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6 Chapter 9 has been allocated a total of 68 pages in the SRREN. The actual chapter length  
7 (excluding references & cover page) is 96 pages, a total of 28 pages over target. Government and  
8 expert reviewers are kindly asked to indicate where the chapter could be shortened in terms of  
9 text and/or figures and tables.

10

11 All monetary values provided in this document will need to be adjusted for inflation/deflation  
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# Chapter 9: Renewable Energy in the Context of Sustainable Development

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## 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2 Given the heavy reliance of modern societies on fossil fuels, any proposed transformation  
3 pathway must be carefully analyzed for feasibility. Both the technological and the economic  
4 analyses of renewable energy (RE) in other chapters of this report need to be embedded in the  
5 broader context of sustainable development and Chapter 9 extends to include the latter in its  
6 assessments. Since the exact nature of sustainable development (SD) is subject to a plethora of  
7 definitions and perspectives, the chapter attempts to organize the available literature in a  
8 consistent way by choosing four broad criteria. By drawing on different quantitative and  
9 qualitative methodologies, this literature suggests that socio-economic benefits are usually  
10 higher and environmental impacts lower with an increased use of renewables, but there are  
11 important exceptions to consider. An initial assessment of indicative information available from  
12 current IAMs generates important insights about the potentially important future role of RE for  
13 SD but also discloses some shortcomings and highlights the need for the inclusion of additional  
14 boundaries (e.g. environmental) and more complex energy system models that can represent  
15 specific local conditions and variability. Discussing barriers to and opportunities of RE in the  
16 context of SD, it is shown how well integrated RE policies and deployment can contribute to  
17 positive and multi-dimensional progress for sustainable development.

18 **Linking RE and SD practices requires both an integration of aspects and impacts from**  
19 **different energy technologies, considering also the possibility of non-substitutability**  
20 **between natural and man-made capital.** The many different concepts of SD emphasize the  
21 distinction between the weak (substitutability between natural and man-made capital) and strong  
22 (non-substitutability, either for production purposes or for the intrinsic value of natural capital)  
23 sustainability paradigms, as well as how REs relate to these paradigms. REs, as a fossil fuel  
24 replacement strategy, can be linked to weak sustainability, but may have their own social,  
25 economic and environmental impacts that this chapter is asked to assess. However, attempts to  
26 amalgamate various types of indicators into one overall score have shown uncertainties so high  
27 that they preclude decision-making. This chapter therefore structures the available literature  
28 around four broad criteria to define SD with respect to RE: sustainable social and economic  
29 development, increased energy access, enhanced energy security and reduced environmental  
30 impacts. Drawing on different methodologies – based on existing literature – the chapter assesses  
31 the performance of RE with respect to these criteria according to SD indicators that are  
32 introduced (9.2).

33 **Countries at different levels of development have different incentives to advance RE.**  
34 Despite the goal of developing and transition economies to limit their energy use by adopting  
35 modern and highly efficient (energy) technologies (and thus ‘leapfrog’ resource-intensive  
36 development stages), the more immediate incentives to advance RE deployment often include,  
37 providing affordable and reliable access to energy for the poorest (particularly women), creating  
38 employment opportunities and reducing costs of energy imports. Even if the hypothesis for  
39 industrialized countries holds that economic growth can continue without increasing energy  
40 consumption, economies based on fossil fuels face a number of serious sustainability concerns,  
41 including environmental impacts and energy security issues. Their incentive to advance RE thus  
42 includes reducing GHG emissions to mitigate climate change, enhancing energy security and  
43 actively promoting structural change in the economy (9.3.1-9.3.3).

1 **Environmental impacts are usually lower with the use of renewables, but there are**  
2 **important exceptions to consider.** Despite its limitations life cycle assessment (LCA) is an  
3 important tool for comparison of technologies: For electricity generation, a LCA literature  
4 review suggests that GHG emissions per unit of electrical output from renewables are in general  
5 considerably less than those from non-renewable resources. For transportation fuels, studies  
6 suggest that both existing and next-generation biofuels have lower GHG emissions compared to  
7 fossil fuels, although with wide ranges (9.3.4.1). Impacts on *water* occur in terms of quantity and  
8 quality: While non-thermal RE technologies use relatively little water, thermo-electric power  
9 generation, renewable or not, consumes significant amounts of water. Water is also required for  
10 bioenergy, with impacts highly dependent on the crop, site and production methods utilized.  
11 *Water Pollution* is an important issue for comparison, considering both normal operations and  
12 accidents in different stages of their life cycle (9.3.4.2). *Local air pollutants* have impacts that  
13 depend on factors like concentrations, toxicity and pathways of substances. Most RETs and  
14 nuclear power have only minor upstream emissions. All RETs (except biomass in some cases)  
15 have advantages over combustion-based technologies concerning air pollution (9.3.4.3). *Indoor*  
16 *air pollution*, mainly due to the use of fuelwood and other traditional solid fuels in primitive  
17 systems, is a major health problem at global scale that needs improved technologies. Other  
18 impacts are related to *nuisances* (e.g. noise) and to *toxic releases* (e.g. spills) (9.3.4.4). *Land use*  
19 *changes*, direct and indirect, may have significant adverse impacts mainly from unsustainable  
20 bioenergy deployment, although the indirect LUCs are complex and therefore very difficult to  
21 quantify. Land use has connected *impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity* (9.3.4.4/5). RETs  
22 exhibit distinctly lower fatality rates than fossil chains; comparable to hydro and nuclear in  
23 highly developed countries. Damages caused by severe accidents in the energy sector are  
24 significant, although mostly still small in comparison to large natural disasters or the expected  
25 consequences of climate change and air pollution (9.3.4.7).

26 **The scenario literature that describes global pathways for RE deployment considering**  
27 **climate targets (e.g. IAMs) has only begun to incorporate SD aspects into the models and**  
28 **thus offer limited results.** This is because IAMs were originally designed to assess energy  
29 portfolios of fairly large world regions and emissions trajectories implied by changes in those  
30 energy portfolios over time. Even though there has been some progress recently in the models,  
31 the IAMs provide little insights about distributional issues within regions or countries which  
32 would be crucial for the assessment of SD impacts, such as rural-urban differences. For example,  
33 models thus do not give a clear answer whether or not renewable energies might play a central  
34 role for the electrification of poor or of rural areas with respect to off-grid facilities (9.4.2). Some  
35 conclusions can still be drawn from IAMs with respect to SD aspects: Constraining the  
36 implementation of renewable energy increases mitigation costs considerably, thus leading to  
37 lower GDP levels in the future and to difficulties at achieving low stabilization targets (9.4.1).  
38 IAMs also suggest that RE help to diversify the energy supply sources despite the fact that the  
39 most flexible fossil fuels (e.g. oil) will be difficult to substitute independent of the climate target  
40 mainly due to the inflexible transport sector (without electrification). The future role of biomass  
41 in the transportation sector is also determined by the availability of CCS, which in combination  
42 with biomass can produce negative emissions in other sectors that might generally ease the  
43 transformation costs (9.4.3). Concerning environmental impacts, IAMs might well be suited to  
44 include some of the most important indicators in addition to GHG emissions (e.g. local air  
45 pollution, water use etc.), but available literature is scarce. Apart from the land use constraints on  
46 bioenergy deployment due to terrestrial carbon and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions, no renewable energy

1 implications can yet be clearly spelled out (9.4.4). To derive more valid conclusions about the  
2 interaction of renewable energy deployment and sustainable development pathways in a global  
3 context, the scenario literature will have to take into account some of the research gaps that are  
4 elaborated on in this chapter. One area that is conceptually straightforward is to include results  
5 from LCA of material, energy and water consumption for various technologies to reach a better  
6 insight regarding their longer-term environmental impacts (9.6).


7 **Anticipating and overcoming potential barriers to RE through clear and integrated policy**  
8 **implementation and planning processes allow for sustainable RE deployment taking**  
9 **environmental, social and economic effects explicitly into account and arriving at multi-**  
10 **benefit results.** In the context of SD, barriers include environmental concerns and social  
11 acceptance, information and awareness barriers, as well as economic barriers. Integrating RE  
12 policy into national SD strategies (explicitly recognized at the 2002 World Summit on  
13 Sustainable Development) provides a framework for countries to select effective SD/RE  
14 strategies and to align those with international policy measures. To that end (and to realize  
15 potential leapfrogging opportunities) national SD strategies should include (i) removal of  
16 existing financial mechanisms that work against sustainable development; (ii) adaption of  
17 existing market mechanisms and (iii) introduction of new financial mechanisms that internalize  
18 environmental or social externalities in order to provide a level playing field for the different  
19 mitigation options. Since shifting to sustainable energy requires replacing a complex and  
20 entrenched energy system, as well political will and strong, sustained policies, the private  
21 sector's guidance and good practice documents may help to achieve sustainable RE deployment  
22 – taking into account local level requirements (9.5).

23 **We can conclude that our knowledge regarding the interrelations between sustainable**  
24 **development and renewable energy in particular is still very limited and does not fully**  
25 **account for the complexity of the issue.** One of the key points that emerges from the literature  
26 is that the evaluation of energy system impacts (beyond greenhouse gas emissions), climate  
27 mitigation scenarios and sustainable development goals have for the most part proceeded in  
28 parallel without much interaction. Effective, economically efficient and socially acceptable  
29 transformations of the energy system will require a much closer integration of insights from all  
30 three of these research areas. However, it is important to note that all energy technologies,  
31 especially when deployed at scale, will create environmental impacts, determined in large  
32 measure by the design and integration into local contexts. This is particularly applicable with  
33 respect to very localised impacts such as on biodiversity. Hence, integrated assessments at the  
34 global and generic level can not take the place of local evaluations and considerations and the  
35 evaluation of trade-offs. (9.6, 9.7)

## 1 9.1 Introduction

2 This Chapter provides an overview of the role that renewable energy can play in advancing the  
3 overarching goal of sustainable development (SD). Whereas Chapter 1 of the SRREN introduced  
4 renewable energy and made the link to climate change mitigation, Chapters 2 through 7 assess  
5 the potential and impacts of specific renewable energy technologies in isolation. Chapter 8  
6 focuses on the integration of renewables into the current energy system, and Chapters 10 and 11  
7 will discuss the economic costs and benefits of renewable energy and climate mitigation, and of  
8 renewable energy policies, respectively. As an integrative chapter, the present chapter assesses  
9 the role of RE from a SD perspective by comparing and reporting the SD impacts of different  
10 energy technologies, by drawing on still limited insights from the scenario literature with respect  
11 to SD goals, and by discussing barriers to and opportunities of RE deployment that are related to  
12 SD. Figure 9.1.1 illustrates the links of Chapter 9 to other chapters in the SRREN.

13 **Figure 9.1.1** Framework of Chapter 9 and Linkages to other chapters of the SRREN.



29 Energy technologies, economic costs and benefits, and energy policies, as described in other  
30 chapters of this report, depend on the societies and natural environment within which they are  
31 embedded. In the context of climate change mitigation, it is clear that renewable energy will play  
32 a central role, but climate mitigation strategies must also be technically feasible and  
33 economically efficient so that any cost burdens are minimized. Knowledge about technological  
34 capabilities and models for optimal mitigation pathways are therefore important. However,  
35 sustainable development of a future energy system encompasses several additional concepts that  
36 are not typically included in, for example, life-cycle assessments (LCA) or integrated assessment  
37 models (IAMs). Thus, one key point of Chapter 9 is to point to the need for additional metrics for  
38 sustainable development that go beyond the purely technical-economic indicators that are used in  
39 the other chapters of this report.

40 As a consequence, this chapter provides an overview of the scientific literature on sustainable  
41 development (SD) goals and the additional boundary conditions these goals place on renewable,  
42 fossil and nuclear energy technologies. Sustainable development aspects which need to be  
43 included in future assessments to arrive at an integrated overall picture are outlined in a  
44 quantitative as well as in a qualitative and more narrative manner. However, for a comprehensive  
45 assessment of all mitigation options these criteria have to be integrated within scenarios of the

1 future and, to the extent possible, quantitative models. As such, Chapter 9 could provide  
2 guidelines for the discussion of scenario results in Chapter 10, and guide researchers toward the  
3 important criteria that are beginning to be included in IAM analyses. A starting point in this  
4 direction is the realization that IAMs do not generally consider the results of full LCAs in their  
5 scenarios.

6 The following paragraphs describe the assessments carried out in the individual sub-sections of  
7 the chapter. In Section 9.2, different concepts of sustainable development and how they relate to  
8 the use of renewable energy are described. Emphasis is given to the distinction between the weak  
9 and strong sustainability paradigms, and their link to the three pillar approach of environmental,  
10 social and economic development, is addressed. To provide a conceptual framework for the  
11 discussion of renewable energy in the context of sustainable development and to organize the  
12 literature throughout the chapter, four criteria are introduced: sustainable social and economic  
13 development, increased energy access, enhanced energy security, and reduced environmental  
14 impacts. A set of indicators are presented briefly that will be used in the following sections to  
15 assess the contribution of RE to these criteria in a quantitative manner.

16 In Sections 9.3.1 - 9.3.3 actual indicator data that apply and quantify the conceptual socio-  
17 economic criteria of 9.2 and that describe the relationship between growth, development and  
18 energy use in general and RE in particular are presented and discussed in detail. Section 9.3.1  
19 analyzes these interactions using conventional economic growth metrics as well as the broader  
20 concept of the Human Development Index, and then expands on the particular motivation of  
21 countries in different development stages to use RE. Sections 9.3.2 and 9.3.3 analyze the  
22 meaning of energy access for development and the diverse components of energy supply  
23 security, and conclude by evaluating the contribution of RE to all these specific aspects.

24 Section 9.3.4 discusses the environmental impacts of RE technologies and makes comparisons to  
25 currently dominant energy technologies. Impacts are assessed through the use of LCA methods,  
26 focusing on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, water use and pollution, local and regional air  
27 pollution, and land use and land use change. In addition, health impacts are explicitly considered  
28 and a section with a comparative assessment of accident risks is included. Additional impacts  
29 such as soil contamination, biodiversity and ecosystem losses are addressed in a more qualitative  
30 manner.

31 Whereas the discussion in Section 9.3 concentrates on current conditions, Section 9.4 focuses on  
32 the interactions of future renewable energy deployment and sustainable development pathways.  
33 Pathways are primarily understood as scenario results that attempt to address the complex  
34 interrelations among the different energy technologies on a global scale. Therefore the chapter  
35 mainly refers to global scenarios derived from integrated assessment models (IAMs)), that are  
36 also at the core of the analysis in Chapter 10. Section 9.4 gives an overview of the insights those  
37 models can provide regarding the interaction of future renewable energy deployment and  
38 different sustainable development indicators. As the models have only begun to explicitly take  
39 sustainable development into account, the section predominantly aims at identifying gaps in the  
40 current scenario literature. It also discusses whether and how models can be modified in order to  
41 address sustainability pathways, as well as the role of renewables in this context.

42 Section 9.5 aims to analyzes barriers to and opportunities of RE in the context of sustainable  
43 development. Barriers addressed include environmental concerns and social acceptance, lack of  
44 capacity building, cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of the technology, as well as



1 distributional aspects with respect to shared benefits. For RE to contribute to the overarching  
2 goal of sustainable development, it is important to address such barriers in an integrative manner.  
3 Hence, environmental, social and economic constraints and concerns need to be clearly  
4 considered during the planning, construction and operational phases of RE projects. A section on  
5 opportunities describes what measures should be taken, on both the national and international as  
6 well as local level, to ensure that all possible SD benefits from RE deployment can be realised.  
7 To conclude the chapter, Section 9.6 synthesizes the material in the earlier sections and distils  
8 the information to arrive at knowledge gaps that are then presented in more detail in Section 9.7.  
9

## 10 **9.2 Interactions between sustainable development and renewable energy**

11 The concept of sustainable development (SD) is – in varying forms – deeply rooted in human  
12 history, addressing concerns about relationships between human society and nature. Sustainable  
13 development was relaunched into the political, public and academic discourse in 1972 with the  
14 Founex report and in 1987 with the publication of the World Commission on Environment and  
15 Development (WCED) report “Our Common Future” – also known as the ‘Brundtland Report’.

16 Sustainable development was tightly coupled with climate change (and thence the IPCC) at the  
17 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro,  
18 Brazil in 1992 that sought to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels  
19 considered to be safe. The IPCC’s First Assessment Report focused on the technology and cost-  
20 effectiveness of mitigation activities. The Second Assessment Report (SAR) included equity  
21 concerns in addition to social considerations (Bruce et al. 1996). The Third Assessment Report  
22 (TAR) addressed global sustainability comprehensively (Metz et al. 2001) and the Fourth  
23 Assessment (AR4) included chapters on SD in both WG II and III reports with a focus on a  
24 review of both climate-first and development-first literature (Parry et al. 2007)(Metz et al. 2007).

25 In the context of this Special Report, the Section 9.2 will outline different SD concepts and their  
26 implication for the assessment of RE. Furthermore, it will introduce a set of SD criteria and  
27 related SD indicators that will allow to structure the assessment of RE around the existing  
28 literature.

### 29 **9.2.1 The concept of sustainable development**

30 Many competing frameworks for sustainable development have been put forward (Pezzey 1992)  
31 (Hopwood et al., 2005). For working purposes, we start with Brundtland and define sustainable  
32 development as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future  
33 generations to meet their own needs (Bojo, Maler, and Unemo, 1992; World Commission on  
34 Environment and Development. 1987) Concepts of sustainable development can be oriented  
35 along a continuum between the two paradigms of weak sustainability and strong sustainability.  
36 The two paradigms differ in assumptions about the substitutability of natural and human-made  
37 capital (Pearce, Kirk Hamilton, and Atkinson 2008)(Neumayer 2003)(Hartwick 1977).

38 Weak sustainability has been labelled the substitutability paradigm (Neumayer 2003) and is  
39 based on the belief that only the aggregate stock of capital needs to be conserved - natural capital  
40 can be substituted with man-made capital without compromising future well-being. As such it  
41 can be interpreted as an extension of neoclassical welfare economics (Solow 1974)(Hartwick  
42 1977). For example, one can argue that non-renewable resources, such as fossil fuels, can be

1 substituted, e.g. by renewable resources and technological progress as induced by market prices  
2 (Neumayer 2003). Weak sustainability also implies that environmental degradation can be  
3 compensated with man-made capital such as more machinery, transport infrastructure, education  
4 and information technology.

5 Whereas weak sustainability mostly assumes that the economic system flexibly adapts to varying  
6 availability of forms of capital, strong sustainability starts from an ecological perspective with  
7 the intent of proposing guardrails for socio-economic pathways. Strong sustainability can be  
8 viewed as the non-substitutability paradigm (Pearce, Kirk Hamilton, and Atkinson 2008)  
9 (Neumayer 2003), based on the belief that natural capital cannot be substituted, either for  
10 production purposes or for environmental provision of regulating, supporting and cultural  
11 services (Norgaard 1994). As an example, sinks such as the atmosphere's capacity to absorb  
12 GHG emissions, may better be captured by strong sustainability constraints (Neumayer 2003;  
13 Metz et al. 2007). In one important interpretation, the physical stock of specific non-substitutable  
14 resources (so-called "critical natural capital") must be preserved (not allowing for substitution  
15 between different types of natural capital) (Ekins and et al. 2003). Guardrails for remaining  
16 within the bounds of sustainability are often justified or motivated by non-linearities,  
17 discontinuities, non-smoothness and non-convexities (Pearce, Kirk Hamilton, and Atkinson  
18 2008; Dasgupta 2004). As a typical correlate, natural scientists warn of and describe specific  
19 tipping points, critical thresholds at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively alter the state or  
20 development of earth systems (Lenton et al. 2008). In a related approach to sustainability, some  
21 environmental ethicists rely on the precautionary principle (according to which the burden of  
22 proof for the non-harmful character of natural capital reduction falls on those taking action) to  
23 argue for strong sustainability (Ott 2000).

24 Spatial and cultural variations are another important factor in coherently addressing sustainable  
25 development. Sustainability challenges and solutions crucially depend on geographic setting (e.g.  
26 solar radiation), socio-economic conditions (e.g. inducing energy demand), inequalities within  
27 and across societies, fragmented institutions, and existing infrastructure (e.g. electric grids)  
28 (National Research Council 1999)(Holling 1997), but also on a varying normative understanding  
29 of the connotation of sustainability (Lele and Norgaard 1996). Analysts, hence, call for a  
30 differentiation of analysis and solution strategies according to geographic locations and specific  
31 places (e.g., (Wilbanks 2002; Creutzig and Kammen 2009) and a pluralism of epistemological  
32 and normative perspectives of sustainability (e.g., Sneddon, Howarth, and Norgaard 2006).

33 Sustainability in the context of renewable energy can be evaluated in the light of the opposing  
34 paradigms of weak and strong sustainability. Non-renewable energy, such as fossil fuels and  
35 uranium, all reduce natural capital directly and sometimes indirectly (e.g., environmental impact  
36 of mining). Renewable energy technologies, in contrast, sustain natural capital as long as the  
37 resources they draw upon are not reducing potential for future harvest.

38 Renewable energy may be a substitute for fossil fuels (for example if electricity is the product),  
39 and as such comprise a solution to both weak and strong sustainability concerns. There are two  
40 qualifications:

41

42

- 1 • Renewable energy can also be a complement to the current energy mix and therefore not  
2 reduce harmful environmental impacts of existing non-renewable energy production.  
3 Hence, renewable energies can be regarded as a solution strategy to climate change (see  
4 also the Box on Sustainable development, renewable energy and climate change), if (and  
5 only if) fossil fuel consumption is simultaneously reduced.
- 6 • Renewable energies may have their own environmental impact and reduce natural capital,  
7 e.g. by upstream GHG emissions, destroying forests, binding land that cannot be used  
8 otherwise and consuming water – all of which can be evaluated again from weak and  
9 strong sustainability paradigms.

10 For some renewable energy technologies a strong sustainability perspective beyond  
11 considerations of climate change alone will be relevant to capture the full impact of specific  
12 technologies. In chapter 10 of this report, the future of renewable energy is evaluated within a  
13 scenarios framework. To complement this integrated, yet more basic approach of global energy  
14 models with climate change as primary constraint, this chapter will focus on non-climate  
15 indicators and criteria for sustainable energy systems. In addition to Section 9.4's focus on the  
16 treatment of SD indicators in these global energy models, Section 9.3.4 assesses life-cycle  
17 assessments (LCA) that represent one well-known bottom-up approach to quantifying some  
18 aspects of the sustainability and wider impacts of renewable (and other) technologies. Future  
19 research should combine these detailed life-cycle assessment of fuels and their corresponding  
20 infrastructures with global energy assessments to fulfill multiple targets and constraints such as  
21 equitable and regional specific energy access and global GHG emission restrictions.


22 Regardless of whether weak or strong sustainability is the relevant framework, it is clear that  
23 exhaustible resources can only be used within a finite time window. To manage the transition to  
24 a non-carbon economy, renewable energy sources must be deployed, and sufficient capital  
25 accumulated to enable future deployment of renewable energy (see chapter 10). The relevance of  
26 both sustainability paradigms in specific circumstances is not always precisely known. Hence,  
27 specific criteria and indicators are needed that connect the use of (renewable) energy to  
28 sustainability.

29 Traditionally, sustainability has been framed in the three-pillar model: Economy, Ecology, and  
30 Society are all considered to be interconnected and relevant for sustainability (BMU, 1998). The  
31 three-pillar model explicitly acknowledges the encompassing nature of the sustainability concept  
32 and allows a schematic categorization of sustainability issues. The United Nations General  
33 Assembly aims for action to promote the integration of three components of sustainable  
34 development – economic development, social development and environmental protection – as  
35 interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars (UN 2005). This view subscribes to an  
36 understanding where a certain set of action can fulfill all three development goals simultaneously  
37 – the three pillars are not mutually exclusive and can be mutually reinforcing. The three pillar  
38 model has been criticized for diluting a strong normative concept with vague categorization and  
39 replacing the need to protect natural capital with a methodological notion of transsectoral  
40 integration (Brand and Jochum 2000). The three pillars of sustainability, however, can also be  
41 nested, and subsumed under the concept of strong sustainability (Ott 2009).

42 Figure 9.2.1 shows schematically the relationship between the three pillars of sustainability and a  
43 set of cross-cutting goals for a sustainable renewable energy system. The figure emphasizes the  
44 fundamental limits imposed by environmental constraints; both society and the economy operate

1 within the bounds set by the environment. Starting with this schematic, renewable energy  
 2 technologies can be evaluated with respect to four criteria: sustainable social and economic  
 3 development, increased energy access, enhanced energy security, and decreased environmental  
 4 impacts (WDR 2010). The potential of the renewable energy system to increase access to  
 5 modern energy technologies can facilitate economic and social development. Energy access and  
 6 economic and social development measures relate to current well-being and to some extent to  
 7 intra-generational equity and sustainability, for example through an emphasis on energy-related  
 8 equity questions, including gender equity and empowerment. Energy security and assessments of  
 9 environmental impacts address more explicitly the intertemporal well-being aspect inherent in  
 10 sustainability. Assessments of environmental impacts of sustainability are most closely related to  
 11 the strong sustainability paradigm discussed above, whereas the focus of energy access and  
 12 energy security concerns can be considered under the weak sustainability paradigm.

13



14

15 **Figure 9.2.1** Embedded dimensions of sustainability. The size of the economy symbolizes the  
 16 magnitude of material throughput. The arrows illustrate schematically the linkages across  
 17 dimensions represented by the evaluative criteria used in this chapter.

18 In the next subsection, a set of tentative indicators for evaluating renewable energy technologies  
 19 in sustainable development is introduced. The aim of the remainder of this chapter is not to  
 20 develop new sustainability indicators, but to follow a pragmatic approach of empirical  
 21 assessment, structured to suitably organize existing literature.

22

23

## Box - Sustainable Development, Renewable Energy and Climate Change

One clear negative consequence of the historical combustion of fossil fuels has been the increase of greenhouse gases, chiefly carbon dioxide, to levels unprecedented in human history. (Metz et al. 2007). A “business as usual” scenario of continuing on the current emissions trajectory could lead to global average temperature increases as high as 6°C by 2100 (Metz et al. 2007). Although land-use change also plays an important role in increasing net carbon flux to the atmosphere, yearly emissions from fossil-fuel combustion have been steadily increasing for more than a century and are currently five to six times greater than the contribution from land-use change. (McGranahan et al; Houghton, et al.). Geographically, countries responsible for the majority of fossil-fuel emissions are those in the industrialized world, with a 25% population share, and over 50% of current emissions (BP, WRI) and a much larger share of cumulative emissions over the course of the past century.

Since the IPCC AR4 report there has been an increasing realization that it may be necessary to use temperature guardrails as goals for climate policy. One proposal for quantifying “allowable” future emissions is that of a carbon budget (Meinshausen et al. 2009) Total cumulative carbon dioxide emissions since the beginning of industrialization play the key role in determining final temperatures of the global climate system. As one example, to avoid with a probability of 50% breaking through a 2°C temperature guardrail, a total of approximately 1000 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> can be emitted from 2010 to 2050. This carbon budget represents a significant reduction in yearly emissions worldwide, and should developing countries be privileged in the distribution of shares of the carbon budget, correspondingly greater reductions will be required of developed countries. Cumulative carbon emissions constitute a crucial and widely recognized guardrail in the strong sustainability sense. Renewable energies are commonly understood as substitutes of fossil energy sources that allow maintaining energy consumption while staying within a total carbon emission budget.

On the other side of the geographical distribution, higher GHG concentrations and temperatures will be accompanied by rising sea levels and ocean acidification on a global scale. Perhaps more important are the projections for both climate change impacts and extreme weather events. Although there is still significant uncertainty as to the exact magnitude of negative climate impacts in a given region (Parry et al. 2007), some general conclusions are clear. Roughly 10% of the world’s population lives in low-elevation coastal zones (LECZ), defined as areas with elevation less than 10 meters and contiguous with the coastline (McGranahan et al. 2007). Using another measure, 40% of the world population lives within 100km of a coastline, thereby placing this fraction within an area of “coastal pressure” as defined for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. In the face of rising sea-levels, this fraction of world population is vulnerable and likely to be impacted by not only long-term sea-level rise, but also by extreme events such as tropical storms and flooding. Of those living in a LECZ, over 85% are in developing countries (McGranahan) and therefore likely to be especially at risk. Furthermore, the strength of larger tropical storms is also projected to increase in a warming climate (Knutson 2010), compounding the risk to these populations.

Overall there is large variability in the capacity for societies to respond to a changing climate. Although all countries will be affected to some extent, even moderate climate change can be a challenge for developing countries (Yohe et al. 2006).

## 9.2.2 Indicators for Sustainable Development and Renewable Energy

Sustainable development indicators for renewable energy should present a balanced set of measures that will allow sustainable development to be assessed. Energy indicators can assist countries in monitoring progress made in energy subsystems consistent with sustainability principles, although there are many different ways to classify indicators of sustainable development (Sathaye et al., 2007). Vera and Langlois (Vera and Langlois, 2007) provide an overview of progress made over the past two decades toward developing a uniform set of Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development (EISD). A subset of the tentative set of thirty indicators discussed by Vera and Langlois will be used in this chapter; these indicators are organized within the broad themes of the three pillars of sustainable development, economy, society and environment.

Sustainability indicators for renewable energy technologies rely on a similar list noted above for energy technologies. A recent study evaluated a range of SD indicators using data obtained from the literature (Evans et al. 2009). The indicators used were price of generated electricity, greenhouse gas emissions during full life cycle of the technology, availability of renewable sources, efficiency of energy conversion, land requirements, water consumption and social impacts. The social impacts were assessed qualitatively. Another approach is to develop a figure of merit (FOM) to compare the different RE systems based upon their performance, net energy requirement, greenhouse gas emissions, and other indicators. FOM combines the ranking of each technology with respect to selected indicators and provides a common platform to compare the various energy or RE systems. Varun and Bhat (2009) use this approach to compare selected RE technologies globally. Measurement and reporting of indicators is an important aspect of the implementation of sound renewable energy technologies. Measurement not only gauges but also spurs the implementation of sustainable development and can have a pervasive effect on decision-making (Meadows, 1998; Bossel, 1999), requiring updated methodologies (Creutzig and Kammen 2009). However, measuring energy sustainability is surrounded by a wide range of conceptual and technical issues (Wilbanks, 2010).

This section uses the four goals of energy policies, as outlined in Figure 9.2.1, as broad criteria to define sustainable development with respect to renewable energies. For each of these qualitative criteria, quantitative indicators can be used to evaluate scenarios for future energy-system development within the context of sustainable development. The indicators chosen reflect a suitable framework to assess the existing literature, but cannot close the considerable gaps in achieving a comprehensive and consistent measure of sustainable development.

### **Sustainable social and economic development**

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or per capita GDP have been used as proxies for economic development for several decades (such as in IAMs, see Section 9.4.1). In expanding the notion of economic development, a variety of indicators of sustainability, and sustainable development, have been suggested. Consistent with the principle of weak sustainability, green net national product (NNP) and genuine savings have been proposed (Hamilton 1994; Dasgupta 2001). Other aggregate indicators of weak sustainability include the index of sustainable economic welfare (ISEW) and the genuine progress indicator (GPI) (e.g., (Daly 2007) which were proposed as intermediate steps by proponents of strong sustainability. Indicators more consistent with strong sustainability, such as carrying capacity, ecological footprint and resilience have also been put forward (Pearce, Kirk Hamilton, and Atkinson 2008). More strict measures have also been

1 proposed as ‘sustainable national income’, and as ‘sustainability gaps’ (Hueting 1980; Ekins and  
2 Simon 1999).

3 Sustainability indicators should in principle be intertemporal, in contrast to commonly-used  
4 indicators of human well-being, such as GDP – measuring economic growth – or HDI – the  
5 Human Development Index. Measures that extend GDP (e.g. ISEW and GPI) tend to deviate  
6 qualitatively from the GDP since the 1970s or 1980s (stagnating, or in case of UK decreasing) in  
7 many OECD countries (Lawn 2003). Another indicator of weak sustainability, genuine savings,  
8 has been systematically related to natural resource exploitation by the World Bank (Kirk  
9 Hamilton and Clemens 1999).

10 In addition, many or all of the proposed sustainability indicators are difficult to measure.  
11 Resulting values are indexed with high uncertainty and are often challenged on methodological  
12 and epistemological grounds (Neumayer 2003). Crucially, sustainability is an open-boundary  
13 concept, and confronted with tipping elements of unknown probability, giving rise to principled  
14 doubts that a coherent quantitative evaluation is possible. This chapter evaluates renewable  
15 energy in terms of bottom-up measures while being cognizant of their limitations.

16 As a general matter, there are some conceptual challenges with using aggregated indicators for  
17 economic development (e.g. HDI or ISEW) as described in (Fleurbaey 2009, 1055). First, it is  
18 difficult to make a rigorous justification for specific choices of weighting the components of  
19 aggregate indicators. Second, it is often difficult to obtain reliable and internationally consistent  
20 data series across components of the composite indicator.

21 In spite of these shortcomings, and because of the correlation between HDI and per-capita  
22 energy use, and due to the availability of data time series for these parameters, these will both be  
23 used as indicators in this chapter (Sections 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.1.2). A further rough indicator of  
24 technological development is decreasing energy intensity, i.e. a decrease in the amount of energy  
25 needed to produce a dollar of GDP.

## 26 **Increased energy access**

27 Access to modern energy services, whether from renewable or non-renewable sources, is closely  
28 correlated with measures of development, particularly for those countries at earlier development  
29 stages. Indeed, the link between adequate energy services and achievement of the Millennium  
30 Development Goals (MDG) was defined explicitly in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation  
31 which emerged from the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (OECD/IEA  
32 Report 2010). Over the past few centuries industrialized societies have transformed the quality of  
33 life by exploiting non-renewable fossil energy sources, nuclear energy and large-scale  
34 hydroelectric power. However, in 2010 almost 20% of the world population, mostly in rural  
35 areas, still lack access to electricity. Twice that percentage cook mainly with traditional biomass,  
36 mainly gathered in an unsustainable manner (WEO 2010). In the absence of a concerted effort to  
37 increase energy access, the absolute number of those without electricity and modern cooking  
38 possibilities is not expected to change substantially in the next few decades. Increasing energy  
39 access without violating the precepts of weak or strong sustainability constraints is an essential  
40 component of sustainable development (Pezzey 1997).

41 Concrete indicators to be discussed in more detail in Section 9.3.2 are per capita final energy  
42 consumption, as well as breakdowns of electricity access (divided into rural and urban areas),  
43 and data for the number of those using coal or traditional biomass for cooking. Implicit in

1 discussions of energy access is a need for models that can assess the sustainability of future  
2 energy-system pathways with respect to decreasing the wide disparity between rural and urban  
3 areas (e.g. in terms of energy forms and quantities used or infrastructure reliability) within  
4 countries or regions (see Section 9.4.2).

### 5 **Enhanced energy security**

6 There is no commonly accepted definition of the term ‘energy security’ and its meaning is highly  
7 context dependent (Kruyt et al., 2009). At a macro-level it can best be understood as robustness  
8 against interruptions of any one source of energy (Grubb et al., 2006). Thinking broadly across  
9 energy systems, one can distinguish between different aspects of security that operate on varying  
10 temporal and geographical scales (Bazilian and Roques, 2008). Four broad themes can be  
11 identified that are relevant to energy security, whether for current systems or for the planning of  
12 future high-penetration renewable energy systems: availability of resources, risk of disruption of  
13 domestic or external energy supply, diversity of energy supplies and potential for compensation  
14 of temporally fluctuating sources. Given the interdependence of economic growth and energy  
15 consumption, access to a stable energy supply is a major political concern and a technical and  
16 economic challenge facing both developed and developing economies, since prolonged  
17 disruptions would create serious economic and basic functionality problems for most  
18 societies. Many developing countries also include providing adequate and affordable access to all  
19 part of the population as part of their definition of energy security and in this way links the  
20 access and security issues, while broadening the concept to include stability and reliability of  
21 local supply.

22 The potential for fossil fuel scarcity and decreasing quality of fossil reserves represent an  
23 important reason for a transition to a sustainable worldwide renewable energy system. One link  
24 between the concepts of weak and strong sustainability is that fossil fuel supplies are finite, and  
25 can represent only a temporary (even if for many decades) foundation for the energy system. By  
26 definition, if fossil fuels are a temporary solution, then that solution is not sustainable.

27 Avoidance of disruptions to energy supplies is a critical component of energy security for  
28 sustainable development and the role of renewable energy. For example, the response of member  
29 states of the International Energy Agency (itself created in response to the first oil shock of the  
30 1970s) (Scott 1994) to vulnerability to oil supply disruption has been to mandate that countries  
31 hold stocks of oil as reserves in the amount of 90 days of net imports. While this stock buffer  
32 clearly reduces the vulnerability of some, mostly wealthier, nations to oil supply disruptions, it  
33 does not remove the risk completely and it is an open question as to how much of the  
34 vulnerability is in fact mitigated. [reference to be supplied later] For countries who are not  
35 members of the IEA, such requirements have little effect. Dependence on energy imports,  
36 whether of fossil fuels or the technology needed for implementation of renewable energy,  
37 represents a measure of energy (in)security for both developing and industrialized countries.

38 One avenue to enhance energy security is thus increasing the diversity of energy supply. All else  
39 being equal, the more reliant an energy system is on a single energy source, the more susceptible  
40 the energy system is to serious disruptions. Examples would be disruptions to oil supply,  
41 unexpectedly large and widespread periods of low wind or solar insolation (for example due to  
42 weather), or the emergence of unintended consequences of any supply source. The extent to  
43 which RET contributes to the diversification of the portfolio of supply options represents a



1 contribution to enhanced energy security at the global, the national as well as the local level  
2 (Bazilian and Roques, 2008).

3 The introduction of renewable technologies that vary on different time-scales, ranging from  
4 minutes to seasonal, adds a new concern to energy security. Not only will there be concerns  
5 about disruption of supplies by unfriendly agents, but also the vulnerability of energy supply to  
6 the vagaries of chance and nature. Renewable energy forms are particularly vulnerable to  
7 extreme events such as for example, abnormally long periods of calm air for wind turbines. Solar  
8 is potentially vulnerable to abnormal cloud cover. Hydro power and bioenergy are potentially  
9 vulnerable to extensive periods of drought. A diverse portfolio of energy sources, together with  
10 good management and system design can help to enhance security.

11 Specific indicators for security are difficult to identify. Based on the four topics described above,  
12 the indicators used to provide information about the energy security criterion of SD in Section  
13 9.3.3 are the magnitude of reserves (also discussed in Section 9.4.3), production and imports of  
14 fossil fuel energy, the share of imports in total primary energy consumption, and the reserves-to-  
15 production ratio.

### 16 **Reduced environmental impacts**

17 As discussed in Chap. 1 and in the Box “Sustainable Development, Renewable Energy and  
18 Climate Change,” reducing greenhouse gas emissions with the aim of mitigating climate change  
19 is one of the key driving forces behind a growing demand for renewable energy technologies.  
20 However, to evaluate the overall burden from the energy system to the environment, other  
21 impacts and categories have to be taken into account as well. Comparison of mass emissions to  
22 water and air, and usage of water, energy and land per unit of energy generated must be  
23 evaluated across technologies. Whereas some environmental impact parameters can be  
24 rigorously quantified, for others comprehensive data may be lacking. In addition, impacts are  
25 always specific to given sites and circumstances, and can therefore not be discussed generically.  
26 In particular, in this chapter impacts on human health, ecosystems and biodiversity are discussed  
27 more qualitatively.

28 While deployment of RE will also entail environmental impacts, the comparative advantage of  
29 renewable over fossil fuel energy sources with respect to reduced GHG emissions and other  
30 long-term impacts is significant. Life-cycle assessments are a particularly useful methodology  
31 for determining total system impacts of a given technology, as a basis for comparison. There are  
32 multiple other methods to assess environmental impacts of energy technologies. Many, such as  
33 environmental impact statements/assessments and risk assessments, require site-specific data or  
34 plans and thus are difficult to generalize for a global review such as this report. Many methods  
35 also only evaluate environmental impacts associated with operation of the facility. These  
36 context-specific approaches are very difficult to relate to the integrated assessment model results  
37 from Chapter 10 that are to be discussed in Section 9.4. While recognizing that LCA does not  
38 give the only possible answer as to the sustainability of a given technology, empirical data  
39 presented in Section 9.3.4 will be largely based on Life Cycle Inventories.

40 Literature on full Life Cycle Impact assessments is scarce, as are sources reporting aggregate  
41 sustainability indicators. Partly, this is due to the incommensurability of different impact  
42 categories (for example litres of polluted water versus tonnes of greenhouse gases) posing  
43 problems for interpretation. Attempts to amalgamate various types of LCA indicators (or other  
44 sort of indicators) into one overall score (for example by joining their impact pathways into a

1 common endpoint, or by monetisation; (Heijungs et al. 2003) have shown that the uncertainties  
2 associated with such scoring approaches are often so high that they preclude decision-making  
3 (Hertwich, McKone, and Pease 1999; Rabl and Spadaro 1999; Schleichner 2000; Krewitt 2002;  
4 Sundqvist 2004; Lenzen 2006). Nevertheless, external costs are discussed in chapter 10.6, and  
5 part of the analysis in 9.4.4 is based on monetization of impacts. The latter section will analyse  
6 the extent to which environmental impacts are represented in scenario analyses for renewable  
7 energy deployment, with indicators being total and per-capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions  
8 (of which some also have local pollution effects) and measures of land-use change.

### 10 **9.3 Social, environmental and economic impacts: Global and regional** 11 **assessment**

12 Structured around the four SD criteria laid down in Section 9.2.1, this section will assess the  
13 literature on the performance of energy in general and RE in particular with respect to the  
14 different SD indicators that were introduced by Section 9.2.2. Since the literature is far from  
15 being comprehensive or consistent, different methodologies will be used for different indicators,  
16 including empirical and qualitative, as well as life cycle assessments.

#### 17 **9.3.1 Sustainable social and economic development**


18 This section assesses the potential contributions of RE to sustainable social and economic  
19 development. Due to the multi-dimensional nature of SD neither a comprehensive assessment of  
20 all mitigation options nor a full accounting of all relevant costs can be performed. Rather, the  
21 following section identifies key issues and provides a framework to discuss the relative benefits  
22 and disadvantages of RE and fossil fuels with respect to development.

##### 23 **9.3.1.1 Energy and Economic Growth**

24 With the ability to control energy flows being a crucial factor for industrial production and socio-  
25 economic development (Cleveland *et al.*, 1984; Krausmann *et al.*, 2008), industrial societies are  
26 frequently characterized as ‘high-energy civilizations’ (Smil, 2000). Globally, per-capita  
27 incomes are positively correlated with per-capita energy use (see Figure 9.3.1) and economic  
28 growth can be identified as the most relevant factor behind increasing energy consumption in the  
29 last decades (see Figure 1.4). Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the direction of the causal  
30 relationship between energy use and increased macroeconomic output, as the results crucially  
31 depend on the empirical methodology employed as well as the region and time-period under  
32 study (Stern, 1993; Asafu-Adjaye, 2000; Paul and Bhattacharya, 2004; Ang, 2007; Ang, 2008;  
33 Lee and Chang, 2008).

34 Industrialization brings about structural change in the economy and therefore affects energy  
35 demand. As economic activity expands and diversifies, demands for more sophisticated and  
36 flexible energy sources arise: while agricultural societies derive a large part of primary energy  
37 consumption from traditional biomass (Leach, 1992; Barnes and Floor, 1996), coal and liquid  
38 fuels – such as kerosene and liquid petroleum gas – gain in importance with rising income, and  
39 electricity, gas and oil dominate at high per-capita incomes (Grubler, 2004; Marcotullio and  
40 Schulz, 2007; Burke, 2010). From a sectoral perspective, countries at an early stage of  
41 development consume the largest part of total primary energy in the residential (and to a lesser  
42 extent agricultural) sector. In emerging economies the manufacturing sector dominates, while in


1 fully industrialized countries services and transport account for steadily increasing shares  
 2 (Schafer, 2005) (see also Figure 9.3.1). Furthermore, several authors (Jorgenson, 1984; Schurr,  
 3 1984) have pointed out that electricity – which offers higher quality and greater flexibility  
 4 compared to other forms of energy – has been a driving force for the mechanization and  
 5 automatization of production in industrialized countries and a significant contributor to  
 6 continued increases in productivity.



7  
 8 **Figure 9.3.1:** Energy Use (GJ) per capita by economic sector. Source: (IEA, 2008).

9 Despite the fact that as a group industrialized countries consume significantly higher amounts of  
 10 energy per capita than developing ones (see Figure 9.3.1), a considerable cross-sectional  
 11 variation of energy use patterns across countries prevails: while some countries (such as e.g.  
 12 Japan) display high levels of per-capita incomes at comparably low levels of energy use, others  
 13 are relatively poor despite extensive energy consumption, especially countries abundantly  
 14 endowed with fossil fuel resources, in which energy is often heavily subsidized (UNEP, 2008b).  
 15 It is often asserted that developing and transition economies can ‘leap-frog’, i.e. adopt modern,  
 16 highly efficient energy technologies, to embark on less energy- and carbon-intensive growth  
 17 patterns compared to the now fully industrialized economies during their phase of  
 18 industrialization (Goldemberg, 1998). For instance, one study for 12 Eastern European EU  
 19 member countries finds that between 1990 and 2000, convergence in per-capita incomes between  
 20 fully industrialized and transition economies has been accompanied by significant reductions of  
 21 energy intensities in the latter (Markandya *et al.*, 2006). For industrialized countries, one  
 22 hypothesis suggests that economic growth can largely be decoupled from energy use by steady  
 23 declines in energy intensity as structural change and efficiency improvements trigger the  
 24 ‘dematerialization’ of economic activity (Herman *et al.*, 1990). However, despite the decreasing  
 25 energy intensities (i.e. energy consumption per unit of GDP) observed over time in almost all  
 26 regions (Figure 9.3.2), declines in energy intensity historically often have been outpaced by

1 economic growth and hence have proved insufficient to achieve actual reductions in energy use  
 2 (Roy, 2000). In addition, it has been argued that decreases in energy intensity in industrialized  
 3 countries can partially be explained by the fact that energy-intensive industries are increasingly  
 4 moved to developing countries (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Davis and Caldeira, 2010) and, as  
 5 observed energy efficiency improvements are largely driven by shifts to higher quality fuels,  
 6 they cannot be expected to continue indeterminately (Cleveland *et al.*, 2000; Kaufmann, 2004).




7  
 8 **Figure 9.3.2** Changes in energy intensities over time for selected regions. Source: (WEC,  
 9 2008).

10 **9.3.1.2 Human Development Index & Energy**

11 As already mentioned in Section 9.2.2, the industrialized societies' improvements in the quality  
 12 of life where so far mainly based on the exploitation of non-renewable energy sources (even  
 13 though it should be noted that in early stages of industrialization, as well as for many developing  
 14 countries today, hydropower has played an important role in development). Apart from its  
 15 significance for productive purposes, access to clean and reliable energy constitutes an important  
 16 prerequisite for fundamental determinants of human development including health, education,  
 17 gender equality, and environmental safety (UNDP, 2007). As the IEA's most recent World  
 18 Energy Outlook (WEO, 2010) points out, providing access to modern energy for the poorest  
 19 members of society is crucial for the achievement of any single of the eight Millennium  
 20 Development Goals (MDGs).

21 Although the income level is an important determinant of development, human well-being also  
 22 includes other elements that cannot be captured by a single measure of income. Figure 9.3.3  
 23 depicts the correlation between the Human Development Index (HDI) and primary energy use  
 24 per capita for 115 countries. The HDI is used to assess comparative levels of development in  
 25 countries and includes purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted income, literacy and life  
 26 expectancy as its three main matrices. The HDI is only one of many possible measures of the  
 27 well-being of a society, but it can serve as a proxy indicator of development. The graph reveals

1 that countries that have achieved high HDI levels in general (although to varying degrees)  
 2 consume relatively large amounts of energy per capita and no country has achieved a high (>0.8)  
 3 or even a medium HDI (between 0.5 and 0.8) without significant access to non-traditional energy  
 4 supplies (which for the largest part of the last century have been dominated by fossil fuels).  
 5 However, with rising levels of energy consumption, saturation of the positive relationship  
 6 between energy use and HDI sets in (Martinez and Ebenhack, 2008), which means that a certain  
 7 minimum amount of energy is required to guarantee an acceptable standard of living  
 8 (Goldemberg, 2001) suggests 1 toe/cap), after which raising energy consumption yields only  
 9 marginal improvements in the quality of life.



10  
 11 **Figure 9.3.3** Correlation between primary energy consumption and the countries' Human  
 12 Development Index (WEO, 2004).

13 **9.3.1.3 Motivations to promote RE**

14 Countries at different levels of development have different incentives to advance RE. For  
 15 developing countries the most likely reasons to adopt RE technologies are (i) providing access to  
 16 energy (see Section 9.3.2.), (ii) creating employment opportunities in the formal economy, and  
 17 (iii) reducing the costs of energy imports (or, in the case of fossil energy exporters, prolong the  
 18 life-time of their natural resource base). For industrialized countries the primary reasons to  
 19 encourage RE include (i) reducing carbon emissions to mitigate climate change (see Chapter 1),  
 20 (ii) enhancing energy security (see Section 9.3.3.1.), and (iii) actively promoting structural  
 21 change in the economy, such that job losses in declining manufacturing sectors are softened by  
 22 new employment opportunities related to RE.

23 According to a recent study prepared by UNEP (UNEP, 2008a), RE already accounts for about  
 24 2.3 million jobs worldwide and in many countries job creation is seen as one of the main benefits  
 25 of investing in renewable energy sources. A study by the German Environment Ministry finds  
 26 that in 2006, about 236.000 people were employed in RE, up from roughly 161.000 two years  
 27 earlier (BMU, 2009). Examples of the use of RE in India, Nepal, and parts of Africa indicate that  
 28 in many parts of the developing world RE can stimulate local economic and social development  
 29 (Cherian, 2009) [TSU: will be inserted later]. This is corroborated by case study evidence from  
 30 the sugar-cane industry in Brazil, which point to increases in levels of employment (Goldemberg

1 *et al.*, 2008) and per-capita incomes (Walter *et al.*, in press). Other studies that also observe  
2 possible negative employment effects are more critical in this regard (Frondel *et al.*, 2010) and  
3 the assertion of positive employment effects is further weakened by disagreements in the  
4 methodology used to calculate them (Sastresa *et al.*, 2009). Evaluating the labour market effects  
5 of RE policies is in any case a challenging task that requires an assessment of how value chains  
6 and production patterns adjust in the mid-term and how structural adjustment and innovative  
7 activity respond in the long-run (Fankhauser *et al.*, 2008) and RE should not be regarded as an  
8 instrument that can be employed to cure underlying inefficiencies in labour markets. For a  
9 comprehensive assessment, it would be necessary to factor in all social costs and benefits of a  
10 given technology (including interactions with labour market frictions) to be able to appropriately  
11 compare RE and fossil fuels on a level playing field. This includes the costs of support schemes  
12 for RE as well as subsidies for fossil fuels. Yet, this has not yet been accomplished satisfactorily.

13 Numerous governments have included substantial spending on clean energy technologies in their  
14 stimulus packages that were put into place in response to the financial and economic crisis  
15 (Bauer *et al.*, 2009; Bowen *et al.*, 2009). For the US, one study (Houser *et al.*, 2009) suggested  
16 that for every US \$ 1 billion [TSU: 2005\$?] spent on green fiscal measures, there was the  
17 potential to create about 30,000 jobs; another one, prepared by the Center for American Progress  
18 (Pollin *et al.*, 2008) estimated that a green stimulus of US \$ 100 billion [TSU: 2005\$?] could  
19 save roughly 2 million jobs. From a more long-term perspective, many national green-growth  
20 strategies e.g. in China, Korea, Japan, EU and US (UNEP, 2010) have stressed the deployment  
21 of RE as an important contribution to job creation and one study (Barbier, 2009) argues that a  
22 ‘Global Green New Deal’ could in the long run create more than 34 million jobs in low-carbon  
23 transportation and related activities alone.

24 As noted above, many developing and transition economies are highly dependent on imports of  
25 energy. For a number of countries (Moldova, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Madagascar, India,  
26 Ukraine, Tajikistan) the share of energy imports in total imports exceeded 25% for the period  
27 2000-2005 and it was as high as 45% for Bahrain and 40% for Sierra Leone (WDI, 2007). A  
28 related indicator is the share that energy import constitutes of export earning and overall GDP.  
29 For example, Kenya and Senegal spend more than half of their export earnings for importing  
30 energy, while India spends over 45% (GNESD, 2010; Jain, 2010).

31 The Energy Sector Management Program (ESMAP) of the World bank has studied the impacts  
32 of higher oil prices on low income countries and the poor (ESMAP, 2005) and the finding about  
33 macro level effects on GDP is illustrated in the table below. It should be noted that the data is  
34 based on a large number of country case studies and do not claim to be universally valid. It  
35 illustrates, however, that oil importing developing countries are affected significantly by oil price  
36 increases and the poorest countries are affected the most as shown in Table 9.3.1. Increases in  
37 important commodity prices will always affect importers of these products. What makes energy  
38 unique is both the scale of the cost as a share of national imports, and the volatility of prices  
39 compared to most other commodities. The ESMAP national case studies also showed the poorest  
40 households experienced the highest percentage changes in expenditure for commercial energy  
41 purchases of e.g. kerosene, LPG and diesel.

42  
43

1 **Table 9.3.1** Percentage change in GDP by a US\$10 a barrel rise in oil prices (analytical results  
 2 grouped by income levels) (ESMAP, 2005).

Per capita income (1999-2001 US\$)	% change in GDP
<b>Net Oil importers</b>	
< 300 [18 countries]	-1.47
> 300 and < 900 [22]	-0.76
>900 and < 9000 [36]	-0.56
> 9000 [21]	-0.44
<b>Net oil exporters</b>	
< 900 [10]	+5.21
> 900 and < 9000 [17]	+4.16

3  
4

5 ESMAP has also analyzed the national policy responses (ESMAP, 2005; ESMAP, 2006;  
 6 ESMAP, 2008) and it was found that many governments try to limit the impacts of international  
 7 price increases in the short term by adjusting subsidies or providing targeted cash support to  
 8 poorest households, rationing supply or forcing supply companies to absorb some of the short  
 9 term effects. This may however have significant effects both on state budgets and companies’  
 10 ability to maintain stable delivery (UNEP, 2008b). Longer term responses are more focused on  
 11 diversification and efficiency measures and are dealt with in section 9.3.3.1.

12 For these countries increased uptake of RE technologies could be a promising avenue to redirect  
 13 highly needed foreign exchange flows away from energy imports towards imports of goods that  
 14 cannot be produced locally, such as high-tech capital goods. For other developing countries  
 15 which are net exporters of energy, promoting the domestic use of RE can extend the life-time of  
 16 their fossil resource base and prolong the time to diversify the scope of economic activities by  
 17 decreasing the dependence on resource exports while strengthening their manufacturing and  
 18 service sectors.

19 **9.3.2 Increased energy access**

20 The traditional link between economic development and energy requirements, as discussed  
 21 above, takes on a different meaning when the focus is on the significant parts of the global  
 22 population that have no or limited access to modern and clean energy services. From a  
 23 development perspective, any sustainable energy expansion should increase the availability of  
 24 energy services to groups that currently have no or limited access to them: the poor (measured by  
 25 wealth, income, or more integrative indicators), those in rural areas and those without  
 26 connections to the grid. Within households the impacts on women of lack of clean and efficient  
 27 energy services are often singled out (Reddy *et al.*, 2000; Brew-Hammond, 2010) (Agbemabiese,  
 28 2009).

29 As noted in Section 9.2.2, the provision of modern energy services is widely recognized as  
 30 critical foundation for promotion of sustainable development and the link was defined explicitly



1 in the 2002's Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (UN, 2002 para 9). This is consistent with a  
 2 number of studies and Section 9.3.1.2 has already noted that there is a link between adequate  
 3 energy services and the achievements of the various MDGs. Their achievement is critically  
 4 dependent on energy inputs (Modi *et al.*, 2006; GNESD, 2007a; Brazilian *et al.*, 2010).

5 Table 9.3.2 provides an estimate of the number of people without access to electricity which  
 6 totals almost 1.5 billion in 2009. The regional distribution indicates that it is entirely a  
 7 developing country issue particularly in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia.

8 **Table 9.3.2** Electricity access in 2008 - Regional aggregates (WEO, 2009)<sup>1</sup>.

	Population without electricity millions	Electrification rate %	Urban electrification rate %	Rural electrification rate %
Africa	589	40.0	66.8	22.7
North Africa	2	98.9	99.6	98.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	587	28.5	57.5	11.9
Developing Asia	809	77.2	93.5	67.2
China & East Asia	195	90.2	96.2	85.5
South Asia	614	60.2	88.4	48.4
Latin America	34	92.7	98.7	70.2
Middle East	21	89.1	98.5	70.6
Developing countries	1,453	72.0	90.0	58.4
Transition economies & OECD	3	99.8	100.0	99.5
World	1,456	78.2	93.4	63.2

9  
 10 A recent report from the UN Secretary General's advisory group on energy and climate change  
 11 (AGECC, 2010) stresses the importance for universal access by 2030 to modern energy sources  
 12 as a key part of enhancing sustainable development.


13 AGECC also presents an approach to a common understanding of "access" that helps identify the  
 14 specific sustainable development elements where renewable energy sources and technologies can  
 15 make specific contributions over and above the effects of energy access expansion based on grid  
 16 expansion or fossil technologies like diesel plants: The AGECC approach defines energy access  
 17 as "access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for cooking and heating, lighting,

<sup>1</sup> See also: WEO electricity database <http://www.iea.org/weo/electricity.asp>



1 communications and productive uses” (AGECC, 2010) and illustrates the incremental process  
2 (Figure 9.3.4) involved in moving from servicing basic human needs to creating a self sustaining  
3 process of sustainable development.

4 Even a basic level of energy access that includes lighting and allows for communication,  
5 healthcare and education can provide substantial benefits to a community or household,  
6 including cost savings. AGECC does, however, suggest a broader definition than basic needs,  
7 and proposes that access to sufficient energy for basic services and for productive uses is the  
8 appropriate level of energy access needed to improve livelihoods in the poorest countries and  
9 drive local economic development.



10  
11 **Figure 9.3.4** Incremental level of access to energy services; source: AGECC, 2010.

12 It is shown in a number of studies (Baumert *et al.*, 2005; Bhattacharyya, 2005; World Bank,  
13 2008; UNDP and WHO, 2009; Brew-Hammond, 2010; IEA, 2010)<sup>2</sup> that access issues need to be  
14 understood in a local context and that in most countries there is a marked difference between  
15 electrification rates in urban and rural areas. This is especially true in the Sub Saharan African  
16 and South Asian regions but the figures illustrate that rural access is still an issue of concern also  
17 in developing regions with high overall national electrification rates, illustrating that the rural -  
18 urban divide on modern energy services is still quite marked in all developing regions.

19 Some studies show that decentralized grids based on RE are generally more competitive in rural  
20 areas with significant distances to the national grid (Baumert *et al.*, 2005; Nouni *et al.*, 2008;  
21 Deichmann *et al.*, 2010) and the low levels of rural electrification offer significant opportunities  
22 for renewable energy based mini-grid systems. The role of RE in providing increased access to  
23 electricity in urban areas is less distinct, as it is either a question about competitiveness compared  
24 with other grid supply options or a local social and economic issue at household or community  
25 level where access is hampered by legal land issues or affordability and small scale RE  
26 technologies can here play the same role as in rural areas.

<sup>2</sup> See also: on-line Earth trends database on electricity access  
[http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable\\_db/index.php?theme=6](http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=6)

1 UNDP and WHO (UNDP and WHO, 2009) have assessed the number of people who rely on  
 2 solid fuels for cooking. As shown in Table 9.3.3 there are around 2.5 billion relying on  
 3 traditional biomass like wood, charcoal and dung for cooking energy and close to another half  
 4 billion that uses coal for cooking. Uncertainty in these estimates is high, but the span is limited  
 5 across the different data sources (IEA, 2010).

6 **Table 9.3.3** Number of people relying on solid and modern fuels for cooking for LDCs and SSA,  
 7 2007 (UNDP and WHO, 2009)

	No. of people relying on solid fuels (In millions)			No. of people with access to modern fuels (In millions)
	Traditional biomass	Coal	Total	
Developing countries	2,564	436	2,999	2,294
LDCs	703	12	715	74
Sub-Saharan Africa	615	6	621	132


Notes: Based on UNDP's classification of developing countries, and the UN's classification of LDCs. There are 50 LDCs and 45 SSA countries, with 31 countries belonging to both categories (see Appendix 2 for a list of countries). Traditional biomass includes wood, charcoal, and dung. Wood includes wood, wood chips, straw, and crop residues. Modern fuels refer to electricity, liquid fuels, and gaseous fuels such as LPG, natural gas, and kerosene. For information on developing-region populations, see Appendix 6.

8  
 9 This shows that around 1 billion people with some form of electricity access have to rely on  
 10 biomass, kerosene, coal or LPG for energy demanding services like cooking (Bravo *et al.*, 2008;  
 11 Karekezi *et al.*, 2008; Dhingra *et al.*, 2009).

12 More detailed analysis is generally hampered by very poor data about energy consumption  
 13 among the poor in many developing countries. While an increasing number of national censuses  
 14 include energy related data, the coverage is still very limited for poor peri-urban and rural  
 15 households with no official registration or land ownership (GNESD, 2008; Dhingra *et al.*, 2009).  
 16 The analytical constraints are compounded by the lack of well defined and generally accepted  
 17 indicators (IEA, 2010).

18 The very dominant use of biomass fuels for cooking purposes, mainly indoors, has a number of  
 19 documented negative health effects (Barnes *et al.*, 2009) in addition to social effects related to  
 20 time spent on gathering fuel or paying high shares of income for small amounts of commercial  
 21 biomass and environmental aspects like deforestation in areas where charcoal and market based  
 22 biomass are the dominant fuels. For further information on specific pollutants, please refer to  
 23 Section 9.3.4.


24 Figure 9.3.5 illustrates the magnitude of the health problems associated with indoor air pollution  
 25 and provides a comparison with other major deadly diseases. The figure shows that while many  
 26 international and national efforts are focusing on the other diseases, household indoor air  
 27 pollution is projected to exceed other major causes of premature deaths (e.g. HIV/AIDS, malaria  
 28 and TB) by 2030.



1  
2 **Figure 9.3.5** Premature deaths from household air pollution and other diseases (IEA, 2010).

3 The health problems like chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and pneumonia are most severe  
4 for women and children (Barnes *et al.*, 2009; Haines *et al.*, 2009; UNDP and WHO, 2009). As  
5 illustrated by Figure 9.3.6, there is in addition a strong correlation with household income and  
6 use of low quality fuels, illustrating that it is the poorest of the poor, who are at risk.

**The relationship between per-capita final energy consumption and income in developing countries** World Energy Outlook 2010



7  
8 **Figure 9.3.6** The relationship between per-capita final energy consumption and income in  
9 developing countries (WEO, 2010).

10 While the importance of access to energy is widely recognized, it is not equally well understood  
11 what this actually means in practice and how contributions from renewable energy sources can  
12 make a specific difference with regard to providing access in a more sustainable manner than  
13 other energy sources. The specific relevance for electrification in remote areas has been  
14 mentioned above (Nouni *et al.*, 2008; Deichmann *et al.*, 2010).

1 A study by the Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD, 2007b)  
 2 examined the options for RE technologies in making specific contributions to rural development  
 3 and found that a number of non-electrical technologies like solar drying and water heating,  
 4 treadle and wind pumps for mechanical power, biogas for cooking and power, etc. were highly  
 5 relevant for satisfying priority household and productive energy requirements in areas with no  
 6 access to electricity (cooking, water heating, heating, water pumping). This is also illustrated by  
 7 the overview in Table 9.3.4 of possible ways RE can provide the basic energy services required.  
 8 Furthermore, the study found a high potential in relation to these technologies for local job  
 9 generation and increased economic activity through system manufacture and renewable resource  
 10 extraction and processing.

11 Implementation of RE based energy access programs are expanding quite rapidly but there is still  
 12 quite limited research on the sustainability related aspects and there is hardly any literature on  
 13 large scale implementation. Instead, one has to rely on a few specific examples of actions where  
 14 elements of energy access has been provided with a specific focus on the combination of social  
 15 and productive services utilizing the potential for local job creation through small scale business  
 16 development (Van der Vleuten *et al.*, 2007; Nouni *et al.*, 2008; Kaundinya *et al.*, 2009; Peters *et al.*,  
 17 2009; Urmee *et al.*, 2009; Jonker Klunne and Michael, 2010). The assessment and case  
 18 examples available, however, show that energy access is key for achievement of the MDGs and  
 19 for economic development in general. Renewable energy technologies have the potential to make  
 20 a significant contribution to improving the provisions of clean and efficient energy services. But  
 21 in order to ensure full achievement of the potential sustainable development benefits from RE  
 22 deployment it is essential to put in place coherent, stable, supportive political and legal  
 23 frameworks. The options and barriers for such frameworks are further assessed in Chapter 11 of  
 24 this report.

25 **Table 9.3.4: Transition to Renewable Energy in Rural (Off-Grid) Areas (REN21, 2010).**

26

27 **Table 3. Transitions to Renewable Energy in Rural (Off-Grid) Areas**

Rural Energy Service	Existing Off-Grid Rural Energy Sources	Examples of New and Renewable Energy Sources
Lighting and other small electric needs (homes, schools, street lighting, telecom, hand tools, vaccine storage)	Candles, kerosene, batteries, central battery recharging by carting batteries to grid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hydropower (pico-scale, micro-scale, small-scale)</li> <li>Biogas from household-scale digester</li> <li>Small-scale biomass gasifier with gas engine</li> <li>Village-scale mini-grids and solar/wind hybrid systems</li> <li>Solar home systems</li> </ul>
Communications (televisions, radios, cell phones)	Dry cell batteries, central battery recharging by carting batteries to grid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hydropower (pico-scale, micro-scale, small-scale)</li> <li>Biogas from household-scale digester</li> <li>Small-scale biomass gasifier with gas engine</li> <li>Village-scale mini-grids and solar/wind hybrid systems</li> <li>Solar home systems</li> </ul>
Cooking (homes, commercial stoves and ovens)	Burning wood, dung, or straw in open fire at about 15 percent efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved cooking stoves (fuel wood, crop wastes) with efficiencies above 25 percent</li> <li>Biogas from household-scale digester</li> <li>Solar cookers</li> </ul>
Heating and cooling (crop drying and other agricultural processing, hot water)	Mostly open fire from wood, dung, and straw	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved heating stoves</li> <li>Biogas from small- and medium-scale digesters</li> <li>Solar crop dryers</li> <li>Solar water heaters</li> <li>Ice making for food preservation</li> <li>Fans from small grid renewable system</li> </ul>
Process motive power (small industry)	Diesel engines and generators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Small electricity grid systems from microhydro, gasifiers, direct combustion, and large biodigesters</li> </ul>
Water pumping (agriculture and drinking water)	Diesel pumps and generators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mechanical wind pumps</li> <li>Solar PV pumps</li> <li>Small electricity grid systems from microhydro, gasifiers, direct combustion, and large biodigesters</li> </ul>

38

39

40

1 The REN study refers to rural (off-grid) applications but other studies (GNESD, 2007b) show  
2 that many of the options apply equally to the increasing number of slum communities in peri  
3 urban areas where many households are not able to gain legal or economic access to even nearby  
4 electricity grids (Jain, 2010). Energy access through some of these technologies allows local  
5 communities to widen their energy choices, stimulate economies and incentivize local  
6 entrepreneurial efforts as well as meeting basic needs and services related to lightening and  
7 cooking and thus reaping ancillary health and education benefits.

8 As a final caveat, it also should be noted that different RE facilities, i.e. distributed versus central  
9 supply, face very different constraints, with the latter experiencing similar barriers as  
10 conventional energy systems, i.e. high upfront investments, siting considerations, infrastructure  
11 and land requirements as well as network upgrade issues.

### 12 **9.3.3 Enhanced Energy security**

13 Based on the four broad themes of energy security outlined in Section 2.2 (availability of  
14 resources, risk of energy supply disruptions, diversity of energy supply and temporal fluctuations  
15 of energy supply) this section will assess the evidence on the potential contribution of renewable  
16 energy technologies to energy security goals at a macro level. Additionally, it will briefly discuss  
17 energy security issues at the micro-level that go beyond grid stability problems.

#### 18 **9.3.3.1 Macro-level: security of supply**


19 Fig. 9.3.7, which depicts the ratio of proven reserves to current production (R/P), i.e. for how  
20 many years production at current rates could be maintained before reserves are finally depleted,  
21 illustrates potential fossil fuel scarcities. While scarcity of coal (with a global R/P ratio of more  
22 than one hundred years) is not a major issue at the moment, at the current rate of production  
23 global proven conventional reserves of oil and natural gas<sup>3</sup> would be exhausted in about 45 and  
24 62 years, respectively<sup>4</sup>. As has been highlighted by the IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2008  
25 (WEO, 2008), accelerated economic growth in many parts of the developing world is likely to  
26 raise global energy demand, which could further shorten the life-span of remaining fossil fuel  
27 resources. Even though technological progress allows tapping reservoirs of oil from so-called  
28 non-conventional sources (such as e.g. oil sands), usually large investments are required, which  
29 raise extraction costs and the price of oil and gas (Bentley, 2002). In addition, increasing  
30 amounts of energy are needed to produce a given quantity of usable energy from depleted  
31 conventional as well as from non-conventional reserves. Published estimates of the ratio of  
32 energy output-to-input (Energy Return on Energy Invested, EROEI) for conventional oil indicate  
33 that there has been a strong decline over time (Cleveland, 2005), while the EROEI for non-  
34 conventional resources is even lower (Seljom *et al.*, 2010; WEO, 2010). Thus, it is not surprising  
35 that the fossil-fuel industry, particularly in the case of oil, has seen sharp increases in extraction  
36 costs over the past decade, although equipment, raw materials and labour demand have also

---

<sup>3</sup> Recent discoveries of shale gas and coal-bed methane and improvements of extraction technologies are expected to result in notable production of natural gas from these non-conventional resources in the near future WEO, 2008: *World Energy Outlook 2008* IEA.


<sup>4</sup> Since 1990, proven conventional reserves of oil and natural gas have moderately grown due to revisions in official statistics, new discoveries, and increased recovery factors. However, new discoveries have lagged behind consumption. Ultimately recoverable reserves (which include reserves that are yet to be discovered) are considerably larger than proven reserves; their actual size crucially depends on future oil prices and development costs Ibid.

1 played a role (EIA, 2009). Correlated with the increasing amounts of input energy to extract  
 2 resources are the life-cycle carbon emissions from these resources.



3  
 4 **Figure 9.3.7** Ratio of proven (conventional) reserves of production for oil, natural gas, and coal  
 5 (in years) at the end of 2009 for different regions. Source: (BP, 2010).


6 The spatial distribution of reserves, production, and exports of fossil fuels is very uneven and  
 7 highly concentrated in a few regions, as can be seen from Figure 9.3.8. Over 60% of coal  
 8 reserves are located in just three regions (the United States, China and the former Soviet Union;  
 9 (BP, 2010), and in 2009 China alone accounted for about half of global production of hard coal  
 10 (WEO, 2010). Over 75% of natural gas reserves are held by OPEC nations and states of the  
 11 Former Soviet Union, and 80% of the global gas market is supplied by the top ten exporters. This  
 12 heavy concentration of energy resources, many of which are located in politically unstable  
 13 countries, creates a dependency for importers and raises the danger of disruptions of energy  
 14 supply (Gupta, 2008). However, it should be noted that the conventional wisdom that oil-price  
 15 shocks were responsible for the recessions in the 1970s is not easily supported by econometric  
 16 evidence (Bohi, 1991; Barsky and Kilian, 2004) unless it is assumed that changes in oil prices  
 17 have also triggered simultaneous changes in the demand for consumption goods and durables,  
 18 such as automobiles (Lee and Ni, 2002; Hamilton, 2005).



1  
 2 **Figure 9.3.8** Concentration of (i) reserves, (ii) production, and (iii) exports of oil, gas, and coal.  
 3 Concentration is measured by the cumulative share of the top ten resource owners / producers /  
 4 exporters (in %). Source: Own calculations based on (WEO, 2010) and (BP, 2010).

5 As there is relatively little overlap between the location of fossil fuel reserves and the place of  
 6 their consumption, fossil fuels are heavily traded and many countries with relatively scarce  
 7 endowments rely heavily on imports of energy to meet desired levels of consumption. Due to the  
 8 fact that a substantial share of global energy trade is channelled through a rather small number of  
 9 critical geographical areas (so-called ‘chokepoints’), it is highly vulnerable to accidents or  
 10 terrorist attacks and importers face a considerable risk of supply disruption or price hikes (Gupta,  
 11 2008). Figure 9.3.9 shows that currently the Euro area, North America, and East Asia and the  
 12 Pacific region are such net importers. Traditionally, the Euro area is the region which displays  
 13 the highest share of imports in total energy use, which amounted to about 63% in 2007. For  
 14 North America (which enjoys relatively abundant reserves of fossil fuels), dependence on energy  
 15 imports has increased considerable in the last decades, from less than 10% in 1990 to more than  
 16 20% in 2007. The Middle East and North Africa are the most important exporters of fossil fuels  
 17 (for the region as a whole, exports of oil and gas by far exceeded domestic consumption), and to  
 18 some lesser extent Russia, Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. This  
 19 particular constellations leads to a situation in which countries that heavily depend on energy  
 20 imports frequently raise concerns that their energy consumption might be seriously affected by  
 21 possible disruptions of supply (Sen and Babali, 2007).





1  
2 **Figure 9.3.9** Energy imports as share of total primary energy consumption (in %). Negative  
3 values denote net exporters of energy carriers. Source: Own graph, based on (WDI, 2010).

4 RE can improve energy security in all the three of the dimensions discussed above. First,  
5 increased use of renewables permits countries to substitute away from the use of fossil fuels,  
6 such that existing reserves of fossil fuels are depleted less rapidly and the point at which these  
7 reserves will eventually be exhausted is shifted farther into the future (Kruyt *et al.*, 2009).  
8 Second, to the extent that countries with large reserves increase their own consumption as part of  
9 the development process, less will be available for export to other countries, thus leading to  
10 potential tensions over access. As many renewables are localized and not internationally  
11 tradable, increasing their share in a country's energy portfolio diminishes the dependence on  
12 imports (Grubb *et al.*, 2006). The extent to which this diminishes the risk of energy supply  
13 disruptions depends, however, on the supply characteristics of the energy sources that substitute  
14 the imported energy. Third, RE resources are far more evenly distributed around the globe than  
15 fossil resources (WEC, 2007). Therefore, energy systems suitable for RE to diversify the  
16 portfolio of energy sources (Awerbuch, 2006; Bazilian and Roques, 2008), and to reduce the  
17 economy's vulnerability to price volatility (Awerbuch and Sauter, 2006). Besides these  
18 advantageous properties, renewable energies also possess some drawbacks with their variable  
19 availability due to e.g. seasonal variability or changing weather conditions (see also Chapter 8)  
20 probably being the most important ones. These problems can be addressed developing and/or  
21 deploying appropriate technical solutions such as increased storage and back-up capacity  
22 (Azoumah *et al.*, in press) as well as optimized institutional settings for energy markets, e.g.  
23 regionally integrated electricity markets in which local fluctuations are smoothed by means of  
24 geographic diversification (Roques *et al.*, 2010). These technical solutions and arrangements  
25 involve, however, additional costs which have to be taken into account in the comparison to the  
26 relative benefits of RE and conventional energy technology projects. More generally, as  
27 highlighted in Section 9.3.1.3, evaluating if a certain technology is desirable requires not only the  
28 direct costs involved, but also all positive and negative external effects as well as existing  
29 subsidies (on RE and fossil fuels) to be included in the analysis.



### 1 9.3.3.2 Micro-level

2 As shown in Section 9.3.1.3, the reduction of import bills for conventional energy is an  
3 important motivation for developing countries to promote RE. However, part of diversification  
4 may also be to engage more in regional power sector integration and there are emerging regional  
5 power collaborations in East, West and Southern Africa, South and Central America, and South  
6 East Asia that aim to enhance the reliability of electricity grids and therefore local supply.  
7 ESMAP has studied 12 sub-regional integration schemes (ESMAP, 2010) and found that for  
8 most schemes energy security has been one of the motivating factors. Larger integrated networks  
9 may also provide benefits in terms of cost efficiency, trade and more general economic  
10 development.

11 Many developing countries specifically include providing adequate and affordable access to all  
12 part of the population as part of their definition of energy security and in this way links the  
13 access and security issues while broadening the concept to include stability and reliability of  
14 local supply. While regional interconnections may be an interesting way to ensure better supply  
15 security at the national level it does not automatically “trickle down” to the poorer segments of  
16 the population in terms of increased access or even stable and affordable supply for those who  
17 are connected. GNESD has examined the effects of power sector reforms on access levels and  
18 found that only when there was strong political commitment to improve access to electricity by  
19 poor households did reforms deliver results (GNESD, 2004). Explicit focus on poor households  
20 was found essential along with specific protection of funds for electrification.

21 While electricity connection is often used as a key indicator for access to modern energy services  
22 it is important to underline that household connections have restrictions in terms of capacity,  
23 stability and outage problems, as illustrated by the data from the World Bank and IEA and can be  
24 seen in Table 9.3.5.

25 **Table 9.3.5** Indicators of the reliability of infrastructure services (IEA, 2010)

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Developing countries
Delay in obtaining electricity connection (days)	79,9	27,5
Electrical outages (days per year)	90,9	28,7
Value of lost output due to electrical outages (per cent of turnover)	6,1	4,4
Firms maintaining own generation equipment (percent of total)	47,5	31,8

26

27 Energy security at the micro level in developing countries may therefore have a number of social  
28 and economic effects that go beyond direct impacts of any fuel price increases (Jain, 2010).  
29 Improving access to affordable and reliable energy supply will therefore not only provide  
30 improved energy services, but it will broadly increase productivity, avoid parallel investments in  
31 infrastructure from small scale generation equipment to parallel lighting and cooking systems  
32 where most household have at least two different options to hedge against unstable supply.

33 However, decentralized RE is competitive mostly in remote and rural areas, while grid connected  
34 supply generally dominates denser areas where the majority of households reside (Deichmann *et*  
35 *al.*, 2010).

### 1 **9.3.4 Reduced environmental impacts**


2 Sustainable development must ensure environmental quality and prevent undue environmental  
3 harm. As no large-scale technology deployment will come without environmental tradeoffs,  
4 environmental interventions and impacts of RE technologies should be evaluated and compared  
5 to conventional alternatives prior to their concerted deployment. The goal of this section is to  
6 evaluate the current evidence along multiple environmental indicators. The complexity of  
7 technologies and the environment, knowledge gaps and incommensurate metrics and methods  
8 thwart a fully comprehensive and clear-cut assessment. For example, it is not possible to cover  
9 all relevant environmental aspects and impact<sup>5</sup> categories of energy chains within the scope of  
10 this chapter. Moreover, the large-scale application of new technologies may lead to unanticipated  
11 impacts. Nevertheless, conclusions can be drawn in a few areas.

12 This section concentrates in large parts on electricity generation and transport fuels, as these  
13 areas are best covered by the literature. Heating and household energy are discussed only briefly,  
14 in particular with regards to air pollution and health. Regarding life-cycle impacts of heating  
15 fuels, upstream impacts of fuel extraction and processing are in many cases similar to those of  
16 the corresponding transport or electricity generation chains, but some new technologies such as  
17 heat pumps or passive solar may exhibit completely different properties. The employment of  
18 renewable energy technologies in the passenger transport sector includes liquid or gaseous fuels  
19 produced from biomass feedstock in conventional internal combustion engine vehicles; use of  
20 renewable electricity generation for charging of electric battery vehicles or hydrogen production  
21 with subsequent use of this hydrogen in combustion engine or fuel cell vehicles. As currently  
22 only utilization of biofuels can be considered as a mature technology available for large-scale  
23 application. Generally, the focus of this subchapter is on current technologies, and only limited  
24 discussion of technology integration options can be provided.

25 Data available for different attributes vary widely regarding number and quality of sources. GHG  
26 emissions are generally well covered, and can therefore be compared across technologies. A  
27 significant number of studies reports on air pollutant emissions and operational water use, but  
28 evidence is scarce for life-cycle emissions to water, and land use, and health impacts other than  
29 those linked to air pollution. Impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems are mostly site-specific and  
30 difficult to quantify. Therefore, the discussion on biodiversity and ecosystems remains  
31 qualitative, in particular as evidence for most technologies is anecdotal. To account for burdens  
32 associated with accidents as opposed to normal operation, we conclude with an overview about  
33 risks associated with ET in the last section of this subchapter. Omitted from this evaluation is the  
34 critical issue of constrained supply of some materials, which could not be addressed for lack of  
35 comprehensive and comparable sector-level data for all energy technologies.

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<sup>5</sup> Within this subsection, the terms impact and impact categories are not used in the strict sense of their definition within the field of LCA.



**Figure 9.3.10** Schematic of generalized life-cycle stages for an energy technology. Examples of specific stages within the broad categories of upstream, operation, downstream and fuel cycle will differ by energy technology. The fuel cycle as employed in operations is only applicable to fossil-fuel, biopower and nuclear technologies, however, to the extent fuels are used in other life cycle stages (e.g., to power construction equipment or maintenance vehicles) it is applicable to all technologies. For these complexities, this box is distinguished from the others by shading. Background processes, such as electricity supplied by the grid, are not shown in this figure but are relevant to all stages. [TSU: Figure will be redesigned to more clearly depict different stages of Energy LCA]

When accounting for all effects along global supply chains, one particularly useful approach for quantifying and fairly comparing environmental impacts of energy technologies is Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA). LCA systematically quantifies the impacts of a technology (or product or process) across its life cycle (Figure 9.3.10). LCA studies provide a well-established, comprehensive and quantitative basis for comparing RE to conventional energy technologies. Because this section reviews the results of hundreds of LCAs, the methods, advantages and limitations of LCA in the context of energy systems are discussed briefly here. LCA methodologies have been evolving for a few decades and are now supported by international initiatives ((UNEP and SETAC, 2010)) and governed by standards ((ISO, 2006a; ISO, 2006b)). The majority of the available literature on energy systems is based on so-called attributional LCAs, mostly process-based studies. Most published LCAs of energy supply technologies only assemble life cycle inventories, quantifying *emissions* to the environment (or use of resources) rather than *effects* (or impacts) on environmental quality. When relying on LCA data, this section uses a similar approach.

Though LCA is increasingly applied to energy technologies, some methodological challenges persist (Udo de Haes and Heijungs, 2007). These include allocation of multi-process inputs and outputs, potential for multiple-counting when assessing large interconnected energy systems (Lenzen, 2009), and assumptions regarding the background system (Curran et al 2005; Weidema and Ekvall 2009; Brander et al 2008). For process based LCA, lack of completeness owing to the setting of a fixed system boundary has been shown by multi regression analysis (Lenzen and Munksgaard, 2002; Lenzen, 2008).

A key limitation to attributional LCA in the context of energy technology is its lack of consideration of effects in market-related sectors not directly included in the supply chain of the system of interest. An approach to better reflect the dynamic interdependencies within the energy system and between the energy system and other economic sectors is the recently developed consequential LCA, which considers the marginal effects of implementing a technology, *and*

1 displacing and changing the operation of other technologies, as reflected by market dynamic interactions  
2 between technologies and industries (Rebitzer et al (2004), Finnveden et al (2009) and Brander et al  
3 (2008)).

4 For electricity generation, this approach is central in two ways. First, attributional LCAs look at the  
5 electricity generating facility in isolation, excluding relevant systemic changes that might result  
6 from the decision to instal additional renewable capacity. For instance, for variable renewable  
7 energy sources such as wind and PV, the variability and limited predictability leads to an  
8 increased need for balancing reserves and efficiency penalties for the remaining conventional  
9 power plants (Pehnt, Oeser et al. 2008, Gross et al. (2007).

10 Second, characteristics of the background energy system (e.g., its carbon intensity) particularly  
11 affect LCAs of most renewable energy technologies, since their life-cycle impacts stem almost  
12 entirely from component manufacturing (e.g. (Lenzen and Wachsman, 2004).

13 Variability in published LCA results can be substantial (as seen for example in Figure 9.3.11),  
14 partly due to variation in spatial and temporal aspects of the analysed system (e.g. background  
15 energy system, the energy resource and geographic context), as well as technology  
16 characteristics (e.g., design, capacity factor, variability, service lifetime and vintage). Differences  
17 in LCA technique (e.g. process based LCA, or hybrid input-output LCA) and central methods  
18 and assumptions (e.g., co-product allocation, avoided emissions, study scope) are also important.

19 Given these significant caveats, emphasis will be placed on the underlying reasons for  
20 uncertainties and variations when describing the results for selected energy technologies.

21 The discussion presented here cannot take the place of an evaluation of local impacts in the  
22 context in which a technology is meant to be deployed. Such evaluations are critical for  
23 accomplishing sustainable development with minimal environmental harm. Still the knowledge  
24 of aggregate emissions to the environment enables comparison between technologies on a global  
25 and generic level, if limitations are transparent and well understood.

## 26 **Energy payback [TSU: will go into a box]**

27 The role of high quality energy sources for the development of modern civilizations is widely  
28 recognized. The energy return on energy invested (EROEI) and similar concepts are used as a  
29 measure for the ability of technologies or fuels to supply the energy needs of modern societies.  
30 In the following, we characterise the balance between the energy expended for the manufacture,  
31 operation and decommissioning of electricity generating plants (the “embodied” energy) and  
32 their energy output in terms of an energy payback time (EPT), ie the operational time it would  
33 take the technology to recuperate its own embodied energy. For combustion technologies, this  
34 includes the energy requirements of fuel extraction and processing, but not the energy content of  
35 the fuel itself. The EPT is closely related to other common metrics such as the Energy Ratio  
36 (ER), the Energy Payback (EP), or the Energy Return On Energy Investment (EROEI). The latter  
37 quantities depend on assumptions about the expected lifetime of a plant, which is also shown  
38 below. For some renewable energy technologies, e.g. wind and PV, EPT have been declining  
39 rapidly over the last years due to technological advances and economies of scale. Thermal power  
40 technologies are characterised by the ongoing energy requirements for fuel extraction and  
41 processing, ultimately resulting in higher EPT. This might become of increasing importance with  
42 declining qualities of conventional fuel supply, and increasing shares of unconventional fuels  
43 (Farrell, 2006) (Gagnon, 2008b), Lenzen 2008.

1 All values in Table 9.3.6 vary with LCA methodology, scope, plant vintage, and assumed plant  
 2 lifetime. In addition, the capacity factor has a major bearing on the energy payback time in  
 3 particular of variable renewable energy technologies. Apart from these common parameters, the  
 4 ranges in Table 9.3.6 are mainly caused by variations in:

- 5 • fuel characteristics (for example coal moisture), cooling method, ambient and cooling  
 6 water temperatures, and load fluctuations (coal and gas),
- 7 • ore grades and enrichment technology (nuclear),
- 8 • crystalline or amorphous silicone materials (PV),
- 9 • power rating (wind), and
- 10 • storage capacity and design (concentrating solar).

11 **Table 9.3.6** Energy payback times and energy ratios of electricity-generating technologies  
 12 (derived from (Lenzen 1999; Lenzen and Munksgaard 2002; Lenzen, Dey et al. 2006; Gagnon  
 13 2008; Lenzen 2008; Kubiszewski, Cleveland et al. 2010)).

Technology	Energy payback time (y)		Assumed lifetime (y)	Energy Ratio (kWhel/kWhprim)	
	Low value	High value		Low value	High value
Brown coal, new subcritical	1.9	3.7	30	2.0	5.4
Black coal, new subcritical	0.5	3.6	30	2.5	20.0
Black coal, supercritical	1.0	2.6	30	2.9	10.1
Natural gas, open cycle	1.9	3.9	30	1.9	5.6
Natural gas, combined cycle	1.2	3.6	30	2.5	8.6
Heavy water reactors	2.4	2.6	40	2.9	5.6
Light water reactors	0.8	3.0	40	2.5	16.0
Photovoltaics	0.5	11.0	25	1.2	15.0
Concentrating solar	0.7	7.5	25	1.0	10.3
Geothermal	0.6	3.6	30	2.5	14.0
Wind turbines	0.1	1.5	25	5.0	34.0
Hydroelectricity	0.1	3.5	70	6.0	280.0

15  
 16 The low energy density of biomass-based energy has spurred a vivid and controversial dispute  
 17 about net energy yields from Biomass and its ability to supply a developed economy with  
 18 sufficient energy (e.g. (Cleveland, 2005), (A. Pradhan, 2008), (Cherubini *et al.*, 2009), (Pimentel  
 19 *et al.*, 2009), (Farrell *et al.*, 2006) Pimentel and Patzek (2008)). Due to this ongoing controversy,  
 20 including uncertainties about net energy metrics for bioenergy, and the very wide array of  
 21 resulting estimates, Biopower is not included in the Table 9.3.6.

22  
 23

### 1 9.3.4.1 Climate change

#### 2 **Life Cycle GHG Emissions of Electricity Generation Technologies**

3 This section synthesizes literature estimates of life cycle GHG emissions of electricity generation  
4 technologies powered by renewable and non-renewable resources, along with the current state of  
5 knowledge, and its limitations, regarding specific generation technologies and key drivers of life  
6 cycle GHG emissions. Figure 9.3.11 displays variability and central tendency in previously  
7 published estimates based on a comprehensive review of primary literature covering all regions  
8 of the world; literature collection, screening and analytical procedures are detailed in the  
9 Methods Annex as well as citations for all references used in Figure 9.3.11.

10 Estimates of GHG emissions associated with land use change (LUC) are not included in Figure  
11 9.3.11. LUC-related GHG emissions are especially important for reservoir-based hydropower  
12 and biopower technologies, and are areas of active research. Current estimates of LUC-related  
13 emissions for biopower systems, mostly utilizing lignocellulosic feedstocks, could increase non-  
14 LUC-related life cycle GHG emissions (EPA, 2010). However, relative to typical starch, sugar,  
15 and oil crops that are often used to produce biofuels, lignocellulosic feedstocks are likely to have  
16 lower or possibly negative (beneficial) LUC impacts (Hoefnagels et al., 2010; Fargione et al.  
17 2010) as they often enhance soil carbon and can have a smaller land displacement effect (US  
18 EPA, 2010). Nevertheless, uncertainties in their estimation are high relative to our understanding  
19 of emissions associated with the technology itself. For bioenergy systems, a text box in this  
20 section briefly summarizes the main issues of LUC, albeit with a biofuels focus; Ch. 2 provides a  
21 more detailed discussion on biopower systems. Ch 5 addresses the LUC issue for hydropower.  
22 LUC-caused GHG emissions from resource extraction for other electricity generation  
23 technologies (e.g., GHG emissions from soils exposed to air after mountaintop-removal coal  
24 mining (Fox and Campbell, 2010) or from oil production (Yeh et al., 2010)) are even more  
25 uncertain and less frequently studied than for hydropower and bioenergy (Gorissen et al., 2010).

26 The present review relies on attributional LCAs, whose methodological limitations, as discussed  
27 in the introduction to this section, should be kept in mind. In particular, the functional unit  
28 typically reported by electricity generation LCAs (unit of electricity generated) does not account  
29 for the quality of power produced, e.g., its variability, dispatchability and distance from load.  
30 Further, attributional LCAs, which the assessment of this chapter relies on, consider the  
31 electricity generation unit (EGU) analyzed in isolation from the system in which it is embedded.  
32 Impacts to the electrical system from the decision to add a new EGU can cause additional GHG  
33 emissions compared to the system without that unit. For instance, Pehnt et al. (2008) found that  
34 20 to 75 g CO<sub>2</sub>-e/kWh additional GHG emissions are caused by adding offshore wind to the  
35 German electrical system owing to operational impacts of wind energy, including the increased  
36 need for balancing reserves and part-load efficiency penalties for the remaining conventional  
37 power plants due to the variability and limited predictability of wind energy. A broad review of  
38 similar studies confirms the findings of Pehnt et al. (Gross, 2007). Similar impacts could result  
39 from the introduction of other variable generation technologies, and additional research on the  
40 general issue of systemic impacts could alter our understanding of GHG emissions attributable to  
41 electricity generation technologies.

42 In addition, understanding limitations to the interpretation of the distributions displayed in Figure  
43 9.3.11 is also important. The median value of published estimates does not necessarily reflect the  
44 likeliest or typical outcome for a given technology in any specific or set of deployment contexts.

1 Also, estimates collected from a review of published literature do not represent a statistical  
2 sample (of electricity generators, designs, applications, deployment contexts, etc.); therefore,  
3 statistical inferences should not be drawn. Finally, despite the depth of previous estimates for  
4 many technologies, cases outside the bounds of previous research can exist, so the range defined  
5 by the estimates reviewed here does not necessarily define the true minima or maxima for a  
6 given technology under all deployment conditions. Nevertheless, given the breadth and number  
7 of estimates available for many technologies and the broad agreement found under repeated,  
8 independent research, the state of knowledge for some technologies appears reasonably robust.

9 Based on estimates from existing research (Figure 9.3.11), life cycle GHG emissions normalized  
10 per unit of electrical output (g CO<sub>2</sub>e / kWh) from technologies powered by renewable resources  
11 are, in general, considerably less than from those powered by fossil fuel-based resources.  
12 Nuclear power exhibits a similar interquartile range (IQR; the range from 75<sup>th</sup> to 25<sup>th</sup> percentile  
13 values) and median as do technologies powered by renewable resources. The maximum estimate  
14 for many renewable energy-powered technologies (CSP, geothermal, hydropower, ocean energy  
15 and wind) is less than or equal to 100 g CO<sub>2</sub>e / kWh, although the number of references  
16 examining several of these technologies is small. The upper quartile of the distribution of  
17 estimates for photovoltaics and biopower extend 2-3× above the maximum for other RE  
18 technologies, as it does for nuclear, owing mainly to differences in system boundaries of the  
19 cited studies (nuclear) and cases of poorly performing production processes (PV, biopower).

20 Cases of post-combustion carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), shown as individual points in  
21 Figure 9.3.11, represent the emissions associated with the base technology plus CCS. As  
22 expected, their life cycle GHG emissions are considerably lower than the base technology's.  
23 Biopower with CCS displays significantly negative GHG emissions. It should be noted that  
24 although capture of CO<sub>2</sub> is well known and commercial, the geological storage portion has not  
25 been deployed at commercial scale. The time horizon considered in each study and assumed  
26 leakage rate during that period can influence the reported results and the ultimate magnitude of  
27 GHG emission reduction benefit of these technologies.

28 Variability in estimates of life cycle GHG emissions from the evaluated technologies is caused  
29 by both factors related to the literature review method and factors relating to specific  
30 technologies. Many studies examined multiple scenarios that yielded a range of estimates  
31 depending on, for instance, different methodological choices (e.g., co-product allocation, avoided  
32 emissions, system boundary), design permutations, geographic location, background energy  
33 system characteristics (e.g., the GHG intensity of grid electricity), technological characteristics,  
34 or technological vintage, all of which are considered here even though some could be less likely  
35 to occur than others. Both theoretical and empirical studies were included, also increasing  
36 methodological variability.


37 For combustion technologies (fossil fuels and biopower), variability is also caused by the range  
38 of real conditions over which these plants are deployed, most prominently the capacity factor, the  
39 combustion technology employed, carbon content of the fuel and conditions under which fuel is  
40 grown/extracted and transported. Biopower additionally is affected by assumptions regarding the  
41 BAU use of the biomass feedstock. Biopower from residues and waste can be considered as  
42 avoiding CO<sub>2</sub> and methane emissions when compared to, e.g., a BAU case of disposal in a  
43 landfill (labelled “with avoided emissions” in Figure 9.3.11). Variability for PV stems from the  
44 rapidly evolving and multiple solar cell designs, some of which appear to perform poorly in  
45 terms of GHG emissions. For solar, geothermal and wind technologies, the primary energy

1 resource significantly influences power output. Hydropower variability is partially based on  
2 differing GHG emission profiles of hydropower technologies (run of river compared to  
3 reservoirs).

4 The key drivers of GHG emissions from technologies powered by renewable and non-renewable  
5 resources differ by life cycle stage. For non-renewable technologies except nuclear, the vast  
6 majority of GHG emissions are emitted during fuel combustion, and thus are related to the  
7 carbon content of the fuel and the efficiency by which fuel energy is converted to electrical  
8 energy. For nuclear and RE technologies, the majority of GHG emissions are upstream of  
9 operation. Most emissions for nuclear and biopower are generated during feedstock production  
10 (biopower) or fuel processing (nuclear) and for other renewable technologies from GHGs  
11 emitted during component manufacturing and used in facility construction. The background  
12 energy system that, for instance, powers component manufacturing, will evolve over time, so  
13 estimates today may not reflect future conditions. Nuclear also has a significant share of GHG  
14 emissions associated with decommissioning.

15 The state of knowledge on life cycle GHG emissions from the evaluated electricity generation  
16 technologies was assessed and found to vary. This synopsis was based on an assessment of the  
17 number of references and estimates, the density of the distribution of estimates (IQR and range  
18 relative to the median), and an understanding of key drivers of life cycle GHG emissions. Life  
19 cycle GHG emissions from fossil-fueled technologies and wind appear well understood.  
20 Reasonably well known, though with some open questions or need for additional research, are  
21 those for biopower, hydropower, nuclear, some PV technologies and CSP. The current state of  
22 knowledge of geothermal and ocean energy is not as well understood.





1  
2 **Figure 9.3.11.** Estimates of life cycle GHG emissions (g CO<sub>2</sub>e / kWh) for broad categories of  
3 electricity generation technologies, plus some technologies integrated with carbon capture and  
4 storage (CCS). All estimates were screened for quality and relevance during a comprehensive  
5 literature review. See Methods Annex for details of methods and complete list of references.  
6 Count of estimates is greater than the count of references because many studies produced  
7 estimates based on multiple scenarios of deployment of the same technology. Counts are  
8 reported in parentheses for those technologies evaluated with CCS. Elements of the box and  
9 whisker did not consider CCS, and represent, from bottom to top: minimum estimate, 25<sup>th</sup>  
10 percentile, 50<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup> and maximum. Technologies integrated with CCS are shown as points.  
11 **[TSU: design will be optimized and harmonized among technology chapters and this chapter]**

12 **Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of selected bio- and petroleum-based transportation**  
13 **fuels**


14 Based on a review of selected life cycle assessment (LCA) meta-analyses and studies, this  
15 section presents literature-derived estimates of life cycle (LC) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions  
16 for liquid, road transportation fuels derived from petroleum and biomass. Existing biofuels (e.g.,  
17 sugar- and starch-based ethanol, and oil seed-based biodiesel and renewable diesel), and selected  
18 next-generation biofuels derived from lignocellulosic biomass (e.g., ethanol and Fischer-Tropsch  
19 diesel (FTD)) are considered.

20

1 LCAs of transportation fuels are generally conducted on a well-to-wheel (WTW) basis, which  
2 encompasses two major stages: the activities from feedstock production through processing to  
3 fuel delivery to the vehicle are referred to as the well-to-tank (WTT) stage while use of the fuel  
4 in the vehicle is referred to as the tank-to-wheel (TTW) stage. Here, only the WTT results are  
5 reported because this stage determines the differences between the petroleum fuels and biofuels  
6 considered here and because other chapters consider WTW comparisons. Since carbon contained  
7 in biofuels originates from CO<sub>2</sub> absorbed from the air through plant's photosynthesis, which is  
8 different from the fossil carbon in petroleum fuels, this "biogenic carbon" is counted as a credit  
9 in the WTT stage of biofuel production. Biogenic carbon is subsequently emitted during the  
10 TTW stage. The TTW GHG emissions are of similar magnitude across petroleum fuels and  
11 biofuels on the basis of 1 MJ of fuel combusted (ranging from 72 to 76 g CO<sub>2</sub> eq/MJ for  
12 gasoline, diesel, ethanol, biodiesel, renewable diesel and FTD) (CONCAWE, 2008; EPA, 2010).  
13 Given that the vehicle fuel efficiency (fuel energy required per unit distance traveled) remains  
14 virtually unchanged when biofuels (considered in this section) displace their counterpart  
15 petroleum fuels, the functional unit selected for comparative purposes here is 1 MJ of fuel  
16 available at the tank. Emissions from land use change are excluded for all fuels. (See Box on  
17 Direct and Indirect Land Use Change and Bioenergy in this chapter for a discussion of this  
18 topic.) Readers are encouraged to refer to Chapter 8 for a comparison of WTW GHG emissions  
19 of various fuels (including hydrogen and electricity) used in different vehicle configurations, and  
20 Chapter 2 for a detailed review of biofuel technologies and their LC GHG emissions.

21 Results from the meta-analyses and studies reviewed here suggest that both existing and next-  
22 generation biofuels have lower WTT GHG emissions compared to petroleum-derived gasoline  
23 and diesel fuels from a variety of sources (e.g., European, US, Middle Eastern, Nigerian,  
24 Venezuelan, and Canadian crude oil) (Figure 9.3.12). The range in WTT GHG emission  
25 estimates for petroleum fuels primarily results from variability in crude oil properties (e.g.,  
26 viscosity, sulfur content) and differing assumptions on oil production and refining processes  
27 (NETL, 2008). In comparison, the ranges in GHG emission estimates for biofuel pathways are  
28 much wider than those for gasoline and diesel fuels. The wide ranges in GHG emissions cited for  
29 biofuels can be attributed to many factors, including the types of feedstocks utilized, land and  
30 soil productivity, crop management practices, conversion process employed, source of process  
31 energy, and methodological choices in LCAs such as coproduct allocation approaches and  
32 definition of system boundaries (Williams *et al.*, 2009; Cherubini and Strömman, 2010;  
33 Hoefnagels *et al.*, 2010).

34 Although there is significant overlap in the ranges of WTT GHG emissions for virtually all  
35 biofuels, not all biofuel systems are equally efficient in reducing GHG emissions compared to  
36 their petroleum-derived counterparts. For example, Brazilian sugarcane produces more biomass  
37 per unit fertilizer and land than European wheat and US corn (von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007;  
38 Miller, 2010). Further, processing starch crops into ethanol requires higher energy input per unit  
39 output than making ethanol from sugar (Solomon *et al.*, 2007). As a result, ethanol from  
40 sugarcane has lower WTT GHG emissions than that produced from wheat and corn.



**Figure 9.3.12.** Ranges in reported WTT GHG emissions (blue bars) of petroleum fuels, existing biofuels and selected advanced biofuels derived from lignocellulosic biomass based on a review of selected literature. Biofuels exhibit lower WTT GHG emissions than petroleum-derived gasoline and diesel fuels based on the studies reviewed (without considering land use change). However, the magnitude of the differences between biofuels and petroleum fuels vary considerably, depending on many factors. [For corn and lignocellulosic ethanol (presented here as a combination of results for three feedstocks), results from Hsu et al. (2010) are presented separately using boxes and whiskers because their uncertainty analysis was more comprehensive than others. (In descending order, percentiles for the box and whisker are 95<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup>.) The red triangles represent the reference cases examined for corn and three lignocellulosic feedstocks (in descending order of WTT GHG emissions: corn stover, switchgrass, and wheat straw) all with performance projected to year 2022.]

[Sources for estimates plotted: (Wu *et al.*, 2005; Fleming *et al.*, 2006; Hill *et al.*, 2006b; Beer *et al.*, 2007; Wang *et al.*, 2007; CONCAWE, 2008; Macedo and Seabra, 2008; Macedo *et al.*, 2008; NETL, 2008; CARB, 2009; Hill *et al.*, 2009; Huo *et al.*, 2009; NETL, 2009a; NETL, 2009b; Hoefnagels *et al.*, 2010; Hsu *et al.*, 2010; Kaliyan *et al.*, 2010; Larson *et al.*, 2010; Wang, 2010)].

Note: 1) BD = biodiesel; RD = renewable diesel; FTD = Fischer-Tropsch diesel. 2) Ranges in the plot are indicative only, and do not necessarily represent the range of all possible fuel production pathways. The central tendency is not necessarily in the middle of the displayed range.

1 Estimates are reasonably comparable for biodiesel derived from European rapeseed and US  
2 soybean (Hill *et al.*, 2006b; CONCAWE, 2008; Huo *et al.*, 2009; Hoefnagels *et al.*, 2010).  
3 Without land use change, biodiesel derived from relatively new feedstocks such as palm oil and  
4 jatropha are estimated to have either similar or higher WTT GHG emissions than rapeseed and  
5 soybean biodiesel (Beer *et al.*, 2007; CONCAWE, 2008; Hoefnagels *et al.*, 2010; Whitaker and  
6 Heath, 2010). Palm oil biodiesel can have higher GHG emissions because organic wastes are  
7 traditionally disposed in lagoons where methane is released under the anaerobic decomposition  
8 conditions, and because palm requires relatively higher fossil energy input for processing the  
9 feedstock (CONCAWE, 2008; Reijnders and Huijbregts, 2008). For Jatropha biodiesel, GHG  
10 emissions can be higher than first generation biodiesel feedstocks because seed yield varies  
11 considerably under different climate and soil conditions (Achten *et al.*, 2010).

12 Significant uncertainties exist in modelling GHG emissions from lignocellulosic ethanol due to  
13 the lack of commercial production of both the feedstocks and the fuels; this is manifested by the  
14 much wider uncertainty range for lignocellulosic ethanol than that for corn ethanol (Figure  
15 9.3.12) (Hsu *et al.*, 2010). The narrower range shown in Figure 9.3.12 for lignocellulosic FTD  
16 compared to lignocellulosic ethanol may not reflect a lower level of uncertainty because fewer  
17 lignocellulosic FTD studies have comprehensively investigated uncertainty across the entire life  
18 cycle (i.e., uncertainty in all activities from feedstock production through fuel production to fuel  
19 use).

20

### 21 **Box - Direct and Indirect Land Use Change and Bioenergy**

22 Conversion from one land type to another directly and indirectly affects global land system GHG  
23 stocks and flows, and has been a significant contributor to global GHG emissions (Watson *et al.*  
24 1996 (Watson *et al.*, 1996; Le Quere *et al.*, 2009). Agriculture and forestry systems are important  
25 drivers of these land use changes (LUC), with energy systems being an additional stressor  
26 (Schlamadinger, 1997). While LUC can be caused by other energy systems (e.g., hydropower's  
27 water reservoir), focus on bioenergy results from its proposed greatly-expanded use and inherent  
28 connection to land use.<sup>6</sup> While quantifying GHG emissions from LUC is difficult, it is important  
29 to investigate and account for them. The potential GHG emission reduction benefits from  
30 increased use of bioenergy compared to fossil energy sources can be partially or wholly negated  
31 when LUC-related GHG emissions are considered along with other life cycle GHG emissions.

32 Direct LUC (dLUC) occurs when production of bioenergy feedstocks modifies an existing land  
33 use type, resulting in a change in above- and below-ground carbon stocks. dLUC-related GHG  
34 emissions are dependent on site-specific conditions such as the prior land use, soil type, local  
35 climate, crop management practices, and the bioenergy crop to be grown (Intergovernmental  
36 Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2006; Croezen and Kampman, 2008; Wicke *et al.*, 2008).<sup>7</sup> The  
37 conversion of certain land types (e.g., rainforest and peatland) can lead to very large GHG  
38 emissions while most others are within  $\pm 200$  g CO<sub>2</sub>e/MJ ( $\pm 200$  t CO<sub>2</sub>e/ha) (Figure 9.3.13). In the  
39 examples shown in Figure 9.3.13, the original land use is generally a more important factor in  
40 determining dLUC-related GHG emissions than the type of bioenergy feedstock planted. Any  
41 dLUC-related GHG emissions must be repaid over time before GHG emission reduction benefits

<sup>6</sup> Replacing dedicated biomass with biomass residues or wastes could avoid LUC, depending on BAU assumptions.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of direct and indirect LUC, more detailed review of published estimated of LUC and additional references.

1 for the use of bioenergy can accrue (Gibbs *et al.*, 2008). Results reported in Figure 9.3.13 are  
2 totals averaged over a 30 year time horizon. Not considered in the analyses reviewed here is the  
3 time signature of these GHG emissions (an initial pulse followed by a long tail) which are an  
4 important determinant of the climate impacts of GHG emissions.


5 Indirect LUC (iLUC) occurs when a change in the production level of an agricultural product  
6 (here, for instance, a reduction in production of food, feed or fiber induced by conversion of  
7 agricultural land to production of bioenergy feedstocks) leads to a market-mediated shift in land  
8 management activities (i.e., LUC) outside of where the primary driver occurs. iLUC is not  
9 directly observable, and is complex to model and attribute to a single cause. Important aspects of  
10 this complexity include model geographic resolution, interactions between bioenergy and other  
11 agricultural systems, how the systems respond to changes in market and policy, and assumptions  
12 about social and environmental responsibility for actions taken by multiple global actors.<sup>2</sup> For  
13 example, estimates of iLUC-induced GHG emissions can depend on how land cover is modeled.  
14 Models using greater geographic resolution and number of land cover types (e.g., more than  
15 pasture and forested land) have tended to produce lower estimates and tighter uncertainty ranges  
16 (Nassar *et al.*, 2009; EPA, 2010). Results also depend on the assumed size of the future  
17 bioenergy market. Despite similar evaluation methods, Al-Riffai *et al.* (2010) and Hiederer *et al.*  
18 (2010) report an LUC impact of 25 and 43 g CO<sub>2</sub>e/MJ, respectively, for a similar collection of  
19 biofuels partly because they evaluated different magnitudes of growth in the biofuels market (0.3  
20 and 0.9 EJ, respectively).

21 Despite challenges in modeling iLUC attributable to bioenergy systems, improvements in  
22 methods and input biophysical data sets have been made. Some illustrative estimates of LUC-  
23 related GHG emissions (direct and indirect) induced by several 1<sup>st</sup> generation biofuel pathways  
24 are (reported here as a range in central tendency estimated by several studies plus, in  
25 parentheses, an uncertainty range): 14 to 82 g CO<sub>2</sub>e/MJ (14 to 200) for U.S. maize ethanol; 5 to  
26 28 (-7 to 42) for sugarcane ethanol; 18 to 45 (11 to 68) for European wheat ethanol; 40 to 63 (10  
27 to 102) for soya biodiesel; 35-45 (22 to 67) for rapeseed biodiesel (Searchinger *et al.*, 2008; Al-  
28 Riffai *et al.*, 2010; EPA, 2010; Fritsche *et al.*, 2010; Hertel *et al.*, 2010; Tyner *et al.*, 2010).<sup>8</sup>

29 The wide ranges of even the central estimates reflect the uncertainty remaining in the estimation  
30 of LUC-induced GHG emissions from bioenergy systems, but in general point to a non-trivial  
31 potential impact of LUC. Thus, it is critical to continue research to improve LUC assessment  
32 methods and increase the availability and quality of information on current land use, bioenergy-  
33 derived products and other potential LUC drivers. It is also critical to consider ways to mitigate  
34 the risk of bioenergy-induced LUC, despite the considerable uncertainty in its quantification (see  
35 Chapter 2). For instance, sustainable development of bioenergy can be encouraged and ensured  
36 through the use of Agro-Ecologic Zoning systems (EMBRAPA, 2010) coupled with adequate  
37 monitoring and enforcement and site-specific evaluation of the carbon footprint of the bioenergy  
38 products.

---

<sup>8</sup> Estimates reported here combine several different uncertainty calculation and reporting methods and represent neither a comprehensive literature review nor, given literature limitations, an evaluation of all potential real world conditions.



**Figure 9.3.13:** Illustration of dLUC-related GHG emission estimates from selected land use types and 1st generation biofuel feedstocks. Each estimate indicates the GHG emissions from converting a certain type of land (i.e., vertically-oriented x-axis labels) to one that produces a bioenergy feedstock in a given region or country (i.e., horizontally-oriented x-axis categories). Data, typically reported as t CO<sub>2</sub>e / ha (shown as single red points), are taken from (Hoefnagels et al., 2010) and (Fargione et al., 2008). Where feasible, conversion to g CO<sub>2</sub>e/MJ of fuel energy content (i.e. ethanol and biodiesel) (blue bars) is reported to facilitate interpretation of these data alongside other results reported in this chapter. Ranges in the perMJ results are based on different co-product allocation methods (i.e., allocation by mass, energy and market value). The results displayed here were developed using a limited set of methods and data sets not necessarily representative of the potential full range of results under all possible real world conditions. The time frame assumed to calculate the per energy content-based results was 30 years. Results can vary depending on this assumption; see Chapter 2 for more details on this and for additional dLUC estimates.

### 9.3.4.2 Water


Water is a critical resource with multiple, competing uses, and the implications of RE development on both water quantity and quality should be considered in the context of sustainable development. Compared with literature of other environmental impacts of energy technologies, the amount of literature on water-related impacts is relatively small. While some broad conclusions can be made based on the evidence and first principles, additional research is needed to confirm many of the results presented and fill gaps in knowledge. Impacts on water are discussed in two sections below: first on water quantity (use) and second on quality (pollution).

## 1 **Water use**

2 Two different metrics are needed to understand impacts of the energy sector on water quantity:  
3 withdrawal and consumption. Water withdrawal is the amount of water removed from the ground  
4 or diverted from a water source (but which could return to the same or different source), while  
5 consumption is the amount of water that is lost to the local water environment through  
6 evaporation, transpiration, human consumption, and incorporation into products (Kenny *et al.*  
7 2009). In 2006, the energy and industrial sectors (encompassing electricity generation, mining,  
8 refineries, and other industrial activities) accounted for 45% of freshwater withdrawals in Annex  
9 I countries and 10% of freshwater withdrawals in non-Annex I countries (Gleick *et al.* 2009).

10 Figure 9.3.14 depicts the high variability in operational water consumption rates associated with  
11 electricity generation units (EGUs), where technologies show greater agreement when organized  
12 according to cooling technology than by fuel type. Only operational water consumption of  
13 EGUs is considered in Figure 9.3.11 because for most technologies (excluding bioenergy and  
14 non-thermal renewables) this life cycle phase has the highest rate of consumption and because  
15 consumption data in other life cycle stages are scarce (Fthenakis and Kim 2010). Data are from  
16 studies of U.S. systems only, but represent a wide range of technology vintages and climatic  
17 conditions, both of which can affect water use rates (Miller *et al.* 1992), and thus their results  
18 should apply to other contexts.

19 Based on this evidence and first principles, non-thermal technologies are found to have the  
20 lowest operational consumptive water use. On a life cycle basis, these technologies also have  
21 been reported to have the lowest water withdrawals per unit electricity generated (Fthenakis and  
22 Kim 2010). Water may be occasionally required for cleaning purposes, but this use is minimal  
23 compared to that for cooling requirements in thermal technologies (Fthenakis and Kim 2010,  
24 Tsoutsos *et al.*, 2005). Water consumption varies widely both within some cooling technology  
25 categories, but especially across technology categories. Decisions to use one cooling system  
26 instead of another are often site specific and are based on the availability of water, local  
27 environmental impacts, water quality impacts, parasitic energy loads, costs, and other  
28 considerations (Reynolds 1980). Not shown in Figure 9.3.11 because of their complexity,  
29 geothermal water requirements depend on technology types, cooling systems, and whether  
30 geothermal steam condensate (process water), freshwater or treated municipal wastewater  
31 sources are used for cooling requirements. Geothermal operational water consumption has been  
32 estimated to range from 0 to 15 m<sup>3</sup>/MWh output (Fthenakis and Kim 2010). While Figure 9.3.14  
33 shows negligible operational water consumption for in-stream hydroelectric facilities, substantial  
34 evaporation can occur from hydroelectric power production if reservoirs are used, resulting in  
35 evaporative rates estimated to be as high as 208.5 m<sup>3</sup>/MWh generated in Southwestern desert  
36 regions of the U.S. (Torcellini *et al.* 2003). However, reservoirs often serve other purposes  
37 besides power production (e.g., flood control, freshwater supply, and recreation), such that it is  
38 challenging to apportion the water evaporated from reservoirs amongst the various uses  
39 (Torcellini *et al.* 2003).



1 **Figure 9.3.14** Ranges of rates of operational water consumption by thermal and non-thermal  
 2 electricity generating technologies based on a review of available literature ( $m^3/MWh$ ).  
 3 Technologies powered by renewable resources display their midpoint of available estimates (or  
 4 single estimates) in red squares; those powered by non-renewable resources use blue  
 5 diamonds. The green endpoints of ranges represent absolute minima and maxima from  
 6 available literature. Data are reported mainly for technologies deployed in the United States, but  
 7 are likely applicable to many other locations. “n” represents the number of estimates reported in  
 8 the number of sources. Methods and references used in this literature review are reported in the  
 9 Methods Annex. (CSP: concentrated solar power. CCS: carbon capture and storage. IGCC:  
 10 integrated gasification combined cycle. CC: combined cycle. PV: photovoltaic )  
 11

12 Life cycle assessments of water quality and quantity impacts are complicated by the highly  
 13 localized nature of water impacts and the different basins from which water is used throughout  
 14 the life cycle. Biopower is a primary example of this limitation, where more water is generally  
 15 required for feedstock production than for power generation, though the biopower feedstock and  
 16 the methods used to produce and process the feedstock differ by location and could change  
 17 throughout the lifetime of the plant (Stone *et al.* 2010, Berndes 2002, Berndes 2008). In addition,  
 18 the allocation of water consumed to the portion of biomass used for energy production may vary  
 19 significantly depending on the allocation methods used (Singh and Kumar 2010). Water  
 20 consumption for hydropower is another technology where estimates of water consumption vary  
 21 considerably depending on assumptions about reservoir-specific characteristics and the  
 22 allocation scheme for multiple use reservoirs (Gleick 1993, Torcellini 2003).

23 Water will become an increasingly important consideration for renewable and non-renewable  
 24 energy sources given expected changes in the climate. Climate change may impact freshwater  
 25 availability for all portions of the life cycle, but thermal-based plants may be especially



1 vulnerable due to their dependence on water resources throughout their operational lifetime  
2 (Bates *et al.* 2008; Dai 2010). Reduced levels in bodies of water, or substantial increases in the  
3 temperature of these water bodies, may require thermal power plants to run at lower capacities or  
4 to shut down completely (Poumadère *et al.* 2005). Additionally, increases in temperatures may  
5 lead to reduced plant-level thermal efficiency and cooling system performance, resulting in an  
6 increase in water consumption per unit of electricity generated (Miller *et al.* 1992). Turchi *et al.*  
7 (2010) have found that *CSP parabolic troughs* located in hot, dry areas will have water  
8 consumption rates 20% higher than similar plants in a cooler area; similar research is necessary  
9 on other thermal-based power plants. Water levels in reservoirs and rivers may also be affected  
10 by climate change, which could alter the performance capabilities and output of hydropower  
11 (Harrison and Whittington 2002).


12 Water resource vulnerabilities of thermal-based power plants can be reduced by utilizing  
13 alternative sources of water, such as municipal wastewater, or by utilizing a dry-cooling system,  
14 yet there are cost, performance, and availability tradeoffs and constraints (EPRI 2003;  
15 Gadhamshetty *et al.* 2006).

16 Water is also required for the production of transportation fuels. Comparisons amongst  
17 bioenergy systems are complicated by the variety of metrics reported, which imply different  
18 system boundaries, and by the use of different functional units, for instance: water volume per  
19 energy content of fuel, water volume per energy content of feedstock, water volume per volume  
20 fuel, and water volume per vehicle distance travelled. A metric that is helpful in understanding  
21 water use impacts of biofuels is the water footprint, defined here as the total volume of  
22 freshwater consumed for feedstock production from natural and anthropogenic sources (Gerbens-  
23 Leenes *et al.* 2009). The water footprint can also be applied to other life cycle phases and other  
24 energy systems and fuels. The water footprint consists of three components: green water  
25 (precipitation), blue water (irrigation), and gray water (effluent or the amount of freshwater that  
26 must be used to dilute pollutants). Similar to producing energy crops for biopower, the water  
27 footprint of growing biofuel crops is highly dependent on the crop, where it is produced, and the  
28 production methods utilized (Gerbens-Leenes *et al.* 2009, Harto *et al.* 2009, Wu *et al.* 2009).

29 Figure 9.3.15 compares the global average water footprint for ten crops providing ethanol and  
30 two crops providing oil for biodiesel, weighted by country production masses (Gerbens-Leenes  
31 *et al.* 2009). As seen in the figure, the water footprint of biofuels varies considerably by  
32 feedstock, with the total water footprint of ethanol produced from sugar beet requiring just 14%  
33 of the water of ethanol from sorghum. Also, with the exception of ethanol produced from  
34 sorghum, the water footprint of biofuels crops for biodiesel is nearly two to four times greater  
35 than the water footprint for ethanol crops. Because Figure 9.3.15 represents the global weighted-  
36 average water footprint for various feedstocks, it does not capture the great variability of the  
37 water footprint within each feedstock (Gerbens-Leenes *et al.* 2009). The water footprint of any  
38 feedstock is dependent on the local climatic conditions of where the feedstock is being produced,  
39 farm management practices, and by the crop species chosen for each feedstock, all of which may  
40 change from year to year. Thus the water footprint for an individual case may differ substantially  
41 from the weighted global average.

42 One factor not considered in Figure 9.3.15 is the water consumption that occurs during the  
43 processing of fuels. By various metrics, water consumption and withdrawal requirements during  
44 the fuel processing stage (including exploration and production of crude oil) are equivalent to  
45 twice as high for biofuels than for petroleum-based fuels, making the overall life cycle water

1 consumption intensity (i.e. the blue water footprint) of biofuels one to three orders of magnitude  
 2 greater than the water consumption intensity of the production of petroleum-based fuels (King  
 3 and Webber 2008, Wu *et al.* 2009, Harto *et al.* 2009). Despite the higher water intensity of fuel  
 4 processing for biofuels, water consumption during fuel processing represents the majority of  
 5 water consumption for petroleum-based fuels, yet is generally a negligible component of  
 6 irrigated biofuel water consumption demands, as these values are generally less than 1 L/MJ  
 7 (Berndes 2002, King and Webber 2008, Wu *et al.* 2009, Harto *et al.* 2009)



8  
 9 **Figure 9.3.15:** Water footprint of feedstock production for ten ethanol-producing feedstocks and  
 10 two biodiesel-producing feedstocks. Values represent global averages weighted by production in  
 11 main producing countries. The irrigation requirement (blue WF) is defined as the crop water  
 12 requirement minus effective precipitation, assuming that irrigation requirements are actually  
 13 met. The green WF of a crop (m<sup>3</sup>/ton) is the total green water use over the length of the growing  
 14 period (m<sup>3</sup>/ha) divided by the crop yield (ton/ha). The blue WF (m<sup>3</sup>/ton) is the total blue water  
 15 use over the length of the growing period (m<sup>3</sup>/ha) divided by the crop yield (ton/ha). Energy  
 16 content of feedstocks, used to convert reported WF (m<sup>3</sup>/ton) to final units of L / MJ, is taken  
 17 from Gerbens-Leenes *et al.* 2009. Values represent calculated average yields over 5 production  
 18 years (1997– 2001) (FAO 2008). Sources: (Gerbens-Leenes *et al.* 2009).

19 Water withdrawals, consumptive uses, and footprints will have localized impacts, and should be  
 20 considered on a site-specific basis. Regional water availability conditions will dictate the impact  
 21 of energy technologies on water resources.

## 22 Water Pollution

23 EGUs can affect water quality through thermal and chemical pollution during normal operation  
 24 and through accidents. These impacts can occur in many different stages of their life cycle.  
 25 During normal operation, EGUs utilizing once-through cooling systems can elevate the  
 26 temperature of water bodies receiving the cooling water discharge, which can negatively affect  
 27 fresh, coastal, and estuarine ecosystems (Barnthouse 2000, Kelso *et al.* 1979, Poornima *et al.*  
 28 2005). EGUs have been estimated to account for 75-80% of thermal water pollution in the U.S.  
 29 (Laws 2000). Hydroelectric facilities can have impacts on the temperature and dissolved oxygen

1 content of the released water while also altering the flow regime, disturbing ecosystems, and  
2 disrupting the sediment distribution process (Cushman 1985, Liu and Yu 1992). Operation of  
3 tidal energy facilities located at the mouths of estuaries could impact the hydrology and salinity  
4 of estuaries (Pelc and Fujita 2002, Vega 2002). Production of bioenergy crops can have similar  
5 water quality impacts as other row crops resulting from fertilizer and pesticide use, yet many  
6 energy crops require less water and chemical inputs for production than row crops (Lovett *et al.*  
7 2009, Paine *et al.* 1996, McLaughlin and Walsh 1998). Water pollution may also occur directly  
8 at ethanol plants from distillery waste discharges, yet these potential pollutant sources can be  
9 mitigated through existing anaerobic digestion technologies (Gaimpietro *et al.* 1997, Wilkie *et*  
10 *al.* 2000).

11 Geothermal facilities can affect both surface and ground water quality through accidents that  
12 result in spills of hazardous substances during exploration or hydraulic stimulation, the spillage  
13 of geothermal fluids at the surface during operation, leakage from surface storage  
14 impoundments, and through contamination of nearby freshwater wells by intrusion of polluted  
15 groundwater (Brophy 1997, Dogdu and Bayari 2005). Ocean thermal energy conversion  
16 technologies can alter local water quality through accidental release of toxic chemicals, such as  
17 ammonia and chlorine (Pelc and Fujita 2002).

18 Mining operations, fuel processing, and air pollutant emissions from the combustion of fossil  
19 fuels deposited to water bodies can also have considerable impacts on water quality. For  
20 instance, effluent from coal mining can degrade local water quality by lowering pH and  
21 increasing concentrations of solids and heavy metals; leachate water from overburden dump can  
22 also have high metal concentrations (Tiwary 2001). Effluent from uranium mining for nuclear  
23 power increase concentrations of uranium, radium, selenium, molybdenum, and nitrate in  
24 surrounding surface water and ground water (van Metre and Gray 1992, Kaufmann *et al.* 1976).  
25 Radioactive water contamination can also occur from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, but  
26 releases have been greatly reduced through regulation (CEC 1999). In the North Sea,  
27 reprocessing has been estimated to contribute orders of magnitude less to radioactive  
28 contamination than from off-shore oil and gas operations and fertilizer production (CEC 1999).  
29 Operational oil tanker discharges (i.e., dumping of oil during tanker cleaning operations) account  
30 for about 45% of the total oil pollution in the world's oceans, while ship and oil platform  
31 accidents contribute 5% and 2%, respectively (ESA, 1998). Air pollutants emitted from coal  
32 combustion can lead to acid deposition, a problem especially for countries highly dependent on  
33 coal such as China (Larssen *et al.* 2006).

34 Accidents from non-renewable energy sources can also impact water resources (see also 9.3.4.6).  
35 Hydraulic fracturing techniques to extract natural gas may result in local water contamination  
36 through accidental spills of fracturing chemicals (Kargbo *et al.* 2010). Spills from the extraction  
37 and production of petroleum fuel can also lead to accidents that affect both saline water and  
38 freshwater resources (Blumer *et al.* 1970, Kramer 1982).

39 Most countries have established strict limits and standards on water pollution, yet this does not  
40 always prevent accidents.

41

#### 1 9.3.4.3 Local and regional air pollution

2 This section presents data on selected air pollutants with most important impacts on human  
3 health – as indicated by the World Health Organization WHO (WHO 2006) – that are emitted by  
4 energy technologies, namely particulate matter (PM)<sup>9</sup>, NO<sub>x</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub> and non-methane volatile  
5 organic compounds (NMVOC). Their dispersion in the atmosphere entails significant impacts at  
6 the local and regional scale (up to a few thousand km) (e.g. (Hirschberg et al., 2004)). In contrast  
7 to GHG emissions, impacts due to these air pollutants are location-specific and depend on their  
8 overall concentrations in the atmosphere as well as those of further pollutants acting as reactants,  
9 e.g. for formation of secondary particulates (e.g. (Hallquist et al., 2009), (Kalberer et al., 2004),  
10 Andreani-Aksoyoglu et al., 2008). Air pollution also varies significantly between urban and rural  
11 areas. Therefore, cumulative life cycle inventory results, i.e. quantities of pollutants emitted per  
12 unit of energy delivered, must be interpreted with care drawing conclusions on potential impacts  
13 on human health and the environment (Torfs et al., 2007). These results can only act as basic  
14 data for the estimation of specific impacts (see section 9.3.4.4).

15 Also indoor air pollution (IAP) through high PM emissions caused by low quality fuels in  
16 traditional cook stoves constitutes a health hazard (see section 9.3.4.4). Black carbon, a fraction  
17 of total particulate matter emissions, can also have impacts on the global and regional climate  
18 (see Box on Black Carbon).

#### 19 **Box – Black Carbon**

20 Black carbon is a short lived air pollutant formed by incomplete combustion of fossil or biogenic  
21 fuels. Prime sources of BC are agricultural and forest fires, (diesel) combustion engines, in  
22 particular maritime vessels running on heavy oil, and residential use of fuel (Bond et al., 2004),  
23 (Lack et al., 2008). BC emissions are particularly high in developing countries. Asia is the global  
24 “black carbon” hot spot, with highest total and per/capita residential BC emissions (Bond et al.,  
25 2004). BC is emitted together with organic carbon (OC), and other aerosols like sulphates,  
26 mostly in the form of soot. BC has detrimental health effects (cp section 9.3.4.5), and can  
27 accelerate global warming through both its heat absorbing properties, and by reducing the  
28 Albedo of cloud, snow and ice surfaces (Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008). However, the net  
29 warming effect of aerosol emissions from combustion is source and location dependent, and still  
30 uncertain (Bond et al., 2004). Recent research suggests that contained combustion of fossil fuels  
31 and residential combustion of solid biofuels results in net warming (Hansen et al., 2005),  
32 (Jacobson, 2004), (Koch et al., 2007). In contrast, the net effects of open combustion (field fires)  
33 of biogenic sources are negative, due to higher ratio of reflective OC to absorptive BC aerosols  
34 (ibid.). Both processes play a prominent role in the formation of atmospheric brown clouds, that  
35 exhibit strong regional climate impacts (Ramanathan et al., 2005), (Ramanathan et al., 2007),  
36 e.g. alteration of the Indian Monsoon (Aufhammer There is evidence that atmospheric heating by  
37 BC and dust aerosols over the Indo-Gangetic Plain as well as BC deposition contribute  
38 substantially to snow-melt and the accelerated stationary decay of Glaciers on the Himalayan-  
39 Tibetan Plateau (Flanner et al., 2009, Ramanathan et al. 2007, (Lau et al., 2010)). Regional  
40 effects due to BC and other aerosols also include larger warming in the elevated regions of the  
41 tropics (Ramanathan et al. 2005, Lau et al, 2008, Gautam et al, 2009), and changes in location of

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<sup>9</sup> PM emissions are specified as PM<sub>d</sub>, where the subscript d indicates the largest diameter (in µm) of the particles that are included. Particles emitted by internal combustion engines are all very small and almost entirely included in the PM<sub>2.5</sub> measure.

1 tropical rainfall (Wang, 2004; Robert and Jones, 2004; Ming and Ramaswamy, 2009; Chung and  
2 Seinfeld, 2005).

3 Black Carbon abatement has thus been proposed as a significant means not only for Climate  
4 Change Mitigation, but also for addressing additional sustainability concerns such as air  
5 pollution, public health and energy services for the poor (Grieshop *et al.*, 2009). Providing  
6 alternative energy-efficient and smoke-free cookers and transferring technology for reducing  
7 soot emissions from coal combustion in small industries could have major impacts on the  
8 radiative forcing due to soot, while at the same time combating indoor air pollution and  
9 respiratory diseases in urban centers (Ramanathan et Carmichael, 2008). A switch from diesel to  
10 LPG in the public transport system in Delhi has resulted in substantial reductions in CO<sub>2</sub>(e)  
11 mainly by reducing the BC loads (Reynolds and Kandlikar, 2008). There is, however, a fuel  
12 penalty on most technologies reducing tail pipe emissions, like flue gas treatment and sulfur  
13 scrubbing for coal plants, or particulate traps on diesel engines (Boucher and Reddy, 2008).  
14 Removing the „masking“ effect of reflective aerosols might accelerate impacts of committed  
15 warming (Ramanathan and Feng, 2008), (Carmichael *et al.*, 2009).

## 16 17 **Heat and electricity supply**

18 Figs.9.3.16 show cumulative LCI results per kWh of end use energy for space heating and  
19 electricity generation systems at the outlet of the boilers and the busbars of the power plants,  
20 respectively (ecoinvent 2009; Viebahn *et al.*, 2008; Bauer *et al.*, 2009; Bauer 2008). In case of  
21 space heating, minimum and maximum figures represent the best and the worst technology  
22 option among the sample of datasets evaluated. Additionally, the type of fuel (e.g. wood logs,  
23 chips, or pellets in case of biomass) affects the results. The figures for solar heating are valid for  
24 a certain location in Europe, variation in solar irradiation is not considered in the interval shown.  
25 In case of fossil electricity generation, the results include country-specific average current  
26 technology and fuel supply for all European countries, but also for further selected ones, e.g. the  
27 US and China. Minimum and maximum figures therefore mainly represent the country with the  
28 best and worst power plant and pollution control technology, respectively. The intervals for PV  
29 and wind turbines are due to technology specific variations in the environmental burdens as well  
30 as different sites, i.e. different solar irradiation and wind speed, taken into account.

31 Neither heat and electricity distribution nor backup systems for stochastic electricity sources like  
32 wind turbines and photovoltaic modules are considered. Also the potential increase in the overall  
33 emissions of the power system due to a more flexible operation of fossil power plants as a  
34 response to feed-in of fluctuating renewable electricity is not taken into account.<sup>10</sup>

35 For electricity production and space heating with fossil fuels and biomass (wood) combustion,  
36 the dominant contributor to the LCI results in focus is the combustion stage with typically 70 to  
37 almost 100% share in the overall emissions (e.g. (Dones *et al.*, 2007), (Jungbluth 2007), (Bauer  
38 2007)). However, in case of long distance transport of coal, natural gas, and wood fuel, the  
39 transport stage might become more important (e.g. (Dones *et al.*, 2007), (Bauer, 2008)). In  
40 general, natural gas causes the lowest emissions among fossil fuels with SO<sub>2</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>  
41 emissions in a similar range as the renewables (except of wood combustion) and nuclear.  
42 Contributions of different sections of the energy chains as well as total emissions vary within


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<sup>10</sup> The latter effect is discussed in chapter 7, see this section for details.


1 orders of magnitude with power plant technology, application of pollution control technologies  
2 (flue gas desulfurization, particulate filters, etc.) and characteristics of fuel feedstock applied, as  
3 indicated by minimum and maximum values in Figs.9.3.16. Emissions on the lower end of the  
4 shown intervals can be expected for industrialized countries with modern technologies as  
5 opposed to developing economies with older technologies, less pollution control and hence  
6 higher emissions. Also lack of environmental regulation in developing countries results in  
7 comparatively higher emissions. Molina and Molina (2004) report outdoor urban air pollution in  
8 cities from industry, energy and transport that are up to ten or more times higher than in  
9 developed nations. However, air pollution abatement has gained importance since the early  
10 1990ies, in particular in China, resulting in a slowdown of Sulfur emissions in Asia ((Carmichael  
11 *et al.*, 2002)). The substantial potential of RE to contribute to air pollution abatement has been  
12 studied in particular for emerging economies Electricity and transport sector (e.g. (Boudri *et al.*,  
13 2002), (Aunan *et al.*, 2004), Creutzig 2008).

14 The non-combustion renewable energy technologies and nuclear power cause comparatively  
15 minor emissions, only from upstream and downstream processes. Also the variations in the  
16 results, depending on both technologies applied and site of power generation (in terms of e.g.  
17 solar irradiation (Jungbluth *et al.*, 2009) and wind conditions (EWEA 2004)), are in general  
18 much lower for renewables and nuclear than for fossil power and heating systems. The use of  
19 biomass via gasification shows clear environmental advantages compared to combustion of solid  
20 biomass. Although not considered in these results, the type of electricity used for the operation of  
21 the geothermal heat pump has a significant impact on the performance of this technology (Heck  
22 2007).

23



**Fig. 9.3.16a.** Cumulative life cycle emissions of NO<sub>x</sub> and SO<sub>2</sub> for current heat and electricity supply technologies according to (ecoinvent 2009; Viebahn *et al.*, 2008; Bauer 2008). Figures for coal and gas power chains are valid for near future forecasts (Bauer *et al.*, 2009). [TSU: Design will be improved and graphs merged in final edit]



**Fig. 9.3.16b.** Cumulative life cycle emissions of NMVOC and PM2.5 for current heat and electricity supply technologies according to (ecoinvent 2009; Viebahn et al., 2008; Bauer 2008). Figures for coal and gas power chains are valid for near future forecasts (Bauer et al., 2009). **TSU: Design will be improved and graphs merged in final edit**



## 1 **Transport fuels**

2 The environmental performance of biofuel based transport services depends to a major extent on  
3 the feedstock used and the production route of the biofuel. LCA results indicate that the overall  
4 environmental performance of biofuels can be by far better, but also clearly worse than the  
5 environmental performance of conventional gasoline and diesel fuels, depending on the certain  
6 type of biofuel (e.g. Zah *et al.*, 2008, Huo *et al.*, 2009). This high variability is mainly due to  
7 differences in the upstream processes of biofuel production, not in its use, i.e. combustion. In  
8 general, using biogenic waste materials like manure, oil residues, or solid biowaste as feedstock  
9 results in lower environmental burdens than using crops like corn or rye dedicated for biofuel  
10 production. Also the location of biofuel production can play a significant role: while conditions  
11 for ethanol production from sugarcane seem to be favourable in Brazil, cultivation of energy  
12 crops in the US and Europe shows much less environmental benefits. Use of gaseous fuels – both  
13 fossil and biogenic origin – tends to reduce air pollution compared to liquid fuels (Zah *et al.*,  
14 2008).

15 Effects of bioethanol and ethanol blends on tailpipe emissions have been examined by numerous  
16 authors with varying results (Costa and Sodre, 2009; Demirbas, 2009; Graham *et al.*, 2008; Hilton  
17 and Duddy, 2009, Liu *et al.*, 2006; Niven, 2005; Pang *et al.*, 2008, Park *et al.*, 2010; Roayaei and  
18 Taheri, 2009; Schifter *et al.*, 2010; Yoon *et al.*, 2009; Zhai *et al.*, 2010, Yanowitz and McCormick,  
19 2009). Fuel blends, combustion temperatures and additives play a decisive role for air pollutant  
20 formation (Ginnebaugh *et al.*, 2010), (Coelho *et al.*, 2006; Lucon *et al.*, 2005). Ethanol fuel can  
21 reduce overall PM fraction, but with elevated amounts of fine particulate matter, that are  
22 particularly detrimental for human health (Ferreira da Silva *et al.*, 2010). Biodiesel from certain  
23 feedstocks was found to reduce the overall life cycle emissions of PM, CO, SO<sub>2</sub>, VOCs and  
24 unburned hydrocarbons significantly. However, it increases nitrogen oxide emissions (Fernando  
25 *et al.*, 2006), (Coronado *et al.*, 2009), (Pang *et al.*, 2008).

26 Oxygenates from biofuels blended in conventional motor fuels (bioethanol and biodiesel,  
27 respectively in gasoline and diesel) are blamed for increasing evaporative emissions, leading to  
28 higher concentrations of tropospheric ozone, a toxic substance. There is a controversy on this  
29 matter, since it is possible to reformulate gasoline and diesel, as well as to use more advanced  
30 tailpipe exhaust control equipments (Schifter *et al.*, 2004). Second generation and future biofuels  
31 are expected to improve performance, when the combustion system is specifically adapted  
32 (Pischinger *et al.*, 2008), (Ußner and Müller-Langer, 2009).

33 Recent research (e.g. Notter *et al.*, 2010, Zackrisson *et al.*, 2010) and the ambivalent LCA results  
34 of biofuels suggest that future vehicle designs like battery vehicles or hydrogen based fuel cell  
35 cars offer a much higher potential for a clear reduction of air pollution (as well as other  
36 environmental burdens) due to passenger transport, if electricity from renewable sources is used  
37 as energy carrier.

### 38 **Box – Air pollutant emissions from ethanol fuel blends in Brazil**

39 Brazil has by far the largest experience on running higher blends and dedicated ethanol vehicles.  
40 Pure gasoline was phased-out in the early 1980's, when sugarcane ethanol replaced toxic lead-  
41 based additives (Coelho *et al.*, 2006; Goldemberg *et al.*, 2009). The National Alcohol Program  
42 (PROALCOOL), a reaction to the oil shock of the seventies, and the unstable sugar prices, lead  
43 massive investments into sugarcane ethanol production and development and manufacturing of  
44 pure ethanol cars in Brazil. As a result, the number of vehicles running on gasohol (E22, a blend

1 with 78% pure gasoline and 22% ethanol) and hydrous ethanol (E100) increased steadily  
2 (Moreira and Goldemberg, 1999). In 2005, flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) were commercially  
3 introduced, soon dominating the market and discontinuing the production of dedicated ethanol  
4 (E100) cars.

5 The use of ethanol fuels had positive impacts on urban air quality. Due to the ethanol blend, lead  
6 ambient concentrations in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region dropped from 1.4 mg/m<sup>3</sup> in 1978 to  
7 less than 0.10 mg/m<sup>3</sup> in 1991, far below the air quality standard (Goldemberg *et al.*, 2008)).  
8 Reductions in total carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons and sulfur emissions were significant,  
9 and ethanol hydrocarbon exhaust emissions are less toxic than those of gasoline, since they  
10 present lower atmospheric reactivity (*ibid.*). Reductions occurred also in PM and Volatile  
11 Organic Compounds (CETESB, 2010), (Goldemberg *et al.*, 2008). In some cases, ethanol fuel  
12 use entails more emissions of ozone precursors like NO<sub>x</sub>, and concerns have been raised by  
13 higher aldehyde emissions (Graham *et al.*, 2008) (Goldemberg *et al.*, 2008). However, while  
14 mass emissions are higher, Acetaldehydes formed by ethanol are less toxic than formaldehydes  
15 from fossil fuels (Coelho *et al.*, 2006).  
16

#### 17 9.3.4.4 Health Impacts

18 Energy generation impacts human health mainly due to **air pollutant emissions** caused by fossil  
19 fuel and biomass combustion (cf 9.3.4.3). A consensus has been emerging among public health  
20 experts that air pollution, even at current ambient levels, aggravates morbidity (especially  
21 respiratory and cardiovascular diseases) and leads to premature mortality (Wilson & Spengler  
22 1996, WHO 2003, Holland *et al.* 2005a). The largest contribution to the impacts comes from  
23 mortality due to particulate matter (PM). Another important contribution arises from chronic  
24 bronchitis due to particles (Abbey *et al.* 1995).

25 Significant reduction of mass emission of pollutants by deployment of RE should yield increased  
26 health benefits (though the relationship is complex).

27 Exposure to **indoor air pollution** (IAP) from the combustion of solid household fuels (coal and  
28 traditional biomass) is an important cause of morbidity and mortality in developing countries  
29 (Ezzati and Kammen, 2002). A recently published World Health Organization (WHO) risk  
30 assessment shows that more than 1.6 million deaths and over 38.5 million of disability-adjusted  
31 life-years (DALYs) were attributable to indoor smoke from solid fuels in 2000 (WHO, 2002;  
32 Smith *et al.*, 2004; Smith and Mehta, 2003). The WHO estimates did not include deaths from the  
33 cardiovascular diseases as a result of ambient air pollution due to lack of epidemiologic studies.  
34 There are also robust findings that tie cataract to IAP (Pokhrel *et al.*, 2005).

35 Regarding contaminant concentrations, traditional biomass based fuels yield worse result  
36 compared to charcoal or coal for simple cookstoves ((Zhang and Smith, 2007), Bailis *et al.*  
37 (2005), (Oanh *et al.*, 1999). The overall impacts of improved technology and ventilation is  
38 dominant for mitigating effects especially on children across all fuel types (Palanivelraja and  
39 Manirathinem, 2009), (Bruce *et al.*, 2004), (Smith *et al.*, 2000). Modern biomass technologies  
40 (improved cookstoves, biogas) can yield health benefits without fuel switch.

41

42

## 1 **Other health impacts [references partly missing from Ref list]**

2 Health impacts of *hydropower* reservoirs are well researched (cf Chapter 5). Major health  
3 impacts are spread of vector borne diseases associated with the reservoirs itself and irrigation  
4 projects (Yewhalaw et al., 2009; Keiser et al., 2005). High concentration of populations and  
5 working migrants during construction phases have also raised concerns about for large  
6 infrastructure projects (ref WCD ch 5) Emissions of hydrogen sulphide emissions from  
7 geothermal plants can occur and and cause nuisance and health impairments ((Anspaugh and  
8 Hahn, 1979). Nuisance from noise has been an issue for *Wind* turbines. The frequency and  
9 volume of this noise can be controlled, but not eliminated by wind turbine design, and impacts  
10 mitigated by proper siting (Leventhall, 2006; Rogers et al., 2006).


11 Health impacts from radioactive pollution might occur for the nuclear chain, and also by  
12 radioactive releases (NORMS = normally occurring radioactive materials) from off-shore oil and  
13 gas operations and fertilizer production, but has so far been neither quantified nor compared for  
14 different pathways (ref.) Radon in high concentrations has long been recognized as a correlative  
15 of lung cancer, and poses a significant risk to workers in uranium mines (Ramsay, 1977), (Al-  
16 Zoughool M, 2009). Increased cancer risk of residents, particularly children, near Nuclear  
17 Power Plants, has been studied but to date remains an open question (Ghirga, 2010). Possible  
18 association between exposure to pesticides and adverse human health effects through numerous  
19 pathways is increasingly studied (e.g. (Faria, 2007),(Ritter L, 2006), (Colborn, 2006).  
20 Groundwater pollution by agrochemicals can also result in adverse health impacts, in particular  
21 for children. Concerns have been raised for Bio Energy feedstock production (Tomei and  
22 Upham, 2009), (Hill *et al.*, 2006a).

### 23 **9.3.4.5 Land use**

24 High land requirements are often cited as an important issue for renewable energy technologies,  
25 in particular for comparably diffuse resources like solar, wind and biomass (Denholm and  
26 Margolis, 2008), (Fthenakis and Kim, 2009). Depending on degree of disturbance and local  
27 conditions, human land use can entail substantial impacts, particularly life support functions of  
28 soils and Biodiversity (Dubreuil *et al.*, 2007).

29 A variety of metrics has been used in the literature to describe land use efficiency by renewable  
30 sources in terms of energy output per area occupied by the generating facility, or cultivated for  
31 Biomass feedstock, e.g. area occupied ( $\text{m}^2/\text{kW}$ ) and % effective land use (Rovere et al. 2010),  
32 land footprint ( $\text{m}^2/\text{cap}$ ) (Denholm and Margolis, 2008), land use efficiency (Trieb, 2009) and  
33 land requirements ( $\text{m}^2/\text{cap} \cdot \text{year}$ ) (Nonhebel, 2005).

34 LCA literature on life-cycle land use per energy output is very scarce. The impact category **land**  
35 **use** in LCA groups all intentional activities necessary to make land usable as a resource in  
36 economic sectors, distinguishing between initial land transformation ( $\text{m}^2$ ) and the following land  
37 occupation ( $\text{m}^2\text{yr}$ ), and including indirect land use of up- and downstream processes (Scholz,  
38 2007). Figure 9.3.17 shows life cycle land use (dividing total land area by lifetime) for selected  
39 technologies generating electricity, based on a recent paper by (Fthenakis and Kim, 2009).



1  
 2 **Figure 9.3.17** Life-cycle land use (direct and indirect transformation) for Electricity generation  
 3 technologies, on 30-years timeframe, square meters per GWh; Data from USA, Germany,  
 4 Denmark, based on (Fthenakis and Kim, 2009) **TSU: graph will be redesigned**  
 5

6 Due to the high continuous requirement of arable or forestry land for feedstock production  
 7 results, land intensity of Bio-Energy is significantly higher than for any other ET (Keoleian,  
 8 2005). Variations are substantial for different feedstocks and climatic zones.

9 For wind, wave and tidal energy, spacing between the facilities is needed because of energy  
 10 dissipation, as for solar PV to a minor extent due to shading. Thus the direct land or ocean area  
 11 transformed is quite large, but secondary uses, such as farming, fishing and recreation activities  
 12 are feasible (Jacobson, 2009). As the land cover change due to roads and turbine foundations  
 13 affects max 10% of the total wind park area, impacts are not proportional (Denholm *et al.*, 2009).

14 Solar PV can be roof-mounted, resulting in negligible land use during operation, while for  
 15 central PV plants and solar thermal installations design considerations can influence extent and  
 16 exclusiveness of the land use (Denholm and Margolis, 2008).

17 Geothermal generation has a very low above ground direct land use, which increases  
 18 considerably if the geothermal field is included for risk of land subsidence (Evans *et al.*, 2009).  
 19 Run of River Hydropower has the lowest land use impact of all technologies, while the values  
 20 for reservoir hydro differ greatly depending on the physical conditions of the site. (Gagnon *et al.*,  
 21 2002) reports values up to 200.000 m²/GWh **TSU: number under review** found in the literature.  
 22 The impoundment and presence of a reservoir stands out as the most significant source of  
 23 impacts (Egré and Milewski, 2002), with social issues such as involuntary people displacement  
 24 or the destruction of cultural heritage adding a critical dimension in particular for very large  
 25 developments. However, attributional issues must be reflected in the many cases of multipurpose  
 26 reservoir use (see Chapter 5.6 for details).

27 For conventional energy technologies, land use is dominated by upstream processes, depending  
 28 on type of mining operations or extraction (in-situ, leaching, surface or underground mining),  
 29 quality of mineral deposits and fuel, and supply infrastructure (Fthenakis and Kim, 2009),

1 (Jordaan, 2009). For coal and solid biomass power plants, handling and transport of large  
2 volumes results in significant land requirements. In the case of coal, waste disposal sites must be  
3 accounted for (NRC, 2010), (Hirschberg *et al.*, 2006).

4 Total land use of nuclear power is dominated by the metrics applied to waste-disposal sites.  
5 Above ground land transformation results in lower ranges than fossil fuel operations, dominated  
6 by higher space requirements during operation because of security cordons. However, the  
7 necessity to maintain depositories for nuclear waste shielded from access for a very long  
8 timespan (10.000 – 100.000 years) can increase the occupational land use of nuclear facilities  
9 substantially (Gagnon *et al.*, 2002), (Fthenakis and Kim, 2009).

10 The land requirements needed for establishment and upgrade of distribution and supply networks  
11 may vary with technology choice and is substantial, but not covered in the literature.

12 The assessment of impacts of land use is even more complex, with many methodological  
13 challenges yet to be solved (Scholz, 2007), (Dubreuil *et al.*, 2007). Categories and indicators  
14 discussed include landscape fragmentation (Jordaan, 2009), impacts on life support functions and  
15 ecosystems services, impacts on naturalness of areas, including the time necessary for  
16 regeneration after different types of use and impacts on biodiversity (Lindeijer, 2000), (Scholz,  
17 2007), (Schmidt, 2008).

#### 18 9.3.4.6 *Impacts on Ecosystems and Biodiversity*

19 Energy technologies impact ecosystems and biodiversity through various pathways, most  
20 evidently through (large scale) direct physical alteration of habitats in the case of Reservoir  
21 creation and alteration of rivers, surface mining, tidal barrages, waste deposits and land use  
22 changes associated with Biomass feedstock production and unsustainable harvesting.

23 The deterioration of habitats due to air and water pollution is largely associated with fossil  
24 energy technologies and mining (cf. (Jacobson, 2009). Thermal pollution is a serious concern for  
25 all thermal technologies, affecting aquatic life. Potential impacts of severe accidents in the  
26 extraction stage of fossil fuels are relevant (cf 9.3.4.5).

27 Scientific evidence for renewable energies impacts on biodiversity is varying: Effects of  
28 reservoir Hydropower developments have been studied extensively (Rosenberg *et al.*, 1997;  
29 IUCN, 2001; Fearnside, 2001; Craig, 2001; Rancourt and Parent, 1994, Coleman, 1996), and  
30 impacts are well understood (cp Chapter 5). In addition to habitat change due to reservoir  
31 creation, most prominent impacts are interference with fish migratory routes, changes in water  
32 temperature, variations in flow and chemical composition of the river, extirpation of native  
33 species through alteration of physical habitat or introduction of exotic species. Effects of Land  
34 use Change due to Biomass feedstock production have been documented and are severest in case  
35 of conversion of high quality natural habitats to productive sites (Searchinger *et al.* 2008, (Dauber  
36 *et al.*, 2010), (Firbank, 2008). Also, introduction of invasive species has been reported (Barney  
37 and DiTomaso, 2008), (Low and Booth (2007), Randall 2004), Sala *et al.*, 2009. Intensification  
38 of agricultural production has severe effects on agrobiodiversity and wildlife (Geiger, 2010).  
39 Biomass production exhibit similar properties, depending on type of feedstock and intensity of  
40 production, with perennial plants faring better than annual crops (Baum *et al.*, 2009; Schulz *et*  
41 *al.*, 2009, (Fletcher *et al.*, 2010). Bioenergy is also driving introduction and spreading of  
42 genetically modified species [ref. missing TSU].

1 For large scale *concentrating solar* power developments, concerns over impacts on fragile desert  
2 ecosystems have been raised, whereas for PV shading could potentially allow enhancement of  
3 biodiversity (Tsoutsos *et al.*, 2005).

4 Tidal barrages are potentially harmful to marine and coastal ecosystems. The change in water  
5 level and possible flooding would affect the vegetation on the coastline. The quality of the water  
6 in the basin or estuary can also be affected; with sediment levels changing the turbidity of the  
7 water, which can affect fish and birds (Mettam, 2005). Brackish waste water and polluted  
8 polyethylene membranes from salinity gradient energy (SGE) sites can adversely impact the  
9 local marine and river environment. For ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) technology,  
10 impacts of the up-welling effect of bringing nutrient-rich deep water to the surface on aquatic life  
11 needs further research (Vega, 2002).

12 For *wind* energy production, concerns over fatalities of (migratory) birds and bats have been  
13 reported in many regions of the world. However, the majority of studies have recorded relatively  
14 low mortalities (Masden *et al.*, 1996, (Desholm and Kahlert, 2005), and siting considerations  
15 account for migration routes (see also Chapter 7.6.2). For off-shore wind power farms, negative  
16 effects on marine mammals due to sound waves during construction are prevailing, while and  
17 positive effects were found in some areas has increased due to artificial reefs appearance (Köller  
18 *et al.*, 2006; Wilhelmsson *et al.*, 2006).

#### 19 9.3.4.7 Hazards and Risks

20 A large variety of definitions of the term risk exists, depending on the field of application and the  
21 object under study (Haimes, 2009). In engineering and natural sciences, risk is frequently defined  
22 in a quantitative way: risk (R) = probability (p) × consequence (C). This definition does not  
23 include subjective factors of risk perception and aversion, which can also influence the decision-  
24 making process, that is, stakeholders may make trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative  
25 risk factors (Gregory and Lichtenstein, 1994; Stirling, 1999). Risk assessment and evaluation is  
26 further complicated when certain risks significantly transcend everyday levels; their handling  
27 posing a challenge for society (WBGU, 2000). For example Renn *et al.* (2001) assigned risks  
28 into three categories or areas, namely (1) the normal area manageable by routine operations and  
29 existing laws and regulations, (2) the intermediate area, and (3) the intolerable area (area of  
30 permission). Kristensen *et al.* (2006) proposed a modified classification scheme to further  
31 improve the characterization of risk. Recently, additional aspects such as critical infrastructure  
32 protection, complex inter-related systems and “unknown unknowns” have become a major focus  
33 (Samson *et al.*, 2009; Elahi, 2010; Aven and Zio, 2011).

34 The energy sector is both a critical infrastructure and key resource for today’s society and  
35 economy. Its complex and interdependent technical systems and facilities make the energy sector  
36 an absolutely necessary element for the functioning of our information society (Rinaldi *et al.*,  
37 2001; Zio, 2007; Kröger, 2008). Thus, the comparative assessment of accident risks is a pivotal  
38 aspect in a comprehensive evaluation of energy security aspects and sustainability performance  
39 associated with our current and future energy system. Accidental events can be triggered by  
40 natural hazards (e.g., Steinberg *et al.*, 2008; Kaiser *et al.*, 2009; Cozzani *et al.*, 2010),  
41 technological failures (e.g., Hirschberg *et al.*, 2004; Burgherr and Hirschberg, 2008), purposed  
42 malicious action (e.g., Giroux, 2008), and human errors (e.g., Meshakti, 2007; Ale *et al.*, 2008).  
43 This contribution primarily compares risks from accidental events of different energy  
44 technologies on the basis of objective information focusing on societal risk measures (e.g.,

1 Jonkman *et al.*, 2003), whereas impacts from normal operation, intentional actions, violations of  
2 ethical standards, as well as voluntary vs. involuntary risks and aspects of risk internalization in  
3 occupational safety are not covered. Additional risk aspects that can potentially lead to accidents  
4 or pose a risk to the deployment of a technology are also discussed.

5 The risks of various energy technologies to society and the environment occur not only during  
6 the actual energy generation, but at all stages of energy chains (Hirschberg *et al.*, 1998; Burgherr  
7 and Hirschberg, 2008). It has already been recognized in the early 1990s that accidents in the  
8 energy sector form the second largest group of all man-made accidents worldwide, however in  
9 terms of completeness and data quality their treatment was not satisfactory (Fritzsche, 1992). In  
10 response to this the database ENSAD (Energy-Related Severe Accident Database) has been  
11 developed, established and continuously updated by the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) (e.g.,  
12 Hirschberg *et al.*, 1998; Hirschberg *et al.*, 2003; Burgherr and Hirschberg, 2008). The results  
13 here are focused on so-called severe accidents because they are most controversial in public  
14 perception and energy politics. A detailed description of the methodological approach is given in  
15 the Appendix.


16 First, two complementary, fatality-based risk indicators are evaluated for large centralized and  
17 decentralized technologies to provide a comprehensive overview. Fatalities were chosen because  
18 (1) fatality data is typically most reliable, accurate and complete (Burgherr and Hirschberg,  
19 2008), (2) reducing risks to acceptable levels often includes fatalities since they are amenable to  
20 monetization (Viscusi, 2010), and (3) actual or precursor events can provide an estimate for the  
21 maximum fatality potential of a technology (Vinnem, 2010). The fatality rate is based on the  
22 expected number of fatalities normalized to the unit of electricity production, which occur in  
23 severe ( $\geq 5$  fatalities) accidents. The maximum consequences are based on the maximum number  
24 of fatalities that are reasonably credible for a single accident of a specific energy technology.

25 Figure 9.3.18 shows risk assessment results of a broad range of currently operating technologies.  
26 For fossil energy chains and hydropower, OECD and EU 27 countries generally show lower  
27 fatality rates and maximum consequences than in non-OECD. Among fossil chains, natural gas  
28 performs best with respect to both indicators. The fatality rate for coal China (1994-1999) is  
29 distinctly higher than for the rest of non-OECD (Hirschberg *et al.*, 2003; Burgherr and  
30 Hirschberg, 2007), however, data for 2000-2009 suggest that China slowly approaches the rest of  
31 non-OECD (see Appendix). Among large centralized technologies, western style nuclear and  
32 hydro power plants have the lowest fatality rates, but at the same time the consequences of  
33 extreme accidents can be very large. Experience with hydro in OECD countries points to very  
34 low fatality rates, comparable to the representative PSA-based results obtained for nuclear power  
35 plants, whereas in non-OECD dam failures can claim large numbers of victims. For nuclear  
36 energy latent fatalities dominate total fatalities (Hirschberg *et al.*, 1998). New Generation III  
37 reactors are expected to have significantly lower fatality rates than currently operating power  
38 plants, but maximum consequences could increase (see Appendix). Finally, the Chernobyl  
39 accident is neither representative for operating plants in OECD using other and safer  
40 technologies, nor today's situation in non-OECD countries (Hirschberg *et al.*, 2004; Burgherr  
41 and Hirschberg, 2008). In contrast, decentralized renewable technologies exhibit distinctly lower  
42 fatality rates than fossil chains, and are fully comparable to hydro and nuclear in highly  
43 developed countries. Concerning maximum consequences, new renewables clearly outperform  
44 all other technologies because their decentralized nature strongly limits their catastrophic



1 potential. However, it is important to assess additional risk factors of renewables that are  
 2 currently difficult to fully quantify, but could potentially impede their large scale deployment.

3



4

5 **Figure 9.3.18** Comparison of fatality rates and maximum consequences of currently operating  
 6 large centralized and decentralized energy technologies. Fossil and hydropower is based on the  
 7 ENSAD database (period 1970-2008); for nuclear PSA is applied; and for new renewables a  
 8 combination of available data, literature survey and expert judgment is used. See Appendix for  
 9 methodological details.

10 Accidents can also result in the contamination of large land and water areas. Accidental land  
 11 contamination due to the release of radioactive isotopes is only relevant for nuclear technologies  
 12 (Burgherr *et al.*, 2008). Regarding accidental releases of crude oil and its refined products into  
 13 the maritime environment, substantial improvements were achieved since the 1970s due to  
 14 technical measures, but also international conventions, national legislations and increased  
 15 financial liabilities (Burgherr, 2007; Knapp and Franses, 2009; Kontovas *et al.*, 2010).  
 16 Nevertheless, very disastrous events like the one of the drilling platform Deepwater Horizon  
 17 (Gulf of Mexico; 2010; 670'000 t spill; (NIC, 2010)) cannot be excluded in future. Furthermore,  
 18 increased extraction of deep offshore resources (e.g. Gulf of Mexico, Brazil) as well as in  
 19 extreme environments (e.g. Arctic) provides an additional threat for accidents with potentially  
 20 high environmental and economic impacts.

21 Table 9.3.7 summarizes a variety of risk aspects that are not amenable to full quantification yet  
 22 because only limited data and experience are available or they cannot be fully covered by  
 23 traditional risk indicators focusing mainly on consequences.

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1 **Table 9.3.7** Overview of selected additional risk aspects for various energy technologies.

2

<b>Risk aspect</b>	<b>Affected technologies &amp; references</b>
Induced seismicity, subsidence	Oil and gas production, coal mining (Klose, 2007; Suckale, 2009; Klose, 2010b); hydropower reservoirs (Kangi and Heidari, ; Gupta, 2002; Klose, 2010a; Lei, 2010); geothermal (Bommer <i>et al.</i> , 2006; Majer <i>et al.</i> , 2007; Dannwolf and Ulmer, 2009); Carbon Capture and Sequestration - CCS (Benson, 2006; Holloway <i>et al.</i> , 2007; Bachu, 2008; Ayash <i>et al.</i> , 2009).
Resource competition	Biofuels (Koh and Ghazoul, 2008; Ajanovic, 2010; Bartle and Abadi, 2010) Reservoir Hydro (Wolf, 1998; Sternberg, 2008; McNally <i>et al.</i> , 2009)
Hazardous substances	Relevance for PV requires sector downscaling to allocate appropriate share of consequences (see Appendix) (Coburn and Cohen, 2004; Bernatik <i>et al.</i> , 2008)
Proliferation	Nuclear (Toth and Rogner, 2006; Yim, 2006)
Geopolitics, terrorist threat	Security and energy geopolitics of hydrocarbons and renewables (e.g. solarthermal) (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009; Giroux, 2010; Toft <i>et al.</i> , 2010; Lacher and Kumetat, Article In Press) Pirate attacks on oil / gas tankers (Hastings, 2009; Hong and Ng, 2010)

3

4 Induced seismicity has already been the cause of delays, and two major EGS projects in the USA  
 5 (California) and Switzerland (Basel) were even permanently abandoned (Majer *et al.*, 2007;  
 6 Dannwolf and Ulmer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2010). With the accelerating expansion of offshore  
 7 wind parks, the risk analysis of ship collisions with offshore wind turbines and the subsequent  
 8 implementation of risk reducing measures becomes an import aspect; although the frequency of  
 9 occurrence is low, the consequences could be large (Christensen *et al.*, 2001; Biehl and  
 10 Lehmann, 2006). Threats to renewable energy infrastructure and supply could become an issue if  
 11 large capacities would be installed in geopolitically less stable regions (Lacher and Kumetat,  
 12 Article In Press). Key issues for biofuels include potential competition with food production and  
 13 use of water resources (e.g., Koh and Ghazoul, 2008).

14 In conclusion, accident risks of renewable technologies are not negligible, but their decentralized  
 15 structure strongly limits the potential for disastrous consequences. However, numerous  
 16 additional risks should also be considered because they may play an important role in public  
 17 debate (e.g. risk aversion) and decision-making (e.g. policies).

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## 1 **9.4 Implications of sustainable development pathways for renewable energy**

2 In contrast to the foregoing section that focused on the impacts of current and developing RE  
3 systems on SD criteria, this section addresses the implications of possible future renewable  
4 energy deployment pathways with sustainable development. Hence, this section will incorporate  
5 the intertemporal concerns of sustainable development (see section 9.2). Since SD pathways and  
6 their interaction with renewable energy cannot be anticipated by relying on a partial analysis of  
7 individual energy technologies or particular regions, the discussion in this section will be based  
8 on results from the scenario literature that typically treats the portfolio of technological  
9 alternatives in the framework of a global energy system.

10 Two issues are essential for understanding the state of scenario modelling today. First, the global  
11 integrated assessment models in existence today were generated around a relatively specific set  
12 of tasks relating to understanding the effects of policy or economics on (1) the energy portfolios  
13 of fairly large world regions and (2) the emissions trajectories implied by changes in those  
14 energy portfolios over time. As expanding the models beyond these tasks can be challenging  
15 there is room for improving treatment of sustainability in the future.

16 A second and less tractable question regards the ability of the models accurately to model  
17 cultural dimensions of energy use and the impact of non-price policies on behaviour and  
18 investment. For example, van Ruijven et al (2008) argue that the some assumptions about energy  
19 transitions – such as a gradual increase and then a decrease in environmental pollution as  
20 incomes rise – are embedded in the current generation of models but could be avoided via  
21 technological leapfrogging.

22 This section will be structured along the lines of the four criteria laid out in section 9.2, i.e.  
23 sustainable social and economic development, increased energy access, enhanced energy security  
24 and reduced environmental impacts. The section will give an overview of what we can learn  
25 from the IAM literature with respect to the interrelation between sustainable development  
26 pathways and renewable energies. The aim of this section is twofold – first, to assess what model  
27 based analyses currently have to say with respect to sustainability pathways and the role of  
28 renewables; and second, to evaluate how model based analyses can be improved to provide a  
29 better understanding of sustainability issues in the future.

### 30 **9.4.1 Sustainable social and economic development**

31 This section discusses research results relevant to understanding the relationship between  
32 renewable energy deployment and economic development. The models used in this chapter  
33 generally focus on a strong macro-perspective and therefore ignore aspects like life-expectancy  
34 or leisure time that would be relevant for alternative welfare indicators compared to GDP, as for  
35 example the HDI. Therefore, this section will focus strongly on economic growth. In general,  
36 economic growth as such is an insufficient measure of sustainability, as it neither includes  
37 defensive cost, nor natural capital, nor does it specify intertemporal concerns (see section 9.2).  
38 Most IAMs that are covered in chapter 10 and thus also implicitly or explicitly relevant for the  
39 analysis presented here include a tentative strong sustainability constraint by putting an upper  
40 limit on future GHG emissions. More generally, however, the non-linear nature of low-  
41 likelihood high-risk impacts (related to strong sustainability) is insufficiently reflected. However,  
42 economic growth can be used as an indicative measure for future consumption path effects of  
43 deployment of renewable energies.

#### 1 *9.4.1.1 Sustainable social and economic development in scenarios of the future*

2 There has been an enormous amount of analysis over the past two decades on the costs of  
3 reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (see for example, IPCC WG3 1996, 2001 and 2007). These  
4 analyses are typically based on a variety of socioeconomic, technological, and geopolitical  
5 assumptions extending over periods of decades to a century or more. When a constraint is  
6 imposed on GHG emissions, welfare losses are incurred. These are usually measured in terms of  
7 GDP or consumption (a major component of GDP) foregone. Other concepts of welfare as  
8 discussed in foregoing sections of this chapter are usually not considered. Thus, at the heart of  
9 such calculations are assumptions about the availability, costs, and GHG emissions generated by  
10 those technologies used to satisfy energy demands – with and without a GHG constraint.

11 Unfortunately, until recently, such analyses have tended to pay insufficient attention to  
12 renewable energy technologies. This was understandable for analyses of the short-term where the  
13 options are limited primarily to fuel switching among fossil fuels, and conservation. But, even  
14 analyses with a longer-time horizon seemed to pay short shrift to renewables in their portfolio of  
15 energy technologies. As a result we know a lot less about the potential role of renewables than  
16 about more conventional alternatives such as nuclear, IGCC with carbon capture and storage  
17 (CCS), and nonconventional sources of oil and gas.

18 Although we still have much to learn, the analyses reviewed in Chapter 10 contain many useful  
19 insights and provide a good point of departure for further analysis. The chapter provides a  
20 synthesis of results from 15 energy-economy models used to examine a broad range of scenarios  
21 about the future evolution of the energy system. The models are initially calibrated to a set of  
22 “standard” assumptions regarding the characterization of three broad categories of technologies:  
23 1) renewables; 2) nuclear and carbon emitting technologies with CCS; and 3) freely emitting  
24 fossil fuels. Sensitivity analysis entails excursions from these “standard” assumptions.

25 Before turning to specific results several caveats are in order. Although there has been some  
26 attempt at standardization among models, these are by no means “controlled experiments”. For  
27 example, the models produce very different business as usual projections based upon non  
28 standardized assumptions about a variety of critical factors, such as how each model responds to  
29 changes in energy prices. This can have a profound effect on the energy system and welfare  
30 losses in mitigation scenarios. Even parameters that tend to be the focus of the analyses often  
31 differ across models such as constraints on nuclear and CCS. Moreover some but not all models  
32 use “Learning Curves”. That is, renewable technology costs are assumed to decline as capacity  
33 grows. Additionally, some models allow for biomass plus CCS. As this technology option  
34 generates negative emissions it can ease the transformation process and thus can lead to  
35 systematically underestimated cost of mitigation (Tavoni and Tol, 2010). All of this leads to  
36 considerable variation among models. Importantly however, the models basically agree on the  
37 fundamental insights.

38 The model comparison in Chapter 10 gives an impression of possible welfare implications of  
39 renewable energies. First note that, not surprisingly, there are GDP reductions associated with a  
40 GHG constraint, independent from a particular technology portfolio. Second, as the options  
41 available for constraining GHG’s are limited, GDP losses are increased. In general, it can thus be  
42 claimed that the losses increase with tighter constraints.


43 Some analyses determine the specific welfare implications of constraining renewable energy  
44 (Luderer et al. 2009, Edenhofer et al. 2010) for different levels of GHG stabilization. First, the

1 wide availability of all kinds of renewable energy technologies is essential to reach low-  
2 stabilization targets. Models used by Edenhofer et al. (2010) calculating a low-stabilization target  
3 (400 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq) do not find a feasible solution when constraining renewable energies to their  
4 baseline levels. Second, when relaxing the stabilization target to 550 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq, models  
5 involved in the study find a solution but show a significant increase of welfare losses compared  
6 to a scenario where renewable energies are fully available. A similar result is derived by a  
7 comparable study by Luderer et al. (2009), using different models. Third, four of six models  
8 analyzed in both analyses also show that constraining renewable energy has the highest welfare  
9 implications in comparison to other low-carbon energies, including nuclear energy, CCS and  
10 biomass (see Figure 10.2.12 in Chapter 10).

11 When other technologies are constrained, not surprisingly, the share of primary energy provided  
12 by renewable energies increases (see also analysis provided in chapter 10). With fewer  
13 competing options, renewable energy increases its share. At the same time, higher mitigation  
14 costs result in decreasing overall energy consumption.

15 The scenario literature provides little information about the role of different end use sectors.  
16 Luderer et al. (2009) for example find that the electricity sector can be decarbonized relatively  
17 fast (until the year 2050) due to the fact that many low carbon options are available, including  
18 renewable energies, nuclear energy and CCS. The result even proves to be robust when different  
19 low carbon technologies are constrained as well as for developed and developing countries. The  
20 transportation sector proves to be more difficult to decarbonize and shows a significant share of  
21 fossil fuels in all models in the long term up to 2100. This can be explained by a lack of cost-  
22 effective alternatives to oil (see also section on energy security) and limitations to the wide  
23 availability of biofuels (mainly due to land-use constraints). The electrification of the transport  
24 sector might be one alternative (see e.g. Turton and Moura 2007), which was however not  
25 explicitly covered in the analysis. Therefore the assessed role of renewable energies in the sector  
26 is limited.

27 Figure 9.4.1 shows the share of non-Annex I countries in global renewable energy deployment  
28 for different renewable energy carriers building upon the analysis rolled out in Chapter 10. As  
29 pointed out by Krey and Clarke (2011) in a separate review of this analysis, “much of the  
30 expansion of renewable energy production will take place in the developing world”. The fact that  
31 renewable energies are in large scale deployed in developing countries is particularly important  
32 because these countries have yet to go through their industrialization process. Even with huge  
33 advances in energy efficiency, their development process is likely to still involve substantial  
34 growth in energy consumption. The challenge of introducing a carbon-free energy system in  
35 developing countries is thus to make renewable energies (and other low carbon technologies)  
36 cost-competitive compared to conventional fuels. This could lead to leap-frogging the emission-  
37 intensive developing paths that developed countries have taken so far.



**Figure 9.4.1.** Share of Non-Annex I countries in the global deployment of different renewable sources in the long-term scenarios by 2030 and 2050. The thick black line corresponds to the median, the colored box corresponds to the interquartile range (25th-75th percentile) and the whiskers correspond to the total range across all reviewed scenarios (Krey and Clarke 2011).

Although global average indicators of welfare are valuable for exploring the general relationship between renewable energy, climate mitigation, and sustained economic growth, a great deal of interest centers not on global totals, but on the relative performance of developing and emerging economies. How might mitigation, and renewable energy in specific as part of a mitigation portfolio, influence sustained economic growth in these economies?

Mitigation scenarios do provide some insights into this issue at a general level. In general, scenarios indicate that the developing countries will need to take on an increasingly large and dominant share of climate mitigation over time, and that renewable energy deployment levels in these countries will, in general, be larger than in developed regions. In general, the same fundamental lessons about renewable energy, mitigation, and sustained economic growth at a global level are found in developing countries, only the forces are generally larger in non-Annex I countries than in the Annex I countries due to more rapid assumed economic growth and the consequent larger mitigation burden over time.

The underlying assumptions of models with respect to a global burden sharing scheme are however crucial for the regional mitigation costs. In general, global mitigation costs do not depend on the allocation of permits but there are significant regional differences depending on the allocation scheme. Whether developing countries gain or lose from mitigation thus depends crucially on how permits are allocated initially. This may also have an effect on convergence/divergence of developing and developed regions.

#### 9.4.1.2 Research Gaps

It should be stressed that the models used for the analyses mentioned above generally provide an incomplete measure of welfare losses because they focus on either GDP or consumption losses. As noted in 9.2, GDP is considered by most economists as a rather poor measure of welfare. However, the use of other welfare indicators proves to be difficult in IAMs as accounting for life expectancy or leisure time would in most cases require a significant higher macro- and micro-economic detail of models. Also, losses are measured at the economy wide level, which although

1 correlated with per capita GDP losses can be misleading. Finally, the models do not give an  
 2 indication of the distribution of wealth across the population. Is it concentrated among “a few” or  
 3 distributed more evenly across “the many”?

4 Beyond the general insights presented in the foregoing section, scenarios do not generally  
 5 provide strong assessments of many of the forces that might make developing countries behave  
 6 differently than developed countries; for example, differences in physical and institutional  
 7 infrastructure and the efficiency and effectiveness of economic markets. The modeling structures  
 8 used to generate long-term global scenarios generally assume perfectly functioning economic  
 9 markets and institutional infrastructures across all regions of the globe, discounting the special  
 10 circumstances that prevail in all countries, and particularly developing countries where these  
 11 assumptions are particularly tenuous. These sorts of differences and the influence they might  
 12 have on sustainable social and economic development among countries should be an area of  
 13 active future research.

14 **9.4.2 Increased energy access**

15 One of the fundamental bases of sustainable development is the expansion of energy services,  
 16 produced more cleanly, to those people who have only limited access to these services today  
 17 (Goldemberg et al 1985). While sustainable energy development entails a number of dimensions  
 18 (see Table 9.4.1), this section focuses particularly on what we might learn from different energy  
 19 scenarios about the future availability of energy services to different populations. Such services  
 20 include basic household level tasks (e.g., food preparation, lighting, water heating, water  
 21 collection, space heating, cooling, refrigeration); transportation (personal and freight); and  
 22 energy for commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture.

23 **Table 9.4.1.** Dimensions of Sustainability in Energy Scenario Modeling. Modified from  
 24 Nakicenovic et al 2000.

<b>Dimensions of Sustainability in Energy Scenario Modeling</b>			
Modified from Nakicenovic et al 2000			
	Dimension of Impact		
Measurable Category	Access	Environmental	Technology
Reducing relative income gaps	x		
Providing universal access to energy	x		
Increasing affordability of energy	x		
Reducing adverse health impacts		x	
Reducing air pollution		x	
Limiting long-lived radionuclides		x	
Limiting toxic materials		x	
Limiting GHG emissions		x	
Raising domestic energy use			x
Improving supply efficiency			x
Increasing end-use efficiency			x
Accelerating technology diffusion			x

25

#### 1 9.4.2.1 Energy access issues in scenarios of the future

2 Energy models have been used to evaluate and explore possible future energy systems for over  
3 three decades, but it is only in the last decade that analyses of energy access have been  
4 implemented in these models. Most energy models developed in the past are based on the  
5 information and experiences of industrialized countries; energy systems of developing countries  
6 were simply assumed to behave likewise (Shukla, 1995). In addition, for energy modelling the  
7 data of industrialized countries were historically extrapolated to low-income countries, with no  
8 change in the underlying assumptions, to assess scenarios for developing countries. However,  
9 there are fundamental differences between the energy systems of developing countries and those  
10 of industrialized countries. As such, models grounded in developed country experience, and  
11 using developed country data, often fail to capture important and determinative dynamics in, for  
12 example, the choices to use traditional fuels, informal access to the electricity grid, informal  
13 economies, and structural changes in domestic economies, all of which exert a demonstrably  
14 large effect on access in many parts of the world (van Ruijven et al., 2008).

15 Although these factors are important to analyse both the energy systems of developing countries  
16 and the dynamics of energy access, only a handful of energy models explicitly account for them.  
17 A comparison study of 12 well-known energy models by Urban et al. (2007) shows that there has  
18 been a progress in addressing these issues for application in developing country contexts. All  
19 models covered electrification (though not all explicitly), and most models had implemented use  
20 of traditional biomass and urban/rural dynamics. However, many of the models still lacked  
21 important factors such as potential supply shortages, informal economies, and investment  
22 decisionmaking. Some of these issues are being implemented into models. For example, to  
23 understand how to avoid supply shortage during the peak hours, a higher time resolution and  
24 daily load curves to allow dynamic pricing of electricity were added to a MARKAL energy  
25 model of South Africa (Howells et al., 2007). Similarly, to reflect an aspect of the informal  
26 economy in fuel choices, a non-commercial “inconvenience cost,” related to using fuels, was  
27 added to MESSAGE (Ekholm et al., 2010). Several groups have attempted to increase the  
28 distributional resolution, and thereby to capture behavioural heterogeneity, by dividing  
29 populations into rural and urban categories, as well as diverse income groups (van Ruijven,  
30 2008, Ekholm et al., 2010). Nevertheless, much more work remains ahead as access models are  
31 typically limited to cover only a region or country due to lack of information, or they only cover  
32 a part of the energy access issue, electrification or cooking fuel.

33 While models use such approaches to capture energy access implications, rural populations in  
34 developing countries will likely continue to rely on traditional fuel to satisfy their energy needs  
35 in the future. Income growth is expected to alleviate some of the access issues, but linking this  
36 growth with fuel transitions carries much uncertainty. A scenario analysis of India’s energy  
37 system in 2050 showed more than 10% difference in the future electrification rate depending on  
38 whether the GINI coefficients approaches the level of present day Italy or China (van Ruijven,  
39 2008). It is vital to have effective policies and major investments in order to achieve high a  
40 penetration of modern energy.

41 Electrification, grid extension or off-grid, is capital intensive and requires large investment. IEA  
42 estimates that investment of \$756 billion from 2010 to 2030 is needed for universal modern  
43 energy access by 2030, of which \$700 billion, or \$33 billion per year on average, is to  
44 accomplish universal electricity access (IEA 2010). If developing countries are not able to secure  
45 finance for electrification, the number of people without electricity is going to stay around the

1 level of today. The combination of the availability of the low cost traditional biomass and high  
2 initial investment cost for LPG will continue to make fuelwood the main source of energy for  
3 cooking. A subsidy will allow higher penetration, but it is more effective when it's coupled with  
4 financing. A scenario analysis on cooking fuel in India by Ekholm et al. (2010) show that  
5 without financing 50% subsidy on LPG is required for a full penetration by 2020, but only 20%  
6 subsidy is needed if improved finance is also offered.

7 Having access to modern energy is not a guarantee to the path of sustainable development. A  
8 shift to modern energy is sometimes a shift to fossil fuel, which is not sustainable in a long run.  
9 However, relying on traditional biomass such as fuelwood or charcoal could also lead to  
10 environmental problems of deforestation and forest degradation, depending on the source of  
11 biomass. To expand access to energy services in a trajectory of sustainable development would  
12 likely experience concomitant shifts toward energy supply technologies that produce less  
13 unwanted byproducts—carbon or other greenhouse gases, regional pollutants, toxins in  
14 manufacture or generation, and radionuclides. One aspect of such a shift would be an increasing  
15 fraction of energy supplied by renewable energy technologies, both on-grid and decentralized. In  
16 addition, there is a social aspect of energy use, which can lead to an unsustainable use of energy.  
17 To secure a sustainable use of energy, measures to alleviate environmental burden in addition to  
18 access to modern energy are essential. In an analysis by Howells et al. (2007) on the future rural  
19 household energy consumption in South Africa, a shift to electricity outside lighting and  
20 entertainment services only occurred in the scenario which puts cost on health or other  
21 externalities from local combustion emissions.

#### 22 *9.4.2.2 Research Gaps*

23 From a development perspective, any sustainable energy expansion should increase availability  
24 of energy services to groups that currently tend to have less access to them: the poor (measured  
25 by wealth, income, or more integrative indicators), those in rural areas, those without  
26 connections to the grid, and women, for example (Reddy et al 2000). From this perspective, the  
27 distribution in the use and availability of energy technologies, and how they might change over  
28 time, is of fundamental importance in evaluating the potential for improvement in access (Baer  
29 2008). Since expanding access requires changes in technology across all values of a variable  
30 (e.g., income), understanding the starting distribution as well as the changes over time is  
31 necessary to evaluate the potential increase in access in one scenario relative to another. A  
32 second confounding factor in using model output to evaluate changes in access is the inability of  
33 many models to capture social phenomena and structural changes that underlie peoples'  
34 utilization of energy technologies.

35 These two aspects – lack of distributional resolution and structural rigidity – present particular  
36 challenges for energy models. Models have historically focused much more on the technological  
37 and macroeconomic aspects of energy transitions, and in the process have produced largely  
38 aggregated measures of technological penetration or energy generated by particular sources of  
39 supply (Parson et al 2007). Such measures can, of course, be useful for making broad  
40 comparisons, such as the relative share of low-carbon energy across countries. However, an  
41 explicit representation of the energy consequences for the poorest, women, specific ethnic groups  
42 within countries, or those in specific geographical areas, tends to be outside the range of current  
43 global model output.



1 Future modelling efforts could potentially address some of the problems highlighted in this  
2 section. Currently, access can be only estimated via proxies to aggregate statistics. However, the  
3 relationships between these aggregate statistics and access are clearly not consistent across  
4 countries and could change over time. Therefore, if access is a concern, then energy models  
5 should incorporate the elements most likely to illuminate changes in energy access. Explicit  
6 representation of traditional fuels, modes of electrification, and income distribution could add  
7 some resolutions to this process. More fundamentally, linking these to representation of alternate  
8 development pathways could provide a more comprehensive view of the possible range of  
9 options to provide access. For example, a dramatic expansion of distributed off-grid electricity  
10 generation coupled with efficient devices raises the possibility that large grid connectivity may  
11 not remain as fundamental a driver of access as it has been in the past. RET, which is valuable in  
12 remote places due to conversion of natural energy source on-site, could play a major role in such  
13 scenarios.

#### 14 **9.4.3 Enhanced energy security**

15 As noted in Section 9.3.3, energy security (ES), like sustainable development, suffers from a lack  
16 of either a well formed quantifiable or qualitative definition. ES is often taken to be synonymous  
17 with oil imports. The focus on oil can be traced to the facts that not only are many countries  
18 potentially vulnerable to supply disruptions, but in addition, many developed countries  
19 experienced an oil supply disruption during the OPEC oil embargo of the mid 1970's. But, the  
20 real concern is not necessarily about oil, so much as, vulnerability to sudden disruption in energy  
21 supply.

22 All other things being equal, the more reliant an energy system is on a single energy source, the  
23 more susceptible the energy system is to serious disruptions. At the same time, it is important to  
24 note that diversity of supply is only beneficial to the extent that the risks of disruptions are equal  
25 across sources. To the extent that risks are not equal, it is generally beneficial to rely more  
26 heavily on those sources with the lowest and most uncorrelated risks.

27 There are two avenues by which renewable energy can affect ES: 1. Diversity of energy supply  
28 and thereby in energy suppliers' market power, and 2. Reliability of resources.

29 We begin by focusing on the oil market and then consider issues associated with variability in  
30 energy supply associated with RE.

##### 31 **9.4.3.1 Energy security in scenarios of the future**


#### 32 **Renewable energy, oil markets and energy security**

33 The role of renewable energy in reducing energy supply disruptions will vary with the energy  
34 form. Solar, wind and geothermal (SWG) energy is closely associated with electric power  
35 production. Reducing oil demand by increasing SWG energy supplies hinges on the ability of  
36 electricity to supplant oil. This happens in greenhouse gas emissions scenarios in the buildings  
37 and industrial sectors as a result of increasingly favorable relative electricity prices (as compared  
38 with non-use fossil fuel forms) in end use sectors. But, the demand for liquid fuels in the  
39 transport sector is highly inelastic and relatively little substitution of electricity for oil occurs  
40 without a technology breakthrough that makes electric power options competitive with liquid  
41 fuel transport options.


1 Bioenergy is another matter. Bioenergy is a versatile renewable energy form that can be  
 2 transformed into liquids fuels that compete directly with fossil fuel liquids. In reference  
 3 scenarios, liquids derived from biomass garner market share. The interaction between bioenergy  
 4 and oil consumption is highly sensitive to both policy and technology. In the presence of a  
 5 carbon price, bioenergy's competitive advantage increases. However the utilization of bioenergy  
 6 depends strongly on whether or not CO<sub>2</sub> capture and storage (CCS) technology is available.  
 7 Luckow, et al. (2010) demonstrated the sensitivity of bioenergy utilization to the availability of  
 8 CCS technology. Figure 9.4.2 shows two scenarios in which the concentration of atmospheric  
 9 CO<sub>2</sub> is stabilized at 450 ppm. In the left figure CCS technology is available, while in the right  
 10 figure it is not. If CCS is unavailable bioenergy is eventually all transformed into liquid fuels for  
 11 use as a substitute for fossil fuel derived liquids. When CCS is available, most bioenergy is  
 12 utilized in solid form by power generation with CCS – resulting in negative net carbon emissions  
 13 for the system. Bioenergy transformation to liquid form is thus reduced by the presence of CCS  
 14 technology and liquid fuel production is generally associated with the use of CCS in the refining  
 15 process to deliver net negative system emissions.

16 As was previously discussed in earlier sections and chapters of this report, bioenergy is subject to  
 17 indirect land-use emissions. There is a substantial literature on this point including Calvin et al.,  
 18 2010, Wise et al., 2009, Searchinger et al. 2008; Tilman, Hill, and Lehman, 2006; Edmonds et  
 19 al., 2003; McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Yamamoto, et al., 2001). Others have critically assessed  
 20 the interaction between bioenergy production and food prices (Wise, et al., 2010, Runge and  
 21 Senauer, 2007; Gurgel, Reilly, and Paltsev, 2008; Gillingham et al., 2008; Edmonds, et al.,  
 22 2003). Calvin et al., (2010) and Wise, et al. (2009) showed the importance of the policy  
 23 environment and in particular the valuation of terrestrial carbon stocks. Burney, et al. (2010) and  
 24 Wise, et al. (2009) both show the importance of traditional crop productivity in reducing  
 25 greenhouse gas emissions. Wise, et al. (2010) also show that absent continued improvements in  
 26 agricultural crop yields, bioenergy production never becomes a significant source of renewable  
 27 energy.

a) Biomass consumption by use (with CCS)



b) Biomass consumption by use (w/o CCS)




28 **Figure 9.4.2.** Biomass consumption by use with (a) and without (b) CCS for a 450 ppm climate  
 29 stabilization scenario using GCAM. Source: Luckow, et al. (2010).


1 While we generally think that the emergence of bioenergy as a major energy form would take  
 2 place in a market characterized by a large number of sellers with relatively little market power,  
 3 that is by no means certain. If the bioenergy market were characterized by a small number of  
 4 sellers, then buyers would be exposed to the same type of risk as characterize the global oil  
 5 market. This sort of risk to portfolio linkage is simply not explored by existing mitigation  
 6 scenarios.

7 In the scenarios calculated for the SRREN, the consumption and the price of oil decrease in  
 8 mitigation scenarios not as significantly as, for example, the consumption of coal. This is  
 9 because oil is majorly consumed in the transportation sector, and as electrification of the  
 10 transportation sector is not an option in most models, alternatives for crude oil, such as biofuels,  
 11 are a) difficult to generate and b) expensive (see Chapter 2). These scenarios therefore do not see  
 12 dramatic differences between the baseline and policy scenarios with respect to cumulative oil  
 13 consumption (see Figure 9.4.3a).

a) Global cumulative oil consumption



b) Share of oil consumed in Non-Annex 1 countries



14 **Figure 9.4.3.a** Conventional oil reserves compared to cumulative oil consumption in SRREN  
 15 scenarios (see also Chapter 10 for a more detailed discussion of scenarios) from 2010 to 2100  
 16 in ZJ for different scenario categories, i.e. baseline scenarios, category 3 and 4 scenarios and  
 17 low stabilization (category 1+2) scenarios. The thick black line corresponds to the median, the  
 18 grey box corresponds to the interquartile range (25<sup>th</sup> – 75<sup>th</sup> percentile) and the whiskers  
 19 correspond to the total range across all reviewed scenarios. The last column shows the range of  
 20 proven recoverable conventional oil reserves (grey box) and estimated additional reserves  
 21 (whiskers) (Rogner 1997)<sup>11</sup> b) Range of share of global oil consumed in non-Annex 1 countries  
 22 for different scenario categories over time.

23 Compared to the SRREN baseline scenarios the median of cumulative consumption decreases by  
 24 20% in category 3+4 scenarios and by 40% in low stabilization scenarios. To the extent that  
 25 imports also decline, countries would be less vulnerable to oil supply disruptions than in a

<sup>11</sup> According to Rogner (1997) proved recoverable reserves are between 5.7 to 6.3 ZJ. In addition to that estimated additional reserves range between 2.6 and 3.2 ZJ. The total consumption of oil goes far beyond that in most scenarios accessed for the SRREN, which directly imply the use of unconventional reserves as well as coal to liquid technologies.

1 reference scenario. However, oil still plays a major role in the mitigation scenarios. Based on the  
2 SRREN scenarios, ES discussions concerning oil supply disruptions that have been raised in the  
3 past will thus remain relevant in the future. For developing countries the issue will become even  
4 more relevant, as their share in global total oil consumption will increase in all scenarios,  
5 independent from the climate target (Figure 9.4.3b).

6 Furthermore, in scenarios that stabilize CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations, carbon prices generally rise to the  
7 point where unconventional oil supplies, such as coal-to-liquids and oil shales, which enter the  
8 market in reference scenarios (see, e.g., Figure 9.4.3 a), are dramatically limited in supply. On  
9 the one hand, this effect would limit the environmental concerns (such as water pollution) that  
10 are generally associated with unconventional oil production. On the other hand, depending on a  
11 country's domestic resource base, this could increase (decrease) energy supply vulnerability for  
12 countries with (without) endowments of coal and unconventional liquids.

13 The effect of a GHG emissions constraint with respect to conventional oil is also interesting in  
14 terms of consumption timing. Because conventional oil is relatively inexpensive to produce, the  
15 immediate suppression in demand, imports and the oil price to suppliers (consumer prices rise),  
16 is offset by an increase in oil use in later years. In other words, the effect of the cap in a CO<sub>2</sub>  
17 concentration stabilization scenario is to lower the peak in oil production and shift it further into  
18 the future. This has the effect of reducing near-term oil imports and increasing oil consumption  
19 in later years. As the allowable long-term CO<sub>2</sub> concentration declines, this effect is overwhelmed  
20 by declining cumulative allowable emissions. See for example, Bollen, et al. (2010).

21 The effect of ES policies on renewable energy and greenhouse emissions is also interesting. For  
22 example, based on a static general equilibrium model for the European Union to analyze trade  
23 flows to and from the former Soviet Union, Kuik (2003) showed that policies to subsidize the  
24 domestic production of bioenergy, simultaneously reduced fossil fuel CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and oil  
25 imports. However, Kuik concludes that the policy is not cost-effective in achieving climate  
26 goals.

### 27 **Renewable energy and energy system reliability**

28 Another source of energy supply vulnerability is exposure to unpredictable disruptive natural  
29 events. For example, wind power is vulnerable to periods of low wind. Of course, wind is not  
30 uniquely exposed to this class of vulnerability. Other energy forms such as solar power or  
31 bioenergy are also exposed to unusual weather episodes.

32 An important method for addressing energy supply stochasticity is holding stocks, which act to  
33 buffer the system (see section 9.2.2 for the example of oil reserves in the amount of 90 days of  
34 net imports that member countries of the IEA have to hold as stocks). An increase in the role of  
35 bioenergy would likely lead to the creation of bioenergy stocks – either in the form of stocks of  
36 solid fuel or bioenergy liquids – as a hedge against uncertainty of supply.

37 Renewable energy forms such as wind, solar and wave energy, which produce electricity, are  
38 generally not easily stored in their native forms. Energy supply variability can be reduced by  
39 increasing the geospatial diversity of supply. However, even distribution over very large areas  
40 such as the 48 contiguous United States does not guaranteed reliability. The system can also be  
41 buffered by a variety of storage methods ranging from hydro pump storage, compressed air  
42 storage, to battery storage.

1 The need to hold buffering stocks grows as the RE form garners increased market share. In all  
2 instances the need for storage introduces increased costs, which in turn dampens that energy  
3 form's competitive position in the market.

4 Future emissions mitigation scenarios are generally characterized by increased energy supply  
5 diversity, if for no other reason than mitigation generally decreases the contribution of fossil  
6 fuels, which continue to dominate the energy system absent climate mitigation. See for example,  
7 Clarke, et al. (2009) or Grubb, et al. (2006). This would be particularly beneficial for regions  
8 with fossil fuel demand that can only be met by domestic or external monopolistic suppliers.<sup>12</sup>  
9 Yet, market power in resource markets is typically not represented by global IAMs.

10 Since renewable energy deployment levels generally increase with mitigation in IAMs, there is a  
11 sense that the emergence of a relatively small share of many individual renewable energy  
12 technologies can be part of a more broadly diversified energy portfolio at the same time that  
13 mitigation is undertaken, an ES benefit.

14 It is important to apply the caveat that it is not necessarily clear that mitigation will increase the  
15 diversification of supply. For example, if the deployment of particular options is largely  
16 constrained or society chooses to focus most heavily on one option, such as nuclear power, then  
17 mitigation may not lead to substantial increases in supply diversity.

#### 18 9.4.3.2 Research gaps

19 The relationship between renewable energy and ES is characterized by numerous research gaps  
20 ranging from the lack of a clear quantifiable definition of ES to the existence of a focused  
21 literature on the relationship between RE and ES. Consideration of ES commonly focuses on the  
22 most prominent of ES issues in recent memory, for example, disruptions to the global oil supply  
23 and security issues surrounding nuclear energy production. However, ES issues go well beyond  
24 these issues. For example, the supply of rare Earth metals and other critical inputs could  
25 constrain the production of many (renewable) energy technologies. These broader concerns are  
26 largely absent from future scenarios of mitigation and renewable energy.

27 Generally missing from the literature is a focus on the relationship between ES and system  
28 reliability. An important aspect of deploying renewable energy sources at large scale is their  
29 integration into the existing supply structures. Systems integration is most challenging for the  
30 intermittent electricity generation technologies such as wind power, solar PV and wave energy.  
31 A first order proxy for the challenges related to systems integration is therefore the share of  
32 different intermittent renewable energy sources, mostly wind power and solar PV, at the global  
33 level (see also Figure 10.2.9). Again, those scenarios with high proportions of wind and solar PV  
34 on the grid implicitly assume that any barriers to grid management in this context are largely  
35 overcome, for example, through electricity storage technologies, demand-side management  
36 options, and advances in grid management more generally (see Chapter 8). This is a strong  
37 assumption and managing storage, back-up capacity, grid improvement and demand-side  
38 innovation costs will be essential to balancing variable renewable generation and ensuring grid  
39 reliability.

---

<sup>12</sup> The concentration of energy supplies in the hands of a small number of sellers means that that a small group has the potential to control access. Diversification of the set of suppliers is one potential response to reduce the potential for energy supply disruptions.

#### 1 **9.4.4 Assessment of environmental impacts**

2 In addition to evaluating alternate scenarios with respect to the potential contribution to energy  
3 access and energy security, any assessment of energy futures under sustainable development  
4 criteria must include a comparison of the environmental impacts of energy services. At a  
5 fundamental level, reductions in environmental impacts derive from increases in the efficiency of  
6 providing services or shifting to lower-impact sources of supply.

##### 7 *9.4.4.1 Environmental impacts issues in scenarios of the future*

8 As existing models include explicit representation of energy efficiency and energy supply mix,  
9 the scenarios they produce provide information on both of these dimensions of sustainability. In  
10 addition, several models have included explicit representation of factors that are linked to  
11 environmental or health impacts. For example, combustion of sulfur-containing coal without  
12 control technology can generate pollutants that are important at local and regional levels (e.g.  
13 SO<sub>x</sub>). This raises the possibility that a move away from sources of combustion would generate  
14 benefits not via reductions in greenhouse gas emissions but also via reductions in local air  
15 pollution. Several models include sulfate pollution and therefore provide the basis for some  
16 estimation of the health or ecosystem consequences of this combustion byproduct (van Ruijven  
17 et al 2008). In standard scenarios, however, the link between SO<sub>x</sub> emissions and consequences is  
18 not explicit. Bollen et al (2009) addressed this question by performing a cost-benefit analysis  
19 (using the MERGE model) that included both greenhouse gas and SO<sub>x</sub> reductions. They found  
20 that climate policy can help drive improvements in local air pollution but that air pollution  
21 reduction policies do not necessarily drive reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Shrestha and  
22 Pradhan (2010) performed a broader co-benefits analysis within a specific country case, linking  
23 the MARKAL model to a model of Thailand's energy system. They found similarly that climate  
24 policy would lower the impacts from coal combustion.

25 Another implication of some potential energy trajectories is possible diversion of land to support  
26 biofuel production. While this has been a topic of intense discussion, many models have until  
27 recently not supported explicit links between energy supply options and land use. Early attempts  
28 to address the links were focused on trade-offs across energy supply and food production  
29 (Yamamoto et al 2001) or used existing scenarios as a basis for estimating future bioenergy use  
30 (Hoogwijk and Faaij 2005). Subsequently these approaches were combined by embedding  
31 bioenergy modules directly into integrated assessment models (Gillingham et al 2008). Wise et al  
32 (2009) incorporated a geographically explicit land-use component into the MiniCAM integrated  
33 assessment model. They found that, absent a carbon price on terrestrial carbon, climate policy  
34 could drive widespread deforestation as land was shifted to bioenergy crops. Melillo et al (2009)  
35 incorporated indirect land-use change as well as agricultural inputs such as fertilizer into MIT's  
36 EPPA model. They found similarly that biofuels policy executed poorly would drive widespread  
37 emissions from land conversion, both direct and indirect, and also could result in substantial N<sub>2</sub>O  
38 emissions derived from improper fertilizer application. In both investigations, what might  
39 ostensibly have been seen as a "sustainable" energy scenario (i.e., the increasing use of biofuels)  
40 was shown to have potential consequences that contravened the principles of sustainable  
41 development.

42 Model scenarios therefore can be useful in demonstrating scenarios of potentially unanticipated  
43 (or at least unquantified) environmental benefits as well as scenarios of unanticipated or  
44 unquantified environmental costs. Other aggregate measures that could be amenable to analysis

1 under current scenarios include, for example, water use intensity of energy (m<sup>3</sup>/MWh) and land  
2 use (hectares/MWh). These could be linked to other dimensions of sustainability, such as loss of  
3 biodiversity or changes in food security, though the appropriate treatment of this link is not  
4 defined.

#### 5 *9.4.4.2 Research gaps*

6 Unfortunately, aside from the two linkages discussed above (land use and sulfur dioxide  
7 emissions), the existing scenario literature does not give explicit treatment to the many non-  
8 emissions related elements of sustainable energy development as, for example, water use, or the  
9 impacts of energy choices on household-level services or indoor air quality. These environmental  
10 aspects of sustainability depend to a much greater degree on the distribution of energy use and  
11 how each energy technology is used in practice. Analysing this with the existing models might  
12 be difficult since models have been designed to look at fairly large world regions without  
13 looking at income or geographic distribution. Existing scenarios rather enable users to compare  
14 the outcomes of different possible “futures” (O’Neill and Nakicenovic 2008) by allowing easy  
15 comparisons for aggregate measurements of sustainability – for example, national or sectoral  
16 greenhouse gas emissions. Although some models have also begun to allow for comparison  
17 across smaller geographic scales of impact, such as for regional air pollution and land use  
18 change, some environmental impacts remain opaque in the scenarios produced to date: the  
19 distribution of the use of traditional fuels, for example, can matter significantly for the health of  
20 billions of people (Bailis et al 2005). What these impacts are, whether and how to compare them  
21 across categories, and whether they might be incorporated into future scenarios would constitute  
22 useful areas for future research.

23

### 24 **9.5 Barriers and opportunities for renewable energies in the context of** 25 **sustainable development**

26 Pursuing a renewable energy deployment strategy is faced by the challenge to take all  
27 environmental, social and economic effects explicitly into account. Clear and integrated policy  
28 implementation and planning processes can support this by anticipating and overcoming  
29 potential barriers to and building on opportunities of RE deployment. In the context of  
30 sustainable development, there are socio-cultural barriers with respect to environmental concerns  
31 and social acceptance; information and awareness barriers, including capacity building; and  
32 market failures and economic barriers. Following the discussion of these barriers in section 9.5.1,  
33 section 9.5.2 focuses on how integrative approaches from the international to the local level can  
34 overcome such barriers to arrive at opportunities for renewable energy deployment that could  
35 entail a multi-dimensional progress for sustainable development.

#### 36 **9.5.1 Barriers**

37 Notwithstanding the strong linkages and consequent beneficial synergies between RE and SD,  
38 criteria for the latter may put additional constraints on the deployment of the first. In order to  
39 reap all sustainability benefits RE policy-making and deployment need to be embedded in a clear  
40 and consistent framework of sustainability strategies. This means that links to the three pillars of  
41 sustainable development have to be taken into account, so that RE policies as well as project  
42 planning, construction and operation are rooted in the specific social, economic and

1 environmental context of a given country. They should also remain aligned with multilateral  
2 environmental agreements (MEAs). Barriers identified in the following section have been  
3 grouped according to the overall structure, laid out in Chapter 1, and provide – sometimes  
4 overlapping – links to possible environmental, social or economic constraints or concerns that  
5 have been partly addressed in the report and should be taken into account during RE policy-  
6 making and deployment.

### 7 9.5.1.1 Socio-cultural barriers

8 **Environmental concerns** with respect to the deployment of RE have many different origins.  
9 Measuring and calibrating the necessary level of sustainability requisites is a difficult task, which  
10 can be supported by tools such as life cycle analyses, environmental impact assessments,  
11 strategic socioeconomic and environmental planning, land use zonings, certification schemes or  
12 overall environmental management systems. Perception and acceptance of impacts vary  
13 considerably with source, type of stakeholders or policies in place. One of the most commonly  
14 discussed impacts – but not necessarily addressed at local implementation level – are greenhouse  
15 gas emissions. For example, in the case of biofuels, life cycle GHG emissions should be at least  
16 lower than a fossil fuel baseline and should contribute to the minimization of overall GHG  
17 emissions. This is not always what occurs at the local level, as shown by the following examples:  
18 (i) land use clearing (deforestation or peatland conversion) to grow palm trees for biodiesel; (ii)  
19 fossil fuel intensive life cycles of some types of ethanol and biodiesel, due to local weather  
20 conditions and crop mechanization. (see also 9.3.4).

21 *Carbon leakage* and *indirect land use change* are complex and at the same time important topics  
22 to be considered. Discussions on indirect land use change are found in sections 2.4.4.2  
23 (sustainability frameworks and standards addressing unwanted land use change), 2.5.3  
24 (challenges related to estimating and modeling direct and indirect land use change from modern  
25 bioenergy); discussions on carbon leakage are found in sections 8.3.3.2 (the problem of energy-  
26 intensive industries moving to developing countries through green-field investments and the  
27 possible solutions brought about by sectoral approaches in international climate policy, reducing  
28 leakage risks and facilitating technology transfer, as well as financing of mitigation measures),  
29 11.6.7 (integration of RE-climate policies to reduce leakage risks). *Energy payback times*  
30 (section 9.3.4) reflect the input-output matrix of a given fuel, which can be affected by long  
31 distance transport, mechanization or production processes. *Waste products*, including local and  
32 regional air pollutants, are another topic worth of investigation (see section 9.3.4 on vehicle  
33 emissions). *Biodiversity impacts* associated with crop production are difficult to assess and may  
34 either represent a limitation (especially when there are pathologic case studies associated) or an  
35 impulse (when compared to conventional energy sources) to the deployment of some types of  
36 renewables (see section 2.5.3.3). The precautionary principle is applicable to assess the level of  
37 impacts on rare, vulnerable or threatened species, maximizing habitat restoration and protecting  
38 high quality habitats. Other criteria include the *extent of land, aquatic or marine area affected*  
39 (environmental footprint) and associated aquatic and terrestrial ecological impacts (soil, water,  
40 natural resource depletion). Concerns regarding the negative effects to ecology and landscape,  
41 for example, led to the failure or revision of several planned biomass energy developments in the  
42 UK (Upreti, 2004). Additional factors are *chronic effects* to human health (e.g. from toxic air  
43 pollutants, pesticides, genetically modified organisms, dioxins and furans, radioactive wastes)  
44 and the avoidance of exceptional natural and human heritage sites. This has proved particularly  
45 important in the context of wind farm deployments, where the main concerns relate to the scenic



1 impact and landscapes expected for the proposed sites (Wolsink, 2000; Wolsink, 2007b).  
2 Disregarding such concerns during the planning process can ultimately lead to the failure of  
3 projects (Upreti, 2004; Jobert *et al.*, 2007; Wolsink, 2010). Finally, but not exhausting the list,  
4 criteria for sustainability include respect for *land and land use rights*, and prior formal and  
5 customary *water rights*. Attitudes towards offshore wind farms, for example, depend on the type  
6 and frequency of beach use with regular visitors perceiving coastal landscapes as more pristine  
7 resources and thus less suited for industrial usage (Ladenburg, 2010). However, reasons for local  
8 opposition to renewable energy projects can vary significantly and may also depend on the  
9 methods used during the opinion elicitation process (van der Horst, 2007).

10 **Social concerns** include project acceptance and ensuring effective public participation. Similarly  
11 to environmental concerns, social concerns can constrain the deployment of renewables in  
12 different ways. *Displacement* issues, for example, are common in land-use intensive projects,  
13 such as large scale hydropower (Water Alternatives, 2010) and commercial scale energy crops  
14 (IIED, 2009). Other types of displacement are more related to nuisances, as is the case of noise  
15 from windpower turbines, or to changes in resource use and biodiversity in the area of the  
16 proposed project and the impacts this may have on the local community (Bosley and Bosley,  
17 1988). Economic compensation for displaced people may not be sufficient to cover housing  
18 replacement costs – and much less externalities such as losses in cultural heritage (Cernea, 1997;  
19 World Commission on Dams, 2000).

20 There are other types of displacement, such as that caused by environmental accidents, both in  
21 renewables (crop fires, dam bursts) and non-renewables (LNG plant explosions, oil spills,  
22 nuclear plant disasters). *Risks* differ from process to process – as well as its perceptions. Large  
23 scale, concentrated incidents and accidents, are usually more visible to the public awareness, and  
24 possibly also lead to displacement, than diffuse ones (e.g. several minor spills or other technical  
25 incidents) (see section 9.3.4.5 for a more detailed discussion). *Hazards* occur also at  
26 occupational level, affecting human and labour rights, e.g. in field crop work (ILO, 2010). Food  
27 security is another important issue (see section 2.5.7.4). The *competition among food-feed-fuel* is  
28 closely related to land use change issues (section 9.3) to which certification schemes are paying  
29 increased attention (see Chapter 2).

30 Most renewable energy applications have traditionally been perceived as environmentally  
31 friendly by the general public, with exceptions for some large hydropower and bioenergy  
32 projects. However, with up-scaling and the development of new installations being driven by  
33 more commercial stakeholders, typically utilities or private power companies, it is not evident  
34 that the positive public perception is immediately maintained. Increased public resistance to new  
35 large installations have been experienced in many countries, often beyond the more narrow “not  
36 in my backyard” type concerns (Wolsink, 2007b). Public awareness and acceptance is therefore  
37 an important element in the climate mitigation driven need to rapidly and significantly scale-up  
38 the adoption and deployment of RE technologies. Evidently, such large scale implementation can  
39 only successfully be undertaken with the understanding and support from the public. This will  
40 require dedicated awareness raising on the achievements of existing RE options and the  
41 opportunities, prospects, and potentials associated with wider scale applications (Barry *et al.*,  
42 2008). At the same time, however, public participation in planning decisions as well as fairness  
43 and equity considerations play an equally important role (Wolsink, 2007b; Malesios and  
44 Arabatzis, 2010).

1 **9.5.1.2 Information and awareness barriers**

2 An often used argument for the promotion of renewable energy projects is their contribution to  
3 *poverty reduction*, with local communities benefiting via employment, skills development,  
4 investment opportunities and technology transfer. However, should these benefits not be  
5 perceived by the local community, acceptance of projects may be problematic (Upreti, 2004; see  
6 box in section 11.6.5). In developing countries the limited technological and business knowledge  
7 and skill base are particularly apparent in the energy sector where awareness, among potential  
8 renewable consumers, of alternative sources of energy is a key determinant in terms of uptake  
9 and market creation. This gap in awareness (and lack of market drivers) is often perceived as the  
10 single biggest factor affecting the development of both the uptake of renewable and energy  
11 SMEs and their ability to contribute to economic growth. The neglect of social aspects of  
12 decentralized units can thus often result in abandoned and dysfunctional systems (Werner,  
13 Schaefer, 2007).

14 In cases where the proprietary ownership of RE technologies is mostly in the hands of private  
15 sector companies and the diffusion of technologies also typically occurs through markets in  
16 which companies are key actors (Wilkins, 2002), there is a need to focus on the capacity of these  
17 actors to develop, implement and deploy RE technologies in various countries. Therefore, the  
18 importance of increasing technological capability – as a part of *capacity building* (Box ) – at the  
19 micro or firm–level needs to be addressed (Lall, 2002; Figueiredo, 2003).

20 **Box – Capacity Building**

21 As recognized by several Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), e.g. the WSSD Plan  
22 of Implementation or the UNFCCC Bali Roadmap, lack of *capacity building* is a key barrier to  
23 the rapid transfer of technologies to and within developing countries. Lack of capacity to set RE  
24 policies and to design and implement programs delays and sometimes negates implementation of  
25 renewable technologies. There are many different types of constraints to an enabling  
26 environment for innovation, revised technical regulations, international support for technology  
27 transfer, microfinance, technical training and liberalization of energy industries (see Chapter  
28 11.6). This need for capacity development for making appropriate planning efforts on RE is most  
29 urgent in developing countries, however, the capacity of many industrialized countries to  
30 develop and implement RE policies and technologies is still limited (Assmann *et al.*, 2006). This  
31 often constitutes a significant and real barrier to increased utilization and deployment of RE  
32 technologies (Painuly, 2001). Capacity building is needed at the technological level as well as  
33 the institution level. At the *technological level* it includes, *inter alia*: (i) research, development,  
34 and demonstration to increase technological skills; (ii) developing capacity within the field of  
35 testing and licensing of renewable energy technologies; (iii) developing international resource  
36 and technology data on renewable energy sources in order to supplement existing measures. At  
37 the *institutional level* could be cited: (i) enhancing capacity of energy planners and analysts to  
38 e.g. include full costs, include externalities when comparing different technological options; (ii)  
39 supporting governments to formulate, implement and enforce renewable energy policy  
40 programmes; (iii) increasing awareness among policy makers to better understand energy market  
41 distortions, their consequences and the opportunities of renewable energy technologies; (iv)  
42 increasing awareness and skills of international and national financial institutions, including  
43 enabling them to exploit the opportunities of carbon financing (using the international  
44 mechanisms JI, CDM and emissions trading), information and education on all educational levels

1 (basic school, high school, more advanced studies etc.) on national level or through international  
2 programmes, in-service training of officials at local as well as national level, provision of  
3 incentives for the general population (and particularly farmers and villagers) to take advantage of  
4 renewable energy deployment (e.g. tax deduction incentives etc.), twinning between authorities  
5 and third sector organizations from countries with different experience, international education  
6 programmes and international in-service training programmes (Kofoed-Wiuff *et al.*, 2006). For  
7 example, there have been mixed experiences with PV technology in terms of project design and  
8 implementation and the involvement of various players like users, implementation agents, policy  
9 makers and financiers. Inadequate local support structures have also greatly hampered success  
10 rates of PV applications (Zhou, CILSS Report).

### 11 *9.5.1.3 Market failures and economic barriers*

12 The economics of renewable energy technologies are discussed in nearly all chapters of this  
13 report, e.g., when discussing cost of technologies (Chapters 2-7), externalities (Chapter 10),  
14 policies (Chapter 11) and various case studies. The three pillar concept of sustainable  
15 development, and the paradigms of weak and strong sustainability require specific cost-  
16 effectiveness assessments, considering among others (i) the economic viability and planned  
17 monitoring of economic performance and (ii) the availability and cost of resources over the  
18 projected life of the facility; furthermore, (iii) regulatory compliance, (iv) the geographic,  
19 cultural, and socio-economic appropriateness of the technology, levels of efficiency and service  
20 required and distributional aspects such as (v) additional or multiple use benefits and (vi) the  
21 distribution and sustainability of economic benefits.

22 There are still many pilot projects of renewables in developing countries that give an anecdotal  
23 account and do not illustrate the real prospects that renewables can offer to a growing energy  
24 poor community (Karekezi and Kithyoma, 2003). In addition, investing in an enabling policy and  
25 entrepreneurial support is needed in order to achieve economic growth, stimulate sustainable  
26 development and dynamise rural and peri-urban cash economies (Davidson *et al.*, 2003). In many  
27 energy poor African societies, emissions reduction is not a key imperative, but focussing on  
28 development and economic growth can also lead to a mitigation pathway.

29 Funding imperatives have also meant that ownership at local level has been quite reduced as  
30 most projects run the risk of making only peripheral progress as given the finite life cycles of  
31 such projects as donors pull out. This project-based approach has several limitations as it reduces  
32 the scope for sustainability. Consequently, a new set of thinking is gradually emerging which  
33 treats RE as an integral component of a market-based energy economy. An essential premise  
34 here is that for RETs to contribute to job creation and poverty reduction, their dissemination and  
35 uptake needs to strongly involve the private sector (GNESD, 2009).

36 The low economic base of some rural and urban communities is also an inhibiting factor,  
37 especially for people in the rural areas. The nature of the cash economy is such that the uptake of  
38 renewable energy technologies will remain slow due to the low and seasonal nature of cash  
39 inflows. In Zambia, the uptake of Solar Home Systems has for example been slow in rural areas  
40 partly because it was based on monthly payments where people do not have a culture of taking  
41 things on credit and often do not understand why they have to pay for it (AREED Study- 2006).

42 Central and local governments in many countries have enacted laws and regulations to promote  
43 renewable energy as a basis to encourage sustainable technologies. For economic incentives, a

1 frequent difficulty is defining in policy terms what is eligible as “sustainable” – some cases of  
2 “sustainable energy” pre-defined by policies include small hydro plants and bioenergy (Frey and  
3 Linke, 2002). In particular for biomass, the concept of “sustainable energy” must be carefully  
4 established (Goldemberg and Coelho, 2004).

5 Economic sustainability decisions should be based on a comprehensive evaluation of resources  
6 affected and project costs and benefits, some of which will be difficult to quantify in precise  
7 terms. However, the application of a framework that provides for procedural and distributive  
8 justice is key to the perceived outcome of a project (Gross, 2007).

9 Renewable energy deployment depends on geographical specific evaluation and needs to follow  
10 quantifiable criteria, such as cost effectiveness, regional appropriateness and distributional  
11 consequences (Creutzig and Kammen, 2009). For this process to remain aligned with economic  
12 sustainability requirements, the costs of RE options need to be compared to other sources of  
13 energy, including fossil fuels. However, only a level playing field of costs of energy carriers can  
14 support rational investment decisions, and depends on the removal of subsidies and the  
15 introduction of carbon prices to internalize social costs. Decision making on energy deployment  
16 is bound by path dependencies (see also Chapter 11), as existing grid networks and engineering  
17 capacities will, for example, advantage some sorts of energy over others. Path dependencies may  
18 lock-in societies into energy carriers or infrastructures that may in the long-term be inferior in  
19 terms of cost efficiency or accumulated social costs (Unruh, 2000). In some but not all cases,  
20 developing countries can take advantage of not being bound to the same infrastructures as OECD  
21 countries, allowing for double benefits in cost effectiveness and environmental benefits delivered  
22 by regionally appropriate technologies. Appropriateness requires that geographical constraints  
23 (e.g. latitude, biomass availability, and wind quality) and demographic and societal  
24 circumstances (e.g., population density in certain areas) are accounted for. In addition, evaluating  
25 the distributional consequences is a crucial precondition of energy deployment. For example,  
26 water dams have regularly been criticized for forcing resettlement of rural population while  
27 serving the increasing energy demands of urban populations (World Commission on Dams,  
28 2000).

### 29 **9.5.2 Opportunities**

30 Economic growth, considered as the notion of progress, is not only correlated with extensive  
31 nature exploitation but also with the intensification of energy use. Energy sources become, then,  
32 a strategic variable for economic development, in some cases disregarding other SD dimensions  
33 when characterized by isolated initiatives and programs (Paz et al, 2007).

34 The need for cross-sectoral SD strategy frameworks has therefore long been noticed and was  
35 articulated at the multilateral level and in its precursory form in the report from the Founex  
36 seminar held outside Geneva, Switzerland, in 1971 as part of the preparatory process for the  
37 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The report highlighted that  
38 environmental problems pose a threat to human well-being and society should consequently seek  
39 a development path which takes into account environmental, social and economic aspects in an  
40 integrative manner (Founex Committee, 1971; Engfeldt, 2009). The realisation that current  
41 decision-making systems still lack the necessary level of integration led the authors of Agenda  
42 21 to reinforce this concern by urging for the consideration of environment and development  
43 aspects at the policy, planning and management level (UNCED, 1992). The adoption of National  
44 Sustainable Development Strategies (NSDS) could help to harmonise these processes, by

1 steering them towards holistic approaches that integrate SD objectives in key economic  
2 development decisions in order to avoid disjointed and incremental policy-making. SD strategies  
3 may thus provide a coherent, systematic and (possibly normative) sense of direction regarding  
4 both the substance and the process of policy-making (Steurer and Martinuzzi, 2007).

5 In the formulation of SD strategies, countries have usually prioritised specific sectors for which  
6 national circumstances and international commitments required swift action, such as transport,  
7 agriculture and energy (OECD, 2002). Energy with its implications for all three pillars of  
8 sustainable development has played an integral part, contributing to productivity, income growth,  
9 health and education, gender equality, social impacts of energy extraction, human development,  
10 and macroeconomic stability and governance (Energy and Mining Sector Board, 2001).  
11 Renewable energy technologies, in particular, can add additional benefits by mitigating climate  
12 change and its related impacts, driving innovation, strengthening the development of local  
13 markets and creating employment opportunities, diversifying energy supplies, improving energy  
14 security and energy access, and impacting positively on health and gender aspects (see section  
15 9.3) (Goldemberg, 2004). In addition, integrating renewable energy policy into national  
16 sustainable development strategies provides a framework for countries to select specific policy  
17 instruments, to incorporate concerns of other countries into their own and to align with  
18 international policy measures. Hence, RE policies in developed countries have often been  
19 explicitly integrated within NSDS (OECD, 2002). Some authors (Birda *et al.*, 2005; Dubash and  
20 Bradley, 2005) have reported integrated resource planning approaches, assessing the full life  
21 cycle costs of alternatives, including end-use efficiency.

22 A further example for such integrative approaches is represented by the ‘sustainable  
23 development policies and measures’ (SD PAMs) as initially proposed by (Winkler *et al.*, 2002).  
24 SD PAMs aim to link specific development needs as prioritised by developing countries with  
25 climate mitigation and adaptation plans. With key development objectives typically including  
26 *inter alia* poverty eradication, job creation, access to modern energy services and transport  
27 (Winkler *et al.*, 2002), the possible promotion of renewable energy within the SD PAMs  
28 approach is evident (Ellis *et al.*, 2007). Modeling and case studies investigating the potential and  
29 actual co-benefits of SD PAMs in Brazil (Moreira *et al.*, 2005) and India (Dubash and Bradley,  
30 2005) document the large role of renewable energies in these approaches. In addition to avoided  
31 GHG emissions, co-benefits from RE deployment include reduced import bills, household  
32 energy bill savings, reduced indoor air pollution, and rural job creation. However, before SD  
33 PAMs may be included in the concept of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs)  
34 for developing countries (UNFCCC, 2008; van Asselt *et al.*, 2010), questions regarding their  
35 environmental effectiveness and the available methodologies for the quantification of benefits  
36 need to be answered (Bradley and Pershing, 2005; Winkler *et al.*, 2008).

37 Shifting to a sustainable energy system based on efficiency and renewable energy requires  
38 replacing a complex and entrenched energy system, as well political will and strong, sustained  
39 policies (Sawin and Moomaw, 2010). Also barriers, such as those identified in the previous  
40 section, will need to be addressed. In order to account for such SD concerns, industry  
41 associations of RE technologies with high maturity levels have drawn up so called guidance and  
42 good practice documents. These provide detailed advice and checklists, how planners,  
43 developers and producers should proceed in order to ensure greater consideration of  
44 sustainability aspects during the assessment of new projects or the operation of existing facilities  
45 (WWEA, 2005). For hydropower, the most mature RE technology, a well structured framework

1 for sustainability assessments exist (World Commission on Dams, 2000; IHA, 2004). Taken  
2 together all of these official standards, recommendations and guidelines describe sets of criteria  
3 that should be considered to ensure beneficial and broadly sustainable outcomes of RE projects.  
4 These criteria are described in the following sections where they have been grouped according to  
5 the level where (policy) action is required, addressing necessary measures from the national and  
6 international to the local level.

#### 7 *9.5.2.1 National and international SD strategies*

8 At the national level, a number of market mechanisms exist that help to overcome barriers for the  
9 implementation of SD strategies and as such RETs. The three basic approaches include: (i)  
10 removal of existing financial mechanisms that work against sustainable development; (ii)  
11 adaption of existing market mechanisms and (iii) introduction of new financial mechanisms that  
12 internalize environmental or social externalities in order to provide a level playing field for the  
13 different mitigation options.

14 Numerous studies and events over the past several years have stressed the importance of  
15 eliminating barriers to trade in renewable forms of energy and the technologies used to exploit  
16 them, as part of a broader strategy to reduce dependence on more-polluting and less secure  
17 energy sources. This is the case for, among others, charcoal, PV, wind turbines and biofuels  
18 (Steenblik, 2005, OECD, 2006, Lucon and Rei, 2006). As outlined in section 2.4.5, barriers for  
19 the market penetration and international trade of bioenergy include tariff barriers, technical  
20 standards, sustainability criteria and certification systems for biomass and biofuels, logistical  
21 barriers, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures.

22

#### 23 **Box - RE and Sustainable international trade**

24

25 Many RE deployment initiatives involve energy trading, such as biofuels as commodities or  
26 interconnected international electricity grids. In this context, there may be economic measures  
27 taken by nations that could be considered as market distortions, like import quotas, technical  
28 barriers or local subsidies considered contrary to trade liberalization. Precise implications of the  
29 overlaps between the UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol and the WTO's Doha round negotiations are  
30 still uncertain. Interactions that are the most problematic include the potential use of border  
31 measures to offset cross-national differences in the energy costs of goods – or, more generally,  
32 an interest in finding trade-related ways to impose costs for free riding. Less problematic but  
33 nevertheless warranting further attention include CDM and JI projects in relation to the WTO  
34 subsidies agreement, efficiency standards in relationship to the WTO technical barriers  
35 agreement and carbon sequestration in relationship to the WTO agriculture agreement. As parties  
36 to the Protocol develop and implement their own individual policies and measures to achieve  
37 emissions targets, compatibility with WTO rules could become a recurrent issue. More generally,  
38 the nexus of investment rules inside and outside the WTO with the climate regime needs further  
39 attention (Brewer, 2004). With the mission of liberalizing international trade, the WTO allows  
40 trade restrictions for environmental reasons, but only under certain specific conditions.  
41 Sustainable development and the protection and preservation of the environment are recognized  
42 as fundamental goals of the organization. Although WTO members have flexibility to pursue  
43 environmental and health objectives, a distinction is necessary between trade measures with a  
44 genuine environmental goal and measures that are intended as disguised restrictions and are

1 applied in an unjustifiable, arbitrary or discriminatory manner. There is a wider range of WTO  
2 rules relevant to climate change, but no rules specific to it. Trade opening has much to contribute  
3 to the fight against climate change by improving production methods, making environmentally  
4 friendly products more accessible at lower costs, allowing for a more efficient allocation of  
5 resources, raising standards of living leading populations to demand a cleaner environment and  
6 by spreading environmentally friendly technologies. Trade can also help countries to adapt to  
7 climate change. When countries are faced with food shortages brought about by climate change,  
8 trade can play the role of a transmission belt between supply and demand (thus reducing the  
9 bioenergy relevant food-fuel conflict). The Organization recognized that the elimination or  
10 reduction of barriers to trade will facilitate access to renewable energy and other environmental  
11 goods that can contribute to climate change mitigation, fostering a better dissemination of  
12 technologies at lower costs. Elimination of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to clean  
13 technologies could result in a 14% increase in trade in these products (WTO, 2010).

14  
15 *Subsidies* are one of many policy instruments used by governments to attain economic, social  
16 and environmental objectives. Energy subsidies, in particular, are often used to alleviate energy  
17 poverty and promote economic development by enabling access to affordable modern energy  
18 services. However, poorly implemented energy subsidies for fossil energy sources are  
19 economically costly to taxpayers and can damage the environment through increased emissions  
20 of greenhouse gas and other air pollutants. For example, multilateral development banks invest  
21 3-4 times as much into fossil than in green energies (Hicks *et al.*, 2008). Carbon disinvestment  
22 in cases where fossil fuels carry high social costs - e.g. by introducing mandatory shadow price  
23 internal accounting in MDBs - may significantly reduce competitiveness of fossil fuels (Wheeler,  
24 2008). In many but not all cases, renewable energies will appear as the more cost effective  
25 options. Nonetheless, some subsidies related to fossil fuels can improve the environment or the  
26 welfare of the poor if they encourage reduced reliance on traditional biomass in areas at risk of  
27 deforestation, and fund research into ways to sequester carbon emissions from combustion (IEA,  
28 OPEC, OECD, World Bank, 2010).

29 Costs borne by governments, including fossil fuel related direct subsidies, tax concessions,  
30 indirect energy industry subsidies (e.g. the cost of fuel supply security) and support of research  
31 and development costs are not externalities. They do, however, distort markets in a similar way  
32 to negative externalities, leading to increased consumption and hence increased environmental  
33 degradation (Owen, 2006). The use of subsidies to promote the development of renewable  
34 energies worldwide includes the gradual phase out of considered harmful subsidies and instead  
35 increasing the provision of subsidies to more sustainable renewable energy production and use.

36 Also very important is the *adaption of existing market mechanisms*. The importance of the  
37 financial viability of new SD policies was realized by most governments about 5 years after the  
38 Rio Summit (Dalal-Clayton and Bass, 2002), when the World Bank released a report,  
39 highlighting the need to remove perverse subsidies, to impose environmental taxes and to apply  
40 more adequate user charges as policy instruments (World Bank, 1997). When RE deployment is  
41 well integrated within cross-sectoral SD strategy, there are better possibilities to arrive at multi-  
42 benefit results. A good benchmark is the experience with Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development  
43 Mechanism projects that are submitted to sustainability screening and approval at national level  
44 by the Designated National Authority (see Box).

45

### Box – National SD Screening of KP-CDM projects

Renewable energy replacing fossil fuels constitute a significant contribution under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a project-based emissions trading mechanism that the Kyoto Protocol has established and which enables cooperation between industrialized and developing countries. CDM has the twin objective to achieve sustainable development (SD) in host countries and assist Annex-1 countries in achieving their emission reduction targets in a cost-efficient manner. However, trade-offs between the two objectives exist in favor of cost-efficient emission reductions, leading to a series of ad-hoc projects, rather than serving the overall host countries' sustainable development needs and priorities. Moreover, the considered slow implementation of incentives for industrialized country companies to embark on CDM projects and low carbon prices led to a preference for just buying Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) instead of investing in projects (Michaelowa, 2007). Additional to definitions established at host country level by Designated National Authorities (DNAs), there is no international standard for sustainability assessment to counter weaknesses in the existing system of sustainability approval. Thus, DNAs have an important role in meeting the countries' sustainable development priorities – as well as to attract investment (Winkler et al, 2005). Literature review has identified assessments of transferring and implementing potentials in Chile, China, Israel, Kenya, Thailand, Yemen, Egypt, India, South Africa and Uruguay (Karakosta and Psarras, 2009; Sieghart, 2009; Shao-jun, 2009; Ganapati and Liu, 2009; Ganapati and Liu, 2008; Nhamo, 2006; Heuberger et al, 2007) and proposed methodologies for verifying potential SD benefits, such as a multi criteria decision making method (Karakosta et al, 2008; Heuberger et al, 2007) weighting values and a taxonomy for sustainability assessment based on analysis of 744 project design documents (Brent et al, 2005; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008). More than a question of definition and establishment of priorities, SD screening depends on many aspects, such as the institutions of CDM management and implementation, CDM project assessment standards, admission regulations for developer institutions, as well as the study and training on CDM knowledge (Shao-jun, 2009).

Finally, there is a constant need for the introduction of *new financial mechanisms that internalize environmental or social externalities*. Diffusion of renewable energy technologies are driven by policies and incentives due to their inherent characteristics such as high upfront costs, lack of level playing field but distinct advantages from energy security, environmental and social considerations (Rao and Kishore, 2010). However, when external costs (more in Section 10.6) are included, the relative advantage of renewable energies is highlighted – especially regarding GHG emissions. Incorporating external costs requires good indicators. A methodological limitation found in studies for different energy production systems is their utilization of relatively few comparable sustainability indicators, drawing conclusions of which would be the “most sustainable energy source” simply based on highest ranked ones (Onat and Bayar, 2010, Varun et al, 2010, Doukas et al, 2010, Xydis et al, 2010, Philips, 2010, Bagliani et al, 2010, Brent and Rogers, 2010, Hoffmann, 2010, Mikkila et al, 2009, Kowalski et al, 2009, Rule et al, 2009, Doukas et al, 2009, Brent and Kruger, 2009, Eason et al, 2009). Although multicriteria approaches contribute significantly, it is recognized that appraising the renewable energy options' contribution to sustainable development is a complex task, considering the different aspects of SD, the imprecision and uncertainty of the related information as well as the qualitative aspects embodied, that cannot be represented solely by numerical values (Doukas et al, 2010, Donat Castello, 2010, Cavallaro, 2009, Michalena et al, 2009). Within the current debate about



1 responses to climate change, the idea that developing countries might be able to follow more  
2 sustainable, low carbon development pathways is particularly attractive. Such decision towards a  
3 more sustainable pathway is both political and societal, but depends intrinsically of the  
4 understanding of the leapfrogging concept (Box).

### 5 **Box – Leapfrogging**

6 ‘Environmental leapfrogging’, basically skipping of pollution intensive stages of development,  
7 would prevent latecomer countries from going through the same pollution intensive stages of  
8 industrial development as industrialised countries have experienced in the past. Three different  
9 types of ‘environmental leapfrogging’ are distinguished: leapfrogging within overall  
10 development pathways, leapfrogging within industrial development, and leapfrogging in the  
11 adoption and use of technologies. A sufficient level of absorptive capacity – i.e. the ability to  
12 adopt new technologies – is a core condition for successful leapfrogging. This capacity includes  
13 technological capabilities, knowledge and skills as well as supportive institutions. There are a  
14 range of policies that can be implemented to develop this capacity. The evidence suggests that a  
15 mix of generic functional policies (e.g. to strengthen levels of education) and more specific  
16 policies (e.g. to stimulate innovation in a particular sector) are required. Any leapfrogging  
17 strategy involves risks. Latecomer countries can, however, benefit if initial risks of developing  
18 new products and establishing markets have been borne in ‘frontrunner’ countries. Once a  
19 market is established, developing countries can catch up through rapid adoption of new  
20 technologies and/or the development of manufacturing capacity. For a sustainable growth  
21 strategy within developing countries, such manufacturing capacity needs to be complemented by  
22 investments in domestic technological capabilities to develop imported products further. More  
23 radical innovation – due to a shift in technological paradigms – can provide additional ‘windows  
24 of opportunity’ for developing countries. Different factors have been identified for the success of  
25 this process. In the case of developing countries that have partly skipped landline phone systems  
26 in favour of mobile phone systems, early adoption in industrialised countries enabled  
27 leapfrogging. Developing countries had access to a competitive international technology market  
28 which had already reduced costs. They could also adopt recognised standards and a proven  
29 technology. The success of the Indian and Chinese wind industries illustrates the benefits of  
30 incentives for the deployment of wind technology. This market creation was allied with the  
31 development of domestic wind manufacturing industries. This, in turn, was enabled by access to  
32 external knowledge and the creation of knowledge networks. Key factors for success in  
33 leapfrogging are different in each case. It is therefore not possible to generalise to a large degree.  
34 This echoes the result of earlier studies of the ‘Asian tiger’ economies which concluded that  
35 there is no standard model of development or catching-up. Instead a country’s distinctive  
36 resources need to be taken into consideration, and trial-and-error learning needs to be accepted as  
37 part of leapfrogging strategies (Sauter and Watson, 2008).

38 Technological leapfrogging in renewable energy has emerged as an opportunity for developing  
39 countries, as reported by several studies (Saygin and Ajetin, 2010, Tarik-ul-Islam and Ferdousi,  
40 2007, Reiche, 2010). Leapfrogging may not necessarily start in more developed countries, as  
41 developing ones start first recasting their development strategies around the prospects for  
42 sustainable renewable energies and biofuels – the case of Brazil (Mathews, 2007). Not only  
43 developing, but developed nations may have barriers against leapfrogging, from non-technical  
44 challenges – the case of expansion of use of imported biofuels in Europe (McCormick, Kuberger,  
45 2007).

1 International technology transfer can allow countries to move quickly to environmentally sound  
2 and sustainable practices, institutions and technologies, avoiding past unsustainable practices and  
3 being locked into old, less sustainable technologies (Karakosta et al, 2010). Information  
4 exchange networks assist in sharing the best available knowledge (Moreno et al, 2007). Regional  
5 coordination is needed not only to provide economic growth but also environmental integrity, as  
6 shows a case described in the Caribbean (Singh, 2007). Public-private partnerships, known as  
7 "civic markets" can create and provide "funds" such as public bonds along with private sector  
8 innovation and markets on the regional, state and national levels (Clark, 2007).

### 9 9.5.2.2 Local SD strategies

10 The facilitation of environmentally benign outcomes of RE deployment at the local level begins  
11 with the planning, construction and operation of projects in accordance with the  
12 recommendations and established codes of good practice set up by the different RE associations  
13 (IHA, 2004; WWEA, 2005; RSB, 2009). These require, amongst others, a careful assessment of  
14 related net GHG emissions, impacts on biodiversity and alterations to the physical environment  
15 (see Chapter 9.3.4 for related discussion on impacts of RE deployment). For bioenergy in  
16 particular, a large array of certification schemes is being developed that aims to assist the  
17 progress of sustainable production (Chapter 2.4.4).

18 In addition to focusing on environmental principles, socio-economic impacts need to be  
19 considered alongside. Disregarding local interests during the initial consultation stages can have  
20 considerable consequences for the success of RE projects. To begin with, the actual project  
21 management and the interaction of developers with local actors play an important part. Case  
22 studies evaluating the success of wind energy projects in France and Germany found that the  
23 familiarity of the developer with local circumstances and concerns was a major determinant for  
24 the project's success. Developers can be perceived as outsiders, interested only in profits and not  
25 in the region's development and "stealing" a landscape that is seen as a common good (Jobert *et al.*,  
26 2007). Also, transparency, the provision of information, and participation of the local  
27 population in the planning process from the early stages on are crucial for public acceptance  
28 (Wolsink, 2007a). In the context of developing countries, this also includes the empowerment of  
29 rural women in order to seek the best solutions for community energy needs (Oikonomou, 2010,  
30 Omer, 2003, Singh, 2009).

31 Positive impacts on the local economy, through the distribution of benefits or community  
32 ownership schemes, further improve public attitudes towards RE developments (Jobert *et al.*,  
33 2007; Maruyama *et al.*, 2007; Warren and McFadyen, 2010). However, there is a need for  
34 institutionalised guidelines to provide greater clarity and give developers greater confidence to  
35 discuss the community benefits package in the early planning stages (Aitken, 2010).

36 With the three aspects of environment, economics and social commitment being thus factored  
37 into a single project, RE deployments can offer various and mutually complementary incentives  
38 for different actors. In the short term, these may include environmental motivation, the aspect of  
39 participation in a community activity and the motivation to stimulate the local economy. In the  
40 middle and long term, the aspect of economic viability of the project, and as such the  
41 contribution to sustainability, was found to act as an incentive (Maruyama *et al.*, 2007). The  
42 successful diffusion of diffuse and locally considered sustainable energy technologies thus  
43 depends on an upgrading of the 'potential adopters' to 'techno-entrepreneurs', by supporting a

1 private sector driven 'business model' approach (Balachandra et al, 2010, Karakosta and Psarras,  
2 2009).

3 Moreover, acceptance of renewable energy technology involves environmental psychological  
4 aspects of the change of energy demand and supply. (Schweizer-Ries, 2008). Matching demand  
5 can provide the necessary appeal – for example, to make ends meet for the poorer, instead of  
6 saving fuel or achieving a cleaner environment (Alam et al, 2003). A more detailed discussion of  
7 pro-active, positive, place - and scale-sensitive planning and permitting approaches is provided  
8 in Box 11.X in section 11.2.5.11.

9 As a consequence, there is a need on the local level to build stronger partnerships between  
10 governments, regional authorities and municipalities, energy producers and consumers, market  
11 intermediaries, non governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions in order to  
12 facilitate a common understanding of the issues, challenges and constraints related to renewable  
13 energy development, and to pave the way for greater cooperation among all groups in society  
14 (Slavov, 2000) (see Chapter 11.6 for a discussion of the enabling environment). Strategic  
15 planning is considered as a combination of an integrated governance framework, fostering and  
16 improving the implementation base, developing a national settlement scheme, and providing  
17 active citizen programs (Taylor, 2004).

18

## 19 **9.6 Synthesis**

20 The renewable energy technologies discussed in this Special Report will play an increasingly  
21 important role in the world energy system over the next several decades. Mitigation of climate  
22 change caused by the combustion of fossil fuels provides one key motivation for a drastic  
23 transformation of the world energy system. Additional factors pointing toward the desirability of  
24 increasing reliance on renewable energy include concerns about uneven distribution and future  
25 supply scarcity of fossil-fuel resources. Given the heavy reliance of modern societies on fossil  
26 fuels, any proposed transformation pathway must be carefully analyzed for feasibility. The aim  
27 of this Special Report is to assess the technical literature on renewable energy technology and the  
28 prerequisites and consequences of such a transformation.

29 This implies that technical feasibility or potential resource size alone are not sufficient to  
30 determine a pathway leading from the current energy system to a low-carbon-emission future  
31 energy system. To aid in the evaluation of transition possibilities, climate target scenarios can be  
32 used with integrated assessment models to provide economic cost estimates with respect to non-  
33 policy, or “business-as-usual” scenarios. As a complement to technological feasibility  
34 assessments, economic assessments are also critically important for understanding which  
35 pathways toward a desired climate goal can be achieved in the most efficient way.

36 Both the technological and the economic analyses of renewable energy (RE) need to be  
37 embedded in the broader context of sustainable development and Chapter 9 extends to include  
38 the latter in its assessments. It is acknowledged at the outset that the exact nature of sustainable  
39 development (SD) is subject to a plethora of definitions and perspectives. Sustainable  
40 development is often considered from the point of view of three pillars: Economy, Society and  
41 Environment (See Fig. 9.2.1). Within this three-pillar framework there are (at least) two  
42 philosophies of sustainability, often referred to as weak and strong sustainability. Weak  
43 sustainability allows for substitution between capital created in the economic and societal

1 spheres, on the one hand, and natural capital from the environmental sphere. Strong  
2 sustainability essentially makes the assertion that the potential for substitution from the  
3 environment is limited, and in fact, presents a fundamental, biophysical boundary condition for  
4 growth of the societal and economic spheres.

5 To better organize this assessment of the literature on sustainable development and make a solid  
6 connection to the role of renewable energy in sustainable development, basic goals of a future  
7 energy system are used as guidelines. The four criteria used in this Chapter are i) sustainable  
8 social and economic development; ii) increased energy access; iii) enhanced energy security; and  
9 iv) reduced environmental impacts.

10 One of the key points that emerges from the literature is that the evaluation of energy system  
11 impacts (beyond greenhouse gas emissions), climate mitigation scenarios and sustainable  
12 development goals have for the most part proceeded in parallel without much interaction.  
13 Effective, economically efficient and socially acceptable transformations of the energy system  
14 will require a much closer integration of insights from all three of these research areas. An initial  
15 assessment of indicative information available from current IAMs in Section 9.4 generates  
16 important insights but also discloses some shortcomings and highlights the need for the inclusion  
17 of additional boundaries (e.g. environmental) and more complex energy system models that can  
18 represent specific local conditions and variability.

19 In any case an assessment of sustainable development must evaluate distributional questions.  
20 How the poor – on the national or the international level – will be affected by particular  
21 measures to promote renewable energy is an important indicator for sustainable development.  
22 For integrated assessment modelling this indicates the need to include a high regional resolution,  
23 a differentiation of different income groups and a strong micro perspective to name just a few of  
24 the relevant issues. However, IAMs were originally designed to assess energy portfolios of fairly  
25 large world regions and emissions trajectories implied by changes in those energy portfolios over  
26 time. Distributional questions were not the focus of the assessment but have gained more  
27 attention just recently. This chapter provides some interesting initial insights with respect to  
28 economic and social development. To begin with, energy-economy models clearly show that  
29 mitigation of GHG emissions is connected to reductions in GDP; generally, the tighter the  
30 constraint, the higher the losses (see also Chapter 10). When assessing the losses in GDP,  
31 however, it must be acknowledged that damages from climate change have usually not been  
32 included in the analyses that have been used for this report. One result that can be derived from  
33 modelling exercises is that renewable energy contributes significantly to cost-efficient  
34 mitigation. Constraining the implementation of renewable energy increases mitigation costs  
35 considerably, thus leading to lower GDP levels in the future. Also, model results highlight the  
36 importance of renewable energy technologies to achieve low stabilization targets. It is important  
37 to understand that IAMs in general have not originally been designed to assess sustainability and  
38 there is room for improvement in the future. Many of the forces that might make developing  
39 countries behave differently than developed countries, e.g. differences in physical and  
40 institutional infrastructure are currently not covered in models. With respect to distribution on  
41 the international level, the role of different allocation schemes is found to be critical for the  
42 regional distribution of mitigation costs. Within regions or countries, the IAMs provide little  
43 insights about distributional issues. However, from historical analysis we know that renewable  
44 energy can particularly benefit to a basic level of access to modern and reliable energy in rural

1 areas, which is widely recognized to as a critical foundation for promotion of sustainable  
2 development.

3 Furthermore, to measure human development, multidimensional metrics that go beyond GDP  
4 are needed, with some alternatives having been proposed. One example that has been used in this  
5 chapter is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is composed of data on life expectancy,  
6 education and per-capita GDP (i.e. purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted income). In this  
7 chapter HDI was used as a measure to emphasise the importance of access to non-traditional  
8 energy supplies for improving the quality of life. Also, it is used to assess comparative levels of  
9 development in countries. Access to clean and reliable energy, which can be promoted by  
10 renewable energies, is an important precondition for the fundamental determinants of human  
11 development, including health, education, gender equality and environmental safety. However,  
12 current scenarios of future energy system developments only contain little information with  
13 respect to most of these aspects.

14 Historically, the development of countries has gone hand in hand with increasing energy use and  
15 thus emissions. Therefore, another important question relates to the issue of leap-frogging and  
16 how the exchange of renewable energy technologies between developed and developing  
17 countries impacts mitigation costs. Even though the aspect is hardly dealt with in any model,  
18 results indicate that renewables play a more important role in developing than in developed  
19 countries, an aspect that hints to a particular role for leapfrogging.

20 Second, these aspects are directly linked to the question of energy access. Models, often with a  
21 strong bias towards developed countries, often fail to take into account the most important  
22 criteria for energy access in developing countries, as for example the choices to use traditional  
23 fuels, informal access to the electricity grid, informal economies, and structural changes in  
24 domestic economies. Even though there has been some progress recently in the models, most  
25 multi-regional models still face major drawbacks in this respect, particularly when it comes to  
26 the role of renewable energy and particularly the role of renewable energy in rural areas, where it  
27 particularly could benefit the poor. If these aspects are not considered, it can be stated that the  
28 increase of energy access is usually capital intensive (thinking of the extension of grids) and will  
29 need targeted support by governments in order to achieve universal electricity access. In general,  
30 models do not give a clear answer whether or not renewable energies might play a central role  
31 for the electrification of poor, rural areas with respect to off-grid facilities. However, if  
32 developing countries are not able to secure finance for electrification, reducing the number of  
33 people without electricity seems unlikely, despite the fact that universal access to clean, reliable  
34 and affordable energy sources is as a key part of enhancing sustainable development.

35 Third, for many developing countries, the definition of energy security specifically includes the  
36 provision of adequate and affordable access to all parts of the population and thus exhibits strong  
37 links to energy access aspects. Hence, the definition of energy security is broadened to address  
38 the stability and reliability of local energy supply. With respect to modelling activities, this again  
39 raises the question for the need of more complex energy system models with a better  
40 representation of technical integration, cost-efficiency and urban versus rural energy access,  
41 which often shows dramatic differences in developing countries.

42 Currently, beyond the rather trivial statement that a growing share of domestically produced  
43 renewable energy will often increase the diversity of supply and decrease the share of other  
44 (often imported) energy sources, the models are often not able to address the interaction between

1 energy security and renewable energy (e.g. variability issues). Some results can however be  
2 condensed: First, the role of the transportation sector will remain crucial for energy security in  
3 the future. As long as there is no electrification of the sector, which might allow a larger role for  
4 all kinds of low carbon technologies, the demand for transportation fuels (both conventional and  
5 renewable) remains inelastic. Oil, which has caused energy security concerns in the past as it is  
6 provided by comparably few suppliers, remains an important energy carrier in all scenarios,  
7 independent from the climate target. For biomass, being an important alternative, it is far from  
8 clear that supply will be provided by perfectly efficient markets in the future. Additionally it also  
9 raises important concerns with respect to land-use emissions. Also, the future role of biomass in  
10 the transportation sector is determined by the availability of CCS, which in combination with  
11 biomass can produce negative emissions in other sectors that might generally ease the  
12 transformation costs. Second, models assume that variability issues of renewable energy will  
13 eventually be solved. Thus results that favour renewable energy deployment might be  
14 misleading, emphasizing that the question how electricity from renewable energy can be stored  
15 in the future is pivotal.

16 Fourth, concerning environmental impacts, IAMs might well be suited to include some of the  
17 most important indicators in addition to GHG emissions (e.g. local air pollution, water use etc.),  
18 but available literature is scarce. Apart from the land use constraints on bioenergy deployment  
19 due to terrestrial carbon and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions, no renewable energy implications can yet be clearly  
20 spelled out.

21 Expanding existing IAMs today to incorporate more SD indicators is a big challenge since these  
22 models were generated around a relatively specific set of tasks which did not include  
23 consideration of sustainable development criteria. To derive more valid conclusions about the  
24 interaction of renewable energy deployment and sustainable development pathways in a global  
25 context, the scenario literature will have to take into account some of the research gaps that are  
26 elaborated on in the next section. One area that is conceptually straightforward is to include  
27 results from LCA of material, energy and water consumption for various technologies to get a  
28 better picture regarding their longer-term environmental impacts.

29 For example, results from LCAs show that RE, with some exceptions, transmit lower impacts  
30 across the categories assessed in this chapter (see section 9.3.4) than fossil fuel based  
31 technologies, but some fundamental differences between different RE technologies are evident.  
32 In particular, bioenergy has a special role, as it exhibits many properties similar to fossil fuels  
33 (combustion leading to air pollution and need for cooling water, energy and water required for  
34 fuel processing and transport), and requires very large exclusive land use with all associated  
35 challenges, but provides the only opportunity for net GHG sequestration when used in certain  
36 circumstances. Overall, the emission reduction potential of all RE power generation technologies  
37 is significant, and remains higher than for fossil plus CCS.

38 However, it is important to note that all energy technologies, especially when deployed at large  
39 scale, will create environmental impacts, determined in large measure by the design and  
40 integration into local contexts. This is particularly applicable with respect to very localised  
41 impacts such as on biodiversity. Hence, integrated assessments at the global and generic level  
42 cannot be a substitute for local evaluations and considerations and the evaluation of trade-offs.

43 In addition to the more economic and technical assessments of the observed and possible long-  
44 term impacts of RE, this chapter also evaluates the SD potential of RE in a more policy

1 orientated context. Section 9.5 discusses the barriers and opportunities for RE with respect to  
2 environmental, social, economic and governance-institutional considerations and concerns and  
3 looks at the required SD policies and instruments to better deploy RE on the global, regional and  
4 local levels. Important barriers to the deployment of RE are, among others, environmental  
5 concerns and social acceptance, lack of capacity building, cost-effectiveness and appropriateness  
6 of the technology, as well as distributional aspects with respect to shared benefits. RE-proactive  
7 political willingness, subsidies and other uneven economic incentives to conventional energy and  
8 barriers to international trade of environmental goods include further important barriers.  
9 Opportunities highlight in particular the possibility of leapfrogging, but also address education,  
10 public participation, and the strengthening of cross-sectoral institutional cooperation. In  
11 particular, it is shown how well integrated RE policies and deployment can contribute to positive  
12 and multi-dimensional progress for sustainable development.

13 *Environmental* constraints have many different origins and metrics. Calibrating the necessary  
14 level of sustainability requisites is a difficult task, which can be supported by different tools.  
15 Perception and acceptance of impacts vary considerably from source, type of stakeholders or  
16 ongoing policies. Some indicators of sustainability are relatively straightforward (e.g. energy  
17 payback times, waste products, emissions), while other are more difficult to quantify  
18 (biodiversity impacts, chronic effects to human health, carbon leakage and indirect land use  
19 change) or represent other kinds of complexity (land and land use rights, water rights,  
20 displacement issues).

21 Most renewable energy applications have traditionally been perceived as environmental friendly  
22 by the general public, but with up-scaling and development of new installations driven by  
23 external stakeholders, such perceptions can potentially change, as symbolized by “not in my  
24 backyard” concerns. The neglect of *social* aspects of decentralized units can also result in  
25 abandoned and dysfunctional systems. Public awareness and acceptance will be a very important  
26 part of successful climate mitigation policies, with rapid and significant increases in the adoption  
27 and deployment of RE technologies. Large scale implementation will require dedicated  
28 awareness-raising about the achievements of existing RE options and the opportunities,  
29 prospects, and potentials associated with wider-scale applications. Capacity-building is also a  
30 key driver to technological leapfrogging. Transparency, access to information and participation  
31 of the local population in the planning process from the early stages are all crucial for public  
32 acceptance.

33 To conclude, integrating renewable energy policy into national sustainable development  
34 strategies provides a framework for countries to select specific policy instruments, to incorporate  
35 experience from other countries into their own and to align with international policy measures.  
36 Shifting to a sustainable energy system based on efficiency and renewable energy requires  
37 replacing a complex and entrenched energy system, which implies the need for thorough analysis  
38 of all available options, with careful consideration given to the multiple dimensions of  
39 technology, economy, society and environment. In this context, it is important to note that  
40 countries at different levels of development have different incentives to advance RE: providing  
41 access to energy, creating employment opportunities in the formal economy, reducing costs of  
42 energy imports, reducing carbon emissions to mitigate climate change, enhancing energy  
43 security and actively promoting structural change in the economy. To identify the right mix of  
44 measures for the specific national and regional circumstances requires the cooperation of

1 decision makers, stakeholders and scientists, underlining the need to transgress the traditional  
2 boundaries between the natural sciences to social sciences and humanities.

3

#### 4 **9.7 Knowledge gaps and future research needs**

5 This chapter has described part of the interactions between sustainable development and  
6 renewable energy and focused on criteria such as sustainable social and economic development,  
7 increased energy access, enhanced energy security and reduced environmental impacts. An  
8 assessment of indicators related to these criteria has revealed several gaps in knowledge.

9 Beginning with the more conceptual discussion of SD, there is a tremendous gap between  
10 intertemporal measures of human well-being (sustainability) and measurable sub-indicators that  
11 needs to be narrowed. In addition, possibilities to relate the two opposite paradigms of  
12 sustainability, weak and strong sustainability, need to be explored. One possibility would be to  
13 allow for non-linearities, tipping points, and uncertainty on non-linearities in intertemporal  
14 measures, or providing formal guidelines for consideration of the precautionary principle. In the  
15 context of this report on renewable energy, this also entails that specific indicators of weak  
16 sustainability like genuine savings, ISEW or GPI, but also those of strong sustainability (e.g.  
17 land use boundaries) need to be statistically and logically related to renewable energy indicators.

18 Apart from the definitions, data that are necessary to access sustainability and renewable energy  
19 are insufficiently available. There is a clear need for better information and data on energy  
20 supply and consumption for non electrified households but also low end electricity consumers.  
21 Furthermore, there is a need for analysis of RE based mini-grid experiences for improving access  
22 as there is for the analysis of energy security implications of regional power integration.

23 Many aspects of the assessment of environmental impacts of energy technologies require  
24 additional research to resolve key scientific questions, or provide confirmatory research for less  
25 contentious but also less studied aspects. Two key issues regarding GHG emissions caused by  
26 energy technologies are direct and indirect land use change. For RE technologies, these issues  
27 mainly concern the production of biomass for bioenergy systems and hydropower  
28 impoundments, but land use change associated with some non-RE technologies deserve  
29 investigation as well (e.g., carbon emission from soils exposed by mountaintop removal coal  
30 mining). Several energy technologies are lacking substantial or any studies of life cycle GHG  
31 emissions: geothermal, ocean energy, and some types of PV cells. Water use has not been  
32 consistently or robustly evaluated for any energy technology across their life cycles. The state of  
33 knowledge of land use, especially when considered on a life cycle basis, is in similar condition as  
34 water. For both, metrics to quantify water and land use need consensus as well as substantial  
35 additional study using those metrics. More is known about air pollutants, at least during  
36 operation of combustion systems, but this knowledge has not been well augmented on a life  
37 cycle basis, and the interpretation of air pollutant emissions on a life cycle basis needs to be  
38 enhanced since the important effects of pollutants should not be summarized by summing masses  
39 over time and space. For LCAs as a whole, heterogeneity of methods and assumptions thwarts  
40 fair comparison and pooling of estimates from different studies. Ex post facto harmonization of  
41 the methods of previous research (and meta-analysis) and perhaps stronger standards guiding the  
42 conduct of new LCAs is critical to clarifying results and producing robust estimates.



1 Assessments of the scenario literature have given only little insights on how sustainable  
2 development pathways will interact with renewable energy and vice versa. In the past, models  
3 have focused on the technological and macro-economic aspects of energy transitions. Therefore  
4 the evaluation of sustainable development pathways mostly needs to rely on proxies that are not  
5 always informative. One major difficulty is the models' macro perspective, while some issues for  
6 sustainable development are relevant on a micro and regional level. Thus, when looking more  
7 specifically on different SD criteria, major drawbacks can be found for all of them. (i) With  
8 respect to sustainable social and economic development, the scenario literature has a strong focus  
9 on consumption and GDP. Even though models address multiple criteria of welfare, they are  
10 generally not sufficiently specific to inform largely about distributional issues. Differentiations  
11 between income groups, urban and rural population and so on are difficult to make. (ii) Also, the  
12 distribution and availability of energy services, and how they change over time are aspects that  
13 are not broadly included in most energy-economy models so far, which makes the evaluation of  
14 energy access challenging. (iii) Regarding energy security the current representation of the grid  
15 structure in most of the models does not allow for a thorough analysis of possible difficulties of  
16 large scale integration of renewable energy. Possible barriers are mostly assumed to be overcome  
17 without difficulties, particularly when thinking of storage and variability issues that might occur.  
18 Possible co-benefits of renewables, such as growing diversity of supply and possibilities to  
19 electrify rural areas, are also poorly covered in the literature as, e.g., fuel supply risks are usually  
20 not taken into account in the models. (iv) The existing scenario literature does not give an  
21 explicit treatment to many non-emissions related aspects of sustainable energy development, as  
22 for example water use, biodiversity impacts, or the impacts of energy choices on household-level  
23 services or indoor air quality. In addition to that, when regarding section 9.3.4 of this chapter,  
24 emissions are generally not treated over the life-cycles of technology choices, which might be an  
25 interesting aspect of future research.

26 We can conclude that our knowledge regarding the interrelations between sustainable  
27 development and renewable energy in particular is still very limited. Finding answers to the  
28 question of effective, economically efficient and socially acceptable transformations of the  
29 energy system will require a much closer integration of insights from social, natural and  
30 economic sciences in order to reflect the different dimensions of sustainability. So far, what we  
31 now is often limited to very narrow views from specific branches of research, which do not fully  
32 account for the complexity of the issue.

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