4.3.2.1 Risks and environmental impacts
Regulations demand that public and occupational radiation doses from the operation of nuclear facilities be kept as low as reasonably achievable and below statutory limits. Mining, milling, power-plant operation and reprocessing of spent fuel dominate the collective radiation doses (OECD, 2000). Protective actions for mill-tailing piles and ponds have been demonstrated to be effective when applied to prevent or reduce long-term impacts from radon emanation. In the framework of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Convention (IAEA, 1994), the IAEA member countries have agreed to maintain high safety culture to continuously improve the safety of nuclear facilities. However, risks of radiation leakage resulting from accidents at a power plant or during the transport of spent fuel remain controversial.
Operators of nuclear power plants are usually liable for any damage to third parties caused by an incident at their installation regardless of fault (UIC, 2005), as defined by both international conventions and national legislation. In 2004, the contracting parties to the OECD Paris and Brussels Conventions signed Amending Protocols setting the minimum liability limit at 700 million € with additional compensation up to 800 € through public funds. Many non-OECD countries have similar arrangements through the IAEA’s Vienna Convention. In the US, the national Price-Anderson Act provides compensation up to 300 million US$ covered by an insurance paid by each reactor and also by a reactor-operator pool from the 104 reactors, which provides 10.4 billion US$.
4.3.2.2 Nuclear-waste management, disposal and proliferation aspects
The main safety objective of nuclear waste management (IAEA, 1997; IAEA, 2005b) is that human health and the environment need to be protected now and in the future without imposing undue burdens on future generations. Repositories are in operation for the disposal of low- and medium-level radioactive wastes in several countries but none yet exist for high-level waste (HLW) such as spent light-water reactor (LWR) fuel. Deep geological repositories are the most extensively studied option but resolution of both technical and political/societal issues is still needed.
In 2001, the Finnish Parliament agreed to site a spent fuel repository near the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. After detailed rock-characterization studies, construction is scheduled to start soon after 2010 with commissioning planned for around 2020. In Sweden, a repository-siting process is concentrating on the comparison of several site alternatives close to the Oskarshamn and Forsmark nuclear power plants. In the US, the Yucca Mountain area has been chosen, amidst much controversy, as the preferred site for a HLW repository and extensive site-characterization and design studies are underway, although not without significant opposition. It is not expected to begin accepting HLW before 2015. France is also progressing on deep geological disposal as the reference solution for long-lived radioactive HLW and sets 2015 as the target date for licensing a repository and 2025 for opening it (DGEMP, 2006). Spent-fuel reprocessing and recycling of separate actinides would significantly reduce the volume and radionuclide inventory of HLW.
The enrichment of uranium (U-235), reprocessing of spent fuel and plutonium separation are critical steps for nuclear-weapons proliferation. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been ratified by nearly 190 countries. Compliance with the terms of the NPT is verified and monitored by the IAEA. Improving proliferation resistance is a key objective in the development of next-generation nuclear reactors and associated advanced fuel-cycle technologies. For once-through uranium systems, stocks of plutonium are continuously built up in the spent fuel, but only become accessible if reprocessed. Recycling through fast-spectrum reactors on the other hand allows most of this material to be burned up in the reactor to generate more power, although there are vulnerabilities in the reprocessing step and hence still the need for careful safeguards. Advanced reprocessing and partitioning and transmutation technologies could minimize the volumes and toxicity of wastes for geological disposal, yet uncertainties about proliferation-risk and cost remain.