. Wykeham, London, .
- 43 Turner, N.J. and H. Clifton, 2009: "It's so different today": Climate change and indigenous lifeways in british  
44 columbia, canada. *Global Environmental Change*, **2(19)**, 180-190.
- 45 Turvey, C., 2001: Weather insurance and specific event risks in agriculture. *Review of Agricultural Economics*,  
46 **2(23)**, 333-351.
- 47 UNDP, 2007: *Human development report 2007/2008: Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided*  
48 *world*. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, UK and New York, NY, .
- 49 UNDP, , 2004: *Reducing disaster risk: A challenge for development*. United Nations Development Programme, New  
50 York, .
- 51 UNFPA, 2009: Facing a Changing World: Women, Population and Climate, .
- 52 UN-HABITAT, 2007: *Global report on human settlements, 2007: Enhancing urban safety and security*. Earthscan,  
53 London, .

- 1 UNISDR, 2004: *Living with risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives*. The United Nations, New York  
2 and Geneva, .
- 3 UNISDR, , 2009: *Global assessment report on disaster risk reduction: Risk and poverty in a changing climate*. The  
4 United Nations, Geneva, .
- 5 Valdes, H.M., 1997: Community-Operatied Early Warning System for Floods, .
- 6 Valente, T.W. and R.L. Davis, 1999: Accelerating the diffusion of innovations using opinion leaders. *Annals of the*  
7 *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, **(566)**, 55-67.
- 8 Valente, T.W., B.R. Hoffman, A. Ritt-Olson, K. Lichtman, and C.A. Johnson, 2003: Effects of a social-network  
9 method for group assignment strategies on peer-led tobacco prevention programs in schools. *American Journal*  
10 *of Public Health*, **(93)**, 1837-1843.
- 11 van Aalst, M.K., 2006: The impacts of climate change on the risk of natural disasters. *Disasters*, **1(30)**, 5-18.
- 12 Van Aalst, M., K. Maarten, T. Cannon, and I. Burton, 2008: Community level adaptation to climate change: The  
13 potential role of participatory community risk assessment. *Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy*  
14 *Dimensions*, **1(18)**, 165-179.
- 15 Van Willigen, M., T. Edwards, B. Edwards, and S. Hesse, 2002: Riding out the storm: Experiences of the  
16 physically disabled during hurricanes bonnie, dennis, and floyd. *Natural Hazards Review*, **3(3)**, 98-106.
- 17 Vellinga, P., E. Mills, G. Berz, L. Bouwer, S. Huq, L.A. Kozak, J. Palutikof, B. Schanzenbacher, G. Soler, 2001:  
18 *Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate*  
19 *Change*. Insurance and Other Financial Services - Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge University  
20 Press, Cambridge, UK, .
- 21 Venkatesh, B.N., B.F. Hobbs, 1999: Analyzing investments for managing lake erie levels under climate change  
22 uncertainty. *Water Resources Research*, **5(35)**, 1671-1683.
- 23 Venton, C.C. and P. Venton, 2004: Disaster Preparedness Programmes in India: A Cost Benefit Analysis, HPN  
24 Network Paper No. 49, Overseas Development Institute, .
- 25 Vörösmarty, C., G. Green, J. Salisbury, and R. Lammers, 2000: Global water resources: Vulnerability from climate  
26 change and population growth. *Science*, **5477(289)**, 284-289.
- 27 Wachtendorf, T., J.M. Kendra, H. Rodriguez, and J. Trainor, 2006: The social impacts and consequences of the  
28 december 2004 indian ocean tsunami: Observations from india and sri lanka. *Earthquake Spectra*, **3(22)**, 693-  
29 714.
- 30 Waddell, E., 1989: Observations on the 1972 frosts and subsequent relief programme among the engas of the western  
31 highlands. *Mountain Research and Development*, **3(9)**, 210-223.
- 32 Walker, P., 1989: *Famine early warning systems: Victims and destitution*. Earthscan Publications, London, .
- 33 Ward, R.E.T., C. Herweijer, N. Patmore, R. Muir-Wood, 2008: The role of insurers in promoting adaptation to the  
34 impacts of climate change. *The Geneva Papers*, **(33)**, 133-139.
- 35 Watts, M., 1983: Hazards and crises: A political economy of drought and famine in northern nigeria. *Antipode*, **1(15)**,  
36 24-34.
- 37 Weems, C.F. and S. Overstreet, 2008: Child and adolescent mental health research in the context of hurricane  
38 katrina: A ecological needs-based perspective and introduction to the special section. *Journal of Clinical Child*  
39 *and Adolescent Psychology*, **3(37)**, 487-494.
- 40 Weibel, W.W., 1988: Combining Ethnographic and Epidemiologic Methods in Targeted AIDS Interventions: The  
41 Chicago Model, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Rockville, MD, .
- 42 Weichselgartner, J. and R.E. Kasperson, 2010: Barriers in the science-policy-practice interface: Toward a  
43 knowledge-action-system in global environmental change research. *Global Environmental Change*, **(20)**, 266-  
44 277.
- 45 Weissbecker, I., Sephton, S.E., M.B. Martin, and D.M. Simpson, 2008: Psychological and physiological correlates  
46 of stress in children exposed to disaster: Current research and recommendations for intervention. *Children, Youth*  
47 *and Environments*, **1(18)**, 30-70.
- 48 Weitzman, M.L., 2007: A review of the stern review on the economics of climate change. *Journal of Economic*  
49 *Literature*, **(45)**, 703-724.
- 50 Weitzman, M.L., 2009: On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. *The Review of*  
51 *Economics and Statistics*, .
- 52 Wellman, B. and S.D. Berkowitz, 1988: *Social structures: A network approach*. Cambridge University Press,  
53 Cambridge, .
- 54 Wenzel, F., F. Bendimerad, and R. Sinha, 2007: Megacities-megarisks. *Natural Hazards*, **3(42)**, 481-491.

- 1 West, J., Small, MJ, and Dowlatabadi, H., 2001: Storms, investor decisions, and the economic impacts of sea level  
2 rise. **2-3(48)**, 317-342.
- 3 Whitehead, J.C., B. Edwards, M. Van Willigen, J.R. Maiolo, K. Wilson, and K.T. Smith, 2000: Heading for higher  
4 ground: Factors affecting real and hypothetical hurricane evacuation behavior. *Environmental Hazards*, **4(2)**,  
5 133-142.
- 6 Wiest, R.E., J.S.P. Mocellin, and D.T. Motsisi, 1994: The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies. Prepared  
7 for the Disaster Management Training Programme of the United Nations Development Programme and the  
8 Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator, Disaster Research Unit, University of Manitoba,  
9 Manitoba, .
- 10 Wilhelmi, O.V. and D.A. Wiilhite, 2002: Assessing vulnerability to agricultural drought: A nebraska case study.  
11 *Natural Hazards*, **1(25)**, 37-58.
- 12 Williams, R., d. Alexander .A., D. Bolsover, and F.K. Bakke, 2008: Children, resilience and disasters: Recent  
13 evidence that should influence a model of psychosocial care. *Current Opinion in Psychiatry*, **4(21)**, 338-344.
- 14 Winsvold, M., K.B. Stokke, J.E. Klausen, and I. Saglie, 2009: Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values and  
15 governance. In: *Organizational learning and governance in adaptation in urban development* [Adger, W.N., I.  
16 Lorenzoni, and K. O'Brien(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 476-490.
- 17 Wisner, B., 2003: Building safer cities: The future of disaster risk. In: *Disaster risk reduction in megacities: Making  
18 the most of human and social capital* [Kreimer, A., M. Arnold, and A. Carlin(eds.)]. World Bank Books,  
19 Washington D.C., .
- 20 Wisner, B., 2002: Earthquakes. In: *Disability and disaster: Victimhood and agency in earthquake risk reduction*  
21 [Rodrigue, C. and E. Rovai(eds.)]. Routledge, London, .
- 22 Wisner, B., P. Blaike, T. Cannon, and I. Davis, 2004: *At risk: Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters*.  
23 Routledge, London, .
- 24 WMO, 2003: Integrated Flood Plain Management Case Study: Bangladesh Flood Management, World  
25 Meteorological Organization (WMO), Geneva, .
- 26 World Bank, 2000: Cities, Seas, and Storms. Managing Change in Pacific Island Economies. Volume IV Adapting  
27 to Climate Change, World Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 28 World Bank, , 2009: *Climate resilient cities: A primer on reducing vulnerabilities*. World Bank, Washington D.C., .
- 29 Wu, S., B. Yarnal, and A. Fisher, 2002: Vulnerability of coastal communities to sea-level rise: A case study of cape  
30 may county, new jersey, USA. *Climate Research*, **(22)**, 255-270.
- 31 Yohe, G., J. Neumann, P. Marshall,H.Ameden, 1996: The economic cost of greenhouse induced sea level rise in the  
32 united states. *Climatic Change*, **(32)**, 387-410.
- 33 Yohe, G., J. Neumann,H.Ameden, 1995: Assessing the economic cost of greenhouse induced sea level rise: Methods  
34 and applications in support of a national survey. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, **(29)**,  
35 78-97.
- 36 Yohe, G., P. Kirshen, and K. Knee, 2011: On the economics of coastal adaptation solutions in an uncertain world.  
37 *Climatic Change (Special Issue: Coastal Adaptation)*, in press.
- 38 Yohe, G. and J. Newmann, 1997: Planning for sea-level rise and shoreline protection and climate uncertainty.  
39 *Climatic Change*, **(37)**, 243-270.
- 40 Zahran, S., S.D. Brody, W.G. Peacock, A. Vedlitz, and H. Gover, 2008: Social vulnerability and the natural and  
41 built environment: A model of flood casualties in texas. *Disasters*, **4(32)**, 537-560.
- 42 Ziervogel, G., 2004: Targeting seasonal climate forecasts for integration into household level decisions: The case of  
43 smallholder farmers in lesotho. *The Geographical Journal*, **(170)**, 6-21.
- 44 Ziervogel, G. and P. Ericksen, 2010: Adapting to climate change to sustain food security. *Wiley Interdisciplinary  
45 Reviews: Climate Change*, .
- 46 Ziervogel, G., A.O. Nyong, B. Osman-Elasha, C. Conde, S. Cortés, and T. Downing, 2006: Climate Variability and  
47 Change: Implications for Household Food Security, .
- 48 Ziervogel, G., M. Shale, and M. Du, 2010: Climate change adaptation in a developing country context: The case of  
49 urban water supply in cape town. *Climate and Development*, **(2)**, 94-110.
- 50 Ziervogel, G. and F. Zermoglio, 2009: Climate-change scenarios and the development of adaptation strategies in  
51 africa: Challenges and opportunities. *Climate Research*, **2-3(40)**, 133-146.
- 52

Table 5-1: Guidelines for grey literature inclusion.



Table 5-2: Local experience with climate extreme hazards based on number of reported disasters, 1999-2008.

	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Oceania	Total
Droughts	127	51	75	16	3	272
Temperature extremes	5	40	50	108	1	204
Floods	402	342	649	259	43	1,695
Wildfires	12	61	20	51	10	154
Mass movements (wet)	12	34	111	18	5	180
Windstorms (cyclones)	88	344	401	160	69	1,062
Regional Total	646	872	1,306	612	131	3,567

Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2009. World Disasters Report 2009.  
<http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2009/summaries.asp>

Table 5-3: Top five climate extreme hazards events, 1950-2009.

	Country	Date	Event	Estimated Loss
Fatalities				
	1. China	July 1959	Flood	2 million
	2. India	1965	Drought	1.5 million
	3. Ethiopia	May 1983	Drought	300,000
	4. Bangladesh	Nov 1970	Storm	300,000
	5. Sudan	Apr 1983	Drought	150,000
People Affected				
	1. India	May 1987	Drought	300 million
	2. India	Jul 2002	Drought	300 million
	3. China	Jul 1998	Flood	239 million
	4. China	Jun 1991	Flood	210 million
	5. India	1972	Drought	200 million
Economic Damages				
	1. USA	Aug 2005	Hurricane Katrina	125 billion
	2. USA	Sep 2008	Hurricane Ike	30 billion
	3. China	Jul 1998	Flood	30 billion
	4. USA	Aug 1992	Hurricane Andrew	26.5 billion
	5. China	Jan 2008	Extreme temp	21.1 billion

Source: <http://www.emdat.be/disaster-profiles>

Table 5-4: Social protection measures and instruments, and associated adaptation benefits.

<b>SP measure</b>	<b>SP instruments</b>	<b>Adaptation and DRR benefits</b>
Provision (coping strategies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– social service protection</li> <li>– basic social transfers (food/cash)</li> <li>– pension schemes</li> <li>– public works programmes</li> </ul>	– protection of those most vulnerable to climate risks, with low levels of adaptive capacity
Preventive (coping strategies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– social transfers</li> <li>– livelihood diversification</li> <li>– weather-indexed crop insurance</li> </ul>	– prevents damaging coping strategies as a result of risks to weather-dependent livelihoods
Promotive (building adaptive capacity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– social transfers</li> <li>– access to credit</li> <li>– asset transfers/protection</li> <li>– starter packs (drought/flood resistant)</li> <li>– access to common property resources</li> <li>– public works programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– promotes resilience through livelihood diversification and security to withstand climate related shocks</li> <li>– promotes opportunities arising from climate change</li> </ul>
Transformative (building adaptive capacity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– promotion of minority rights</li> <li>– anti-discrimination campaigns</li> <li>– social funds</li> </ul>	– transforms social relations to combat discrimination underlying social and political vulnerability

Source: Davies et al., 2009a




Figure 5-1: Procedure for assessing grey literature.




Figure 5-2: The Continuum of development and urbanization.



Figure 5-3: Earth embankment along the river (left) with stabilization (right) (ADPC, 2005).




Figure 5-4: Dimensions of the adaptation continuum (O'Brien et al. 2009).