3.2.1.5 Energy use

Future evolution of energy systems is a fundamental determinant of GHG emissions. In most models, energy demand growth is a function of key driving forces such as demographic change and the level and nature of human activities such as mobility, information processing, and industry. The type of energy consumed is also important. While Chapters 4 through 11 report on medium-term projections for different parts of the energy system, long-term energy projections are reported here. Figure 3.5 compares the range of the 153 SRES and pre-SRES scenarios with 133 new, post-SRES, long-term energy scenarios in the literature. The ranges are comparable, with small changes on the lower and upper boundaries, and a shift downwards with respect to the median development. In general, the energy growth observed in the newer scenarios does not deviate significantly from the previous ranges as reported in the SRES report. However, most of the scenarios reported here have not adapted the lower population levels discussed in Section 3.2.1.1.

Figure 3.5: Comparison of 153 SRES and pre-SRES baseline energy scenarios in the literature compared with the 133 more recent, post-SRES scenarios. The ranges are comparable, with small changes on the lower and upper boundaries.

Note: The two vertical bars on the right extend from the minimum to maximum of the distribution of scenarios by 2100. The horizontal bars indicate the 5^th, 25^th, 50^th, 75^th and the 95^th percentiles of the distributions.

In general, this situation also exists for underlying trends as represented by changes in energy intensity, expressed as gigajoule (GJ)/GDP, and change in the carbon intensity of the energy system (CO₂/GJ) as shown in Figure 3.6. In all scenarios, energy intensity improves significantly across the century – with a mean annual intensity improvement of 1%. The 90% range of the annual average intensity improvement is between 0.5% and 1.9% (which is fairly consistent with historic variation in this factor). Actually, this range implies a difference in total energy consumption in 2100 of more than 300% – indicating the importance of the uncertainty associated with this ratio. The carbon intensity is more constant in scenarios without climate policy. The mean annual long-term improvement rate over the course of the 21^st century is 0.4%, while the uncertainty range is again relatively large (from -0.2 to 1.5%). At the high end of this range, some scenarios assume that energy technologies without CO₂ emissions become competitive without climate policy as a result of increasing fossil fuel prices and rapid technology progress for carbon-free technologies. Scenarios with a low carbon-intensity improvement coincide with scenarios with a large fossil fuel base, less resistance to coal consumption or lower technology development rates for fossil-free energy technologies. The long-term historical trend is one of declining carbon intensities. However, since 2000, carbon intensities are increasing slightly, primarily due to the increasing use of coal. Only a few scenarios assume the continuation of the present trend of increasing carbon intensities. One of the reasons for this may be that just a few of the recent scenarios include the effects of high oil prices.

Figure 3.6: Development of carbon intensity of energy (left) and primary energy intensity of GDP (right). Historical development and projections from SRES and pre-SRES scenarios compared to post-SRES scenarios.

Note: The blue coloured range illustrates the range of 142 carbon intensity and 114 energy intensity – SRES and pre-SRES non-intervention scenarios.

Source: After Nakicenovic et al., 2006.