10.4.3. Economic and Market-Based Measures
IPCC (1996b), OECD (1989), and others have examined other potential economic
instruments for mitigating aviation environmental effects:
. Fuel taxes and charges (levies) to promote fuel efficiency and reduce demand
. Emissions charges aimed at encouraging adoption of lower emitting technology
. Emissions trading to encourage emissions reductions through market forces
. Ticket taxes or charges
. Levies on empty aircraft seats to promote improvement in seat load factor
. Levies on excessive traffic per destination, destinations served, or type
of equipment serving a destination
. Levies on route length to reduce the number of flights that are less than
a minimum distance
. Subsidies or rebates to act as an incentive for polluters to change their
behavior, such as grants, soft loans, tax allowances or differentiation, and
instruments similar to effluent, product, or administrative charges.
Some of these measures are currently being considered by ICAO. Although examples
of some of these and other measures exist in some countries, however, they have
not been actively pursued by governments or ICAO.
10.4.3.1. Environmental Levies
Aviation is subject to various taxes and charges (grouped for convenience and
referred to as levies in this report), most of which are related to the recovery
of infrastructure costs and the provision of services. These levies consist
primarily of landing charges imposed by airports on air service providers, route
facility charges imposed by providers of air navigation services on operators,
and passenger and cargo taxes based on the value of the ticket or waybill. The
term environmental levy or emissions-related levy refers to charges and taxes.
There are, however, relatively few examples of environmental charges or taxes
related to emissions. The primary goal of such charges is to ensure that the
external costs of the service provided are fully reflected in the charges paid.
By internalizing external costs, environmental levies have the potential to
reduce aircraft emissions by providing further incentives to develop and purchase
low-emission technology, improve operational efficiency, and reduce demand via
higher fares.
ICAO makes a distinction between charges and taxes and, because charges are
based on cost of service and the revenue is retained by the aviation sector,
has expressed a strong preference for the former. It regards charges as levies
to defray the costs of providing facilities and services for civil aviation
and taxes as levies to raise government revenues, which are applied to non-aviation
purposes. In applying this principle to environmental levies, the ICAO Council
Resolution on Environmental Charges and Taxes recommends that, where introduced,
levies should be guided by the following principles:
. There should be no fiscal aims behind the charges.
. Charges should be related to costs.
. Charges should not discriminate against air transport compared with other
modes of transport.
The Resolution was adopted in December 1996, and endorsed by the 32nd ICAO
Assembly (ICAO, 1998b).
One of the recommendations at the CAEP/4 meeting in April 1998 (ICAO, 1998a)
was to "identify and evaluate the potential role of market-based options, including
emissions charges, fuel taxes, carbon offset, and emissions trading regimes."
This recommendation was approved by the ICAO Council, and the 32nd ICAO Assembly
subsequently requested that a conclusion be reached on guidance to be given
to states on emissions-related levies in time for the next ICAO Assembly in
2001 (ICAO, 1998b). In its future work, CAEP will identify a range of market-based
options, assess their limitations, identify their environmental effects, consider
the application of revenues that might be accrued, and consider implementation
mechanisms that might be employed.
ICAO does not, however, cover member states' tax policies for domestic aviation.
The United States, for example, applies a fuel tax on domestic air carriers
and general aviation aircraft; the receipts are held in the Airport and Airways
Trust Fund and are prohibited by law from being used for non-aviation purposes.
Similarly, some domestic aviation fuel is already taxed in Europe, where the
status of the mandatory exemption of international aviation fuel from taxation
has been under discussion for some time. In March 1997, the European Commission
proposed in a draft directive that this aviation fuel tax exemption should remain
until the international legal situation permits imposition of such a tax (European
Commission, 1997).
Zurich Airport has added an emissions surcharge to the landing fee based on
engine certification information contained in the ICAO Engine Exhaust Emissions
Data Bank (ICAO, 1995b; Zurich Airport Authority, 1997). This charge was intended
primarily to provide an incentive to encourage operators to use their lowest
emissions aircraft into Zurich and to accelerate the use of best available technology.
Revenues are used to finance emissions reduction measures at the airport. A
similar emissions-related charge was applied at 10 Swedish airports beginning
1 January 1998. These charges are revenue neutral and do not affect consumer
demand. They do, however, provide an incentive to airlines to purchase and operate
aircraft with lower engine emissions. These charges are considered consistent
with ICAO principles.
Concern has been expressed that uncoordinated introduction of emissions charges
at the national, sub-federal, or regional level or by airports will have international
repercussions because they are discriminatory to some aircraft that comply with
internationally recognized standards, and the original intention of the NOx
certification standards was not to set local environmental restrictions, including
levies. One implementation issue that would need to be addressed with fuel taxation
is that international taxation of aviation fuel is currently precluded by provisions
contained in many bilateral air service agreements between countries, the main
legal framework underlying the operation of international civil aviation. Three
studies assessing the economic and environmental impact of environmental levies
are considered below. A 1997 OECD study (OECD, 1997a) found that although fuel
price increases have had little impact on the demand for air travel, the rate
of energy intensity reduction in civil aviation has been very responsive to
fuel price. On the basis of historical data, the study concluded that, when
implemented on an international basis, a meaningful rise in fuel prices introduced
at a moderate rate each year could have a large impact on increasing the rate
of energy intensity reduction. The study considered fuel charge options equivalent
to 2, 10, and 50% of the price of aviation fuel, and considered the use of revenues
to reduce the general level of taxation and to fund research and development
within the aviation industry.
Although the OECD study did not attempt to identify a direct relationship between
fuel price and energy intensity over the scenario period, it did suggest that
cumulative fuel levies resulting from an increase in the price of aviation fuel
of up to 5% per year could result in at least a 30% reduction in aviation energy
use in 2020 relative to the reference scenario. However, if charges were not
applied at a uniform global level, the study concluded that the increase in
fuel price would lead to a distortion of competition and a weakening of incentives
to develop and adopt energy-efficient aircraft. It further concluded that a
fuel charge was unlikely to have any substantial long-term effect on air traffic
growth, particularly if it were introduced gradually.
In its report to CAEP/4, the Focal Point on Charges (FPC) (ICAO, 1998a) considered
the potential economic and environmental impacts of various environmental levies.
It concluded that, among the options studied, the most effective options for
addressing global emissions were a fuel levy and en route charges. The report
showed that any resulting cost increases passed on to consumers would result
in a reduction in emissions. This result would occur primarily through lower
traffic demand, but airline and manufacturer supply-side responses also would
be stimulated, with limited impact on airline operating results. The portion
of the fuel price increase not passed on to customers would be borne by the
airlines, affecting their profitability, cash flow, and retained earnings-which,
in turn, could affect the ability of airlines to purchase more environmentally
beneficial equipment.
The report considered alternative applications of the proceeds of environmental
levies. The revenue-neutral approach did not cause a problem with the redistribution
of revenues, but the environmental benefits were found to be limited. Although
general taxes are feasible on implementation grounds, they raise serious problems
of equity and acceptability. A prevention cost approach using revenues to fund
future technology improvement was regarded as better than general taxation in
reducing total emissions; however, rechanneling of revenues to the aviation
industry would give rise to administrative complexities and raises equity problems
and risks of distortion of competition.
A feasibility study by the Centre for Energy Conservation and Environmental
Technology (CE) (Bleijenberg and Wit, 1998) considered the feasibility of introducing
an environmental charge on civil aviation in Europe. Using a scenario-based
approach and an aviation fuel price to include the environmental cost at 125%
of the cost of the fuel, the study found that the rate of growth in aviation
emissions in Europe would be approximately halved. A charge based on calculated
emissions was found to have similar environmental effectiveness to a fuel charge,
but the former had smaller economic distortions and fewer legal obstacles than
the latter. The study found that an emissions charge in European airspace would
have little impact on competition between domestic and non-European carriers.
A revenue-neutral emissions charge was judged to be the most feasible option,
with high environmental effectiveness and relatively few economic distortions.
Several comparisons may be made of the main features of these three studies.
In the FPC study, most of the benefits arose from a reduction in the growth
of demand, whereas in the OECD and CE studies, the supply-side influence was
predominant. Partly as a consequence of the strong supply-side effect, the OECD
and CE studies estimated a larger reduction in total emissions than did the
FPC report. Both the FPC and the OECD considered options to rechannel revenues
for technology improvement within the aviation sector. The FPC study found greater
distortions to competition between airlines arising from a European emissions
or fuel charge than the CE study.
Two areas require further study. The first is the applicability of environmental
levies to the circumstances of countries other than those in OECD and countries
in transition; the other is how revenues generated from a levy would be used.
10.4.3.2. Other Market Approaches
Emissions trading of greenhouse gases has been adopted as part of the Kyoto
Protocol as a potential means of achieving reductions in these gases at the
lowest possible costs. Emissions trading allows market forces to operate to
achieve the lowest possible costs of achieving an environmental goal. It can
provide companies such as airlines with the flexibility to reduce their own
emissions or to purchase equivalent reductions from others, if doing so would
be less expensive. It gives firms the incentive to employ innovative technologies
and reduce emissions beyond what any standard would require.
Markets play a central role in the efficient exchange of commodities, shares,
bonds, and financial instruments. Existing international markets have well-established
practices for contracting, delivery, and settlement that could be applicable
to emissions trading. Emissions trading differs considerably from the more traditional
standards approach that, for example, has been used by ICAO. Under that approach,
a specific emissions limit has been established, and each aircraft must meet
the standard. Under emissions trading, an overall level of emissions production
is set, and firms are allowed flexibility to jointly meet that standard. Firms
that can achieve low-cost reductions to meet their requirements have an incentive
to reduce below the required levels and sell their excess emissions reductions
to other firms. Firms facing higher control costs can purchase these reductions
to comply with their requirements at lower costs than by using alternative means.
A credible system of monitoring and verifying emissions reductions that allows
for trading with minimal transaction costs would be needed to achieve the cost
savings potential of these mechanisms. As in other areas of environmental policy,
an emissions trading regime would be likely to meet environmental objectives
at the lowest cost because it sets overall environmental goals, provides geographic
and temporal flexibility, would allow for flexible trading across industry boundaries,
and would offer incentives for meeting the goals (Dudek and Goffman, 1997).
Among OECD countries, the efficacy of emissions trading in meeting the objectives
of the Kyoto Protocol has been compared to direct market and regulatory intervention.
Some observers have suggested emissions trading is difficult to enforce and
raises potentially difficult liability issues. Others have expressed concern
about the possibility that companies with excess reductions will not sell them,
thus creating a barrier to new entrants in the market. However, successful allowance-based
SO2 emissions trading among competitive electric power generation companies
in the United States favored emissions trading over other options. Monitoring,
reporting, verification, and certification systems need to be explicitly defined
and developed.
Emissions trading has been used in the United States in the control of SO2
emissions responsible for acid rain. Flexibility in this program has resulted
in pollution permit prices of about $100 per ton, compared to estimated prices
before the program was implemented on the order of $250-400 per ton (Council
of Economic Advisors, 1998a). In addition, modeling indicates that programs
using tradable permits could enable more cost-effective control of local and
global atmospheric pollutants than other regulatory options under consideration
(IPCC, 1996d; GAO, 1997). Emissions trading has been incorporated in the Montreal
Protocol, the international treaty that limited ozone-depleting substances.
Under that treaty, restrictions were placed on several specific chlorofluorocarbon
(CFC) compounds as a group, instead of separate restrictions on each compound.
Countries could permit firms to trade among CFCs, reducing those that cost the
least first. In addition, in a separate provision, production permits were allowed
to be traded across nations to allow for a lower cost, more orderly phaseout
of manufacturing facilities (Montreal Protocol, 1987).
The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998b) contains emissions trading provisions that
provide substantial flexibility for nations to reduce their costs of meeting
agreed emissions goals. As with the Montreal Protocol, targets for greenhouse
gases were not set for individual compounds but rather as a single comprehensive
goal combining six major greenhouse gases (sources and sinks). Nations can adopt
plans that minimize the costs of meeting this target based on the relative costs
of controls among these different categories of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto
Protocol provisions allow developed nations to trade emissions on a project-by-project
basis (Article 6) and through an emissions trading system (Article 17). A clean
development mechanism (Article 12) was established to allow developed countries
to support and get emissions credit for actions in conjunction with developing
countries that reduce emissions in those countries.
Relevant principles, modalities, rules, guidelines for emissions trading, and
the role of governments are being discussed by the Conference of the Parties
to the UNFCCC and its subsidiary bodies, with the goal of reaching agreement
before the end of the year 2000. A credible system of monitoring and verifying
reductions that allows for trading with minimum transaction costs will be needed
to achieve the cost savings potential of these mechanisms. International aviation
emissions are not covered by the emissions-related targets in the Kyoto Protocol.
The prerequisite for emissions trading is adoption of emissions reduction targets
or caps. In principle, the aviation sector could be included in the emissions
targets agreed in the Kyoto protocol, but the feasibility of applying an emissions
trading regime depends on establishing a method to allocate international aviation
bunker fuels. Emissions trading would likely be available across all industries,
allowing progress in emissions reduction at the lowest cost. High-cost compliance
industries with limited compliance options could purchase rights from lower-cost
producers of other commodities.
An analysis of the potential for reducing the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets
from these flexible, market-based approaches was conducted within the United
States. This study suggests that reductions in permit prices on the order of
70-90% were possible because of these provisions (Council of Economic Advisors,
1998b).
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