Report by UK

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 0
UK
The approach is normative in focusing on utility rather than alternative ethical schemes such as rights/ deontological ethical approaches (e.g. right to life) or virtue ethic and epistemological approaches - e.g. (precaution/wisdom and seeing moderation of consumption as good for individuals, societies and the Earth System). One example is the focus of where people act as 'consumers' and have shorter term aims that some economic analysis suggests is wise, ignoring where peopl
View full comment by Mark Charlesworth...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 0
UK
This is a good chapter and has potential to be extremely valuable, but to do so I think it needs to be clearer in structural approach towards different types of decisionmakers, and needs further development in two main directions: • The concepts of risk and uncertainty are applied almost entirely to climate impacts (“the nature of the problem”) rather than aspects of mitigation – which is rather odd for a report on Mitigation: in more than 40 pages, for example, the
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 0
UK
The current draft of chapter 2 ends rather inconclusively and its difficult to see the practical implications of the various approaches to decision making. It would benefit from a few illustrative examples. I wasn't convinced that devoting the second chapter to this topic was appropriate - it might be better to give the reader a better idea of mitigation options first. There is no discussion of the use of macroeconomic modelling including the co-benefits of mitigation strateg
View full comment by Andy Haines...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 11 , Line 4
UK
Probably should note that perceptions (I assume) is partly with reference to perceptions of climate change; and that extreme weather events may have disproportionate impact on these. Its hard to be definitive about a list of uncertainties but I’d make a case for at least one more than the five listed: the state of international negotiations and of international relations more broadly, and the role of governments vis-à-vis other actors within this. The social science lite
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 11 , Line 36 To Page 20 , Line 22
UK
Section 2.2 is insightful and helpful; however, much of the broad thrust of the analysis and more concrete discussions of how to address the issues raised are implicit in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and subsequent virtue epistemology and ethics literature. I have completed an unpublished book manuscript that applies these insights directly to sustainable development and climate change. This includes questioning needing control for happiness - important given that humans ca
View full comment by Mark Charlesworth...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 12 To Page 13
UK
This is, or should be, the intellectual heart of the chapter. My sense is it needs attention to a few things to play this role well: * It is hard to follow – having mentioned associative and affective processes, one assumes they have some link to the material that follows but its not obvious; cant eg the subsection titles that follow reflect these processes? * I think the System 1 and System 2 are defined too narrowly at the outset broadly in terms of cognitive proce
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 15
UK
“Other factors”. Is the chapter too polite to mention lobbying? It is estimated that US industry spent $500m on lobbying on climate change in 2010 and presumably much of this was targeted a public opinion.
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 15
UK
Section 2.2 overall might benefit from cross-check against literature in the most recent (June 2012) Special Issue of Risk Assessment which is on climate change (eg. Spence et al., 2012).
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 15 , Line 35
UK
This discussion does not place enough emphasis on the role of organised climate change denialism see for example 'The Merchants of Doubt' by Naomi Oreskes which shows how powerful interests are funding denialist activities in the USA
View full comment by Andy Haines...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 15 , Line 47 To Page 15 , Line 48
UK
This discussion does not place enough emphasis on the role of organised climate change denialism see for example 'The Merchants of Doubt' by Naomi Oreskes which shows how powerful interests are funding denialist activities in the USA
View full comment by Andy Haines...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 16 , Line 41
UK
Shouldn’t the title be something like "Social amplification and attention of risk perception"? It seems to cut both ways, particularly if industry spends $500m convincing publics that there is not a problem
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 18 , Line 31 To Page 34
UK
This is almost the first mention of energy-related decisions (notably energy efficiency) in the chapter, and it is not a strong one – I note, with no reference. It reads as a theoretical assumption, not evidence-based: actually over most of the range, efficient fridges are not more expensive than less efficient ones, and the evidence is that labelling has had a huge effect - though probably because of branding concerns of manufacturers as well as actual rational choice by
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 20
UK
end of section 2.2 The section could do with a conclusion. In relation to energy-related decisions, there is a clear implication about the non-optimality of energy decisions which is backed strongly by empirical data. Since most choices on energy consumption are taken by private decision-makers strongly influenced by “System 1” processes, whereas most supply investments are by big companies using “System 2” processes, there is an intrinsic bias towards supply-side
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 20 , Line 29 To Page 27 , Line 23
UK
A useful discussion of the issues in using utilitarian ethics to address climate change, including trying theorise the precautionary principle through this lens and apply optimality and 'management'; however, Charlesworth M & Okereke C (2010, Policy responses to rapid climate change: An epistemological critique of dominant approaches, Global Environ. Change, 20:121-129, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.09.001) illustrates the more fundamental issue of using consequential manageri
View full comment by Mark Charlesworth...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 26 , Line 12 To Page 26 , Line 13
UK
"cannot" is a very strong term - surely the point is that the precautionary effect/principle does not automatically dictate a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions solely on the basis of uncertainty in climate projections.
View full comment by Stephen Smith...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 28 , Line 9 To Page 29 , Line 24
UK
Again generally good discussion of the approach but no discussion of the fundamental difficulties in using expert opinion in this manner when it is difficult to gauge the impact of the experts ideological and religious positions, ethical, ontological and epistemological assumptions, expertise in philosophy of science, etc.
View full comment by Mark Charlesworth...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 31 , Line 21 To Page 31 , Line 22
UK
Why is establishment of a stabilisation target sensitive only to uncertainties in the natural system? Surely the magnitude of many climate change impacts (and thus the level to be avoided) is dependent on vulnerability and exposure of social systems too? Indeed, Article 2 talks about food production and economic development - both strongly socio-economic systems.
View full comment by Stephen Smith...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 35 , Line 13
UK
It's not immediately clear why a country with more resource vulnerability would be more averse to a climate change treaty - could this be explained more clearly
View full comment by Andy Haines...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 4 To Page 5
UK
At the moment this has strong overlap (and considerable duplication) with the Introductory section. My sense is that it works better in the latter role, and that the authors might consider a largely fresh approach to Exec Sum in the Second Order Draft. For IPCC Audience, the present Exec Sum does induce a slight reaction of “so what?” from a policy perspective.
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 7 To Page 7
UK
I can see the structuring value of Figure 2.1 but it does seem a little odd to have the prime structuring Figure without an obvious specific “place” for the actual decision-maker; also am not clear on relationship of the first two boxes (try running a “shall I insulate my house?” decision through this …). It might be useful to compare against Triandis’ theory of decision making, as also elaborated and applied to climate change in DECC (2011). DECC (UK Departmen
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

First Order Draft, Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies: From Page 7 , Line 7
UK
Linked to the above: The key problem here is not so much the range of decisions, but the range of decisionmakers. My sense is that it may be important to separate out (1) private decisionmakers, (2) government decisionmakers on internal policy decisions, and (3) decisionmakers and influencers in international negotiations (which collectively one might hope tries to converge towards some kind of global strategy). The objectives, and processes, are quite different in each ca
View full comment by Michael Grubb...

Breakdown for UK