

**Chapter 6. National Systems for Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes and Disasters****Coordinating Lead Authors**

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## Executive Summary

**Disasters cause significant socioeconomic impacts in all countries, but low and middle-income countries are especially vulnerable, and experience higher fatalities and higher direct economic losses (high confidence). Disasters can be important barriers for continued socioeconomic development (medium confidence).** Low and middle-income countries are especially vulnerable, and experience higher fatalities even when exposed to hazards of similar magnitude. The number of deaths per cyclone event, for example, in the last several decades was concentrated in low-income countries even though a higher proportion of population exposed to cyclones live in countries with higher income. While in absolute terms, the direct economic losses from disasters are greater in high-income countries, low-income countries bear the heaviest burden of these costs in terms of damage relative to annual GDP. In small exposed countries, particularly, small island developing countries, these wealth losses expressed as a percentage of GDP (but not a loss of GDP itself) can be very high, with recent assessments suggesting that the average costs over recent decades can be close to 10% for countries such as St. Lucia or Grenada and individual events can amount to more than 200% of annual GDP. Disasters can cause adverse developmental effects in causing hardships and even forcing people below the poverty line, and reduced direct and indirect tax revenue, dampened investment and reduced long-term economic growth through their negative effect on a country's credit rating and an increase in interest rates for external borrowing. Amongst the reasons influencing their ability to adequately respond to disasters include a lack of disaster insurance and other risk financing instruments, reduced tax bases, and high levels of indebtedness, combined with limited household income and savings, little capital assets and limited social insurance (6.1).

**Effective national systems for managing the risks of disasters and extreme events involve actors playing differential but complementary roles according to their accepted functions and capacities, working in partnership across levels of society, temporal and spatial scales (high confidence).** Actors include national and sub-national governments, civil society and community-based organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies, research agencies, media and the private sector, working in partnership to cost effectively support efforts to reduce vulnerability and exposure to hazards. National and sub-national government agencies play multiple roles by initiating and leading many functions of the system: developing policies and strategies, enacting legislation and regulatory measures, deciding on risk financing and transfers and creating the enabling environments for other stakeholders in the system to flourish (6.2).

**Advances in disaster risk management at national scale offer lessons for organising national systems for adapting to climate change (high confidence).** Managing disaster risk at national level involves a continuum of actions and policy options that are complimentary and include measures to manage uncertainty, reduce risk, transfer and share residual risk and prepare for and respond to disaster impacts. The relative emphasis placed on different actors and actions depends on the scale of potential impacts, the capacities of governments or agencies to act, comparative advantage of community based organizations, the level of certainty about the future, the timeframes associated with predictions and the costs and political consequences of decisions. A sample of lessons across this continuum includes that:

- Efforts to systematically manage risk are more likely to be successful if they are co-ordinated across sectors and scales and led by organisations at the highest political level.
- Efforts to systematically manage risk are more likely to be successful if focus is also placed development-risk reduction-risk management as a continuum and risk considerations are integrated into economic development and environmental management efforts as well as well focused on disaster response and management.

- 1 • Legislation for managing disaster risks is most valuable where it is complemented by clear regulations that  
2 are effectively enforced across scales and complemented by other sectoral development and management  
3 legislations where risk considerations are explicitly integrated.
- 4 • Making informed decisions about which policy options to pursue is strongly dependent on comprehensive  
5 national databases of observations, losses, forecasts and inventories of assets and socio-economic  
6 information, and capacity for risk assessment and management..
- 7 • Ecosystem-based investments, including conservation measures associated with forestry, land use, coastal  
8 wetlands and biodiversity, offer benefits for reducing disaster risk across multiple sectors, as well as  
9 provide other livelihood benefits.
- 10 • While financial and economic planning for disasters has been often ignored in the recent past, a number of  
11 countries have begun to plan and budget for extreme events.
- 12 • A common recourse for financing residual risk involves disaster risk insurance and setting up reserve funds  
13 or contingent credit instruments and insuring public disaster relief expenditure, such as in the cases of  
14 Mexico or in the Caribbean.
- 15 • Early warning systems are only effective if they place emphasis on translating complex scientific  
16 information and engaging with target audiences and encompass four interacting components: (i) generation  
17 and management of risk knowledge including monitoring and forecasting, (ii) surveillance and warning  
18 services, (iii) dissemination and communication and (iv) response capability (6.3).

19  
20 **While the Hyogo Framework for Action has been influential in improving national systems, measures to**  
21 **manage current disaster risks and extreme events at national level are not sufficient to prevent increases in**  
22 **adverse impacts on human and natural systems (high confidence).** Existing climate-related disasters are partially  
23 attributable to weaknesses in the national systems, including gaps in national public policies, poor co-ordination in  
24 national systems and to sub-optimal risk management at multiple scales. However, there is high confidence that  
25 improvement in risk management at national level, through better co-ordination, rigorous risk assessment, enhanced  
26 early warning systems, investments in human development, critical infrastructure and natural capital, and adequate  
27 financing, can significantly reduce impacts, including economic losses, morbidity and mortality (6.3).

28  
29 **The trends in hazards, vulnerability and exposure detailed in Chapters 2-4 present new challenges for**  
30 **disaster risk management. The effectiveness of current and future efforts to manage disaster risk at national**  
31 **level are therefore dependent on the extent to which they respond to these trends and integrate knowledge**  
32 **about dynamic risks associated with climate change (high confidence).** The assessment found very limited  
33 evidence of cases where national disaster risk management systems and associated risk management measures had  
34 explicitly responded to the impacts of climate change on disaster risk. While the risk management literature  
35 indicates concern that climate change is increasing the frequency and magnitude of hazards, is increasing  
36 uncertainty and may be responsible, at least in part, for upward trends in disaster impacts, adaptive actions to these  
37 changes still tend to remain normative. The literature suggests that national systems for managing disaster risk can  
38 adapt to a changing climate by assessing and ‘mainstreaming’ knowledge of dynamic risks on a regular basis,  
39 respond to uncertainty by linking learning and adaptive management practices across scales, improve co-ordination  
40 between disaster, climate and development organisations, increase standing emergency response capacity and pursue  
41 efforts to address the root causes of poverty and other drivers of vulnerability (6.3, 6.4).

42  
43 **While disaster risk management actions need to be reassessed based on observed and projected hazard,**  
44 **vulnerability and exposure trends, there is considerable overlap between current disaster risk management**  
45 **and climate change adaptation measures that can be considered as ‘no or low regrets’ at the national level**  
46 **(high confidence).** No or low regrets measures offer benefits with or without climate change and tend to be  
47 overlapping risk management and adaptation practices associated with addressing vulnerability and exposure. The  
48 assessment considered such ‘no or low’ regrets options across a range of key sectors, with some of the most  
49 commonly cited measures associated with improvements to early warning and health surveillance systems,  
50 improvements to sanitation and drainage systems, investments in national water conservation measures, enhanced  
51 education and training, maintenance of existing infrastructure, enforcement of building codes and restoration of  
52 degraded ecosystems and investment in nature and natural systems (6.3.1).

## 6.1. Introduction

The socioeconomic impacts of disaster events can be significant in all countries, but low and middle income countries are especially vulnerable, and experience higher fatalities even when exposed to hazards of similar magnitude (UNISDR 2009; IFRC 2010). The number of deaths per cyclone event, for example, in the last several decades was concentrated in low income countries even though a higher proportion of population exposed to cyclones live in countries with higher income; 11 percent of the people exposed to natural hazards live in low human development countries, but they account for more than 53 percent of the total recorded deaths resulting from natural disasters (UNDP 2004). At the same time, while in absolute terms, the direct economic losses from disasters are greater in high-income countries when compared to low-income countries, low-income countries bear the heaviest burden of these costs in terms of damage relative to annual GDP (UNDP 2004; DFID 2005), where this ratio overall amounted to 0.5% averaged over disaster and non-disaster years the 25 year period from 1980 to 2004 compared to 0.15% of GDP for high income countries. In small exposed countries, particularly, small island developing countries, these wealth losses expressed as a percentage of GDP (but not a loss of GDP itself) can be considerably higher, with recent assessments suggesting that the average costs over disaster and non-disaster years recent decades can be close to 10% for countries such as St. Lucia or Grenada (World Bank/UN, 2010). The average costs during disaster years can be much higher, for example in the Samoa these have been reported to be as high as 45.5% as compared with 6.7% across disaster and non-disaster years (Betterncourt et al 2006). Costs of individual events though can be almost 200% of the annual GDP as experienced in Niue following cyclone Heta in 2004 (McKenzie et al. 2005).

A growing body of literature has shown significant adverse macroeconomic and developmental impacts of natural disasters (Cochran 1994; Otero and Marti 1995; Benson 1997; Benson 1997; Benson 1997; Benson 1998; Benson et al. 2001; Benson et al. 2001; ECLAC 2002; ECLAC 2003; Murlidharan and Shah, 2001; Crowards, 2000; Charveriat 2000; Mechler, 2004; 2009; Hochrainer, 2006; Noy, 2009). These include reduced direct and indirect tax revenue, dampened investment and reduced long-term economic growth through their negative effect on a country's credit rating and an increase in interest rates for external borrowing. Individuals, communities and even governments in developing countries often do not have sufficient capital to replace or repair damaged assets and restore infrastructure and livelihoods following major disasters. Amongst the reasons influencing their ability to adequately respond to disasters include a lack of disaster insurance and other risk financing instruments, reduced tax bases, and high levels of indebtedness, combined with limited household income and savings, little capital assets and limited social insurance. This body of evidence emphasises that natural disasters can cause a setback for development, and even a reversal of recent development gains in the short- to medium-term. Poor development status of communities and countries further increases their exposure to disasters. Disaster impacts can also force households to fall below the basic needs poverty line, further increasing their vulnerability to other shocks (Owens et al. 2003; Lal 2010). Consequently, natural disasters are seen as barriers for development, requiring ex-ante disaster risk reduction policies that also targets poverty and development (eg. Ninno et al. 2003; Owens et al. 2003; Skoufias 2003; Benson and Clay 2004; Cardona et al. 2010; IFRC 2010). There is though some literature that suggests that disasters may not always have a negative effect on economic growth and development and for some countries disasters are regarded as rather a problem of, and not for development (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Skidmore and Toya 2002; Caselli and Malthotra 2004; Hallegate and Gill 2007).

As a response to the impacts of disasters on countries' economies, on levels of poverty and broader development trajectories, national disaster risk management systems have evolved in recent years, guided by international instruments, particularly the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (see Chapter 7). Increasing knowledge, understanding and experiences in dealing with natural disaster risks and poverty has gradually contributed to a paradigm shift globally; a shift that recognises the importance of reducing risks and adaptation to climate change and as well as responding to and rebuilding after disaster events (Yodmani 2001; IFRC 2004; UNISDR 2004; UNISDR 2007; UNISDR 2008; Venton and LaTrobe 2008; IFRC 2010). While governments cannot act alone, majority of them are well placed and equipped to support communities and private sector to tackle disaster risk. It is at national level that overarching development policies and legislative frameworks are formulated and implemented to create appropriate enabling environments to guide other stakeholders to reduce, share and transfer risks (Carter 1992; Freeman et al. 2003), albeit in different ways. National level governments in developed countries are often the "insurers of last resorts" and used to be considered to be the most effective insurance instruments of society (Priest

1 1996). Governments are often what citizens turn to particularly when they do not have their own savings to fall back  
2 on or cannot rely on family or other social support in times when the effects of disasters affect many communities at  
3 the same time. However, there is disagreement in the literature about reliance on national governments as the  
4 appropriate foundation for a comprehensive risk management program, as it draws away from local concerns and  
5 initiatives (Aalbala-Bertrand 1993). Those holding this view favor reducing natural hazard risk through community-  
6 driven projects and programs developed by nongovernmental organizations (cross check with chapter 5). In practice,  
7 targeted governments' policies and actions aimed at ex-ante poverty reduction and improvements in their economic  
8 livelihoods can also help communities reduce their disaster risks, and better cope with disaster events (Ninno et al.  
9 2003; Owens et al. 2003; Skoufias 2003; McGray et al. 2007).

10  
11 National level governments also have the ability to mainstream risks associated with climate variability and change  
12 into existing disaster risk management and sectoral development, policies and plans; albeit to differing degrees  
13 depending on their capacity. These include initiatives to assess risks and uncertainties, manage these across sectors,  
14 share and transfer risks and establish baseline information and research priorities (Freeman et al 2003; Prabhakar *et*  
15 *al.* 2008; Mechler 2004). Ideally, national level institutions are best able to respond to the challenges of climate  
16 extremes, particularly given that disaster are largely covariate in nature, often surpassing people's and businesses'  
17 coping capacity (OAS 1991; Otero and Marti 1995; Benson and Clay 2002). National government are well placed to  
18 take a longer time perspective when making decisions and are amenable to better appreciate key uncertainties and  
19 risks associated with climate change (Priest 1996; Hallegate and Gill 2007).

20  
21 With this in mind, valuable lessons for advancing adaptation to climate change can be drawn from existing national  
22 systems for managing current disaster risks. These systems are comprised of actors operating across scales, fulfilling  
23 a range of roles and functions, guided by an enabling environment of institutions, international agreements and  
24 experience of previous disasters (Carter 1991; Freeman et al 2003). These systems vary considerably between  
25 countries in terms of their capacities and effectiveness and in the way responsibilities are distributed between actors.  
26 They also vary in how much emphasis they place on integration with development processes, tackling vulnerability  
27 and reducing disaster risk, compared with preparing for and responding to extreme events and disasters (Cardona *et*  
28 *el* 2010). As detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, climate change poses new challenges for these systems, which in many  
29 instances remain poorly adapted to the risks posed by existing climatic variability and extremes (Lavell 1998;  
30 McGray et al. 2007; Venton and La Trobe 2008)

31  
32 Closing the current adaptation deficit and responding to the effects of climate change on disaster risk are seen as  
33 priorities for national risk management systems and as a crucial aspect of countries' responses to climate change.  
34 With a history of managing climatic extremes, a stronger institutionalisation across scales and levels of governance,  
35 a greater number of experienced actors and more widespread instances of supporting legislation and cross-sectoral  
36 co-ordinating bodies, national disaster risk management systems offer a promising avenue for supporting adaptation  
37 to climate change and reducing climate-related disaster risks. In many cases, it is at this national level that national  
38 systems for adapting to climate change and changing disaster risks, where policies themselves adapt to changing  
39 conditions, will provide a critical supporting environment for adaptation processes at all scales. Development of  
40 adaptive policymaking will require policymakers to treat policies as ongoing experimental and learning processes  
41 (McGray et al. 2007).

42  
43 However, despite some recent progress in strengthening national systems, and despite the burden of disasters  
44 imposed are increasingly being recognized, measures to reduce the risks of disasters are still small, and for most part  
45 there is a continued reliance on post disaster response and disaster management support. While it is difficult to  
46 accurately indicate the level of funds allocated to disaster risk reduction efforts as compared to disaster response and  
47 rehabilitation efforts, major donors and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, SIDA, and  
48 European Union in 2003 reported to have at times allocated in excess of 90% of their disaster management funds for  
49 relief and reconstruction and less than 10% of the funds for preparedness and risk reduction (LaTrobe and Venton  
50 2003). This level of investment by government and development partners in preventing disasters can be partially  
51 explained inter alia by a difficulty in mainstreaming disaster risk management in all phases of national development  
52 due to a lack of understanding and knowledge and concrete evidence regarding the types and extent of the cost and  
53 benefits of measures to reduce disaster risk as compared with disaster management (LaTrobe and Venton 2003;  
54 Benson and Twigg 2004).

1  
2 Costs and benefits information on disaster risk reduction and adaptation options could help motivate and defend  
3 investments in these measures. Some recent studies on sub-national level disaster risk reduction and adaptation  
4 measures have demonstrated that disaster prevention and adaptation can pay high dividends. Several studies  
5 (Mechler 2005; MMC 2005; Moench et al. 2007; UN/ World Bank 2010) reported that for every dollar invested in  
6 risk management broadly, two to six dollars are returned in terms of avoided or reduced disaster impacts on life,  
7 property, the economy and the environment. In the absence of concrete information on net economic and social  
8 benefits, and in the presence of limited budgetary resources, many policy makers have been reluctant to commit  
9 significant funds for risk reduction. Many international agencies also continue to invest considerable funds into high  
10 profile, post-disaster response particularly when these are reported in media stories (LaTrobe and Venton 2003;  
11 Benson and Twigg 2004).

12  
13 While there is current lack of emphasis on risk reduction compared to response, there are nevertheless many success  
14 stories and promising initiatives for managing and reducing the risks of climate extremes and disaster that could  
15 provide valuable guidance for strengthening national systems for advancing adaptation to climate change.

16  
17 Accordingly, this chapter assesses the literature on national systems for managing disaster risks and climate  
18 extremes, particularly the design of such systems of functions, actors and roles they play, emphasising the  
19 importance of government and governance for improved adaptation to climate extremes and variability. It reflects on  
20 the adequacy of existing knowledge, policies and practices globally and considers the extent to which the current  
21 disaster risk management systems may need to evolve to deal with the uncertainties associated with and the effects  
22 of climate change on disaster risks. Section 6.2 characterises national systems for managing existing climate  
23 extremes and disaster risk by focusing on the actors that help create the system - national and sub-national  
24 government agencies, bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations, private sector, research agencies, civil society and  
25 community-based organisations. Drawing on a range of examples from different countries, section 6.3 describes  
26 what is known about the status of managing current and future risk, what is desirable in an effective national system  
27 for adapting to climate change and what gaps in knowledge exist. The later part of the chapter is organised by the set  
28 of functions undertaken by the actors discussed in 6.2. The functions are divided into three main categories – those  
29 associated with planning and policies (section 6.3.1), strategies (section 6.3.2) and practices, including methods and  
30 tools (section 6.3.3) for reducing climatic risks. Section 6.4 reflects on how national systems for managing climate  
31 extremes and disaster risk can become more closely aligned to the challenges of climate change and development –  
32 particularly those associated with uncertainty, changing patterns of risk and exposure and the impacts of climate  
33 change on vulnerability and poverty. Many aspects of section 6.4 are further elaborated in chapter 8.

## 34 35 36 **6.2. National Systems and Actors for Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes and Disasters**

37  
38 Managing climate-related disaster risks is a concern of multiple actors, from national and sub-national governments,  
39 private sector, research bodies, civil society and community-based organizations and communities working in  
40 partnership to ultimately help individual households to reduce their risks and vulnerabilities (Twigg, 2004, UNISDR  
41 2009). For an effective and efficient national system for managing climate-related disaster risks each actor would  
42 ideally play differential but complementary roles according to their accepted functions and effectiveness across  
43 spatial and temporal scales, supported by relevant scientific and traditional knowledge (UNISDR, 2008). This  
44 section assesses the literature on the roles played by different actors working within such national systems.

### 45 46 47 **6.2.1. National and Sub-National Government Agencies**

48  
49 National governments have the moral and legal responsibility to ensure economic and social well-being, including  
50 safety and security, of their citizens from socio-natural disasters (UNISDR, 2004). It is also government's  
51 responsibility to protect the poorest and most vulnerable citizens from disasters, and to implement disaster risk  
52 management that reach all (McBean, 2008; O'Brien *et al.*, 2008; CCCD, 2009). In terms of risk ownership and  
53 responsibility, government and public disaster authorities "own" a large part of current and future extreme event  
54 risks and is expected for them to govern and regulate risks owned by other parts of society (Mechler, 2004).

1 Recourse to various normative theories could be included. As one example, economic welfare theory suggests that  
2 national governments are exposed to natural disaster risk and potential losses due to their three main functions:  
3 allocation of public goods and services (e.g. education, clean environment and security), the redistribution of income  
4 as well as their role in stabilizing the economy (see Musgrave, 1959, Twigg, 2004; White *et al.*, 2004; McBean,  
5 2008; Shaw *et al.*, 2009). The risks faced by governments include losing public infrastructure and assets. National  
6 level government also redistributes income across members of society and thus are called upon when those are in  
7 need (Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola, 2000), such when in danger of become poor, and in need of relief payments  
8 to sustain a basic standard of living, especially in countries with low per capita income and/or have large proportions  
9 of the population in poverty (Cummins and Mahul, 2008). Finally, it can be argued that governments are expected to  
10 stabilize the economy, e.g. by demand side interventions, when it is in disequilibrium. National level government are  
11 often called “insurers of last resort” as the governments are often the final entity that private households and firms  
12 turn to in case of need. It may well be suggested that most national governments would accept those normative  
13 functions, yet their degree of compliance and ability to honour those responsibilities differs significantly across  
14 countries.  
15

16 In the context of a changing climate, governments have a particularly critical role to play in relation to not only  
17 addressing the current gaps in disaster risk management but more importantly in response to uncertainties and  
18 changing needs due to increase in frequency, magnitude and duration of some climate extremes (Katz and Brown,  
19 1992; Meehl *et al.*, 2000; UNISDR, 2004; Christensen *et al.*, 2007; UNISDR, 2009).  
20

21 Different levels of governments – national, sub-national and local level governments as well as respective sectoral  
22 agencies play multiple roles in addressing drivers of vulnerability and managing the risk of extreme climate events,  
23 although their effectiveness varies within a country as well as across them. They are well placed to create multi-  
24 sectoral platforms to guide, build and develop policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks that prioritize risk  
25 reduction (Sudmeier-Rieux *et al.*, 2006; Handmer and Dovers, 2007); integrate disaster risk management with other  
26 policy domains like development or climate change adaptation (UNISDR, 2004, 2009; White *et al.*, 2004; Tompkins  
27 *et al.*, 2008); and address drivers of vulnerability and assist the most vulnerable populations (McBean, 2008; CCCD,  
28 2009). Governments across sectors and levels also provides many public goods and services that help address  
29 drivers of vulnerability as well as those that support disaster risk management (White *et al.*, 2004; Shaw *et al.*, 2009)  
30 through education, training and research related to disasters (Twigg, 2004; McBean, 2008; Shaw *et al.*, 2009).  
31 Governments play particularly a critical role in disaster risk management through the allocation of financial and  
32 administrative resources, and also with political authority (Spence, 2004; Twigg, 2004; Handmer and Dovers, 2007;  
33 CCCD, 2009). Resources must be available at all administration levels, but not sufficient policy and institutional  
34 commitment has been made to provide adequate resources at all level, especially in local governments (Twigg, 2004;  
35 UNISDR, 2009). The funds could be used in a complementary manner to address adaptation deficit, sustainable  
36 development and disaster risk reduction. Governments also has an important role to play in creating appropriate  
37 frameworks and enabling environment for the private sector, civil society organisations and other development  
38 partners to play their differential roles in managing disaster risk (O’Brien *et al.*, 2008; Prabhakar *et al.*, 2008). Such  
39 functions of national and sub-national governments are discussed further in section 6.3.  
40  
41

#### 42 **6.2.2. Private Sector Organisations** 43

44 Some aspects of disaster risk management may be suited for non-government stakeholders to implement, albeit this  
45 would most effectively be coordinated within a framework created by governments. The private sector plays an  
46 important role in DRM and adaptation. Three avenues for private sector engagement may be identified (Roeth,  
47 2009; UNISDR, 2008): (i) corporate social responsibility (CSR) in terms of advocacy and general awareness raising  
48 for DRR and involving funding support and the contribution of volunteers and expertise, (ii) Public Private  
49 Partnerships (PPP) enhancing the provision of public goods for DRR in joint undertakings of public and private  
50 sector players, and (iii) businesses model approaches. While a considerable amount of effort has been dispensed on  
51 CSR, PPPs and business model approaches remain rather untouched areas, one very important exception being risk  
52 financing and insurance.  
53

1 Risk financing instruments in 2010 covered about 40% of disaster losses in exchange for premium payments, this  
2 albeit mostly in the industrialized countries (Munich Re, 2010). In developing countries, despite complexities and  
3 uncertainties involved on both supply and demand for risk transfer, risk financing mechanisms have been found to  
4 demonstrate substantial potential in for absorbing the financial burden of disasters (e.g., Pollner, 2000; Andersen,  
5 2001; Varangis, Skees and Barnett, 2002; Auffret, 2003; Dercon, 2005; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2005; Hess and  
6 Syroka, 2005; World Bank, 2007; Skees et al., 2005; Cummins and Mahul, 2008; Hazell and Hess, 2010). There is  
7 some uncertainty as to the extent to which the private sector would continue to play this role in the context of  
8 changing environment due to uncertainty and imperfect information, missing and misaligned markets and financial  
9 constraints (see Smit et al., 2001; Aakre et al., 2010). Private insurers are less prepared to underwrite insurance for  
10 extreme event risks linked to climate change due to ambiguity aversion, i.e. the uncertainty about the chances of  
11 climate change induced modifications of extreme event intensity and frequency). Thus innovative private-public  
12 sector partnerships are required supported in developing countries by development partner funds as well (see section  
13 6.3.3.3 and case study in chapter 9).

14  
15 Although the potential for private sector players in DRR in sectors such as engineering and construction,  
16 information communication technology, media and communication as well as utilities and transportation seems  
17 large (Roeth, 2009), little evidence of successful private sector activity has been documented here, owing to a  
18 number of reasons: there has in fact been little cooperation and activity as the business case for private sector  
19 involvement in DRR remains unclear, hampering private sector engagement; companies may be averse to reporting  
20 activities which are fundamental to their business; and, in more community-focussed projects companies often work  
21 with local non-governmental organizations and do not report those efforts. Climate change seems to be an entry  
22 point here as well leading to an enhanced understanding of a business case in DRR particularly in terms of  
23 guaranteeing global value chains in the presence of potentially large scale disruptions triggered by disasters. As one  
24 example, the economic viability of the Chinese Coastal Zone, the economic heartland of China and home to many  
25 multinational companies producing a large share of consumer goods globally while at the same time highly exposed  
26 to typhoon risk, increasingly will depend on well implemented DRR mechanisms in terms of PPP and core business  
27 efforts (Roeth, 2009).

### 28 29 30 **6.2.3. Civil Society and Community-Based Organisations (CSO and CBOs)**

31  
32 At the national level civil society and community based organizations have gained a major role in developing  
33 different initiatives to respond to disasters, reduce the risk of disasters and, recently, adapt to climate related hazards.  
34 CSO and CBO initiatives in the field of disaster risk management while may usually begin as humanitarian  
35 concerns, often evolve to also embrace the broader challenge of disaster risk reduction following community  
36 focused risk assessment, including specific activities targeting education and advocacy, environmental management;  
37 sustainable agriculture; infrastructure construction, as well as increased livelihood diversification (McGray, et al.,  
38 2007, Care International 2008; Oxfam America 2008; Practical Action Bangladesh 2008; SEED 2008; Tearfund  
39 2008; World Vision 2008).

40  
41 Recently in some high risk regions there has been a large development of national platforms of CSO and CBO that  
42 have been working together in order to push for the transformation of policies and practices related to disaster risk  
43 reduction, this is specially true in the case of Central America, where at least four platforms are functioning in the  
44 same number of countries, gathering more than a hundred and twenty CSO and CBO's (CRGR, 2007). In recent  
45 times the efforts of these platforms have been aimed to advocacy, training, research and capacity building in DRR.  
46 Advocacy on climate policy construction has been included as a new set of activities since 2007 (CRGR, 2008). In  
47 other cases, like in South America CSO have been developing efforts aimed at the local level, trying to link disaster  
48 risk reduction with local development goals (Lavell, 2009), as a matter of fact in most of the cases CSO are  
49 developing actions at the local level, emphasizing in different services such as water, sanitation, irrigation, social  
50 infrastructure or disaster preparedness (GNDR, 2009).

51  
52 Civil society organizations and Community-based organizations have always played a critical role in humanitarian  
53 support, although more recently they have become more active in the field of disaster risk reduction and climate  
54 change adaptation (UNISDR 2008; Oxfam America 2008; Practical Action Bangladesh 2008; Tearfund 2008; World



1 Vision 2008). Such expansion of roles has coincided with the increase in frequency and severity of disasters  
2 (Wilchez-Chaux, 2008), providing a variety of services including training, preparedness, food security, environment,  
3 housing and microfinance (Benson, 2001). In several countries of Latin America CSO and CBO are considered, by  
4 law, as part of the national systems for civil protection, this is the case. (CRGR, 2007a., Lavell and Franco, 1996).  
5 Among the biggest challenges for civil society organizations the following can be mentioned: securing resources for  
6 replicating successful initiatives and scaling up geographically (Care International 2008; Oxfam America 2008;  
7 Practical Action Bangladesh 2008; SEED 2008; Tearfund 2008; World Vision 2008); supporting capacity  
8 development to replicate and sustain projects (Care International 2008; Oxfam America 2008); sustaining  
9 commitment to work with local governments and stakeholders over long term and maintaining partnerships with  
10 local authorities (Oxfam America 2008), and coordinating and linking local level efforts with sub-national  
11 government initiatives and national plans during the specific project implementation (SEED 2008).  
12  
13

#### 14 **6.2.4. Bi-Lateral and Multi-Lateral Agencies**

15  
16 In developing countries, particularly where the government is weak and has limited resources, bilateral and  
17 multilateral agencies are major players in supplying financial and technical support to government and non-  
18 government agencies to tackle multifaceted challenges of disaster risk management and more recently climate  
19 change challenges. In managing climate-related risks, donor agency with multiple recipient countries, may take a  
20 pragmatic approach to delivering regionalised support given that extreme climatic events normally occur  
21 contiguously within specific region, such as across Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia and regions of Africa and Latin  
22 America. This also strengthens the role of regional agencies charged with helping countries manage climate  
23 extremes and disaster risks, such as SOPAC and SPREP in the Pacific (Gero, Méheux et al. 2010; Hay 2010).  
24

25 Many bilateral and multilateral agencies though continue to address disaster risk management and climate change  
26 adaptation separately, linking with respective regional and national agencies and those associated with respective  
27 international instruments (Gero et al 2010). However, it is increasingly expected that multilateral and bilateral  
28 assistance is provided to support nationally-owned strategies, development plans and disaster risk management  
29 policies, though many such strategies, policies and plans still tend to treat climate change and disaster risks  
30 separately and predominantly focus on the response and preparedness dimensions of managing disaster risk.  
31

32 Consequently, bilateral and multilateral agencies often adopt different approaches and modalities to supporting  
33 different dimension of risk management and climate change adaptation. This in itself is not a bad thing – particularly  
34 in countries with weak delivery capacity at the local level supporting a diversity of stakeholders and approaches can  
35 help to ensure progress – for example through supporting local level NGOs and CBOs, along with government  
36 agencies. However, the critical challenge in such situations becomes that of coordination. Ultimately, a lack of  
37 effective coordination, including amongst external partners, often results in competing approaches and priorities and  
38 an unnecessary burden on government. While coordination of effort in countries are expected to be guided under  
39 national action plans for adaptation and disaster risk management, these have not necessarily been acted on in a  
40 coordinated manner, largely because of policy and funding gaps (Wickham, et al. 2009; Hay 2010). This situation is  
41 improving, for example in the Pacific; countries are using their prioritised national action plan to engage with  
42 development partners to appropriately sequence and coordinate the support (Hays 2010). Countries, too, are trying  
43 to use national action planning processes on climate change and disasters to better coordinate their own as well as  
44 development partners support and resource allocation. This is being achieved through their budgetary allocation  
45 processes as well as with coordinating requests coming from sub-national to national levels.  
46  
47

#### 48 **6.2.5. Scientific and Other Research Organisations**

49  
50 The effectiveness of national systems for managing climate extremes and disasters risks is highly dependent on the  
51 availability and communication of robust and timely scientific information (Sperling and Szekely 2005; Thomalla et  
52 al. 2006) and traditional knowledge (UNISDR, 2008) to not only communities but also amongst researchers, and  
53 researchers and policy makers who manage national approaches to disaster risk and climate change adaptation. Even

1 a progress has been reported in the communication and availability of scientific information, still a lack of for  
2 example sufficient local or sub-national data of hazards (UNISDR, 2009).

3  
4 Scientific and research organisations range from specialised research centres and universities, regional  
5 organisations, to national research agencies, multilateral agencies and NGOs playing differential roles, but generally  
6 continue to divide into disaster risk management or climate change adaptation communities. Scientific research  
7 bodies play important roles in managing climate extremes and disaster risks by: (a) supporting thematic programmes  
8 to study the evolution and consequences of past hazard events, such as cyclones, droughts, sandstorms and floods;  
9 (b) analysing time- and space-dependency in patterns of weather-related risks; and (c) building cooperative networks  
10 for early warning systems, modelling, and long-term prediction; (d) been actively engaged in technical capacity  
11 building and training; (e) translating scientific evidence into adaptation practice; (f) collating traditional knowledge  
12 and lessons learnt for wider dissemination, and (g) translating scientific information into user-friendly forms for  
13 community consumption (Sperling and Szekely 2005; Thomalla et al. 2006).

14  
15 Disaster practitioners largely focus on short term climate forecasting and effective dissemination and  
16 communication of hazard information and responses (Thomalla et al 2006). Such climate change expertise can  
17 typically be found in environment or energy departments and in academic institutions (Sperling and Szekely 2005),  
18 while disaster risk assessments have been at the core of many multilateral and civil society organisations and  
19 national disaster management authorities (Sperling and Szekely 2005; Thomalla et al. 2006).

### 22 **6.3. Functions of National Systems for Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes and Disasters**

23  
24 As section 6.2 highlighted, national systems are comprised of a range of actors, undertaking certain functions and  
25 with varying success, cover the full range of disaster risk management activities, from managing uncertainty and  
26 reducing risk to responding to the impacts of climate extremes and disasters. It is important to recognise that in  
27 many countries national and sub-national government agencies initiate and lead many of the functions within the  
28 national system. However, in some countries, where governments are weak, unwilling or unable to extend their  
29 reach to all people, social groups and areas of the country, other actors, particularly CSOs and multi-lateral  
30 organisations undertake a greater proportion of these functions (see section 6.2). Furthermore, some national  
31 systems might organise and allocate responsibilities for functions more formally; others are constituted by actors  
32 fulfilling functions where they see gaps. However, even where governments are weak or unwilling, it is important to  
33 continue efforts to strengthen national government capacity to lead national risk management systems (OECD  
34 2010), given that governments are usually expected to lead the management of disaster risks and that governments  
35 typically have the greatest potential for delivery and implementation.

36  
37 The functions of national systems for managing the risks of climate extremes and disasters are multidimensional  
38 across actors and scales. As detailed in 6.2, national and sub-national governments usually have the mandate and  
39 capacity to create the enabling environment for other actors through its own agencies to reduce risk, share and  
40 transfer residual risk and manage the impacts of disasters. By drawing upon a range of cases from different  
41 developed and developing countries, this section describes what is known about the status of managing current and  
42 future risk, what is possible in an effective national system and what gaps in knowledge exist. It is organised by the  
43 set of activities undertaken by the actors discussed in 6.2 and is divided into three main categories – those associated  
44 with planning and policies (section 6.3.1), strategies (section 6.3.2) and practices, including methods and tools  
45 (section 6.3.3).

#### 48 **6.3.1. Planning and Policies for Integrated Risk Management, Adaptation, and Development Approaches**

49  
50 The management of climate and disaster risks today and into the future is a cross-cutting process that requires  
51 leadership, planning and coordination of policies at all levels of government, but especially at the national level  
52 (UNISDR, 2009; CCCD, 2009). In spite of differences and given that learning will come from doing, there are many  
53 ways that countries can learn from each other in prioritizing their climate and disaster risks, in mainstreaming  
54 climate change adaptation and disaster risk management into plans, policies and processes for development and in  
55 securing additional financial and human resources needed to meet increasing demands (UNDP, 2002; CCCD, 2009;

1 Schipper, 2009). This sub-section will address frameworks for national disaster risk management and climate  
2 change adaptation planning and policies (6.3.1.1), the mainstreaming of plans and policies nationally (6.3.1.2) and  
3 the various sectoral disaster risk management and climate change adaptation options available for national systems  
4 (6.3.1.3).

#### 7 *6.3.1.1. Developing and Supporting National Planning and Policy Processes*

9 National and sub-national government agencies and other actors have a range of planning and policy options to help  
10 create the enabling environments for departments, public service agencies, the private sector and individuals to act  
11 (UNDP, 2002; Heltberg et al, 2009; OECD, 2009). When considering risk management and adaptation actions, it is  
12 often the scale of the potential climate and disaster risks and impacts, the capacity of the governments or agencies to  
13 act, the level of certainty on future changes, the timeframes within which these future impacts and disasters will  
14 occur and the costs and consequences of decisions that play an important role in their prioritization and adoption  
15 (Heltberg et al, 2008; World Bank, 2008b).

17 Both DRR and CCA have a common goal of risk reduction, with DRR concerned with an ongoing problem  
18 (disasters) and CCA more concerned with an emerging climate change issue (McGray et al, 2007; WRI, 2007;  
19 UNISDR, 2009). Similarly, both DRR and CCA are best mainstreamed or implemented through other sectors and  
20 other policies, including those for agriculture, water resources, infrastructure, health, land use, environment, early  
21 warning services, finance and planning (UNISDR, 2009). Both are also linked with other plans, policies and  
22 strategies for poverty eradication, planning for sustainable development, education and use of hydro-meteorological  
23 science (WRI, 2007; UNISDR, 2009).

25 There is a continuum of national planning and policy options that can be used to implement (or mainstream) DRR  
26 and CCA actions. The options range from climate vulnerability approaches through to climate change impact-based  
27 approaches. On the left hand side of the continuum, the vulnerability oriented CCA options overlap with existing  
28 DRR practices and realize “no regrets” benefits, with or without climate change. These vulnerability-based  
29 approaches are described in Chapters 2 and 4. At the far right side of the continuum are the specialized climate  
30 change science dependent activities that exclusively target and reduce distinct climate change impacts. Many of  
31 these climate science based approaches are described in Chapter 3. In between the ends of the continuum lie a broad  
32 spectrum of activities with gradations of emphasis on vulnerability and impacts. In some cases, mal-adaptation can  
33 occur when vulnerabilities to the current climate are addressed without consideration of climate change impacts (e.g.  
34 changes to agricultural livelihoods to strengthen resilience today could undermine DRR gains over the longer term  
35 when climate change impacts on future flood risks are ignored). Maladaptation actions are discussed in detail in  
36 section 1.4.

38 Increasingly, studies suggest that the most pragmatic CCA and DRR options depend on the adaptive capacity and  
39 ability of the country or sector to deal with uncertainties (McGray et al, 2007; Wilby and Dessai, 2010; Auld, 2008b;  
40 UNISDR, 2008; Lu, 2009). Cases where certainty is greater in projecting future climate change impacts may better  
41 lend themselves for the “top down” modelling approaches, while cases where adaptive capacity is low or the  
42 uncertainties over future climate changes are high may be more suited to the “no regrets” and vulnerability-oriented  
43 approaches (McGray et al, 2007; UNISDR, 2008; Auld, 2008b; Wilby and Dessai, 2010; Lu, 2009). No-regret  
44 approaches are little affected by uncertainties in the information on future climate changes and hence, can be  
45 justified under all plausible future climate change scenarios, including no climate change (i.e., they deliver benefits  
46 greater than costs no matter what happens to the uncertain parameters in the decision-making) (McGray et al, 2007;  
47 Eales et al, 2006; Agrawala and van Aalst, 2008; OECD, 2009; Prabhakar et al, 2009; Auld, 2008b). These no  
48 regrets actions would include interventions enhancing the provision and dissemination of climate information for  
49 agriculture in drought-prone regions or improving hazard warning and dissemination systems or updating climatic  
50 design information for engineering projects. At the other end of the spectrum, some long-term, high implication  
51 planning issues (e.g., to plan for the relocation of a large population) or large investments (e.g., a system of major  
52 infrastructure projects or watershed management) start with the current and future climate, involve climate change  
53 impacts studies and may also incorporate additional redundancies that account for the uncertainties of the future  
54 climate (Lu, 2009; McGray et al, 2007; Wilby and Dessai, 2010). Given the consequences, the high irreversibility of

1 the decisions, the significant investment costs and the long-lived nature of these national decisions, more climate  
2 information may be needed to treat the range of uncertainties for the future.

3  
4 Some CCA and DRR options involve “win-win” outcomes for greenhouse gas reduction, disaster risk management,  
5 climate change adaptation and development synergies (Heltberg et al, 2009; Ribeiro et al, 2009; World Bank,  
6 2008b). Many of the “win-win” options, illustrated in Table 6-1, include ecosystem-based adaptation actions,  
7 sustainable land and water use planning, carbon sequestration, energy efficiency and energy and food self-  
8 sufficiency. An example would include afforestation, reforestation and conservation of forests for disaster risk  
9 reduction from floods, landslides, avalanches, coastal storms and drought while contributing to adaptation for future  
10 climates, economic opportunities, increased biomass and carbon sequestration.

11  
12 [INSERT TABLE 6-1 HERE:

13 Table 6-1: National policies, plans, and programs: selection of disaster risk management and adaptation options.]

14  
15 Under both current and future climate conditions, disaster risk sharing is another viable option and includes  
16 instruments such as insurance, micro-insurance and micro-financing, government disaster reserve funds and  
17 government-private partnerships involving risk sharing (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2006; World Bank, 2010).  
18 These risk sharing options provide much needed, immediate liquidity after a disaster, can allow for more effective  
19 government response, provide some relief of the fiscal burden placed on governments due to disaster impacts and  
20 constitute critical steps in promoting more proactive risk management strategies and responses (Arnold, 2008). The  
21 catastrophe insurance pool in Turkey for flood risks, as illustration, offers incentives for improved standards and  
22 thereby can mitigate climate risks (von Lucius, 2004, Hoff et. al, 2005). The decision to “bear residual losses” is  
23 also an option when uncertainties over the directions of future climate change impacts are high, when capacity is  
24 initially limited or adaptation options not available or when the risks of future impacts are considered to be very low  
25 (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2006; Heltberg et al, 2009; World Bank, 2010). Residual losses are also the reality  
26 when very unusual events—well beyond those typically expected—result in exceptionally high impacts. All of these  
27 policy and planning options are particularly relevant at the sectoral level where governments either define enabling  
28 environments for development projects or define risks that are shared or transferred to different parts of society.

29  
30 It is important that uncertainty over future climate change risks not become a barrier to climate change risk  
31 reduction actions. In cases where climate change uncertainties will remain high, countries may choose to increase or  
32 build on their capacity to cope with uncertainty, rather than risk maladaptation from use of ambiguous impact  
33 studies or no action (McGray et al, 2007; Lu, 2009). National policies may need to become more adaptable in cases  
34 where national plans and policies operate within a limited range of conditions and are oriented towards providing  
35 certainty (McGray et al, 2007; UNISDR, 2008). Without flexibility, rigid national policies may become  
36 disconnected from evolving climate risks and have unintended consequences (Sperling and Szekely, 2005).

#### 37 38 39 *6.3.1.2. Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation into Sectors and Organisations*

40  
41 Mainstreaming of CCA and DRR implies that national, sub-national and local authorities adopt, expand and enhance  
42 measures that factor disaster and climate risks into their normal plans, policies, strategies, programs, sectors and  
43 organizations (CCCD, 2009; Few et al 2006; UNISDR, 2008). In reality, it can be challenging, even for experts  
44 within the fields of CCA and DRR, to provide clear pictures of what mainstreaming is, let alone how it can be made  
45 operational, supported, and strengthened at the various national and sub-national levels (Olhoff and Schaer, 2010).  
46 The real challenge to mainstreaming adaptation is not planning but implementation.

47  
48 The existing barriers to managing the disaster risks from current climate variability may need to be addressed in  
49 order to reduce the even greater barriers that inhibit actions nationally towards future climate disaster risks (UNDP,  
50 2002; UNDP, 2004); CCCD, 2009; Prabhakar et al, 2009). A key challenge, and an opportunity in mainstreaming  
51 DRR and CCA lies in building bridges between current disaster risk management actions to deal with existing  
52 climate vulnerabilities and the additional and revised efforts needed for adaptation to future climate change (Few et  
53 al, 2006; Olhoff and Schaer, 2010). The DRR community has a long tradition in multi-disciplinary, vulnerability and  
54 community-based approaches to reducing risks, often based on response to events, while the CCA community has

1 traditionally placed emphasis on atmospheric prediction science, technological advances, monitoring, warning-  
2 response-relief approaches or in the longer term, on climate change modelling and potential impact reductions  
3 (Thomalla, 2006; Basher, 2009). As a result, CCA approaches to date have been predominantly “top-down” or  
4 information cascading processes, but with limited tangible examples of planned adaptation decisions being based on  
5 these approaches (Wilby and Dessai, 2010; UNISDR, 2008). On the other hand, most disaster risk management  
6 planning has traditionally aimed to reduce disaster risks from existing climate hazards and vulnerabilities,  
7 sometimes little appreciating that the future may not be a repetition of the past uncertainties, hazards and risks  
8 (Dilley, 2005, Prabhakar et al, 2009). The DRR community also has a long tradition and strength in multi-  
9 disciplinary, vulnerability and community-based approaches to reducing risks. Inherent in the bridge building is a  
10 need to better understand how existing DRR practices need to be augmented or revised for future adaptation. Some  
11 studies advocate a concurrent or twin-track approach to mainstreaming CCA and DRR, consisting of: (1) “bottom-  
12 up” approaches or vulnerability assessments of social and economic strategies for coping with present climate  
13 extremes and variability, as practiced by the DRR community and (2) “top-down” approaches using climate forecast  
14 tools and scenarios to evaluate sector-specific, incremental changes in risk over the next few decades (Wilby et al,  
15 2009; Wilby and Dessai, 2010; Auld, 2008b; Schipper, 2009). In many cases, the approaches can be combined and  
16 “streamlined” by considering a range of climate change scenarios and impacts relative to critical vulnerability  
17 thresholds defined by decision-makers (Wilby et al, 2009; Auld, 2008b; McGray et al, 2007). The combination of  
18 ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ thinking allows vulnerability and impacts approaches to be “mixed and matched” for  
19 the realities of different geographic scales, uncertainties and governance mechanisms. In some cases, changing  
20 climate risks can be monitored and mainstreamed into decision-making through regularly updated revisions to  
21 hazard and vulnerability assessments (Prabhakar et al, 2009; Dilley 2006). Redundancies can also be incorporated  
22 into existing disaster management planning in order to strengthen against the unforeseen risks of the changing  
23 climate (Prabhakar et al, 2009; McGray et al, 2007). In other cases, downscaled ensembles of future climate change  
24 and socio-economic scenarios, impact models, vulnerability assessments and their uncertainties can be incorporated  
25 or mainstreamed into planning (Wilby and Dessai, 2010; Wilby et al, 2009; Prabhakar et al, 2009).

26  
27 In reality, limitations on the availability of current climate hazards and risk information, a mismatch between  
28 climate model outputs and the information needs of adaptation planners, limited access to dependable high-  
29 resolution regional climate change projections, a shortage of good quality climate data and methodologies for  
30 downscaling relevant climate variables to decision-making scales, uncertainties in the climate scenarios themselves,  
31 limitations in the relevant climate parameters available from existing models, and a shortage of guidance on the  
32 contributions that climate hazards alone make to risks all limit mainstreaming actions (Prabhakar et al, 2009;  
33 Basher, 2009; Wilby, 2009; Auld, 2008b). Even when good quality climate risk information is available to meet  
34 needs, there may be other factors, including political and economic realities, that influence whether climate guidance  
35 is accepted for decision-making (UNISDR, 2008; WCC 2009, NTREE, 2009). The scope for mainstreaming climate  
36 change scenario information into CCA and DRR planning depends on the risk management approach taken, the  
37 availability of technical and financial capacity, scale of the risk(s) and the type(s) of adaptation being considered  
38 (Adger et al., 2005; Dessai et al., 2005; Wilby et al, 2009).

39  
40 Much of the guidance and tools used for mainstreaming tends to be tailored for decision-making at the local,  
41 regional and project level, rather than the sectoral and national level (Few et al, 2006; Olhoff and Schaer, 2010).  
42 Generally, studies indicate that the most effective means for effectively mainstreaming both DRR and CCA  
43 nationally involve “whole of government” coordination across different levels and sectors of governance and  
44 include the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders (Few et al, 2006; Thomalla et al, 2006; OECD, 2009). In  
45 spite the strong interdependencies, governments have tended to manage these issues in their “silos”. Typically,  
46 environment or energy authorities as well as scientific institutions have tended to be responsible for climate change  
47 adaptation while disaster risk management authorities may reside in a variety of national government departments  
48 (Prabhakar et al, 2009; Thomalla, 2006; Sperling and Szekeley, 2005). Progress within government agencies usually  
49 depends on political commitment, institutional capacity and in some cases, on enabling legislation, regulations and  
50 financial support (Few et al, 2006; OECD, 2009). Nationally, it may be important to clearly identify a lead for  
51 disaster and climate risk management efforts where that lead has influence on budgeting and planning processes  
52 (Few et al, 2006; OECD, 2009). In some cases, countries may be able to build on phases of raised awareness and  
53 increased attention to disaster risk in order to develop and strengthen their responsible institutions (Few et al, 2006).

54

1 While developed countries may be equipped to meet many of the challenges of mainstreaming adaptation and  
2 disaster risk reduction into national plans and policies, the situation is often much less satisfactory in developing  
3 countries (Basher, 2009). Nonetheless, there are examples from developing countries where progress is being noted  
4 in mainstreaming CCA and DRM, as shown in the Chapter 9 case studies. In other cases, international and national  
5 funding mechanisms such as the LDC (Least Developed Countries) Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, Multi-  
6 donor Trust Fund (MDTF) on Climate Change, the Climate Investment Fund of the Pilot Programme for Climate  
7 Resilience (PPCR), are making funding and resources available to developing countries to pilot and demonstrate the  
8 integration of changing climate risks and resilience into core development implementation and providing incentives  
9 for scaled-up action and transformational change (see section 7.4.3 for details).

### 12 6.3.1.3. *Developing Sector-Based Risk Management and Adaptation Approaches*

14 National planning and policies can be challenged to manage short-term climate variability while also ensuring that  
15 different sectors and systems remain resilient and adaptable to changing extremes and risks over the long term  
16 (UNISDR, 2007; Füssel, 2007; Wilby and Dessai, 2010). The challenge is to find the balance between the short-term  
17 and the longer-term actions needed to resolve underlying causes of vulnerability and to understand the nature of  
18 changing climate hazards (UNFCCC, 2008; OECD, 2009). Achieving DRR and CCA while attaining human  
19 development goals requires a number of cross-cutting, inter-linked sectoral and development activities, as well as  
20 effective strategies within sectors and coordination between sectors (Few et al, 2006; Thomalla et al, 2006). Climate  
21 change is far too big a challenge for any single ministry of a national government to undertake (CCCD 2009).

23 In many countries, sectoral-based organizations and government departments play a central role in national decision-  
24 making and are a logical focus for adaptation actions (McGray et al, 2007). Table 6-1 provides examples of some  
25 sectoral CCA and DRR approaches that have been documented at the national scale, including governments,  
26 agencies and the private sector. These national level sectors and landscapes included in the table include natural  
27 ecosystem management, agriculture and food security, fisheries, forestry, coastal zone management, water  
28 management, health, infrastructure including housing, cities and transportation, and energy. As described above, the  
29 options in the table can be considered as a continuum of potential actions that are incremental and reinforce each  
30 other. The national DRR and CCA options for sectors are categorized in Table 6-1 as follows:

- 31 • Plans and policies to accept and deal with residual risks (e.g. can't adapt, unavoidable risks);
- 32 • Plans and policies to transfer or "spread" the risks due to current or future hazards;
- 33 • Climate proofing or "no regrets" plans and policies to reduce existing climate risks ;
- 34 • Plans and policies that prepare for the uncertainties associated with the future climate;
- 35 • Climate change adaptation plans and policies that reduce disaster risks from future climate change;
- 36 • "Win-win" plans and policies offering synergistic solutions for GHG reductions, climate change  
37 adaptation, disaster risk reduction and human development.

39 Several national level sectoral risk management and adaptation options, along with their challenges and  
40 opportunities, are described in the Chapter 9 case studies. In many of these case studies, the starting point for risk  
41 management and adaptation are the options that address existing vulnerabilities.

43 The impacts of changing climate risks in one sector can affect other sectors and scales, operating vertically and  
44 horizontally—vertically from national to local levels or scales within the same sector and horizontally across  
45 different sectors at the same level or scale (Urwin and Jordan, 2007; CCCD, 2009; UNFCCC, 2008). The complex  
46 and multi-disciplinary nature of these cross-sectoral impacts will require innovative national approaches (Urwin and  
47 Jordan, 2007). While the case and need for integration across sectors and levels may be clear, the issue of how to  
48 integrate or mainstream nationally across multiple sectors still remains challenging, requiring governance  
49 mechanisms and coordination that can cut across governments and sectoral organizations (UNFCCC, 2008; CCCD,  
50 2009). Typically, multi-sector integration tends to deal with the broader national scale (e.g. entire economy or  
51 system) and aims to be as comprehensive as possible in covering several affected sectors, regions and issues  
52 (UNFCCC, 2008). Effective CCA and DRR coordination between all sectors may only be realized if all areas of  
53 government are coordinated from the highest political and organizational level (CCCD, 2009; Schipper and Pelling,  
54 2006; Prabhaker, 2009; UNISDR, 2008).

1  
2 CCA and DRR approaches for most sectors benefit from ecosystem based adaptation and integrated land, water and  
3 coastal zone management options. For example, conservation and management of ecosystems, forests, land use and  
4 biodiversity have the potential to create win-win disaster risk protection services for agriculture, infrastructure,  
5 cities, water resource management, food security, etc and also create synergies between climate change adaptation  
6 and mitigation measures (CCCD, 2009; CBD, 2009; UNISDR, 2009). Water resources management options cross or  
7 thread up and down different spatial scales and levels and policy options, from the local to the global and  
8 international and also require integrated approaches (CCCD, 2009; Urwin and Jordan, 2007). Water shortage due to  
9 climate induced drought will not only limit people's access to drinking water but also seriously affect a range of  
10 economic activities, ranging from farming to industry to energy production (CCCD, 2009; IPCC, 2007; WHO,  
11 2003). However, adaptive agriculture and integrated coastal zone and water management practices may prove  
12 particularly important in managing water resources in light of climate change (CCCD, 2009; UNFCCC, 2008; IPCC,  
13 2007; UN-WWAP, 2009). Human health will be impacted both directly and indirectly from the changing climate  
14 and public health planning and policies may need to shift from focusing only on relatively short-term risks to  
15 include the projected long-term impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2007; CCCD, 2009; World Bank, 2009; WHO,  
16 2003). National energy systems are closely linked to adaptive capacity, GHG mitigation, disaster risk reduction, land  
17 and water use and human development—sometimes with competing objectives (Marcel and Kok, 2008; UNDP,  
18 2005). Access to energy services and energy efficiency options will become increasingly important for countries and  
19 their development, given that the capacity of countries to adapt to climate change risks is much greater where access  
20 to energy supplies and energy efficiency options is greater (CCCD, 2009; Klein et al, 2007). The literature indicates  
21 that, traditionally, no country in modern times has substantially reduced poverty initially without an increase in its  
22 use of commercial energy and/or a shift to more-efficient energy sources that provide better energy services (CCCD,  
23 2009; UNDP, 2005).

### 24 25 26 **6.3.2. Strategies including Legislation, Institutions, and Finance**

27  
28 National systems for managing the risks of extreme events and disasters are shaped by legislative provision and  
29 associated compliance mechanisms, the approach to co-ordinating actors in cross sectoral, cross stakeholder bodies  
30 and financial and budgetary processes that allocate resources to actors working at different scales. These elements  
31 tend to form the 'technical infrastructure' of national systems, but there are also other non-technical dimensions of  
32 'good governance', such as the distribution and decentralisation of power and resources, structures and processes for  
33 decision-making, equity, transparency and accountability, and participation of a wide range of stakeholders groups  
34 (UNDP 2004a). It is important to recognise the variation between countries in governance capacity for managing the  
35 risks and uncertainties of changing climate extremes. This recognition is based on the understanding that risks and  
36 uncertainties are addressed through both formal and informal governance modes and institutions in all countries  
37 (Jaspars and Maxwell 2009), but the balance between the two can be different across countries depending on the  
38 specific economic, political or environmental context of the individual country or the scale at which action is taking  
39 place (Menkhaus, 2007; Kelman, 2008).

#### 40 41 42 **6.3.2.1. Legislation and Compliance Mechanisms**

43  
44 Legislation that supports disaster risk management by establishing organisations and their mandates, clarifies  
45 budgets, provides (dis)incentives and develops compliance and accountability mechanisms is an important  
46 component of a national disaster risk management system (UNISDR HFA 2005, UNDP 2004). Legislation creates  
47 the legal context of the enabling environment in which others, working at national and sub-national scales, can act  
48 and it can help define people's rights to protection from disasters, assistance and compensation (Pelling and  
49 Holloway 2006). With new information on the impacts of climate change, legislation on managing disaster risk may  
50 need to be modified and strengthened to reflect changing rights and responsibilities and to support the uptake of no,  
51 low, medium and high regrets adaptation options (UNDP 2004; see Chapter 9 case study on 'effective legislation for  
52 adaptation and disaster risk reduction). 'National Platforms' for managing disaster risk, the multi-stakeholder, cross  
53 sectoral co-ordination bodies supported by the Hyogo Framework for Action, are seen as key advocates for new and  
54 improved legislation (UNISDR 2007), but regional disaster management bodies, such as in the Caribbean or the

1 Pacific region, can also be influential at national level where national co-ordinating bodies lack capacity or are  
 2 missing (Pelling and Holloway 2006).

3  
 4 While the large majority of countries (in excess of 80%) have some form of disaster management legislation  
 5 (UNISDR 2005; Bhavnani et al. 2008), little is known about what proportion of legislation is oriented toward  
 6 managing uncertainty and reducing disaster risk compared with disaster response, whether legislation includes  
 7 provision for the impact of climate change on disaster risk and whether aspects of managing disaster risk are  
 8 included in other complimentary pieces of legislation (see chapter 9 case study). However, where reforms of disaster  
 9 management legislation have occurred, they have tended to: (a) demonstrate a transition from emergency response  
 10 to a broader treatment of managing disaster risk, (b) recognise that protecting people from disaster risk is at least  
 11 partly the responsibility of governments, (c) promote the view that reducing disaster risk is everyone's responsibility  
 12 (see case study in chapter 9). For example, Viet Nam has taken steps to integrate disaster risk management into  
 13 legislation across key development sectors –its Land Use Law and Law on Forest Protection. Viet Nam's Poverty  
 14 Reduction Strategy Paper also included a commitment to reduce by 50% those falling back into poverty as a result  
 15 of disasters and other risks (Pelling and Holloway 2006; Viet Nam National Report on Disaster Reduction 2005). The  
 16 chapter 9 case study highlights a number of components of effective disaster risk management legislation. An act  
 17 needs to be: (a) comprehensive and overarching act, (b) establish management structures and secure links with  
 18 development processes at different scales and (c) establish participation and accountability mechanisms that are  
 19 based on information provision and effective public awareness and education. Chapter 9 includes detailed case  
 20 studies from legislation development processes in the Philippines and South Africa. Box 6-1 supplements these  
 21 cases with reflections on the process that led to the creation of disaster risk management legislation in Indonesia.

22 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-1 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 23 **Box 6-1. Enabling Disaster Risk Management Legislation in Indonesia**

24  
 25 *Indonesia: Disaster Management Law (24/2007)*

26  
 27 The legislative reform process in Indonesia that resulted in the passing of the 2007 Disaster Management Law  
 28 (24/2007) created a stronger association between disaster risk management and development planning processes.  
 29 The process was successful because of the following elements:

- 30 • *Strong, visible professional networks* - Professional networks born out of previous disasters meant a high  
 31 level of trust and willingness to co-ordinate became pillars of the legal reform process. The political and  
 32 intellectual capital in these networks, along with leadership from the MPBI (The Indonesian Society for  
 33 Disaster Management) was instrumental in convincing the law makers about the importance of disaster  
 34 management reform.
- 35 • *Civil Society Leading the Advocacy* - Civil society led the advocacy for reform has resulted in CSOs being  
 36 recognised by the Law as key actors in implementing disaster risk management in Indonesia
- 37 • The impact of the 2004 South Asian tsunami helping to create a conducive *political environment* - The  
 38 reform process was initiated in the aftermath of the tsunami which highlighted major deficiencies in  
 39 disaster management. However, the direction of the reform (from emergency management towards DRR)  
 40 was influenced by the international focus, through the HFA, on DRR.
- 41 • *An Inclusive Drafting Process* - Consultations on the new Disaster Management Law were inclusive of  
 42 practitioners and civil society, but were not so far-reaching as to delay or lose focus on the timetable for  
 43 reform.
- 44 • Consensus that *passing an imperfect law is better than no law at all* - An imperfect law can be  
 45 supplemented by additional regulations, which helps to maintain interest and focus.

46  
 47 Source: United Nations Development (2009); UNDP (2004a); Pelling and Holloway (2006)

48  
 49 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 6-1 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

50  
 51 Where risk management dimensions are a feature of national legislation positive changes are not always guaranteed  
 52 (UNDP 2004a). A lack of financial, human or technical resources and capacity constraints present significant  
 53  
 54



1 obstacles to full implementation (UNISDR 2005 *review of national submissions*), especially as experience suggests  
2 legislation should be implemented continuously from national to local level and is contingent on strong monitoring  
3 and enforcement frameworks (UNDP 2004a) and adequate decentralisation of responsibilities and human and  
4 financial resources at every scale (Pelling and Holloway 2006). There is anecdotal evidence of disaster risk  
5 management legislation that is technically excellent but practically unenforceable (UNDP 2004a). Building codes  
6 for instance are often not implemented because of a lack of technical capacity and political will of officials  
7 concerned. Where enforcement is unfeasible, accountability for disaster risk management actions is impossible –  
8 this supports the need for an inclusive, consultative process for discussing and drafting the legislation (UNDP 2007).  
9 ‘Effective’ legislation also includes benchmarks for action, a procedure for evaluating actions, joined-up planning to  
10 assist co-ordination across geographical or sectoral areas of responsibility and a feedback system to monitor risk  
11 reduction activities and their outcomes (UNISDR 2005, Pelling and Holloway 2006).

12  
13 Improving risk management legislation in the context of climate change suggests stronger synergy with economic  
14 development, land-use planning and environmental protection laws, and the integration of environmental  
15 management principles into existing legislation (UNISDR 2007, UNISDR GAR 2009). However, the limited  
16 political power of risk management actors in many governments limits the ability to affect change alone across other  
17 areas of legislations and reform requires cross-sectoral coalitions. Evidence from the Philippines cited in Chapter 9,  
18 one of the first country to enact legislation that explicitly attempts to integration climate change and disaster risk  
19 management dimensions across scales, highlights the importance given to ensuring co-ordination across all levels of  
20 government, provision of financial resources for implementation across scales and a commitment to regularly assess  
21 the impact of climate change on disaster risks and extremes.

#### 22 23 24 6.3.2.2. *Coordinating Mechanisms and Linking across Scales*

25  
26 Given that the task of managing the risks of climate extremes and disasters cuts across the majority of development  
27 sectors and involves multiple actors, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder mechanisms are commonly cited as  
28 preferred way to ‘organise’ disaster risk management systems at national level. The Hyogo Framework for Action  
29 (HFA) terms these mechanisms *National Platforms*, which are defined by the HFA (footnote 10) as ‘a generic term  
30 for national mechanisms for co-ordination and policy guidance on disaster risk reduction ( DRR) that are multi-  
31 sectoral and inter-disciplinary in nature, with public, private and civil society participation involving all concerned  
32 entities within a country’. National Platforms were first supported by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in  
33 1999 (UNGA 1999/63) and more recently reaffirmed in A/RES/62/192. Guidelines on establishing National  
34 Platforms suggest that they need to be built on existing relevant systems and should include participation from  
35 different levels of government, key line ministries, disaster management authorities, scientific and academic  
36 institutions, civil society, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, the private sector, opinion shapers and other relevant sectors  
37 associated with disaster risk management (UNISDR 2007). Limited independent evaluations of National Platforms  
38 exist and conclusive evidence of their establishment leading to more effective disaster risk management is largely  
39 absent though strong in normative literature (UNISDR 2007).

40  
41 Many national climate change adaptation co-ordination mechanisms remain are largely disconnected from such  
42 disaster risk management platforms though joint bodies are beginning to emerge [UNISDR GAR 2009], despite  
43 calls to involve climate change focal points/organisations into National Platforms (UNISDR 2007). Benefits of  
44 improved co-ordination between climate adaptation and disaster risk management bodies, and development and  
45 disaster management agencies include the ability to (i) explore common trade-offs between present and future  
46 action, including addressing human development issues and reducing sensitivity to disasters versus addressing post  
47 disaster vulnerability ; (ii) identify synergies to make best use of available funds for short-to longer term adaptation  
48 to climate risks as well as to tap into additional funding sources, (iii) share human, information, technical and  
49 practice resources, (iv) make best use of past and present experience to address emerging risks, (v) avoid duplication  
50 of project activities; and (vi) collaborate on reporting requirements (Mitchell and Van Aalst 2008). Barriers to  
51 integrating disaster risk management and adaptation co-ordination mechanisms include the underdevelopment of the  
52 ‘preventative’ component of disaster risk management, the fragmentation of projects that integrate climate change in  
53 the context of disaster risk management, disconnects between different levels of government and the weakness of

1 both disaster risk management and climate change adaptation in national planning and budgetary processes (Few *et*  
2 *al.*, 2006; Mitchell and Van Aalst 2008) (see Box 6-2).

3  
4 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-2 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

5  
6 **Box 6-2. National and Sub-National Coordination for Managing Disaster Risk in a Changing Climate: Kenya**  
7 **Case Study**

8  
9 Kenya's National Platform sits under the Office of the President and has made significant achievements in co-  
10 ordinating multiple stakeholders, but is constrained by limited resources and lack of budgets for DRR in line  
11 ministries (Kenya Submission to Global Platform 2009). Key constraints of the national system are recognised as  
12 being difficulties in integrating DRR in planning processes in urban and rural areas and lack of data on risks and  
13 vulnerabilities at different scales (ibid 2009; Few *et al* 2006). In this regard, Nairobi has experienced multiple  
14 periods of drought and heavy rains in the last decade, prompting action to reduce exposure and vulnerability to what  
15 is perceived as changing hazard trends (ActionAid 2006). Increasing exposure and vulnerability has resulted from a  
16 rapid expansion of poor people living in informal settlements around Nairobi, leading to houses of weak building  
17 materials being constructed immediately adjacent to rivers and blocking natural drainage areas. While data and co-  
18 ordination systems are still lacking, the Government of Kenya has established the Nairobi Rivers Rehabilitation and  
19 Restoration Programme (ADB, Tunis 2010), designed to install riparian buffers, canals and drainage channels, while  
20 also clearing existing channels. The Programme also targets the urban poor with improved water and sanitation,  
21 paying attention to climate variability and change in the location and design of wastewater infrastructure and  
22 environment monitoring for flood early warning (ADB Tunis 2010). This demonstrates the kind of no or low regrets  
23 options for investments that can be achieved in the absence of a fully fledged nationally co-ordinated disaster  
24 management system and in the absence of complete multi-hazard, exposure and vulnerability data sets.

25  
26 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 6-2 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

27  
28 While national level co-ordination is important and the majority of risks associated with disasters and climate  
29 extremes are owned by national governments and are managed centrally; a broad range of research reflects that  
30 decentralization is critical to effective risk management, especially in supporting community-based disaster risk  
31 management processes. Whereas, other literature suggests that decentralisation as not always been successful in  
32 achieving improved disaster risk management outcomes, on the contrary, on some occasions it has been utilized in  
33 inappropriate ways, for example by delegating responsibilities to local governments when these are not prepared to  
34 do so because they do not have the skills or finances required, and neither the jurisdiction or political power (Twigg,  
35 2004). It is important to take into account that decentralization is not only based on governance systems supported  
36 by policy and legislation, but also in allocation of time, resources and in building trust (Tompkins *et al.*, 2008).  
37 Therefore, a tension exists between devolution or centralization of disaster risk management. While on the one hand  
38 centralization is necessary to overcome compartmentalization (Wisner 2003), ad hoc decision-making, and the  
39 concretization of localized power relations (Naess *et al.* 2004), devolution is critical because it results in more  
40 accountable, credible, and democratic decision-making. These decisions about governance approaches are critical  
41 because they shape efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy of responses (Adger *et al.* 2003). In addition,  
42 motivation for management at a particular scale promises to influence how well the impacts of disasters and climate  
43 change are managed, and therefore affect disaster outcomes (Tsing *et al.*, 1999). Finally, decisions made at one scale  
44 may have unintended consequences for another (Brooks and Adger 2005), meaning that governance decisions will  
45 have ramifications across scale and contexts. In all cases, the selection of a framework for governance of disasters  
46 and climate change related risks may be issue or context-specific (Sabatier 1986).

47  
48 Current management practices have tended to be centralized at the federal/national level. This may be, in part, due to  
49 the ways in which many disasters and climate extremes affect environmental systems that cross political boundaries  
50 resulting in scale discordance if solely locally managed (Cash and Moser 1999), or because human reactions cross  
51 local boundaries, such as migration in response to disasters, necessitating national planning (Luterbacher 2004). In  
52 addition, in situations where civil society is flattened due to poverty, marginalization, or historical political  
53 repression, regional and federal governments with access to resources may be most important in instigating public  
54 action (Thomalla *et al.* 2006). National-level policies can facilitate otherwise impossible localized strategies through

1 the establishment of resources or legal frameworks (Adger 2001) and often shape what localities can accomplish  
2 within existing governance frameworks (Kesitalo 2009).

3  
4 Yet, centralized approaches have faced many challenges. Disaster preparedness in least developed countries, which  
5 has often been centralized and focused on a particular risk rather than a holistic approach, has been unable to  
6 advance capacity at the grassroots level (O'Brien et al. 2006). For example, national adaptation efforts in Southern  
7 Africa have been insufficiently integrated into local strategies, resulting in resilience gaps (Stringer et al. 2009).  
8 Challenges regarding credibility, stability, accountability, and inclusiveness are some of the critical issues that  
9 plague efforts at the national level (Bierman 2006). The private sector has begun to engage in financial assistance for  
10 climate change impacts through insurance for developing nations that have limited supplies to assist impacted  
11 households (Hoeppe and Gurenko 2006). However, it is not yet clear how effectively such funding can be  
12 distributed to households themselves. Devolution of management is supported by the need to overcome these  
13 challenges.

14  
15 As a general rule, actions generated within and managed by communities are most effective since they are context-  
16 specific and tailored to local environments (Cutter 2003; Liso et al. 2003; Mortimer and Adams 2001). Bottom-up  
17 management of climate and disaster risks acknowledges that the vulnerable live within countries, and are not nations  
18 themselves (Kate 2000). Involvement of local or grassroots groups in the planning and implementation of  
19 preparedness plans can lead to greater resilience (Larsen and Gunnarsson-Östling 2009). For example, communities  
20 themselves can lead vulnerability assessments as a part of community-based adaptation (Yamin et al. 2005).  
21 Communities can also be effectively engaged in information dissemination and training, awareness raising,  
22 accessing local knowledge or resources, and mobilizing local people (Allen (2006). Local management may need  
23 assistance from non-traditional sources. The private sector can facilitate action through the provision of resources,  
24 technology, and tools, such as insurance against the extreme impacts of climate change to support (Linnerooth-  
25 Bayer et al. 2005). Such programs could introduce preventive measures, such as retrofitting buildings and public  
26 education.

27  
28 Since environmental systems relate to risks for local population and since environmental management functions  
29 across scales (Berkes 2002), the creation of effective multi-level governance within national systems for managing  
30 risk that span these scales are critical in responses to climate change and changing disaster risks (Adger et al. 2005;  
31 Olsson and Fulke 2001). Devolution of activities for climate-related disaster risk reduction can also be managed by  
32 cities that develop plans for multiple communities, such as that in Dhaka, Bangladesh where urban-level plans have  
33 advanced community resilience (Roy 2009). Such city-level plans can be communalized through the incorporation  
34 of participatory approaches (Laukkonen 2009). When necessary, localized plans should be supported by the  
35 integration of multiple levels of management, although questions about how to scale up from localized assessments  
36 to national-level plans still remain (van Aalst et al. 2008). Dryland communities in Chile have created local  
37 committees to manage extreme events when national and regional level institutions did not effectively communicate  
38 or collaborate with them (Young et al. 2010). The Cayman Islands responses to Hurricane Ivan in 2004 after three  
39 prior events, Gilbert, Mitch, and 2000 Michelle, demonstrated that adaptation planning at community and national  
40 levels was necessary to improve preparedness and resilience (Adger et al. 2005). These measures included  
41 improving localized social cohesion and diversifying adaptation strategies (Tompkins 2005). Procedural dimensions,  
42 such as participatory models, that allow for involvement for a wider range of local stakeholders provide a  
43 mechanism to mitigate existing power dynamics that might otherwise be concretized in localized planning (Paavola  
44 and Adger 2002). If multiple levels of planning are to be implemented, such mechanisms for facilitation and  
45 guidance on the local level is needed in order that procedural justice is guaranteed during the implementation of  
46 national policies (Thomas and Twyman 2005). Taking these ideas into account might allow national governments to  
47 help facilitate programs where local community members jointly engage in risk management (Perez et al. 1999).  
48 Such programs may allow for an integration of bottom-up and top-down approaches that overcomes each  
49 approaches strengths and weaknesses (Urwin and Jordan 2008).

### 6.3.2.3. Finance and Budget Allocation

Governments in the past have ignored catastrophic risks in decision-making, implicitly or explicitly exhibiting risk-neutrality (Carpenter, 2000). This is consistent with the Arrow Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind 1970), according to which a government may efficiently (i) pool risks as it possesses a large number of independent assets and infrastructure so that aggregate risk becomes negligible, and/or (ii) spread risk across the population base, so that per-capita risk to risk-averse household is negligible. Governments, because of their ability to spread and diversify risks, are considered to "the most effective insurance instrument of society" (Priest 1996). It has been argued that, although individuals are risk-averse [to natural disasters risk], governments should take a risk-neutral stance. The reality of developing countries suggests otherwise and the above does not completely apply to developing countries, forcing a recent paradigm shift and critical reevaluation of governments taking 'risk neutral' approach to managing risks. Government decisions should be based on the opportunity costs to society of the resources invested in the project and on the loss of economic assets, functions and products. In view of the responsibility vested in the public sector for the administration of scarce resources, and considering issues such as fiscal debt, trade balances, income distribution, and a wide range of other economic and social, and political concerns, governments should not act risk-neutral (OAS, 1991).

Many highly exposed developing countries have a precarious economic base, are faced with shallow and exhausted tax bases, high levels of indebtedness and the inability to raise sufficient and timely capital to replace or repair damaged assets and restore livelihoods following major disasters, exacerbating the impacts of disaster shocks on poverty and development (OAS, 1991; Mechler, 2004; Linnerooth-Bayer, Pflug and Mechler, 2005; Hochrainer, 2006; Mahul and Ghesquiere, 2007; Cummins and Mahul, 2009). Exposed countries often also rely on donors to "bail" them out after events, which can be described as an instance of *moral hazard*, although ex-post assistance usually only provides partial relief and reconstruction funding, and such assistance is also often associated with substantial time lags (Pollner, 2001; Mechler, 2004). Consequently, a risk neutral stance in dealing with catastrophic risks may not be suitable for exposed developing countries with little diversified economies or small tax bases. Accordingly, assessing and managing risks over the whole spectrum of probabilities is gaining momentum (Cardenas, 2007; Cummins and Mahul, 2009).

Also, in more developed economies less pronounced but still important effects have been identified. For example, disasters pose significant contingent liabilities for governments and prudent planning is necessary to avoid debilitating consequences (Mechler et al. 2010). This is shown by the Austrian political and fiscal crisis in the aftermath of large scale flooding that led to losses in billions of Euro in 2002. Climate change, projected to increase the disaster burden, adds additional impetus for planning for and reducing disasters risks. Given the uncertainties associated with climate change and extreme events, development planning for reducing risks will need to be based on a systematic estimate of risk.

Budget and resource planning for extremes is not an easy proposition. Governments commonly plan and budget for *direct* liabilities, that is liabilities that manifest themselves as certain and annually recurrent events. Those liabilities can be of explicit nature (as recognized by law or contract), or implicit (a moral obligation) (see Table 6-2). In turn, governments are not good at planning for contingencies, that is, obligations for probable events, which is where climate extremes and adaptation fall into. Explicit, contingent liabilities have to do with the reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed by events, implicit ones with providing relief which generally throughout the globe is a recognized moral liability, albeit serviced to varying degrees (Schick and Polackova Brix, 2004). In many particularly developing countries, government do not even explicitly plan for contingent liabilities, and rely on reallocating their resources following disasters, raise capital from domestic and international donations to meet infrastructure reconstruction costs.

[INSERT TABLE 6-2 HERE:

Table 6-2: Government liabilities and disaster risk (modified after Schick and Polackova Brix, 2004).]

Rather than planning for or having contingency funds available post-disaster, countries also have tended to rely on development partner support. Knowing that such additional funds are usually forthcoming, it creates a serious moral hazard problem (see World Bank 2006 b). More recently, some developing countries that face large contingent

1 liabilities in the aftermath of extreme events and associated financial gaps have begun to plan for contingent natural  
2 events. Countries such as Mexico, Colombia and many Caribbean countries now include contingent liabilities into  
3 their budgetary process and eventually even transfer their risks (Cardenas et al., 2007; Cummins and Mahul, 2009;  
4 Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2007; see Box 6-3). Similarly, many countries have started to also focus on  
5 improving human development conditions as an adaptation strategy for climate change and extreme events,  
6 particularly with the help of international agencies such as the World Bank. These deliberations are in line with the  
7 described *no* and *low regrets* strategies discussed in 6.3.1.1.

8  
9 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-3 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 10 11 **Box 6-3. Case study: Mexico's Fund for Natural Disasters, FONDEN**

12  
13 Mexico lies within one of the world's most active seismic regions and in the path of hurricanes and tropical storms  
14 originating in the Caribbean Sea, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Mexico's population and economy is highly exposed  
15 to natural hazards and in the past severe disasters have created large fiscal liabilities and imbalances.

16  
17 Given its high financial vulnerability, the Mexican Government passed a law in 1994 requiring federal, state and  
18 municipal public assets to be insured relieves the central government of having to pay for the reconstruction of  
19 public infrastructure, although the proper level of insurance particularly for very large events remained a concern. In  
20 1996 the national government established a system of allocating resources into FONDEN (Fund For Natural  
21 Disasters) to enhance the country's financial preparedness for natural disaster losses. FONDEN provides last-resort  
22 funding for uninsurable losses, such as emergency response and disaster relief. In addition to the budgetary program,  
23 in 1999 a reserve trust fund was created, which is filled by the surplus of the previous year's FONDEN budget item.  
24 FONDEN's objective is to prevent imbalances in the federal government finances derived from outlays caused by  
25 natural catastrophes.

26  
27 The FONDEN program started well, although in recent years some concerns have been raised, particularly due to  
28 regular demands on the funds. Budgeted FONDEN resources have been declining in the last few years, demands on  
29 FONDEN's resources are becoming more volatile, and outlays have often exceeded budgeted funds, causing the  
30 reserve fund to decline. In 2005, after the severe hurricane season affecting large parts of coastal Mexico, the fund  
31 was finally exhausted. This has forced the Mexican Government to look at alternative insurance strategies, including  
32 hedging against natural disaster shocks, and government agencies at all levels providing their insurance protection  
33 independent of FONDEN, and the instrument should indemnify only losses that exceed the financial capacity of the  
34 federal, local or municipal government agencies. In 2006 Mexico became the first transition country to transfer part  
35 of its public sector natural catastrophe risk to the international reinsurance and capital markets, and in 2009 the  
36 transaction was renewed for another three years covering both hurricane and earthquake risk.

37  
38 Source: based on Cardenas *et al.* 2007

39  
40 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 6-3 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 41 42 43 **6.3.3. Practices including Methods and Tools**

44  
45 Governments, and other agencies working in the national system have developed a set of different practices for  
46 managing disaster risks. Practices involving risk assessment, information systems, hard and soft management  
47 options, risk transfer, public awareness, early warning, preparedness and response are all raised in this sub-section,  
48 which is divided into four sections related to those practices associated with building a culture of safety (6.3.3.1),  
49 reducing climate related risks (6.3.3.2), transferring and sharing residual risk (6.3.3.3) and managing the impacts  
50 (6.3.3.4).

### 6.3.3.1. *Building a Culture of Safety*

Building a culture of safety involves several strategies and activities that start with the assessment of risk factors and building information systems that provide relevant information for critical decision making. Early warning systems play a very relevant role in disaster management but, as stated in this section, also in long term planning because of their capability of generating relevant information of inadequate land use and planning, for example. In the same sense climate-adapted infrastructure, enhanced human development, ecosystems protection, risks transfer and sharing and managing the impacts of climate related disasters can play a fundamental role in building a culture and practice of human safety.

#### 6.3.3.1.1. *Assessing risks and maintaining information systems*

As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the first key step in managing risk is to assess and characterise it. In terms of risk factors, disaster risk commonly is defined by three elements: the hazard, exposure of elements, and vulnerability (Swiss Re, 2000; Kuzak, 2004; Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005). Thus, understanding risk involves observing and recording impacts, hazard analysis, studying exposure and vulnerability assessment. Responding to risks is dependent on the way risk-based information is framed in the context of public perception and management needs (See Chapter 5).

National governments have a fundamental role in providing good quality and context-specific risk information about, for example, the geographical distribution of people, assets, hazards, risks and disaster impacts and vulnerability to support disaster risk management (McBean, 2008). Good baseline information and robust time series information are key for long-term risk monitoring and assessments, not only for hazards but also for evaluating the evolution of vulnerability and exposure (McEntire and Myers, 2004; Aldunce and León, 2007). Regular updating of information about hazards, exposure and vulnerability is recommended because of the risk dynamics, especially today due to the affects of climate change on disaster risk and the associated uncertainty this creates (UNISDR, 2004; Prabhakar, 2008).

A key component in the risk assessment process is to determine the exposed elements at risk. This may relate to persons, buildings structures, infrastructure (e.g. water and sewer facilities, roads and bridges) or agricultural assets in harm's way, which can be impacted in case of a disaster event, and for national level assessments their aggregate values are of interest. Ideally, this would be based on national asset inventories, national population census, and other national information. In practice, collecting an inventory on assets and their values often proves very difficult and expensive due to the heterogeneity and sheer number of the examined elements (see Cummins and Mahul, 2009). In addition, risk management process would require identifying those elements of the social process that also contribute to vulnerability – organisational and institutional strength, the status of national wealth and human development status of community at risk and capacity to respond to disasters (Cardona et al 2010 and Lavell 1998). Considerable progress has been made in the use of information (UNISDR, 2009). Nevertheless, in many countries this is not a regular practice and efforts to document impacts are started only after major disasters (UNISDR, 2004; Prabhakar, 2008). Regular monitoring of vulnerability is also at nascent stage (Cardona, 2010; Dilley, 2005). Table 6-3 shows a sample of the kinds of information required for effective disaster risk management and climate change adaptation activities.

[INSERT TABLE 6-3 HERE:

Table 6-3: Information requirements for selected disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation activities (adapted from Wilby, 2009).]

As to assessing and monitoring impacts and losses, country and context specific information, including baseline data about observations (different types of losses, weather data) from past events, are often very limited and of mixed quality (see Carter et al., 2007; Embrechts et al., 1997). Data records at best may date back several decades, and thus often would provide only one reference data point for extreme events, such as a 100 year event. Data on losses from extremes can also be systematically biased due to high media attention or unusual donor support (Sapir and Below, 2002). At times the data on losses are incomplete, as in the Pacific SIDS, because of limited capacity to

1 systematically collect information at the time of disaster, or because of inconsistent methodologies and the costs of  
2 measures used (Chung 2009, Lal et al 2009).

3  
4 Comparisons of disaster loss databases have shown significant variations in documented losses due to  
5 inconsistencies in the definition of key parameters and estimation methods used (Chung 2009, Lal 2010),  
6 emphasising the need to standardise parameter definitions and estimation methods (Guha-Sapir and Below, 2002;  
7 Tschoegl et al., 2006). For some countries, reasonable quality and quantity of information may exist on the direct  
8 impacts particularly where the reinsurance industry, consulting firms and multi-lateral financial institutions have  
9 worked together with the research communities. Limited information is generally available on socially relevant  
10 effects, such as the incidence of health effects post disaster as well as ecosystem impacts, which have not been well  
11 studied (Benson and Twigg 2005). Furthermore, the assessment of indirect and flow-on economic effects of  
12 disasters, such as on income generating sectors, and national savings needs greater attention, and can often be very  
13 useful to assess risks later on, using statistical estimation techniques (Embrechts et al. 1999), or catastrophe  
14 modeling approaches (Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005).

#### 15 16 17 6.3.3.1.2. *Promoting public awareness, including education and early warning systems*

18  
19 National governments create the environment and communication channels to develop and disseminate different  
20 kinds of information, for example, about hazards that affect different populations and preparedness for disaster  
21 response. For this, a robust and up-to date Early Warning Systems (EWS) is critical to not only reduce or mitigate  
22 the impacts of disasters, but to also provide timely warning to the agencies involved in preparing for and managing  
23 the risks of climate extremes and disasters and to the affected population for quick response (White et al., 2004;  
24 Aldunce and Neri, 2008; McBean, 2008). Traditionally, early warning systems had been interpreted narrowly as  
25 technological instruments for detecting and forecasting impending hazard events and for issuing alerts (NIDIS,  
26 2007). This interpretation, however, does not clarify whether warning information is received by or helpful to the  
27 population it serves or actually used to reduce risks (UNISDR, 2006; NIDIS 2007). Governments maintain early  
28 warning systems to warn their citizens and themselves about, for example, impending climate- and weather-related  
29 hazards. “Early warnings” of potentially poor seasons to inform key actions for agricultural planning have been  
30 successful in producing proactive responses. This is reliant on close inter-institutional collaboration between  
31 national meteorological and hydrological services and agencies that directly intervene in rural areas, such as  
32 extension services, development projects and civil society organisations (Hammer, 2000; Meinke et al., 2001).

33  
34 An effective early warning system delivers accurate, timely, and meaningful information dependably (UNISDR,  
35 2005; Auld, 2008a; Basher, 2006; Wimbi, 2007). To be effective and complete, an early warning system typically  
36 comprises four interacting elements (UNISDR, 2006a; Basher, 2006): (i) generation of risk knowledge including  
37 monitoring and forecasting, (ii) surveillance and warning services, (iii) dissemination and communication and (iv)  
38 response capability. The success of an early warning system depends on the extent to which the warnings trigger  
39 effective response measures (van Aalst, 2009; Wimbi, 2009). Warnings can and do fail in both developing and  
40 developed countries due to inaccurate weather and climate forecasting, public ignorance of prevailing conditions of  
41 vulnerability, failure to communicate the threat clearly or in time, lack of local organization and failure of the  
42 recipients to understand or believe in the warning or to take suitable action (UNISDR, 2001; Auld, 2008). Warnings  
43 are received and understood by a complex target audience and are most relevant when conveyed to have meaning  
44 that is shared between those who issue the forecasts and the decision-makers they are intended to inform (Auld,  
45 2008; Basher, 2006; UNISDR, 2006a). Because emergency responders, the media and the public often are unable to  
46 translate the scientific information on forecast hazards in warnings into risk levels and responses, early warning  
47 systems are most effective when they can identify and interpret the general impacts in simple and meaningful terms,  
48 prioritize the most dangerous hazards, assess potential contributions from cumulative and sequential events to risks  
49 and identify thresholds linked to escalating risks for infrastructure, communities and disaster response (Auld, 2008;  
50 UNISDR, 2006a).

51  
52 Different hazards and different sectors often require unique preparedness, warnings and response strategies  
53 (UNISDR, 2006a; Basher, 2006; van Aalst, 2009). Some may represent singular extreme events, sequences or  
54 combinations of hazards. For example, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), National Meteorological

1 and Hydrological Services, World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other  
2 United Nation partners recognize that combinations of weather and climate hazards can result in complex  
3 emergency response situations and are working to establish multi-hazard early warning systems for complex risks  
4 such as heat waves and vector-borne diseases (WMO, 2007; UNISDR, 2006a) and early warnings of locust swarms  
5 (WMO, 2007; WMO, 2004b; FAO, 2011). Some “creeping” hazards can evolve over a period of days to months;  
6 floods and droughts, for example, can result from cumulative or sequential multi-hazard events when accompanied  
7 by an inherent vulnerability (Auld, 2008a; Basher, 2006).

8  
9 Understanding by the public and community organizations of their risk and vulnerabilities are critical but  
10 insufficient for risk management, requiring that early warning systems be complemented by preparedness  
11 programmes as well as land use and urban planning, public education and awareness programmes (UNISDR,  
12 2006a; Basher, 2006; Wimbi, 2007). Public awareness and support for disaster prevention and preparedness is often  
13 high immediately after a major disaster event—such moments can be capitalized on to strengthen and secure the  
14 sustainability of early warning systems (Basher, 2006). It should be noted that such “policy windows” are seldom  
15 used without the pre-existence of a social basis for cooperation that in turn supports a collaborative framework  
16 between research and management.

17  
18 The timing and form of climatic information (including forecasts and projections), and access to trusted guidance to  
19 help interpret and implement the information and projections in decision-making processes may be more important  
20 to individual users than improved reliability and forecast skill (Pulwarty and Redmond, 1997; Rayner et al., 2001).  
21 Decision makers typically manage risks holistically, while scientific information is generally derived using  
22 reductionist approaches (Meinke et al, 2006). The net outcome can be a ‘disconnect’ between scientists and decision  
23 makers with the result that climate and hydro-meteorological information can be developed that, although  
24 scientifically sound, may lack relevance (Cash and Buizer, 2005; Meinke et al, 2006; Vogel and O’Brien, 2006;  
25 Averyst, 2010). Perceptions of irrelevance, inconsistency, confusion, or doubt can delay action (National Research  
26 Council, 2009). Some studies (Lowe, 2002; Meinke, 2006; Glantz, 2005; Feldman and Ingram, 2009) advise  
27 scientists and practitioners to work together to produce trustworthy knowledge that combines scientific excellence  
28 with social relevance. These studies suggest that decision support activities should be driven by users’ needs, not by  
29 scientific research priorities, and that these user needs are not always known in advance, but should be identified  
30 collaboratively and iteratively in ongoing two-way communication between knowledge producers and decision  
31 makers (National Research Council 2009; Cash and Buizer, 2005). It has been suggested that this ongoing  
32 interaction, two-way communication, and collaboration allows scientists and decision makers to get to know each  
33 other, to develop an understanding of what decision makers need to know and what science can provide, to build  
34 trust and, over time, develop highly productive relationships as the basis for effective decision support (National  
35 Research Council, 2009; Feldman and Ingram, 2009; Averyst, 2010).

36  
37 Since early warning information systems are multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary, they usually require  
38 anticipatory coordination across a spectrum of technical and non-technical actors. National governments can play  
39 an important role in setting the high-level policies and supporting frameworks involving multiple organizations, in  
40 adopting multi-hazard and multi-stakeholder approaches and in promoting community based early warning systems  
41 (UNISDR, 2006b, Pulwarty et al, 2004). National governments can also interact with regional and international  
42 governments and agencies to strengthen early warning capacities and to ensure that warnings and related responses  
43 are directed towards the most vulnerable populations (UNISDR, 2006b). At the same time, national governments  
44 can also play an important role in supporting regions and sub-national governments in developing operational and  
45 response capabilities (UNISDR, 2006b; see 6.3.3.4).

#### 46 47 48 *6.3.3.2. Reducing Climate-Related Disaster Risk*

49  
50 National climate disaster risk reduction activities include a broad range of options that vary from safe infrastructure  
51 and building codes to those aimed to protect natural ecosystems, human development and, following extreme  
52 climate impact events, humanitarian focused actions. Each of these strategies can prove ineffective in isolation but  
53 effective in combination. These and other different options are addressed in the following sections, noticing how



1 risk reduction and disaster response measures are increasingly being considered as good practices to deal with  
2 uncertainty and climate change.  
3  
4

#### 5 6.3.3.2.1. *Applying technological and infrastructure-based approaches* 6

7 Climate change has the potential to negatively impact the safety of existing infrastructure, increase the frequency of  
8 weather-related disasters, increase premature weathering regionally, change engineering and maintenance practices  
9 and to alter building codes and standards where they exist (Wilby, 2007; Auld, 2008a; Stevens, 2009). With  
10 potential increases in extreme events regionally, small increases in climate extremes above regional thresholds have  
11 the potential to result in large increases in damages to all forms of existing infrastructure nationally and to increase  
12 disaster risks (Auld, 2008a; Coleman, 2002; Munich Re, 2005).  
13

14 The need to address the risk of climate extremes and disasters in the built environment and urban areas, particularly  
15 for low- and middle-income countries, is one that is not fully appreciated by many national governments and the  
16 majority of development and disaster specialists (Moser and Satterthwaite, 2008; Rossetto, 2007). Low- and middle-  
17 income countries, which report close to three-quarters of the world's urban populations, are at greatest risk from  
18 extreme events and also have a far greater deficit in adaptive capacity than do high-income countries largely due to  
19 backlogs in protective infrastructure and services and limitations in urban government (Moser and Satterthwaite,  
20 2008; Satterthwaite et al. 2007).  
21

22 An inevitable result of potentially increased damages to infrastructure will be a dramatic increase in the national  
23 resources needed to restore infrastructure and assist the poor most affected by damaged infrastructure (Freeman and  
24 Warner, 2001). A study by the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE) concluded  
25 that national retrofit measures will be needed to safeguard existing infrastructure in Australia and new adaptation  
26 approaches and national codes and standards will be required for construction of new infrastructure (Stevens, 2008).  
27 Recommendations from this study call for: research to fill gaps on the future climate risks, comprehensive risk  
28 assessments for existing critical climate sensitive infrastructure, development of statistical information on future  
29 climate change events, investigation of the links between soft and hard engineering solutions and strengthened  
30 research efforts to improve the modelling of small-scale climate events (Stevens, 2008; Wilby, 2008; Auld, 2008a).  
31 The recommended national adaptation options to deal with projected impacts to the built environment range from  
32 deferral of actions pending development of new information to modification of infrastructure components according  
33 to national guidance, acceptance of residual losses, reliance on insurance and risk transfer instruments, formalized  
34 asset management and maintenance, new structural materials and practices, improved emergency services and  
35 retrofitting and replacement of infrastructure elements (Stevens, 2008; Wilby, 2007; Wilby et al, 2009; Auld, 2008a;  
36 Neumann, 2009).  
37

38 The implementation of adequate national building codes that incorporate regionally specific climate data and  
39 analyses can improve resilience for many types of risks (World Water Council, 2009; Wilby et al, 2009; Auld,  
40 2008a). Typically, infrastructure codes and standards in most countries use historical climate analyses to climate-  
41 proof new structures, assuming that the past climate will represent the future. For example, water related engineering  
42 structures, including both disaster- proofed infrastructure and services infrastructure (e.g. water supply, irrigation  
43 and drainage, sewerage and transportation), are all typically designed using analysis of historical rainfall records  
44 (Wilby and Dessai, 2010, Auld, 2008a). Since infrastructure is built for long life-spans and the assumption of  
45 climate stationarity will not hold for future climates, it is important that national climate change guidance, tools and  
46 consistent adaptation options be developed to ensure that climate change can be incorporated into infrastructure  
47 design (Stevens, 2008; Wilby et al, 2009; Auld, 2008b). While some government departments responsible for  
48 building regulations and the insurance industry are taking the reality of climate change very seriously, challenges  
49 remain on how to incorporate the uncertainty of future climate projections into engineering risk management and  
50 legislation, especially for elements such as extreme winds and extreme precipitation and its various phases (e.g.  
51 short and long duration rainfalls, freezing rain, snowpacks) (Wilby, 2010; Auld, 2008a; Sanders and Phillipson,  
52 2003; Lu, 2009). A few successful cases are emerging. In one example, the Canadian Standards Association (CSA)  
53 and its National Permafrost Working Group developed a Technical Guide, CSA Plus 4011-10, on "Infrastructure in  
54 Permafrost: A Guideline for Climate Change Adaptation" that directly incorporates climate change temperature

1 projections from an ensemble of climate change models. This Guide factors in climate change projections of  
2 temperature and precipitation and risks from melting permafrost to foundations over the planned lifespans of the  
3 structure. The guide also suggested possible adaptation options, taking into account the varying levels of risks and  
4 the consequences of failure for foundations of structures, whether buildings, water treatment plants, utilidor,  
5 towers, tank farms, tailings ponds or other infrastructure (NRTEE, 2009; Canadian Standards Association, 2010; see  
6 Chapter 9 case study 9.x.x on vulnerable regions: The Arctic).

7  
8 In developing countries, structures are often built using best local practices. But, problems can arise when the best  
9 local practices do not incorporate the use of national building standards or inadequately account for local climate  
10 conditions (Rossetto, 2007). While the perception in some developing countries is that national building codes and  
11 standards are too expensive, the implementation of incremental hazard-proof measures in building structures has  
12 proven in some countries to be relatively inexpensive and highly beneficial in reducing losses (ProVention, 2009;  
13 Rossetto, 2007; see Chapter 9 case studies 9.x.x). In reality, the most expensive component to codes and standards is  
14 usually the cost to implement national policies for inspections, knowledge transfer to trades and national efforts for  
15 their up-take and implementation (Rossetto, 2007). Bangladesh, for example, has implemented simple modifications  
16 to improve the cyclone-resistance of (non-masonry) kutcha or temporary houses, with costs that amounted to only 5  
17 per cent of the construction costs (Lewis and Chisholm, 1996; Rossetto, 2007). Bangladesh is also developing  
18 national policies requiring that houses built following disasters include a small section of the replacement house that  
19 meets “climate proofing” standards and acts as a household shelter in the next disaster. In many countries, climate  
20 proofing guidelines and standards are applied to structures that are used as emergency shelters and for structures that  
21 form the economic and social lifeline of a society, such as its communications links, hospitals and transportation  
22 networks (Rossetto, 2007).

23  
24 National support for land and water use planning that protects and enhances “green infrastructure” or natural buffers  
25 and defences can significantly reduce vulnerabilities for the built environment under current and future climate  
26 change. These ecosystem based adaptation approaches are discussed in section 6.3.3.2.3.

#### 27 28 29 6.3.3.2.2. *Promoting human development and secure livelihoods and reducing vulnerability*

30  
31 Vulnerabilities to climate related hazards and the options to reduce them vary between and within countries due to  
32 factors such as poverty, social positioning, geographic location, gender, age, class, ethnicity, ecosystem condition,  
33 community structure, community decision-making processes and political issues (Yodmani, 2001; UNISDR, 2009c).  
34 Policies and measures such as the establishment of a LDC fund, Special Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, climate  
35 change Multi-Donor Trust Fund etc., have all been developed to address the special adaptation issues of these most  
36 vulnerable countries (see section 7.4.3 for more details). Within these countries, the most vulnerable are usually  
37 those who are least able to cope with climate hazards due to a paucity of skill-sets, resources and access to assets for  
38 adaptive capacity. Studies indicate that national policies can increase this capacity (Davies et al, 2009; Heltberg et  
39 al., 2009; UNISDR, 2009c).

40  
41 The most vulnerable communities may require full scale assistance to protect lives, properties and livelihoods  
42 (UNISDR, 2009b). In many countries, including those in Africa, vulnerable communities suffer greater water stress,  
43 food insecurity, disease risks and loss of livelihoods (IPCC, 2007; FAO, 2008). Climate change may increase risks  
44 for waterborne diseases for many, requiring targeted assistance for health and water sanitation issues (Curriero,  
45 2001; IPCC, 2007). Resilient housing and safe shelters will remain one of the key adaptation actions to protect the  
46 vulnerable from disasters and climate extremes, requiring national guidelines to ensure that new or replacement  
47 structures are built with flexibility to accommodate future changes (Rossetto, 2007; Auld, 2008). Small island states  
48 and low-lying countries may require support that relocates vulnerable groups to safer locations or other countries, all  
49 requiring a complex set of actions at the national and international levels (IPCC, 2007).

50  
51 While there is a lot of rhetoric about targeting assistance to most vulnerable in the developing world, practical “on  
52 the ground” examples have been limited (Ayers and Huq, 2009). Nonetheless, some developing countries have  
53 implemented successful policies and plans. Nationally, good progress is being made in strengthening some disaster  
54 reduction capacities for disaster preparedness and early warning and response systems and in addressing some of the

1 underlying risk drivers in many developing country regions and sectors (UNISDR, 2009c; also see Chapter 9 case  
2 study 9.x.x). For example, social safety nets and other similar national level programmes, particularly for poverty  
3 reduction and attainment of MDGs etc., have helped the poorest to reduce their exposure to current and future  
4 climate shocks (Davies et al, 2009; Heltberg et al., 2008). Some examples of social safety nets are cash transfers to  
5 the most vulnerable, weather-indexed crop insurance, employment guarantee schemes and asset transfers (Davies et  
6 al., 2009; CCCD, 2009). A national policy to help the vulnerable build assets should incorporate climate screening  
7 in order to remain resilient under a changing climate (UNISDR 2004; Davies et al., 2009; Heltberg et al., 2008).  
8 Other measures such as social pensions that transfer cash from the National level to vulnerable elderly people  
9 provide buffers against climate shocks (Davies et al, 2009; Heltberg et al., 2008). However, lack of capacity and  
10 good governance has remained a major barrier to efficient and effective delivery of assistance to most vulnerable  
11 (UNDP, 2007; Warner et al., 2009; CCCD, 2009c).  
12

13 Many of the most vulnerable people who live below the International poverty line live and work in rural areas and  
14 are greatly impacted by disaster impacts (UNISDR, 2009c). Poor rural areas as well as many of the poor urban  
15 centers are often characterized by vulnerable housing, weak emergency services and infrastructure and a dependence  
16 on agriculture and other natural resources (UNISDR, 2009c; Reid et al, 2010). A high sensitivity to weather and  
17 climate variability combined with a lack of access to the necessary productive inputs for improved crop yields (e.g.  
18 productive land, seeds, fertilizer, irrigation, financial assets) means that rural poor in particular have low resilience  
19 to even the smallest weather irregularity (UNISDR, 2009c; IRI, 2006).  
20

21 In reality, when faced with food scarcity, these poor populations often adopt maladaptive coping strategies that  
22 aggravate long-term disaster risks, such as overgrazing, deforestation, unsustainable extraction of water resources  
23 (UNISDR, 2009c; IRI, 2006). Short-term but limited strategies to minimize these risks include diversifying  
24 livelihoods to spread risk, farming in different ecological niches and building social networks to pool risks  
25 (UNISDR, 2009c). In the longer-term, climate change is expected to lead to more erratic food productivity and to  
26 even lower levels of output, requiring changes towards higher agricultural productivity, reduced production  
27 variability and agricultural systems that are more resilient to disruptive events (IPCC, 2007b; Stern et al, 2006;  
28 Cline, 2007; FAO, 2010; UNISDR, 2009c). This will require transformations in the management of natural  
29 resources and new climate-smart-agriculture policies, practices, tools and financing for food security, as outlined by  
30 the FAO (2010). FAO (2010) also developed carbon balance tools to assess greenhouse gas reduction impacts for  
31 these newly proposed food security and agriculture policies and practices, and these tools now being used in many  
32 countries. Other coping strategies include increased non-farm incomes, migration, government and other financial  
33 assistance, microfinance, social protection and index-based crop insurance (UNISDR, 2009c). The Sustainable  
34 Livelihoods Approach or Framework has been used internationally for rural and coastal development to holistically  
35 describe the variables that impact livelihoods locally and to define the capacity, assets (both natural and social) and  
36 policies required for sustainable living, poverty reduction and recovery from shocks (Allison and Horemans, 2005;  
37 Bennett, 2010). Chapters 2, 5 and 9 also discuss sustainable livelihood approaches that can be considered in building  
38 adaptive capacity and resilience to climate shocks in communities.  
39

40 A crucial aspect in reducing vulnerability of climate-related risks among the most vulnerable - including food  
41 insecurity - is to make climate-related and climate change information available and accessible to decision-makers  
42 (IRI, 2006; Wilby et al., 2009; Washington et al., 2006), as discussed in section 6.3.3.1.1. developing countries in  
43 Africa, and particularly in the Sub-Saharan African economies, are especially susceptible to climate variability and  
44 change due to their predominately agrarian structure (IRI, 2006). Since food security crises in these countries are  
45 associated with climatic extremes, Sub-Saharan Africa currently represents the only region of the world where  
46 childhood malnutrition is actually increasing (IRI, 2006). There is growing recognition that better management of  
47 and responses to short and long-term climate risk in these countries will represent both a crucial step toward  
48 achieving the Millennium Development Goals and an opportunity to build some of the resilience for adaptation to  
49 the uncertainties of a changing future climate (IRI, 2006). Recent studies from Africa have shown that while climate  
50 information exists that could aid decision makers in making “no regret” adaptation decisions, this information is  
51 seldom incorporated into decisions (IRI, 2006; Ayers and Huq, 2009). In some cases, limited access to weather and  
52 climate forecasts in a timely manner also prevents the use of weather and climate information. The integration of  
53 climate information and services to support climate risk management of sensitive livelihoods will depend on

1 effective use of communication infrastructure and networks to reach users, to facilitate climate awareness and  
2 education campaigns, and to receive feedback so that users can help shape the services they receive (IRI, 2006).  
3

4 In many developing countries, one of the potential barriers for identifying the most vulnerable regions and people  
5 under future climate change is the limited human resource capacity to downscale global and regional climate  
6 projections to a scale suitable to support national level planning and programming process (Wilby et al., 2009;  
7 CCCD, 2009; Washington et al., 2006), and as discussed in section 3.2.3. Even when available, their use can be  
8 limited by a lack of understanding and interpretation on the degree to which these downscaled projections can  
9 highlight vulnerabilities.  
10

11 National Adaptation Programme of Actions (NAPA) under the UNFCCC process have been able to assess the  
12 climate sensitive sectors and prioritize projects to address the most urgent adaptation issues of the most vulnerable  
13 regions, communities and populations in 49 least developed countries (UNCTAD, 2008). While the NAPA process  
14 has proven instrumental in increasing awareness of climate change and its potential impacts in LDCs, it can be  
15 limited by its tendency to focus on a project rather than a national programme approach to adaptation and risk  
16 reduction and by challenges in mainstreaming these plans into national developmental plans and strategies (CCCD,  
17 2009; Satterthwaite et al, 2007). Concerns have been raised on means to fund NAPA activities and in some cases,  
18 potential donors may see the NAPA as little different from development plans, given that countries often fail to  
19 demonstrate incremental climate change benefits (UNFCCC, 2008; Satterthwaite et al, 2007). A key challenge is to  
20 ensure that NAPAs don't just become other policy documents, without translation into concrete support for  
21 adaptation (UNFCCC, 2008; Satterthwaite, 2007).  
22  
23

#### 24 6.3.3.2.3. *Investing in natural capital and ecosystem-based adaptation*

25

26 Investment in sustainable ecosystems and environmental management has the potential to produce triple wins –  
27 reduction in underlying risk factors (UNISDR/UNISDR, 2007, UNEP 2006, 2009 and Sudmeier-Rieux and Ash  
28 2009), improved livelihoods, and conservation of biological diversity - through sustainable management of  
29 biological resources and, indirectly, through protection of ecosystem services (UNEP 2006, 2009; World Bank  
30 2009).  
31

32 Healthy, natural or modified, ecosystems (see Section 6.3.1 and Box 6-4) have a critical role to play in reducing risk  
33 of climate extremes and disasters (UNEP, 2009; Bebi, 2009; Dorren, 2004; Phillips and Marden, 2005; Sidle et al.,  
34 1985; SDR, 2005a, b; UNISDR, 2007, 2009; Colls et al., 2009; Sudmeier-Rieux and Ash 2009; Reid and Huq, 2005;  
35 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009; Lal 2010). Although the scientific evidence base  
36 relating to the role of ecosystem services in mitigating many disasters is nascent, investment in natural ecosystem  
37 management has long been used to reduce risks of disasters (see Box 6-4). Forests, for example, have been used in  
38 the Alps and elsewhere as effective mitigation measures against avalanches, rockfalls and landslides since the 1900s  
39 (Bebi, 2009; Dorren, 2004; Phillips and Marden, 2005; Sidle et al., 1985). The damage caused by wildfires, wind  
40 erosion, drought and desertification are buffered by forest management, shelterbelts, greenbelts, hedges and other  
41 “living fences” (Dudley et al., 2010; ProAct, 2008). Mangroves could reduce 70-90% of the energy from wind  
42 generated waves in coastal areas, depending on the health and extent of the mangroves (UNEP, 2009), and  
43 depending on the width and age the mangrove stand can also contribute significantly to reducing damage from  
44 tsunamis (Yanagisawa et al. 2010).  
45

46 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-4 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
47

#### 48 **Box 6-4. Value of Ecosystem Services in Disaster Risk Management: Some Examples**

49

- 50 1) In the Maldives, degradation of protective coral reefs necessitated the construction of artificial breakwaters at a  
51 cost of US\$ 10 million per kilometre (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009).
- 52 2) In Viet Nam, the Red Cross began planting mangroves in 1994 with the result that, by 2002, some 12,000  
53 hectares of mangroves had cost US\$1.1 million for planting but saved annual levee maintenance costs of US\$

1 7.3 million, shielded inland areas from a significant typhoon in 2000, and restored livelihoods in planting and  
2 harvesting shellfish (Reid and Huq, 2005; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009).

- 3 3) In the United States, wetlands are estimated to reduce flooding associated with hurricanes at a value of US\$  
4 8,250 per hectare per year, and US\$ 23.2 billion a year in storm protection services (Constanza et al., 2008).  
5 4) In Sri Lanka Data from two villages in Sri Lanka that were hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004  
6 show that while two people died in the settlement with dense mangrove and scrub forest, up to 6,000 people  
7 died in the village without similar vegetation (World Bank, 2009)

8  
9 Source: Sudmeier-Rieux and Ash (2009)

10  
11 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 6-4 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
12

13 Investment in natural ecosystems also contributes significantly to reduction in GHG emissions, through practices  
14 such as Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and through Reduced Carbon Emissions from  
15 Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) or REDD+ (which additionally includes the role of conservation,  
16 sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks) (UNEP, 2006; Secretariat of the  
17 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009).

18  
19 REDD and REDD+ related strategies can help generate alternative sources of income for local communities and  
20 provide much needed financial incentives to prevent deforestation (Angelsen, et al. 2009; Sudmeier-Rieux and Ash  
21 2009; Reid and Huq, 2005; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009). Additional livelihood  
22 benefits are derived from the conservation and restoration of forest ecosystems and the services they support  
23 (International Union for the Conservation for Nature and Natural Resources and Stockholm Environment Institute et  
24 al. 2003; Longley and Maxwell 2003; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; SEEDS 2008).

25  
26 With improvements on economic well being and associated human development conditions, vulnerability to risks of  
27 climate extremes and disasters are also expected to be reduced (Benson and Clay 2004; Lal and Singh et al. 2009).  
28 The extent to which ecosystems support such benefits though depends on a complex set of dynamic interactions of  
29 ecosystem related factors, as well as the intensity of the hazard (Sudmeier-Rieux and Ash, 2009) and institutional  
30 and governance arrangements (see various case studies in Angelsen, et al 2009). For example, coastal forests,  
31 stabilized sand dunes, mangroves and seagrasses are all known to reduce impact forces, flow depths and velocities  
32 of storm surges, but unless specifically protected, sand dunes are frequently used as building material, or flattened to  
33 enhance views for seaside resorts. (Baird et al. 2005; Balmford et al, 2008; Björk et al. 2008; IOC, 2009; Kaplan et  
34 al., 2009; Yanagisawa, 2009; Yanagisawa et al., 2010). Scientific understanding of the relationship between  
35 ecosystem structure and function and the reduction of risks associated with climate extremes and disaster risks is  
36 limited, though growing.

37  
38 Some countries have begun to explicitly integrate ecosystem-based adaptation as a key strategy for addressing  
39 climate change, integrating such strategies in national and sectoral development planning (see Box 6-5).

40  
41 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-5 HERE \_\_\_\_\_  
42

#### 43 **Box 6-5. Some Examples of Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) Strategies and Disaster Risk Management** 44 **Interventions Taking into Account the Role of Ecosystem Services**

- 45  
46 • Viet Nam has applied Strategic Environmental Assessments to land use planning projects and hydropower  
47 development for the Vu Gia-Thu Bon river basin (OECD, 2009; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological  
48 Diversity, 2009?).  
49 • European countries affected by severe flooding, notably the U.K., the Netherlands and Germany, have made  
50 policy shifts to “make space for water” by applying more holistic River Basin Management Plans and Integrated  
51 Coastal Zone Management (EC, 2009; DEFRA, 2005; Wood et al. 2008).  
52 • At the regional level, the Caribbean Development Bank has integrated disaster risk into its Environmental  
53 Impact Assessments for new development projects (UNISDR, 2009 and CDB and CARICOM, 2004).

- 1 • Under Amazon Protected Areas Program, Brazil has created over 30 million ha mosaic of biodiversity-rich  
2 forests reserve of state, provincial, private, and indigenous land, resulting in potential reduction in emissions  
3 estimated at 1.8 billion tons of carbon through avoided deforestation {World Bank, 2009}.
- 4 • Swiss Development Cooperation's four year project in Muminabad, Tajikistan adopted an integrated approach  
5 to risk through reforestation and integrated watershed management (SDC, 2008).

6  
7 \_\_\_\_\_END BOX 6-5 HERE\_\_\_\_\_

8  
9 Generally, ecosystem-based adaptation strategies, often referred to as 'soft' options, can be a more cost-effective  
10 adaptation strategy than hard infrastructures and engineering solutions, and produce multiple benefits. Many  
11 ecosystem-based options are often considerably more accessible to the rural poor (Sudmeier-Rieux and Ash2009).  
12 However, countries would need to overcome many challenges if they are to be successful in increasing investment  
13 in ecosystem-based solutions, including for example:

- 14 • Insufficient recognition of the economic and social benefits of ecosystem management under current risk  
15 situations, let alone under increased risks of climate change extremes and disasters (Vignola et al, 2009).
- 16 • Lack of interdisciplinary science and implementation capacity for making informed decisions associated  
17 with complex and dynamic systems (OECD, 2009; Leslie and McLeod, 2007).
- 18 • Lack of capacity to undertake careful assessments of alternative strategies to inform choices at the local  
19 level. Such assessments could provide total economic value of the full range of disaster-related ecosystem  
20 services, compared with alternative uses of the forested land such as in agriculture (see, e.g., Balmford,  
21 2002).
- 22 • Where they exist, data and monitoring on ecosystem status and risk are often dispersed across agencies at  
23 various scales and are not always accessible at the sub-national or municipal level where land use planning  
24 decisions are made (UNISDR, 2009a).
- 25 • The mismatch in geographic scales and mandates between the administration and responsibilities for  
26 disaster reduction, and that of ecosystem extent and functioning, such as in water basin (OECD, 2009;  
27 Leslie and McLeod, 2007).

### 30 6.3.3.3. *Transferring and Sharing 'Residual' Risks*

31  
32 Risk sharing and transfer mechanisms for individuals and businesses at the local level are discussed in section  
33 5.5.2.2. This section sets out the role of national institutions, especially governments, in enabling and regulating  
34 practices at the local and regional scales. It also discusses the need on the part of some governments to transfer their  
35 risks.

36  
37 Markets can often provide risk financing solutions, albeit partial ones given market failures and market gaps. Market  
38 mechanisms may work less well in developing countries, particularly because there is often little or no supply of  
39 insurance instruments. In such circumstances, governments may need to create enabling environments for the  
40 private sector to become more engaged or offer insurance themselves. Employing insurance and other risk financing  
41 instruments for helping to manage the vagaries of nature generally involves the building of public private  
42 partnerships in developing and in developed countries due to market failure, adverse selection and the sheer non-  
43 availability of such instruments (see Aakre et al., 2010). Because of such reasons, there is a role for governments to  
44 not only create enabling environment for private sector engagement, but also to regulate their activities. Some  
45 literature distinguishes between protection and promotion models, while acknowledging that in many instances  
46 hybrid combinations may contain elements of both (Hess and Hazell 2009). Protection relates to governments  
47 helping to protect themselves, individuals and business from destitution and poverty by providing ex post financial  
48 assistance, which however is taken out as an ex ante instrument as insurance before disasters. The promotion model  
49 relates to the public sector promoting more stable livelihoods and higher income opportunities by better helping  
50 businesses and households access risk financing, including micro-financing.

51  
52 In many instances, insurance providers even in industrialized countries have been reluctant to offer region-  
53 nation-wide policies covering flood and other hazards because of the systemic nature of the risks, as well as  
54 problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Froot, 2001; Aakre, 2010). Insurance policies in Europe may be

1 bundled with household insurance, or offered on a stand-alone basis; governments may pay a premium on behalf of  
2 the insured or governments may choose to (also) compensate post event; insurance may be compulsory  
3 (Prettenthaler et al., 2004; Schwarze, 2004; Aakre et al., 2010). Even where insurance markets do exist, there is a  
4 wide variety of schemes and penetration is never often much less than 100%. In some highly exposed countries,  
5 such as the Netherlands for flood risk, insurance is even virtually non-existent.  
6

7 Because private insurers are often not prepared to fully underwrite the risks, many countries, including Japan,  
8 France, the US, Norway and New Zealand, have legislated public-private national insurance systems for natural  
9 perils with mandatory or voluntary participation of the insured as well as single hazard and comprehensive  
10 insurance. Also, in order to increase market penetration of non-traditional risks, such as in fledgling micro-insurance  
11 schemes, different strategies are being employed, including, as one example of pro-poor regulation in India shows,  
12 that insurers within their regular business segment reserve a certain quota for low income policies, effectively  
13 leading to a cross-subsidization of the micro-insurance industry (Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer and Peppiatt, 2005).  
14

15 Governments have a responsibility for a large portfolio of public infrastructure assets that are at risk to disasters.  
16 Moreover, most governments are obligated to provide post-disaster emergency relief and assistance to vulnerable  
17 households and businesses. Governments of developing countries typically finance their post-disaster expenses by  
18 diverting from their budgets or from already disbursed development loans, as well as by relying on new loans and  
19 donations from the international community (Mechler, 2004). In the past, these post-disaster sources of finance have  
20 often proven woefully inadequate to assure timely relief and reconstruction in developing countries. What is more,  
21 post-disaster assistance is not only often inadequate, but it can discourage governments and individuals from taking  
22 advantage of the high returns of preventive actions (Gurenko, 2003).  
23

24 In wealthy countries, government insurance hardly exists at the national level and in Sweden insurance for public  
25 assets is illegal (Bayer and Amendola, 2000), although states in the US, Canada and Australia, regulated not to incur  
26 budget deficits, often carry cover for their public assets (Burby, 1991). As discussed earlier, this is consistent with  
27 Arrow and Lind Theorem, which suggests that governments can spread risk over its citizens, most usually by means  
28 of taxation; then, the expected and actual loss to each individual taxpayer is minimal due to the sheer size of the  
29 population. Second, a government's relative losses from disasters in comparison with its assets may be small if the  
30 government possesses a large and diversified portfolio of independent assets. Neither of this however, applies to  
31 small, low-income and highly exposed countries that have over-stretched tax bases and highly correlated  
32 infrastructure risks (OAS, 1991; Pollner, 2001; Mechler, 2004; Cardona, 2006; Linnerooth and Bayer, 2007; Mahul  
33 and Ghesquiere, 2007). Realizing the shortcomings of after-the-event approaches for coping with disaster losses,  
34 sovereign insurance may become an important cornerstone for tackling the substantial and increasing effects of  
35 natural disasters (Mahul and Ghesquiere, 2007).  
36

37 A common recourse of action has been to insure public sector relief expenditure, and key applications have been in  
38 Mexico in 2006 and in the Caribbean with the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) (Cardenas et  
39 al., 2007; Ghesquiere, et al., 2006). These transactions are likely to set an important precedent for protecting highly  
40 exposed developing and transition country governments against the financial risks of natural catastrophes. Like  
41 national governments, donor organizations, exposed indirectly through their relief and assistance programs, too,  
42 have considered purchasing insurance. The World Food Programme, for example, purchased protection for its  
43 drought exposure in Ethiopia through index-based reinsurance (see case study in chapter 9).  
44

45 Markets can often provide risk financing solutions, albeit partial ones given market failures and market gaps. Market  
46 mechanisms may work less well in developing countries, particularly because there is often little or no supply of  
47 insurance instruments. In such circumstances, governments may want to consider creating enabling environments  
48 for the private sector to become more engaged or offer insurance themselves as well as ensure financial oversight  
49 and monitoring of implemented schemes (Warner et al., 2009).  
50

51 Employing insurance and other risk financing instruments for helping to manage the vagaries of nature generally  
52 involves the building of public private partnerships in developing and in developed countries due to market failure,  
53 adverse selection and the sheer non-availability of such instruments (see Aakre et al., 2010). Because of such  
54 reasons, there is a role for governments to not only create enabling environment for private sector engagement, but

1 also to regulate their activities. For the development context, Hazell and Hess (2010) distinguish between protection  
2 and promotion models, while acknowledging that in many instances hybrid combinations may contain elements of  
3 both. Protection relates to governments helping to protect themselves, individuals and business from destitution and  
4 poverty by providing ex post financial assistance, which however is taken out as an ex ante instrument as insurance  
5 before disasters. The promotion model relates to the public sector promoting more stable livelihoods and higher  
6 income opportunities by better helping businesses and households access risk financing, including micro-financing,  
7

8 In many instances, insurance providers even in industrialized countries have been reluctant to offer region- or  
9 nation-wide policies covering flood and other hazards because of the systemic nature of the risks, as well as  
10 problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Froot, 2001; Aakre, 2010). As one example, insurance policies in  
11 Europe may be bundled with household insurance, or offered on a stand-alone basis; governments may pay a  
12 premium on behalf of the insured or governments may choose to (also) compensate post event; insurance may be  
13 compulsory (Pretenthaler et al., 2004; Schwarze, 2004; Aakre et al., 2010). Even where insurance markets do exist,  
14 penetration is often much less than 100%. In some highly exposed countries, such as the Netherlands for flood risk,  
15 insurance is even non-existent and government relief is dispensed in lieu (Botzen, W. and van den Bergh, J., 2008).  
16 In many developing countries, there is little in terms of insurance for disaster risks, yet novel index-based  
17 microinsurance solutions have been developed and are starting to show results (Hazell et al., 2010; Hazell and Hess,  
18 2010) (see also ch.5 and ch.9 case study on risk financing).  
19

20 Because private insurers are often not prepared to fully underwrite the risks, many countries, including Japan,  
21 France, the US, Norway and New Zealand, have legislated public-private national insurance systems for natural  
22 perils with mandatory or voluntary participation of the insured as well as single hazard and comprehensive  
23 insurance. Also, in order to increase market penetration of non-traditional risks, such as in fledgling micro-insurance  
24 schemes, different strategies are being employed, including, as one example of pro-poor regulation in India shows,  
25 that insurers within their regular business segment reserve a certain quota for low income policies, effectively  
26 leading to a cross-subsidization of the micro-insurance industry (Mechler *et al.* 2005).  
27

28 Governments have a responsibility for a large portfolio of public infrastructure assets that are at risk to disasters.  
29 Moreover, most governments are obligated to provide post-disaster emergency relief and assistance to vulnerable  
30 households and businesses. As discussed above (see section 6.3.2.3), post-disaster sources of finance have often  
31 proven woefully inadequate to assure timely relief and reconstruction and pre-disaster risk financing arrangements  
32 may be worth considering. Yet, in wealthy countries, government insurance hardly exists at the national level and in  
33 Sweden, insurance for public assets is illegal (Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola, 2000), although states in the US,  
34 Canada and Australia, regulated not to incur budget deficits, often carry cover for their public assets (Burby, 1991).  
35 As discussed earlier, this is consistent with Arrow and Lind Theorem, which suggests that governments can spread  
36 risk over its citizens, most usually by means of taxation; then, the expected and actual loss to each individual  
37 taxpayer is minimal due to the sheer size of the population. Second, a government's relative losses from disasters in  
38 comparison with its assets may be small if the government possesses a large and diversified portfolio of independent  
39 assets. Neither of these conditions, however, applies to small, low-income and highly exposed countries (see section  
40 6.3.2.3). Realizing the shortcomings of after-the-event approaches for coping with disaster losses, sovereign  
41 insurance may become an important cornerstone for tackling the substantial and increasing effects of natural  
42 disasters (Mahul and Ghesquiere, 2007).  
43

44 A common recourse of action has been to insure public sector relief expenditure, and key applications have been in  
45 Mexico in 2006 and in the Caribbean with the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) (Cardenas et  
46 al., 2007; Ghesquiere, et al., 2006) (see Box 6-3 and ch.9 case study on risk financing). These transactions set an  
47 important precedent for protecting highly exposed developing and transition country governments against the  
48 financial risks of natural catastrophes. Like national governments, donor organizations, exposed indirectly through  
49 their relief and assistance programs, too, have considered purchasing insurance. The World Food Programme, for  
50 example, purchased protection for its drought exposure in Ethiopia through index-based reinsurance (see case study  
51 in chapter 9).  
52  
53  
54



#### 6.3.3.4. *Managing the Impacts*

Even in the rare circumstances where efforts outlined previously are all in place, there still needs to be investment in capacities to manage potential impacts as risk cannot be reduced to zero (Coppolla, 2007; Pelling, 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). The scale of the disaster impact should ideally dictate the level and extent of response. Individual household capacities to respond to disasters may be quickly overwhelmed, requiring local resources to be mobilised (Del Ninno, 1998). When community-level responses are overwhelmed, regional or central government needs to be called upon (Coppolla, 2007). Some events overwhelm national government capacities, and requires mobilisation of the international community of humanitarian responders (Fagen, 2008; Harvey, 2009). International responses pose the most complex management challenges for national governments, because of the diversity of actors that are involved and the multiple resources flows that are established (ALNAP, 2010a; Bennet, J, et al, 2006; Borton, 1993; Ramalingam, 2008). However, although humanitarian principles call for a proportionate and equitable response, in practice there are a few high-profile disasters that are over-resourced, with many more that are ‘forgotten or neglected emergencies’ (Slim, 2006; Walker et al. 2005). Despite the definition of international or national disasters as those where immediate capacities are overwhelmed, evaluations routinely find that most of the vital life-saving activities happen at the local level, led by households, communities and civil society (See Chapter 5, ALNAP, 2005; Hilhorst, 2003; Smillie, 2001, Telford and Cosgrave, 2006).

In terms of how responses are managed nationally, there are different models to consider (ALNAP, 2010b). Many countries now have some standing disaster management capacity (Interworks, 1998) and this should be considered distinct from national systems for managing disaster risk, commonly associated with ‘national platforms’ detailed in section 6.3.2. Examples of standing disaster management capacity include the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the US, Public Safety in Canada, National Disaster Management Authorities in India and Indonesia and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the UK. Comparative analysis of these structures shows that there are a number of common elements (Coppolla, 2007, Interworks, 1998). Countries with formal disaster management structures typically operate a system comprised of a National Disaster Committee, which works to provide high-level authority and ministerial coordination, alongside a National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) to lead the practical implementation of disaster preparedness and response (Interworks, 1998).

- National Committees are typically composed of representatives from different ministries and departments as well as the Red Cross/Red Crescent. They might also include donor agencies, NGOs and the private sector. The committee works to coordinate the inputs of different institutions to provide a comprehensive approach to disaster management.
- NDMOs usually act as the executive arm of the national committee. Focal points for disaster management, NDMOs are usually staffed by professional disaster managers NDMOs may be operational, or in large countries they may provide policy and strategic oversight to decentralised operational entities at federal or local levels.

Government ownership of the national disaster management function can vary with three models evident: It may reside with the presidential or prime ministerial offices, it may sit within a specific ministry, or it may be distributed across line ministries (Interworks, 1998). The way in which the international community is engaged in major emergencies is shaped by existing national capabilities and social contracts, with four possible response approaches (Chandran and Jones 2008; ALNAP, 2010b, see Table 6-4). Analysis based on these broad categories helps clarify the ways in which international agencies are mobilised to manage disaster impacts.

[INSERT TABLE 6-4 HERE:

Table 6-4: Typology of response.]

Details of the disaster management systems of two of the countries listed in Table 6-4 are outlined in Box 6-6.

1 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-6 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 3 **Box 6-6. National Disaster Management Systems of China and Kenya**

#### 5 *China*

6 The Government's disaster management process (called the 'disaster emergency response' in official documents) is  
7 a comprehensive system involving various central and local government sectors and covering the different phases of  
8 disasters preparedness, response and recover / rehabilitation. China has enacted more than 30 laws and regulations  
9 related to disaster management, including the Law on Earthquake Preparedness and Disaster Reduction. The  
10 national legislature adopted the Emergency Response Law on 30 August 2007 as the overall legal document  
11 governing all emergency responses in China, including disaster response.

12  
13 Under the related law and regulations, the Government has established an emergency response system comprising  
14 three levels:

- 15 • The National Master Plan for Responding to Public Emergencies - an overall framework to be used at all  
16 levels of government to ensure public security and cope with public emergency events, including all  
17 disaster response activities.
- 18 • Five national thematic disaster response plans which outline the detailed assignment of duties and  
19 arrangements for major disaster response categories – natural disaster relief; flood and drought;  
20 earthquakes; geological disasters and very severe forest fires.
- 21 • Emergency response plans for 15 central Government departments and their detailed implementation plans  
22 and operation norms (UNESCAP, 2009).

#### 24 *Kenya*

25 The government is working towards a national disaster management policy with the intention of preventing disasters  
26 and minimising the disruption they cause through taking steps to reduce risks. The policy will help enhance existing  
27 capacities by building resilience to hazard events, build institutional capacity, developing a well-managed disaster  
28 response system, reducing vulnerability and ensuring that disaster policy is integrated with development policy and  
29 poverty-reduction and takes a multi-sectoral, multi-level approach. The Ministry of State for Special Programmes  
30 will be responsible for the co-ordination of the disaster management policy and will promote integration and  
31 coordination of disaster management and will establish a national institute for disaster research to improve  
32 systematic monitoring and promotion of research.

33  
34 The draft policy published in 2009 stressed the central role of climate change in any future sustainable planned and  
35 integrated National Strategy for Disaster Management. It sets out principles for effective disaster management,  
36 codes of conduct of different stakeholders, and provides for the establishment of an institutional framework that is  
37 legally recognized and embedded within the government structures. It stresses the importance of mobilising  
38 resources to enable the implementation of the policy, with provision of 2% of the annual public budget to a National  
39 Disaster Management Fund.

40  
41 At the time of writing, this policy has not reached Parliament for discussion and approval (MOSSP, 2009, 2010).

42  
43 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 6-6 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

44  
45 Although the level of response and actors involved can vary considerably between disasters and countries (ALNAP,  
46 2010a), the basic actions taken to manage disaster impacts remain the broadly the same across countries, and  
47 correspond closely to the different stages of the disaster timeline (see Table 6-5; Coppola, 2007). In general, disaster  
48 management employs immediate activities, needs assessments and the delivery of goods and services to meet  
49 requirements. The demand for water, food, shelter, sanitation, healthcare, security and – later on - education,  
50 employment, reconstruction and so on is balanced against available resources (Wisner and Adams, 2003).

51 [INSERT TABLE 6-5 HERE:

52 Table 6-5: Disaster Management Actions across the Disaster Timeline (adapted from Coppola, 2007 and ALNAP  
53 2010a).]  
54

1  
2 Literature from the humanitarian community indicates that climate-related disasters are widely seen as playing a  
3 major role in the increasing the overall human impact of disasters and trends in disaster events are commonly  
4 attributed to climate change, even in the absence of robust scientific evidence (IASC, 2009a, IFRC 2009). As such,  
5 climate change is often cited as a reason for increasing pressure on both national and international disaster  
6 management capacities (Oxfam, 2007, IASC, 2009a, IASC, 2009b, HFP, 2007). Consequently, climate change-  
7 related considerations are increasingly featuring in literature on disaster management (Barret et al., 2007; IASC,  
8 2009a, McGray, 2007, Mitchell and Van Aalst, 2008; Venton and La Trobe, 2008), although challenges remain in  
9 how climate information can be used as a direct guide to decision-making (IASC, 2009a).

10  
11 The challenges of climate change calls for institutional changes to disaster management approaches that are far from  
12 trivial (Salter 1998), with such challenges including more appropriate policies and legislation; decentralization of  
13 capacities and resources; greater budgetary allocation; improved capacity building at the local level; and the political  
14 will to bridge the divide between disaster risk reduction activities and disaster management (Sanderson, 2000;  
15 UNISDR, 2005). Recent analyses of the need for greater innovation in international humanitarian responses  
16 (Ramalingam et al, 2009) present these shifts as among the most significant and important reforms the international  
17 system must undergo.

#### 18 19 20 **6.4. Aligning National Disaster Risk Management Systems** 21 **to the Challenges of Climate Change and Development**

22  
23 As has been mentioned in the above, climate change presents multidimensional and fundamental challenges for  
24 national systems for managing the risks of climate extremes and disaster risks, including potential changes to the  
25 way society views, treats and responds to risks (Mitchell and Ibrahim 2010). As climate change is altering the  
26 frequency and magnitude of some extreme events (see Chapter 3) and contributing to trends in exposure and  
27 vulnerability (see Chapter 4), the efficacy of national systems requires review and realignment with the new  
28 challenges (Mitchell and Ibrahim 2010, Polack 2010, UNISDR GAR 2009). Literature suggests that the  
29 effectiveness of national systems for managing disaster risk in a changing climate will be improved if they integrate  
30 assessments of changing climate extremes and disasters into current investments, strategies and activities; seek to  
31 strengthen the adaptive capacity of all actors and address the causes of vulnerability and poverty recognising climate  
32 change as one such cause (UNISDR GAR 2009, Schipper 2009, Mitchell and Ibrahim 2010). In practice, this might  
33 require new alliances and hybrid organisations across government and potentially between countries, different actors  
34 to join the national system, new cross-sector relationships, a reallocation of responsibilities and resources across  
35 scales and new practices (Polack 2010, Hedger *et al.* 2010). As a compliment the available data, information and  
36 knowledge about the impact of climate change and disaster risk presented in chapter 2, 3 and 4, this section seeks to  
37 elaborate the key areas where realignment of national systems could occur – in assessing the effectiveness of  
38 disaster risk management in a changing climate (6.4.1), managing uncertainty and adaptive management (6.4.2) and  
39 in tackling poverty, vulnerability and their structural causes (6.4.3).

##### 40 41 42 **6.4.1. Assessing the Effectiveness of Disaster Risk Management in a Changing Climate**

43  
44 In order to align disaster risk management with the challenges presented by climate change, it is necessary to assess  
45 the effectiveness and efficiency of management options in a changing climate based on the best available  
46 information, recognising that this information is patchy at best. This section assesses the literature from both disaster  
47 risk management and climate change adaptation on the effectiveness of different options from an economics  
48 perspective. Studies framed around climate adaptation for developed and developing countries have focused on the  
49 costs of adaptation rather than impacts and damage costs as well as jointly considering costs and benefits (see  
50 UNFCCC, 2009; World Bank, 2009; EEA, 2007; ECA, 2009; Solomon 2007; Nordhaus, 2007; Parry, 2009;  
51 Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). National level studies in the EU, UK, Finland and the Netherlands, as well as in a  
52 larger number of developing countries, using the NAPA approach, have been conducted or are underway (Lemmen  
53 et al, 2008; MMM, 2005; Van Ierland, 2005; DEFRA, 2006; UNFCCC, 2009). Yet, the evidence base on the  
54 economic efficiency, that is benefits net of cost assessments, of adaptation remains limited and fragmented (Adger

1 et al., 2007; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; UNFCCC, 2009). In the disaster risk management literature, too, there  
2 have been few national level assessments focussing on economic efficiency of management responses (see World  
3 Bank, 1996; Benson 1998; Mechler (2004)). A recent report, taking an economic lense to DRR, goes as far as  
4 suggesting that governments should in many instances prioritize spending on early warning (such as for floods),  
5 critical infrastructure, such as water and electricity lifelines, as well as, within limits, *environmental buffers* such as  
6 mangroves, forests and wetlands (World Bank 2010).

7  
8 Where assessments of costs and benefits of alternative options have been undertaken, most of these studies have  
9 focused on sea level risk and slower onset impacts on agriculture (UNFCCC, 2009; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008).  
10 Such studies have generally adopted deterministic impact metrics, which is problematic for disaster risk particularly  
11 in a environment where frequency and variability of extreme events is changing. On the other hand, assessments of  
12 variability in a changing climate are generally difficult to establish and mostly not available for many hazards (see  
13 Mechler *et al.*, 2010).

14  
15 Several different methods have been advocated for explicitly aligning disaster risk management with climate change  
16 considerations. A recent, risk-focused study (ECA, 2009) suggested the use of an adaptation cost curve approach,  
17 which organizes adaptation options around their cost benefit ratios. Interestingly, many of the options considered  
18 efficient are of what are considered to be “soft” options, such as reviving reefs, using mangroves as barriers and  
19 nourishing beaches. Clearly, many caveats and uncertainties apply to establishing such cost-curves, and this  
20 assessment, as one example, is based on asset losses rather than income-based outcomes and opportunity costs.  
21 Apart from proper cost benefit analyses, a selected number of studies using variants of a multi criteria approach have  
22 been conducted (see Van Ierland, 2005; Debels et al., 2007; de Bruin et al. (2009). Debels et al (2007) develop a  
23 multi-purpose index for a quick evaluation of adaptation practices in terms of proper design, implementation and  
24 post-implementation evaluation and apply it to cases in Latin America. De Bruin et al. (2009) describe a hybrid  
25 approach based on qualitative and quantitative assessments of adaptation options for flood risk in the Netherlands.  
26 For the qualitative part, stakeholders selected options in terms of their perceived importance, urgency and other  
27 elements. In the quantitative assessment costs and benefits of key adaptation options are determined. Finally using  
28 priority ranking based on a weighted sum of the qualitative and quantitative criteria suggests that in the Netherlands  
29 an integrated portfolio of nature and water management with risk based policies has particular high potential and  
30 acceptance. Overall, the costing and assessment of adaptation explicitly considering the risk based nature of extreme  
31 events remains incipient, and more work is desirable.

#### 32 33 34 **6.4.2. *Managing Uncertainties and Adaptive Management in National Systems***

35  
36 Disasters associated with climate extremes are inherently complex, involving socio-economic as well as  
37 environmental and meteorological uncertainty. Population, social, economic and environmental change all influence  
38 the way in which hazards are experienced, through their impact on levels of exposure and on people’s sensitivity to  
39 hazards (Pielke Jr. et al. 2003). Uncertainty about the magnitude, frequency and severity of climate extremes is  
40 managed, to an extent, through the development of predictive models and early warning systems. Yet uncertainty  
41 pervades climate and weather models from the initial theoretical foundations to model parameters (Murphy et al.  
42 2004; Stainforth et al. 2005). Early warning systems are also based on models and consequently there is always a  
43 probability of their success (or failure) in predicting events accurately, although the failure to heed early warning  
44 systems is also a function of social factors, such as trust in the information-providing institution, previous  
45 experience of the hazard, degree of social exclusion, and gender (see for example Drabek 1986; Drabek 1999).  
46 Enhanced scientific modelling and interdisciplinary approaches to early warning systems can address some of these  
47 uncertainties provided good baseline and time series information is available. Even where such information is  
48 available, there remain other uncertainties that influence the outcome of hazards. These relate to the capacity of  
49 ecosystems to provide buffering services, and the ability of systems to recover. Management approaches that take  
50 uncertainty into account include adaptive management and resilience, yet these approaches are not without their  
51 challenges (also see Chapter 8).

52  
53 Adaptive management has come to mean the testing of hypotheses through management action and the bringing  
54 together interdisciplinary science, experience and traditional knowledge into decision making through “learning by

1 doing” (Walters 1997). In most cases it is implemented at the local or regional scale and there are few examples of  
2 its implementation at the national level. Proponents argue that effective adaptive management contributes to more  
3 rapid knowledge acquisition, better information flows between policy makers, and ensures that there is shared  
4 understanding of complex problems (Lee, 1993). Examples abound of adaptive management in ecosystem  
5 management (Johnson 1999; Ladson and Argent 2002) and in disaster risk reduction (Thompson and Gaviria, 2004;  
6 Tompkins, 2005; see Box 6-7). One of the main unresolved issues in adaptive management is how to ensure that  
7 scientists and engineers tasked with investigating adaptation and disaster risk management processes are able to  
8 learn and how this learning can be integrated into policy and practice. In the case of the restoration of the Florida  
9 Everglades a limiting factor to effective management is the unwillingness of some parts of society to accept short  
10 term losses for longer term sustainability of ecosystem services (Kiker et al. 2001). Investment in hurricane  
11 preparedness in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina provides a contemporary example of science not being  
12 included in disaster risk decision making and planning (Congleton 2006; Laska 2004).

13  
14 \_\_\_\_\_ START BOX 6-7 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

### 16 **Box 6-7. Building Resilience for Disasters in the Cayman Islands**

17  
18 The Cayman Islands (Tompkins et al. 2008) illustrates how factors such as flexibility, learning and responsive  
19 governance are helpful in managing risks. The National Hurricane Committee (NHC) manages hurricane disaster  
20 risk reduction in the Cayman Islands and is responsible for preparedness, response and recovery. Compared to other  
21 countries, the Cayman Islands have been successful in managing disaster risk. For example, in 2004 Hurricane Ivan  
22 (which was similar in magnitude to Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans in 2005) only caused two fatalities in the  
23 island. Key aspects that are relevant to built disaster resilience are flexibility, learning and adaptive governance  
24 (Adger *et al* 2005; Berkes, 2007), all are present in the case study. The NHC is a learning-based organization. It  
25 learns from its successes, but more importantly from mistakes made. Each year the disaster managers actively assess  
26 the previous year’s risk management successes and failures. Every year the National Hurricane Plan is revised to  
27 incorporate this learning and to ensure that good practices are institutionalised. Evidence of adaptive governance can  
28 be observed, for example, in the changing composition of the NHC, their structure, network arrangements, funding  
29 allocation, and responsibilities. Policy makers are encouraged to design and to implement new initiatives, to make  
30 adjustments, and take motivated actions. Creating such space for experimentation, innovation, learning, and  
31 institutional adjustment is crucial for disaster resilience.

32  
33 \_\_\_\_\_ END BOX 6-7 HERE \_\_\_\_\_

34  
35 Testing new approaches to disaster risk management can only be undertaken effectively if the management  
36 institutions are scaled appropriately, where necessary at the local level (Berkes 2004), or at multiple scales with  
37 effective interaction (Gunderson and Holling 2002, Eriksen *et al*, 2011). For the management of climate extremes,  
38 the appropriate scale is influenced by the magnitude of the hazard and the affected area. Research suggests that  
39 increasing biological diversity of ecosystems allows a greater range of ecosystem responses to hazards, and this  
40 increases the resilience of the entire system (Elmqvist et al, 2003). Other research has shown that reducing non-  
41 climate stresses on ecosystems can enhance their resilience to climate change. This is the case for coral reefs  
42 (Hughes et al. 2003; Hoegh-Guldberg, et al., 2009), and rainforests (Malhi et al 2008). Managing the resources at  
43 the appropriate scale, e.g. water catchment or coastal zone instead of managing smaller individual tributaries or  
44 coastal sub-systems (such as mangroves), is becoming more urgent (Parkes and Horwitz 2009; Sorenson 1997)

45  
46 Spare capacity within institutions has been argued to increase the ability of socio-ecological systems to address  
47 surprises or external shocks (Folke et al. 2005). McDaniels et al (2008) in their analysis of hospital resilience to  
48 earthquake impacts, agreed with this finding, concluding that key features of resilience include the ability to learn  
49 from previous experience, careful management of staff during hazard, daily communication and a willingness by  
50 staff to address specific system failures. The latter can be achieved through creating overlapping institutions with  
51 shared delivery of services/functions, and providing redundant capacity within these institutions thereby allowing a  
52 sharing of the risks (Low et al. 2003). Such redundancy increases the chances of social memory being retained  
53 within the institution (Ostrom 2005). However, if carefully managed, the costs to this approach can include  
54 fragmented policy, high transactions costs, duplication, inconsistencies and inefficiencies (Imperial 1999).

1  
2 Nearly forty years of research, after the seminal paper published by Holling in 1973, have produced evidence of the  
3 impacts of aspects of resilience policy (notably adaptive management) on forests, coral reefs, disasters, and  
4 adaptation to climate change, however most of this has been at the local or ecosystem scale. There is still little  
5 evidence of the implementation of resilience policy at the national scale. Climate resilience as a development  
6 objective is difficult to implement, particularly as it is unclear as to what resilience means (Folke, 2006). Unless  
7 resilience is clearly defined and broadly understood, with measurable indicators designed to fit different local  
8 contexts and to show the success, the potential losers from this policy may go unnoticed, causing problems with  
9 policy implementation and legitimacy (Eakin et al. 2009). Please see the ‘glossary’ for the report’s definition of  
10 resilience.  
11

#### 12 13 **6.4.3. Tackling Poverty, Vulnerability, and their Structural Causes** 14

15 Chapters 2 and 4 suggest that climate change may exacerbate vulnerability and exposure, which may potentially lead  
16 to more extreme impacts. This increases the urgency for disaster risk management systems to more effectively tackle  
17 the underlying drivers and root causes of poverty and vulnerability (UNISDR 2009), while also recognizing that  
18 climate change itself is one of these drivers; posing new challenges for considering the environmental and carbon  
19 emissions dimensions of disaster risk management activities (covered in section 6.4.4). As discussed in Chapter 2,  
20 underlying drivers and root causes of vulnerability and poverty include: inequitable development, declining  
21 ecosystems, lack of access to power, basic services, land and weak governance (UNISDR, 2009). Climate change  
22 adaptation and disaster risk reduction share similar interests in promoting measures to reduce vulnerability – those  
23 which address inequity, promote secure livelihoods, act against discrimination, and increase access to power and  
24 resources, among others (Mitchell and Van Aalst 2008, Tanner and Mitchell 2008, Mitchell and Ibrahim 2010;  
25 Schipper 2009). However, strategies for tackling the risks of climate extremes and disasters, in practice, tend to  
26 focus on treating the symptoms of vulnerability, and with it risk, rather than the underlying causes, and these are not  
27 sufficiently embedded in sustainable development (Schipper 2009). The mid-term review of the HFA indicates that  
28 insufficient effort is being made to tackle the conditions which create risk (UNISDR 2010). This is despite a highly  
29 evolved awareness of the drivers of vulnerability to extreme events (Wisner *et. al.* 2004, CCCD 2009), highlighting  
30 a disconnect between disaster risk management and development processes that tackle the structural causes of  
31 poverty and vulnerability, and between knowledge and implementation at all scales (UNISDR 2009).  
32

33 This raises questions about the alignment of current national risk management systems and poverty and vulnerability  
34 reduction approaches and to what extent climate change provides an opportunity to recreate this link in an  
35 innovative way (Soussan and Burton 2002). One option discussed in the literature that aims to recreate this link  
36 involves investing in and strengthening national social protection measures as discussed with reference to the local  
37 scale in chapter 5 (see table 5.4) and more broadly in Chapter 8. Other options include mainstreaming disaster risk  
38 management and climate change adaptation within poverty reduction strategies or strengthening local government  
39 and NGO capacity for community-based development in areas with concentrations of hard-to-reach, vulnerable  
40 populations (Tanner and Mitchell 2008; Mitchell and Van Aalst 2008).  
41

#### 42 43 **6.4.4. Approaching Disaster Risk, Adaptation, Mitigation, and Development Holistically** 44

45 Diverse and complex challenges of climate change call for a fundamental shift in how climatic risks are viewed,  
46 treated and responded to. Ideally, national systems for managing risks from climate extremes and disasters would  
47 need to be redesigned to fully integrate development, environmental and humanitarian dimensions, appropriately  
48 designing, coordinating and sequencing disaster risk reduction strategies, including social protection, and climate  
49 change adaptation. However no country, developed or developing, could afford to do this in the short term. A  
50 second best option would be to progressively move towards such a system by, in the first instance, aligning existing  
51 national disaster risk management systems to the trends in extreme events described in chapter 3, as well as by  
52 addressing the trends in exposure and the underlying drivers of vulnerability.  
53

1 Strategies for mainstreaming climate change responses into national development planning and budgetary processes,  
2 and climate proofing at the sector level were discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. In this section, the focus has been on  
3 the system level changes required to address uncertainty, in the form of explicitly assessing economic benefits, net  
4 of costs, of options for adaptation to changing risks associated with climate change, adaptive management, and  
5 linking poverty reduction and managing risks of climate extremes by focusing on social protection. None of these  
6 measures are likely to be easy to implement as actors and stakeholders at all levels of society are being asked to  
7 embrace risk as an inherent part of management; and continuously learn and modify policies, decision and actions  
8 taking into account new scientific information as they emerge and experiential lessons. A space that is poorly  
9 understood and more scientific work is needed to understand human beings perception of risks, their decision-  
10 making processes in the face of uncertainty and different stakeholder and human values, and then to translate these  
11 knowledges into governance arrangements and incentives for change. Other major transformational ideas such as  
12 focussing on low-carbon development strategies producing synergistic outcomes for climate change mitigation and  
13 adaptation is unclear. More research and experiments with different low carbon initiatives and their sensitivity to  
14 changing disaster risks are needed before firm conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

15  
16 Given the new information presented in this report, factoring in the impacts of climate change, including the  
17 associated changing disaster risks and uncertainties, and the need to tackle the drivers of vulnerability in to disaster  
18 risk management systems and finding synergistic climate change adaption and mitigation solutions will remain  
19 priorities for most countries.

## 20 21 22 **6.5. Knowledge Gaps**

23  
24 The knowledge-base for the assessment of national systems for managing the risks of climate extremes and  
25 disasters, their practices and actors is evolving rapidly as more countries prioritise climate change related risk  
26 management within national and sub-national development and planning processes. At the same time, there are  
27 significant gaps in our knowledge about the specific ways that climate change is affecting and altering disaster risks  
28 and uncertainties (see chapters 3 and 4) and the associated impacts on the different dimensions of vulnerability and  
29 exposure that may exacerbate future disasters. Such uncertainty may be viewed by national level policy actors as a  
30 barrier to making policies, adopting legislation and targeting investments in managing disaster risks. However, as  
31 this chapter has shown, there is considerable experience of measures to respond to existing climate variability and  
32 disaster risk that can reduce the adaptation deficit, be viewed as ‘no regrets’ and not be dismissed as risking mal-  
33 adaptation to a changing climate (see section 6.3.1.3 for examples). Furthermore, it is important for understanding  
34 climate change, its effects on disaster risks and uncertainties, to build adaptive capacity and promote adaptive  
35 management and the compulsion to tackle the dual issue of vulnerability and poverty. It is equally important to  
36 understand their causes to be progressively integrated into, and used to realign and redesign, national systems for  
37 managing the risks of climate extremes and disasters. Experience of this happening and experience of creating  
38 national systems that integrate disaster risk, climate adaptation, environmental management and development more  
39 broadly is largely missing. In practice for national systems this would mean engaging a wider groups of  
40 communities of practice in planning, budgetary, policy design and investment decisions and implementation,  
41 connecting legislation and overarching national and sub-national committees associated with climate change to  
42 disasters and development more explicitly, and assembling robust information, expertise and decision-making  
43 systems that can recognise changing patterns of risk and uncertainty and respond accordingly. In order to gain such  
44 experience, this chapter has highlighted the following research priorities:

- 45 • How wise is the current trend to support decentralisation of disaster risk management functions to regional  
46 and local governments given the information requirements, changing risks and associated uncertainties of  
47 climate change? To what extent are efforts to build disaster risk management capacities at different scales  
48 creating sets of skills that prepare people and organisations for the new challenges that climate change  
49 poses (see section 6.3.2.2)?
- 50 • How are the roles and responsibilities of different actors working within national disaster risk management  
51 systems changing given the impacts of climate change? To what extent are the traditional functions  
52 associated with managing disaster risk being reshaped or redistributed as a result of climate change (see  
53 section 6.2)?

- 1 • Are systems that integrate a wider set of communities of practice and line ministries more efficient at  
2 reducing disaster risk or adapting to climate change than supporting a series of parallel efforts that place  
3 less emphasis on cross-sectoral co-ordination?
- 4 • What are the benefits and trade-offs of creating programmes and policies that seek to manage disaster risk,  
5 mitigate and adapt to climate change and reduce poverty simultaneously?
- 6 • To what extent do changing climate extremes and disaster risks present limits to low carbon growth?  
7 (Swart and Rees 2007).
- 8 • How to better monitor and demonstrate the successes (and failures) of managing risks due to climate  
9 variability and change as a means to provide more incentive for ex ante intervention as compared to the still  
10 dominant ex post stance taken for dealing with disasters.

## 11 12 13 **Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)**

### 14 15 *1) What constitutes a national system for managing risks and disasters associated with climate extremes?*

16  
17 A national system of disaster risk management ideally comprises of nation-wide multiple actors and stakeholders -  
18 national and sub-national government agencies, private sector, research bodies, international and regional non-  
19 government organizations, and community-based organizations and communities - working in partnership across all  
20 levels of society. These actors carry out differential but complementary roles according to their accepted functions  
21 and effectiveness and across spatial and temporal scales, to minimize exposure, reduce risks and vulnerabilities of  
22 communities and assets and assist communities to reduce their own exposures and risks, prepare them to respond  
23 quickly and efficiently to disaster events and residual risks and have capacity to rebuild and rehabilitate following  
24 disaster events.

### 25 26 27 *2) What functions do key national systems' actors play in managing risks of climate related extreme events and 28 disasters?*

29  
30 National and sub-national government agencies generally play multiple roles and functions in managing the risk of  
31 climate extremes and disasters. These vary between countries depending on the strength of the governments and  
32 their technical and budgetary capacity. The differential but complementary roles of national systems' actors can be  
33 categorized from a functions perspective into creating an enabling environment of policies, plans, legislation,  
34 organizational arrangements, coordination mechanisms; building knowledge and capacity to assess and identify risks  
35 and implement appropriate responses, including transferring and sharing risks through insurance and social safety  
36 nets; as well as generation and communication of information about hazards and risks, and appropriate responses.

37  
38 These functions may include building and developing policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks that prioritize  
39 risk reduction; integrating disaster risk management with other policy domains, such as economic development or  
40 climate change adaptation; enabling different sectors and actors, as well as different levels of society, to be included  
41 in disaster risk management systems. Governments often also provide direct services for the management of disaster  
42 risks and climate extremes, including early warning systems, and measures to support the most vulnerable in  
43 society; research and public awareness related to disasters and training in subjects such as disaster preparedness and  
44 response. Certain aspects of disaster risk management in some countries may be suited to and delivered by non-  
45 government stakeholders, including the private sector, to implement; albeit this would most effectively be  
46 coordinated within a framework created by national and sub-national governments.

47  
48 The private sector has traditionally played an important role in DRM, including risk financing and insurance,  
49 engineering and construction, information communication technology, media and communication. Under changing  
50 climatic environments the roles the private sector plays is changing including an enhance uptake of corporate social  
51 responsibility (CSR) in terms of advocacy and general awareness raising for DRR and involving humanitarian  
52 funding support and the contribution of volunteers and expertise; Public Private Partnerships (PPP) enhancing the  
53 provision of public goods for DRR in joint undertakings of public and private sector players; and businesses model



1 approaches. Innovative risk sharing mechanism such as indexed catastrophic insurances and micro insurances for  
2 poverty alleviation and reducing risks through development efforts are also emerging private sector roles.  
3

4 Civil Society and Community-based Organizations (CSO and CBOs) are part of national systems. Civil societies  
5 have provided humanitarian support and many other services including specific activities targeting education and  
6 advocacy, environmental management; sustainable agriculture; infrastructure construction, as well as increased  
7 livelihood. Their role in changing climate conditions is becoming even more critical as they largely operate on the  
8 ground with communities building their awareness and knowledge and capacity to understand their climatic risks,  
9 prepare for, respond to and rebuild after extreme events and disasters.  
10

11 Bilateral and multilateral agencies are also major players in developing countries supplying financial and technical  
12 support to government and non-government agencies, as well as local communities and NGOs and CSOs, to tackle  
13 multifaceted challenges of disaster risk management. They vary in their approaches and modalities and support  
14 different aspects of risk management and climate change adaptation. Efforts in the past have generally focused on  
15 providing post disaster humanitarian and post disaster rehabilitation assistance, with almost 90% of their budget  
16 going towards disaster relief and reconstruction, and only less than 10% of the funds for preparedness and risk  
17 reduction. Recently the need for allocating resources also to disaster risk reduction assistance has been  
18 acknowledged, with increasing levels of resources, albeit still relatively small in comparison to budget allocation,  
19 identified for various disaster risk reduction efforts, including poverty reduction as a means of reducing risks and  
20 vulnerability.  
21

22 Scientific and research organizations play important roles as well by undertaking research and assessments on  
23 subjects such as the evolution and consequences of past hazard events - cyclones, droughts, sandstorms and floods-;  
24 analyzing spatial and temporal patterns of weather-related risks; building cooperative networks for early warning  
25 systems, modeling, and long-term prediction; actively engaging in technical capacity building and training;  
26 transforming scientific evidence into adaptation practice; collating traditional knowledge and lessons learnt for  
27 wider dissemination, and translating scientific information into user-friendly forms for community consumption.  
28 The effectiveness of different actors and stakeholders in managing climate extremes and disasters risks is highly  
29 dependent on the policies, legislation and other enabling environments as well as the capacity of the stakeholders to  
30 proactively take steps. Also the availability and communication of robust and timely scientific information and  
31 traditional knowledge to all stakeholders and actors is key.  
32  
33

### 34 **3) *What can governments do to help reduce risk and manage residual risks of climate change related extremes*** 35 ***and disasters?*** 36

37 Governments at all levels are well placed to provide the enabling environments in support of actors and stakeholders  
38 to cost effectively and equitably play their part in a multifaceted disaster risk management. National and sub-  
39 national governments can utilize a range of planning and policy options to create necessary enabling environments  
40 for government agencies, sub national and municipal governments, private sector and individuals to reduce exposure  
41 to hazards, reduce risks and manage residual risks of climate change related extremes and disasters. Planning and  
42 policy options range from targeting key underlying drivers and determinants of risks and vulnerability – such as  
43 poor human development status,; poor access to water and sanitation; unsustainable resource and environment use -  
44 to information generation and knowledge management; provision of private sector incentives to supply services such  
45 as insurance and microfinance; and coordination of post disaster response and rehabilitation efforts..  
46

47 Governments can adopt longer term “no regrets” vulnerability options, which include some traditional disaster risk  
48 reduction (DRR) approaches to deal with the existing climate conditions and can be justified under all plausible  
49 future climate change scenarios, including no climate change. “No regret” actions would include interventions to  
50 enhance the provision and dissemination of climate information for agriculture in drought-prone regions,  
51 improvements to hazard warning and dissemination systems and updates to climatic design information for  
52 engineering codes and standards.  
53

1 At the other end of the spectrum, some long-term, high implication planning issues involving large investments  
2 involve climate change impacts' studies and may also incorporate additional redundancies that account for the  
3 uncertainties of the future climate. Given the consequences, the potential irreversibility of decisions, significant  
4 investment costs and the long-lived nature of these national decisions, more climate information may be needed to  
5 treat the range of uncertainties for the future. In between these ranges lies a broad spectrum of activities with  
6 gradations of emphasis on vulnerability and impacts. In some cases, mal-adaptation can occur in the longer term  
7 when "no regret" actions for current climate vulnerabilities do not consider climate change impacts (e.g. changes to  
8 agricultural livelihoods to strengthen resilience today could undermine DRR gains over the longer term when  
9 climate change impacts on future flood risks are ignored).

10  
11 Policies can also comprise of a range of financial instruments suitable under both current and future climate  
12 conditions. Key risk transfer options include insurance, micro-insurance and micro-financing, government disaster  
13 reserve funds and intergovernmental risk sharing. The latter two help to provide much needed relief, immediate  
14 liquidity after a disaster in regions where individual countries because of their size cannot have viable risk insurance  
15 schemes. They can allow for more effective government response, provide some relief of the fiscal burden placed  
16 on governments due to disaster impacts and constitute critical steps in promoting more proactive risk management  
17 strategies and responses. The decision to bear residual losses is always in the background as due to financial and  
18 other constraints generally very low probability events cannot be fully adapted to and uncertainties over the  
19 directions of future climate change impacts can be high. Also, often, there are important constraints in terms of  
20 limited capacity or a small set of available adaptation options

21 .  
22 When evaluating options, the scale of potential climate-related disaster risks, the capacity of governments or  
23 agencies to act, the level of certainty on future changes, the timeframes within which these future impacts and  
24 disasters will occur and finally the costs and consequences of decisions to be taken are key considerations in a  
25 government's prioritization and finally implementation. In terms of appropriate methods, cases with greater certainty  
26 in projecting future climate change impacts may better lend themselves for climate change impacts and modelling  
27 approaches while cases where a country's adaptive capacity is low or the uncertainties over future climate changes  
28 are high may be more suited to the "no regrets" and vulnerability-oriented approaches. All options are best  
29 implemented or mainstreamed through sectors and other policies and between sectors, including those for  
30 agriculture, water resources, infrastructure, health, land use, environment, early warning services, finance and  
31 planning, poverty reduction, education, hydro meteorological science.

32  
33 Given competing priorities and development goals, policy makers of national and sub-national governments may  
34 prefer to consider win-win outcomes that result in synergies for disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation,  
35 greenhouse gas reduction and human development. An example involves ecosystem based adaptation, as healthy,  
36 natural or modified, ecosystems have a critical role to play in reducing risk of climate extremes and disasters.  
37 Although the scientific evidence base relating to the role of ecosystem services in mitigating many disasters is  
38 nascent, investment in natural ecosystem management has long been used to reduce risks of disasters. Sustainable  
39 land management, including reforestation and conservation of forests, reduces risk of landslides, avalanches, and  
40 floods. Wetland protection and other coastal ecosystem conservation serve to protect against coastal storm surges.  
41 Such ecosystem based adaptation also contributes towards increased and sustainable economic opportunities,  
42 increased carbon sequestration and greenhouse gas mitigation in some cases. In many cases it can be more cost  
43 effectively replace or complement other adaptation actions like building expensive 'hard' infrastructure such as sea-  
44 walls and dykes. In an ecosystem based approach, in essence governments work towards streamlining their planning  
45 processes so that development, environmental management, disaster management and climate agendas are  
46 successfully combined.

47  
48  
49 **4) *How can countries integrate considerations of increasing risks of climate change related extremes and***  
50 ***disasters to reduce risks, transfer and manage residual risks?***

51  
52 Countries can integrate or mainstream considerations of increasing risks of climate change related extremes and  
53 disasters into their plans, policies, strategies, programs, sectors and institutions in multiple ways and at all levels. A  
54 key challenge and opportunity in mainstreaming or implementing DRR and CCA actions lies in building bridges

1 between current disaster risk management actions to deal with existing climate vulnerabilities and the additional and  
2 revised efforts needed for adaptation to future climate change. The ultimate challenge is the need for  
3 transformational change across the society where risk becomes a central component of social, economic and  
4 environmental development efforts, recognizing that it is the social processes which transform natural or  
5 technological phenomena into disasters and create and increase human vulnerability.

6  
7 Several studies advocate a concurrent or twin-track approach to mainstreaming CCA and DRR, consisting of: (1)  
8 “bottom-up” approaches or vulnerability assessments of social and economic strategies for coping with present  
9 climate extremes and variability, as practiced by the DRR community and (2) “top-down” approaches using climate  
10 forecast tools and scenarios to evaluate sector-specific, incremental changes in risk over the next few decades. The  
11 combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ options allows vulnerability and impacts approaches to be “mixed and  
12 matched” for the realities of different geographic scales, uncertainties and governance mechanisms

13 .  
14 In many cases, these approaches can be combined by considering a range of climate change scenarios and impacts  
15 relative to critical vulnerability thresholds defined by decision-makers. In other cases, changing climate risks can be  
16 monitored and mainstreamed into decision-making through regularly updated revisions to hazard and vulnerability  
17 assessments. Redundancies can be incorporated into existing disaster management planning in order to strengthen  
18 against the unforeseen risks of the changing climate. When available, downscaled ensembles of future climate  
19 change and socio-economic scenarios, impact models, vulnerability assessments and their uncertainties can be  
20 incorporated or mainstreamed into national and sectoral plans.

21  
22 Mainstreaming nationally across multiple sectors requires governance mechanisms and coordination that can cut  
23 across national and subnational government agencies and sectoral organizations and may best be realized if all areas  
24 of government are coordinated from the highest political and organizational level.

25  
26 Mainstreaming DRR and CCA also requires good and relevant information being available to actors and  
27 stakeholders in the form that could be understood and acted upon. Good information includes not only scientific  
28 information about hazards and trends but also about the underlying ecological, social and economic drivers and  
29 determinants of risks and vulnerability, and appropriate responses. For example, increasing biological diversity of  
30 ecosystems allows a greater range of ecosystem responses to hazards, and this increases the resilience of the entire  
31 system. Research has shown that reducing non-climate stresses on ecosystems, such as coral reefs and rainforests  
32 can enhance their resilience to climate change. Moreover, intervention on the socio economic factors that trigger  
33 disasters implies reducing vulnerability that have to do with: low income, inappropriate technology, absence of land  
34 use planning, inappropriate education, lack of organization, institutional weakness and political willingness.  
35 Comprehensive considerations of the multifaceted determinants of increasing risks of climate change related  
36 extremes and disasters and responses required to reduce risks, transfer and manage residual risks suggest a need for  
37 relevant and appropriately sequenced multidisciplinary and experiential knowledge sets – natural hazard  
38 identification and patterns, risk construction processes, and evaluation and assessment.

39  
40 Recent successful experiences suggest that the production and communication of relevant scientific and other  
41 knowledge to decision-makers and actors can be best be achieved by a co-generation of knowledge through  
42 scientists and researchers in collaboration with policy makers and other non-academic stakeholders. Collaboration  
43 between scientific disciplines, adopting transdisciplinary methodologies also helps generate a body of  
44 complementary and appropriately sequenced knowledge that generates synergistic outcomes.

45  
46  
47 **5) *What methods and tools are currently available to help develop a culture of resilience by assessing risks,***  
48 ***reducing climate-related disaster risks through hard and soft options and transferring and sharing ‘residual***  
49 ***risks?***

50  
51 Information and knowledge is crucial for the development of different methods and tools that may help to reduce  
52 risks, improve the planning processes, help in the recovery process and improve the capabilities to adapt to a  
53 changing climate. Building a culture of resilience involves not only natural hazard identification and an  
54 understanding of the root causes of exposure, vulnerability and risk, but also the communication of knowledge to

1 actors and decision-makers, designing residual risk preparedness procedures for effectively responding to disasters  
2 when they occur and finally an evaluation and assessment of adaptive learning.  
3

4 Some examples of assessment methods, and tools are: climate change modeling, hazard zoning, “hot spot”  
5 mapping”, national vulnerability mapping and monitoring using vulnerability indices, seasonal outlooks for  
6 preparedness planning. DRR options include early warning systems for fluvial, glacial, flood and tidal hazards;  
7 structural and non-structural flood controls, artificial draining of pro-glacial lakes, traditional rain and groundwater  
8 harvesting, and storage systems, long-range reservoir inflow forecasts and water demand management and  
9 efficiency measures.  
10

11 National climate-related disaster risk reduction activities include a broad range of national options that vary from  
12 “hard” structural options for safer and future oriented national infrastructure and building codes, coastal defense  
13 practices, standards for maintenance of enhanced early warning systems to “soft” options that include policies for  
14 more rigorous land use planning, protection of natural ecosystems, human development, and financial instruments  
15 for promoting human development and disaster risk sharing and risk transfer (see Table 6-6).  
16

17 [INSERT TABLE 6-6 HERE:

18 Table 6-6: Some examples of methods/tools/practices for assessing risks, reducing climate-related disaster risks, and  
19 transferring and sharing risks.]  
20

21 “Hard” structural or engineering options include new and revised construction practices, implementation of adequate  
22 national building codes that incorporate regionally specific climate data and analyses to improve resilience for many  
23 types of risks. Since infrastructure is built for long life-spans and the assumption of climate stationarity will not hold  
24 for future climates, it is important that national climate change guidance, tools and consistent adaptation options be  
25 developed to ensure that climate change can be incorporated into these national infrastructure design standards.

26 Meanwhile, challenges remain on how to incorporate the uncertainty of future climate projections into engineering  
27 risk management and legislation, especially for elements such as extreme winds and extreme precipitation.

28 Examples are emerging where these challenges have been overcome successfully at the national level, for example,  
29 climate change related uncertainties are now incorporated into the national permafrost standard for Arctic regions of  
30 Canada and the design of cyclone-resistant temporary houses in Bangladesh.  
31

32 Soft options for resilient infrastructure and communities include ecosystem-based adaptation strategies, which can  
33 prove to be more cost-effective adaptation strategies than hard engineering solutions alone and produce multiple  
34 benefits. Many ecosystem-based options are also more accessible to the rural poor and can support livelihoods. Land  
35 use planning and management that aims to protect and enhance functioning “green infrastructure” or natural buffers  
36 and defences such as wetlands, forests and natural drainage corridors can reduce vulnerabilities in the longer term.  
37 Index-based catastrophe insurance often linked to microfinance and microinsurance are some recent tools that have  
38 also proven successful in DRR. Hard structural options alone, without the support of soft ecosystem based services,  
39 private sector engagement and incentive based financing of DRR, may first prove to be very expensive in terms of  
40 construction and maintenance and then may not bring about the expected benefits as they can lead to over-reliance on  
41 structures, which may fail catastrophically in large events.  
42

43 For building resilience and reducing risk, information and knowledge needs to be translated into concrete actions,  
44 measures and tools to deal with disaster risk and climate change adaptation. Effective communication and public  
45 awareness for action is critical when trying to reduce risks and disaster losses and damages. Early Warning Systems  
46 are essential tools to promote both risk assessment and public awareness in order to promote a culture of resilience  
47 as they can deliver accurate, timely, and meaningful information. To be effective and complete, an early warning  
48 system should comprise of four interacting elements (i) generation of risk knowledge including monitoring and  
49 forecasting, (ii) surveillance and warning services, (iii) dissemination and communication and (iv) response  
50 capability. The success of an early warning system depends on the extent to which the warnings trigger effective  
51 response measures and how it promotes changes in planning and future policies.  
52  
53

1 **6) How can governments facilitate increased engagement of the private sector in managing risks associated**  
2 **with climatic extremes and climatic variabilities?**  
3

4 The private sector has always been involved in disaster risk management particularly providing services such as post  
5 disaster engineering and construction, information communication technology, media and communication, utilities  
6 and transportation. But little evidence has been documented in relation to successful national systems level private  
7 sector engagement, with the exception of risk financing. There is scope for increased private sector involvement in  
8 DRR by creating increased awareness and understanding and highlighting a business case for private sector  
9 engagement, such as for guaranteeing global value chains in the face of disasters. There exists scope for innovative  
10 private-public sector risk financing partnerships in the supply of innovative risk financing instruments, although  
11 private insurers are often not prepared to fully underwrite disaster risks. In response to this reluctance, countries  
12 could, as many OECD countries including Japan, France, the US, Norway and New Zealand have done, legislate  
13 public-private national insurance systems for natural disasters with mandatory or voluntary participation of the  
14 insured. Within such partnerships, in a development context governments could follow a promotion model of pro-  
15 poor regulation to increase market penetration of non-traditional risk financing measures, such as through micro-  
16 insurance schemes. In India, for example, the government passed a regulation where insurers were made to reserve a  
17 certain quota of business for low income insurance policies within their regular business segment. This government  
18 legislation effectively led to the cross-subsidization of the micro-insurance industry and has helped the poor in rural  
19 communities access insurance against disasters.  
20

21  
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Table 6-1: National policies, plans, and programs: selection of disaster risk management and adaptation options.

Sector/ Response	Manage residual risks	Transfer of risks	“No regrets” or climate proof actions	Preparing for climate change by reducing uncertainties ( <i>‘No regrets’ options plus...</i> )	Reduce future climate change risks ( <i>“Reducing uncertainties” options plus...</i> )	‘Win-win’ for GHG reduction, adaptation, risk reduction and development benefits
Natural Ecosystems and Forestry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Replace lost ecosystem services through additional hard engineering, health measures <sup>6</sup></li> <li>▪ Restore loss of damaged ecosystems <sup>6</sup></li> <li>▪ Reduce forest harvesting and provide incentives for alternate livelihoods <sup>6</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Micro-funding and insurance to compensate for lost livelihoods <sup>5</sup></li> <li>▪ Investments in additional insurance, government reserve funds for increased risks due to loss of protective ecosystem services <sup>5</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Use of Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) or “soft engineering”; Financial recognition of EbA; Integrate DRR and climate into Integrated Coastal Zone and Water Resources Management; forest, land-use Management; Conserve, enhance resilience of ecosystems; restore protective ecosystem services <sup>1</sup></li> <li>▪ Adaptive forest management Forest fire management, controlled burns; Agroforestry; biodiversity <sup>2</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Synergies between UNFCCC and Rio Conventions (e.g. UN CBD); avoid perverse incentives in conventions <sup>3</sup></li> <li>▪ Research on climate change-ecosystem-forest links; climate and ecosystem prediction systems, climate change projections; Monitor ecosystem and climate trends <sup>3</sup></li> <li>▪ Incorporate ecosystem management into NAPAs and DRR plans <sup>3</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CCA interventions to maintain ecosystem resilience; corridors, assisted migrations; Plan EbA for climate change <sup>4</sup></li> <li>▪ Seed, genetic banks; new genetics; tree species improvements to maintain ecosystem services in future <sup>4</sup></li> <li>▪ Changed timber harvest management, new technologies, new uses to conserve forest ecosystem services <sup>4</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Afforestation reforestation, conservation of forests, wetlands and peatlands, increased biomass; LULUCF; REDD <sup>7</sup></li> <li>▪ Incentives, Sequestration of carbon; sustainable bio-energy; energy self – sufficiency<sup>7</sup></li> </ul>
Agriculture and Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Changed livelihoods and relocations in regions with climate sensitive practices <sup>12</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improved access to crop, livestock and income loss insurance, (e.g. weather</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Food security via sustainable land and water management, training; Efficient water use, storage; Agro-forestry; Protection shelters,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased agriculture-climate research and development <sup>10</sup></li> <li>▪ Research on climate tolerant crops, livestock; Agrobiodiversity for</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Adaptive agricultural practices for new climates, extremes <sup>12</sup></li> <li>▪ New and enhanced agricultural weather, climate prediction services <sup>11</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Energy efficient and carbon sequestering practices; Training; Reduced use of chemical</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Emergency stock and improved distribution of food and water <sup>12</sup></li> </ul>	<p>derivatives) <sup>13</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Micro-funding and micro-insurance <sup>13</sup></li> <li>▪ Subsidies, tax credits <sup>13</sup></li> </ul>	<p>crop and livestock diversification; Improved supply of climate stress tolerant seeds; Integrated pest, disease management <sup>8</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Climate monitoring; Improved weather predictions; Disaster management, crop yield and distribution models and predictions <sup>9</sup></li> </ul>	<p>genetics <sup>10</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Integration of climate change scenarios into national agronomic assessments <sup>11</sup></li> <li>▪ Diversification of rural economies for sensitive agricultural practices <sup>10</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Food emergency planning; Distribution and infrastructure networks <sup>12</sup></li> <li>▪ Diversify rural economies <sup>12</sup></li> </ul>	<p>fertilizers <sup>14</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Promote Bio-gas from agri-waste and animal excreta<sup>14</sup></li> <li>▪ Agroforestry <sup>14</sup></li> </ul>
Coastal Zone and Fisheries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enhance emergency preparedness measures for changed extremes, including evacuations <sup>16</sup></li> <li>▪ Relocations of communities, infrastructure <sup>16</sup></li> <li>▪ Exit fishing; alternate livelihoods <sup>19</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enhance insurance for coastal regions and resources; Fisheries insurance <sup>21</sup></li> <li>▪ Government reserve funds <sup>21</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EbA; Integrated Coastal Zone Management ICZM; Combat salinity; alternate drinking water availability; soft and hard engineering <sup>15</sup></li> <li>▪ Strengthen institutional, regulatory and legal instruments; Setbacks <sup>16</sup></li> <li>▪ Marine Protected Areas, monitoring fish stocks, alter catch quantities, effort, timing; Salt-tolerant fish species <sup>17</sup></li> <li>▪ Climate risk reduction planning; Hazard delineation; Improve weather forecasts, warnings, environmental prediction <sup>16</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CC projections for coastal management planning; Develop modelling capacity for coastal zone-climate links; Climate-linked ecological and resource predictions; Improved monitoring, geographic and other databases for coastal management <sup>18</sup></li> <li>▪ Monitor fisheries; Selective breeding for aquaculture, fish genetic stocks; research on saline tolerant crop varieties <sup>19</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Incorporate CCA, sea-level rise into ICZM, coastal defences; <sup>18</sup></li> <li>▪ Hard and “soft” engineering for CCA; Resilient vessels and coastal facilities <sup>16</sup></li> <li>▪ Manage for changed fisheries, invasives <sup>19</sup></li> <li>▪ Inland lakes: Alter transportation and industrial practices, Soft and hard engineering <sup>20</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Promote renewable energy; conservation, energy self-sufficiency (especially for offshore islands, coastal regions) <sup>22</sup></li> <li>▪ Offshore renewable energy for alternate incomes and aquaculture habitat <sup>22</sup></li> </ul>

<p>Water resources</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National preparedness and evacuation plans <sup>24</sup></li> <li>▪ Enhanced health infrastructure <sup>24</sup></li> <li>▪ Transport, engineering; temporary consumable water taking permits <sup>24</sup></li> <li>▪ Food , water distribution, alternate livelihoods <sup>24</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Public-private partnerships; Economics for water allocations beyond basic needs <sup>26</sup></li> <li>▪ Mobilize financial resources and capacity for technology and EbA <sup>26</sup></li> <li>▪ Insurance for infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Implement Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), national water efficiency, storage plans <sup>23</sup></li> <li>▪ Effective surveillance, prediction, warning and emergency response systems; Better disease and vector control, detection and prediction systems; Awareness and training on public health <sup>24</sup></li> <li>▪ Adequate funding, capacity for resilient water infrastructure and water resource management; Improved institutional arrangements, negotiations for water allocations <sup>23</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop prediction, climate projection and early warning systems for flood events and low water flow conditions; Research and downscaling for hydrological basins <sup>24</sup></li> <li>▪ Multi-sectoral planning for water; Selective decentralization of water resource management (e.g. catchments and river basins); joint river basin management (e.g. bi-national) <sup>23</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National water policy frameworks, IWRM incorporate CCA <sup>25</sup></li> <li>▪ Investments in hard and soft infrastructure considering changed climate; river restoration <sup>25</sup></li> <li>▪ Improved weather, climate, hydrology-hydraulics, water quality forecasts for new conditions <sup>24</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Integrated water efficiency and renewable hydro power for CCA <sup>23</sup></li> </ul>
<p>Infrastructure, Housing, Cities, Transportation, energy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Relocation <sup>28</sup></li> <li>▪ Evacuation planning; Contingency plan for transport during extreme events <sup>28</sup></li> <li>▪ Climate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Infrastructure insurance and financial risk management <sup>29</sup></li> <li>▪ Insurance for energy facilities, interruption <sup>29</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Building codes, standards with updated climatic values; Climate resilient infrastructure (and energy) designs; Training, capacity, inspection,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improved downscaling of CC information; Maintain climate data networks, update climatic design information; Increased safety/uncertainty factors in codes and standards; Develop</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Codes, standards for changed extremes; <sup>30</sup></li> <li>▪ Publicly funded infrastructure and post-disaster reconstruction to include CCA <sup>30</sup></li> <li>▪ New materials, engineering approaches; Flexible</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Implement energy and water efficient GHG reductions, DRR and adaptation synergies <sup>29</sup></li> <li>▪ Scale up, market penetration for renewable energy</li> </ul>

	<p>resilient shelter construction <sup>28</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote energy security; Distributed energy generation and distribution <sup>29</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Innovative risk sharing instruments <sup>29</sup></li> <li>Government reserve funds <sup>29</sup></li> </ul>	<p>enforcement; Monitoring for priority retrofits (e.g. permafrost) <sup>27</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legal alternatives to shanty settlements, sanitation <sup>27</sup></li> <li>Strengthen early warning systems, hazard awareness; Improved weather warning systems; Disaster resilient building components (rooms) in high risk areas; heat-health responses <sup>28</sup></li> <li>Integrate urban planning, engineering, maintenance <sup>27</sup></li> <li>Redundant, diversified energy systems; Maintenance; Self-sufficiency, clean energy technologies for national energy plans, MEA goals (bio-gas, solar cooker); Promote renewable energy in remote and vulnerable regions; Promote appropriate energy mixes nationally <sup>29</sup></li> </ul>	<p>CCA tools <sup>28</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Research on climate, energy and built environment interface, including flexible designs, redundancy; Forensic studies of failures (adaptation learning), Improved maintenance <sup>27</sup></li> <li>Investments for sustainable energy development; Cooperation on trans-boundary energy supplies (e.g. wind energy at times of peak wind velocity) <sup>29</sup></li> </ul>	<p>use structures; Asset management <sup>30</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hazard mapping; Zoning and avoidance; Prioritized retrofits, abandon the most vulnerable; Soft engineering services <sup>30</sup></li> <li>Design energy generation, distribution systems for CCA; Switch to less risky energy systems, mixes; Embedd sustainable energy in DRR and CCA planning <sup>29</sup></li> </ul>	<p>production; Increased hydroelectric potential; Sustainable biomass; “Greener” distributed community energy systems <sup>29</sup></p>
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National plan for heat and extremes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extend and expand health insurance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community/urban planning, building standards and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Research on climate-health linkages and CCA options; Develop</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New food and water security, distribution systems; air quality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote use of clean renewable energy and water</li> </ul>

	<p>emergencies; New disease detection and management systems; Better land and water use management to reduce health risks; Enhanced prediction and warning systems for new risks<sup>32</sup></p>	<p>coverage to include new and changed weather and climate risks<sup>33</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government reserve funds<sup>33</sup></li> <li>▪</li> </ul>	<p>guidelines; cooling shelters; safe health facilities; Retrofits for vulnerable structures; Health facilities designed using updated climate information<sup>31</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strengthen surveillance, health preparedness; Early warning weather-climate-health systems, heat alerts and responses; Capacity for response to early warnings; Prioritize disaster risks; Disaster prevention and preparedness; Public education campaigns; Food security<sup>31</sup></li> <li>▪ Strengthen disease surveillance and controls; Improve health care services, personal health protection; Improve water treatment/sanitation; Water quality regulations; Vaccinations, drugs, repellants; Development of rapid diagnostic tests<sup>31</sup></li> <li>▪ Monitor air and water quality; regulations; urban planning<sup>31</sup></li> </ul>	<p>new health prediction systems for emerging risks; Research on landscape changes, new diseases and climate; Urban weather-health modelling<sup>31</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Education, Disaster prevention and preparedness<sup>31</sup></li> </ul>	<p>regulations, alternate fuels<sup>32</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ New warning and response systems; Predict and manage health risks from landscape changes; Target services for most at risk populations<sup>32</sup></li> <li>▪ Climate proofing, refurbish/ maintain national health facilities and services; Address needs for additional health facilities and services; Design for climate change; Alternate energy for improved air quality<sup>32</sup></li> </ul>	<p>sources; increase energy efficiency; Air quality regulations; Clean energy technologies to reduce harmful air emissions (e.g. cooking stoves)<sup>34</sup></p>
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## END NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Adger et al, 2005; Barbier, 2009; Colls et al, 2009; FAO, 2008a; UNISDR, 2007; UNISDR, 2009; MA, 2005; SCBD, 2009; Shepherd, 2008, Shepherd, 2004; UNEP, 2009; World Bank, 2010.
- <sup>2</sup> FAO, 2007; Neufeldt et al, 2009; Shugart et al, 2003; Spittlehouse and Stewart 2003, Weih, 2004.
- <sup>3</sup> Colls et al, 2009; FAO, 2008a; SCBD, 2009; Rahel and Olden, 2008; Robledo et al, 2005; OECD, 2009; SCBD, 2009; UNEP, 2009; UNFCCC, 2006.
- <sup>4</sup> Berry, 2007; FAO, 2007; FAO, 2008a; FAO, 2008b; OECD, 2009; Leslie and McLeod, 2007; SCBD, 2009.
- <sup>5</sup> CCCD, 2009; Coll et al, 2009; FAO, 2008b; ProAct, 2008; UNFCCC, 2006.
- <sup>6</sup> Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; FAO, 2008b; Reid and Huq, 2005; SCBD, 2009;
- <sup>7</sup> FAO, 2008a; Reid and Huq, 2005; SCBD, 2009; UNEP, 2006; Venter et al, 2009;
- <sup>8</sup> Arnell 2004; Branco et al., 2005; Campbell et al, 2008; FAO, 2008a; FAO, 2009; Fischer et al. 2006; Howden et al, 2007; IPCC, 2007; UNISDR, 2009; McGray et al, 2007; Neufeldt et al., 2009; Romano, 2003; SCBD, 2009; World Bank, 2009.
- <sup>9</sup> FAO, 2007; Hammer et al, 2003; IPCC, 2007; UNISDR, 2009; McCarl, 2007; Taggarwal et al, 2006; UNFCCC, 2006; World Bank, 2009.
- <sup>10</sup> FAO, 2007; Campbell et al, 2008; CCCD, 2009; IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 2009.
- <sup>11</sup> FAO, 2007, IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 2009.
- <sup>12</sup> Butler and Oluoch-Kosura, 2006; Butt et al, 2005; CCCD, 2009; Davis, 2004; FAO, 2006; FAO, 2007; FAO, 2008a; Howden et al, 2007; McCarl, 2007; Romano, 2003; World Bank, 2009.
- <sup>13</sup> CCCD, 2009; FAO, 2007; IPCC, 2007; UNISDR, 2009; World Bank, 2009.
- <sup>14</sup> Batima et al. 2005; FAO, 2007; Rosenzweig and Tubiello, 2007.
- <sup>15</sup> Adger et al, 2005; Kay and Adler, 2005; Kesavan and Swaminathan, 2006.
- <sup>16</sup> Adger et al, 2005; FAO, 2008b ; Kesavan and Swaminathan, 2006; Klein et al, 2001; Nicholls, 2007; UNFCCC, 2006a.
- <sup>17</sup> FAO, 2007; FAO 2008b; IPCC, 2007; Rahel and Olden, 2008; UNFCCC, 2006.
- <sup>18</sup> Adger et al, 2005; Dolan and Walker, 2003; FAO, 2008b; Nicholls, 2007b; Thorne et al, 2006; UNFCCC, 2006b; World Bank, 2010.
- <sup>19</sup> FAO, 2008b; Kesavan and Swaminathan, 2006; Rahel and Olden, 2008.
- <sup>20</sup> FAO, 2007; IIED, 2009.
- <sup>21</sup> FAO, 2007; Nicholls, 2007.
- <sup>22</sup> FAO, 2008b; UNFCCC, 2006a.
- <sup>23</sup> Branco et al, 2005; CCCD, 2009; Hedger and Cacourns, 2008; ICHARM, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Klijn et al., 2004; Mills, 2007; Olsen, 2006; Rahaman and Varis, 2005; World Bank, 2009; WSSD, 2002; WWAP, 2009.
- <sup>24</sup> Arnell and Delaney, 2006; Auld et al, 2004; CCCD, 2009; DaSilvia et al. 2004; Hedger and Cacouris, 2008; Mills, 2007; Muller, 2007; Thomalla et al., 2006; UNFCCC, 2006b; UNFCCC, 2009; WHO, 2003; World Water Council, 2009; WWAP, 2009.
- <sup>25</sup> CCCD, 2009; Crabbe and Robin, 2006; Hedger and Cacourns, 2008; IPCC 2007; Rahaman and Varis, 2005; WWAP, 2009.
- <sup>26</sup> Few et al, 2006; Kirshen, 2007; Mills, 2007; Rahaman and Varis, 2005; Warner et al, 2009; WWAP, 2009.
- <sup>27</sup> Auld, 2008; Auld, 2008a ; Hodgson and Carter, 1999; IPCC, 2007; Lowe, 2003; Mills, 2007; NRTEE, 2009; ProVention, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2007; Rosetto, 2007; Wamsler, 2004; World Bank, 2000; World Bank, 2008; World Water Council, 2009.
- <sup>28</sup> Auld, 2008; Auld, 2008a ; Auld, 2008b; Lewis and Chisholm, 1996; Mills, 2007; Neumann, 2009; ProVention, 2009; Rosetto, 2007; UNFCCC, 2006.
- <sup>29</sup> Auld, 2008a ; IPCC, 2007; Islam and Ferdousi, 2007; Kagiannas et al, 2003; Marechal, 2007; Mills, 2007; Neumann, 2009; Robledo et al, 2005; UNDP/WHO, 2009; VanBuskirk, 2006; Warner et al, 2009; Younger et al, 2008.
- <sup>30</sup> Auld, 2008a; Freeman and Warner, 2001; Mills, 2007; Neumann, 2009; NRTEE, 2009; ProVention, 2009; Stevens, 2008; Younger et al, 2008.
- <sup>31</sup> Auld et al, 2004; Auld, 2008a; CCCD, 2009; Curriero et al, 2001; DaSilvia et al, 2004; Ebi et al, 2006b; Haines et al, 2006; Patz et al, 2000; Patz et al, 2005; UNFCCC, 2006; WHO, 2003; WHO, 2005; WHO, 2008; World Bank, 2003..
- <sup>32</sup> CCCD, 2009; Ebi et al, 2006b; Ebi, 2008; Haines et al, 2006; Patz et al, 2005; Younger et al, 2008; UNFCCC, 2006a; WHO, 2003; WHO, 2005.
- <sup>33</sup> Mills, 2005; Mills, 2006.
- <sup>34</sup> Haines et al, 2006; Younger et al, 2008.

Table 6-2: Government liabilities and disaster risk.

<b>Liabilities</b>	<b>Direct:</b> obligation in any event	<b>Contingent:</b> obligation if a particular event occurs
<b>Explicit:</b> Government liability recognized by law or contract	Foreign and domestic sovereign borrowing, expenditures by budget law and budget expenditures	States guarantees for non-sovereign borrowing and public and private sector entities, reconstruction of public infrastructure
<b>Implicit:</b> A ‘moral’ obligation of the government	Future recurrent costs of public investment projects, pensions and health care expenditure	Default of sub-national government as public or private entities provide disaster relief.

Source: Modified after Schick and Polackova Brix, 2004

Table 6-3. Information requirements for selected disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation activities.

<b>Activities</b>	<b>Information needs</b>
<b><i>Cross-cutting</i></b>	
Climate change modelling	Time series information on climate variables, air and sea surface temperatures and circulation patterns, green house gas levels, rainfall and precipitation measures.
Hazard zoning and “hot spot” mapping	Inventories of landslide, flood, drought, cyclone occurrence and impacts at district level; human development indicators
Relief payments	Dense network of rain gauges to calculate meteorological drought indices; household surveys of resource access
Seasonal outlooks for preparedness planning	Seasonal climate forecast model; sea surface temperatures; remotely sensed and <i>in situ</i> measurements of snow cover/depth, soil moisture, vegetation growth; teleconnection indices; monthly rainfall-runoff; crop yields; epidemiology
A system of risk indicators: reflecting macro and financial health of nation, social and environmental risks, human vulnerability conditions; and strength of governance (Cardona et al. 2010)	Macroeconomic and financial impacts (DDI) Measures of social and environmental risks (LDI) Measures of vulnerability conditions reflected in exposure in disaster-prone areas, socioeconomic fragility and a lack of social resilience in general. Measures of organisational, development and institutional strengths (RMI)
<b><i>Flood risk management</i></b>	
Early warning systems for fluvial, glacial and tidal hazards	Real-time meteorology and water-level telemetry; rainfall and tidal surge forecasts; remotely sensed snow, ice and lake areas; rainfall-runoff model
Structural and non-structural flood controls	Inventories of pumps, drainage and defence works; land use maps for hazard zoning; post disaster plan; climate change allowances for structures; floodplain elevations
Artificial draining of pro-glacial lakes	Satellite surveys of lake areas and glacier velocities; inventories of lake properties and infrastructure at risk; local hydro-meteorology
<b><i>Drought management</i></b>	
Traditional rain and groundwater harvesting, and storage systems	Inventories of system properties including condition, reliable yield, economics, ownership; soil and geological maps of areas suitable for enhanced groundwater recharge; water quality monitoring; evidence of deep-well impacts
Long-range reservoir inflow forecasts	Seasonal climate forecast model; sea surface temperatures; remotely sensed snow cover; in situ snow depths; teleconnection indices; multi-decadal rainfall-runoff series
Water demand management and efficiency measures	Integrated climate and river basin water monitoring; data on existing systems’ water use efficiency; metering and survey effectiveness of demand management

Source: Adapted from Wilby (2009)

Table 6-4: Typology of response.

States where there is an existing or emerging social contract with its citizens, by which the state undertakes to assist and protect them in the face of disasters, and there is a limited role for international agencies, focusing on advocacy and fundraising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• China post-Sichuan earthquake</li> <li>• Chile post-2010 earthquake</li> <li>• USA post-Hurricane Katrina</li> <li>• Australia during 2010 floods</li> </ul>
States that have a growing capacity to respond and request international agencies to supplement their effort in specific locally owned ways, through filling gaps in national capacities or resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indonesia post-Earthquake</li> <li>• India post-Bihar floods</li> <li>• Mozambique post-2008 floods</li> </ul>
States that have limited capacity and resources to meet their responsibilities to assist and protect their citizens in the face of disasters, and which request international assistance to cope with the magnitude of a disaster, resulting in a fully-fledged international response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Haiti post-2010 earthquake</li> <li>• Bangladesh post Cyclone Sidr</li> <li>• Uganda post-2009 floods</li> <li>• Kenya 2009 drought</li> </ul>
States that lack the will to negotiate a resilient social contract, including assisting and protecting their citizens in times of disaster. These pose significant challenges, and pose the greatest challenge; and involve a combination of direct delivery and advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Myanmar post-Cyclone Nargis</li> <li>• DRC post-Goma volcano</li> <li>• Zimbabwe</li> </ul>

Table 6-5: Disaster management actions across the disaster timeline.

	<b>Pre-disaster</b>	<b>Immediate post-disaster</b>	<b>Recovery</b>
Disaster Management Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Warning and evacuation</li> <li>• Pre-positioning of resources and supplies</li> <li>• Last minute mitigation and preparedness measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Search and rescue</li> <li>• Emergency medical treatment</li> <li>• Damage and Needs Assessment</li> <li>• Provision of services – water, food, health, shelter, sanitation, social services, security</li> <li>• Resumption of critical infrastructure</li> <li>• Coordination of response</li> <li>• Donation management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transitional shelter in form of temporary housing or long-term shelter</li> <li>• Demolition of critically damaged structures</li> <li>• Repair of less seriously damaged structures</li> <li>• Clearance, removal and disposal of debris</li> <li>• Rehabilitation of infrastructure</li> <li>• New construction</li> <li>• Social rehabilitation</li> <li>• ‘Building back better’ to reduce future risk</li> <li>• Employment schemes</li> <li>• Reimbursement for losses</li> <li>• Reassessment of risks</li> </ul>

Adapted from Coppola, 2007 and ALNAP 2010a

Table 6-6: Some examples of methods/ tools/ practices for assessing risks, reducing climate-related disaster risks and transferring and sharing risks.

Methods/Tools/Practices	Examples
Mainstreaming climate change considerations in development and disaster risk management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation across project/community; ii) sector regulation and compliance; and or iii) policy and planning level (short- and mid-term policy making and planning at sub-national level and national strategic development planning in Cook Islands and Federated States of Micronesia {ADB, 2005 #2669}.</li> <li>Swiss Development Cooperation's four year project in Muminabad, Tajikistan adopted an integrated approach to risk through reforestation and integrated watershed management (SDC, 2008). (see also chapter 8)</li> </ul>
<b>“Hard Options”</b>	
Structural and non-structural flood controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early warning and flood control systems for Mozambique (chapter-9)</li> </ul>
Artificial draining of pro-glacial lakes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Tsho Rolpa glacial lake project in Nepal (Sperling and Szekely, 2005 (chapter-9)</li> </ul>
Protection of natural ecosystems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Forests, used in the Alps as effective mitigation measures against avalanches, rockfalls and landslides since the 1900s(Bebi, 2009; Dorren, 2004; Phillips and Marden, 2005; Sidle et al., 1985</li> </ul>
Building code	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Permafrost standard for Arctic regions of Canada</li> <li>Simple modifications to improve the cyclone-resistance of (non-masonry) kutchas or temporary houses in Bangladesh</li> </ul> <p>(Lewis and Chisholm, 1996; Rossetto, 2007</p>
Coastal defence practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Artificial breakwaters in Maldives (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009)</li> </ul>
Traditional rain and groundwater harvesting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Marshall Islands, Bangladesh, Japan</li> </ul>
<b>“Soft Options”</b>	
Ecosystem based adaptation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planting Mangroves in Viet Nam for coastal protection (Reid and Huq, 2005)</li> <li>Application of holistic River Basin Management Plans and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (EC, 2009; DEFRA, 2005; Wood et al. 2008).</li> <li>Brazil, under Amazon Protected Areas Program, Brazil has created over 30 million ha mosaic of biodiversity-rich forests reserve of state, provincial, private, and indigenous land, resulting in potential reduction in emissions estimated at 1.8 billion tons of carbon through avoided deforestation {World Bank, 2009}.</li> </ul>
Risk sharing and transfer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Index-based reinsurance in Ethiopia for protection for its drought exposure under the World Food Program (chapter-9)</li> <li>Supporting Index-based microinsurance in Bolivia</li> <li>Insuring public relief expenditure in Mexico and the Caribbean region (Cardenas et al, 2007; Ghesquiere, et al 2006</li> </ul>
<b>Information and Communication</b>	
Early warning and communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cyclone warning system in Bangladesh (Paul 2009)</li> <li>Early warning systems based on medium-range and seasonal forecasts across Europe and West Africa (Bartholmes et al. 2008; Tall et al. 2010)</li> </ul>
Disaster Deficit Index (DDI) using integrated science, economics, social processes and traditional knowledge and expert knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring disaster risk and vulnerability in 19 Latin American countries (Cardona, et al 2010)</li> </ul>