4.4.2. Translation of Storylines into Scenario Drivers
Table 4-4 gives a summary overview of the main scenario assumptions and characteristics
(see also Table 4-2 above). To facilitate comparability, the summary format
adopted is similar to the previous IS92 scenario series (Pepper et al., 1992).
Specific assumptions about the quantification of particular scenario drivers,
such as population and economic growth, technological change, resource availability,
land-use changes, and local and regional environmental policies, are summarized
in this Section (GHG emissions are reported in detail in Chapter 5). The assumptions
are based on the range of driving forces identified in Chapter 2 and their relationships
as summarized in Chapter 3. For simplicity these drivers are presented separately,
but it is important to keep in mind that the evolution of these scenario drivers
is to a large extent interrelated, as reflected in the SRES scenarios.
Table 4- 4a: Overview of main driving
forces for the four SRES marker scenarios for 2100 if not indicated otherwise.
Numbers in brackets show the range across all other scenarios from the same
scenario family as the marker. Units are given in the table. (IND regions
includes industrialized countries consisting of OECD90 and REF regions;
and DEV region includes developing countries consisting of ASIA and ALM
regions, see Appendix IV). |
|
|
Population In Billion |
Economic Growth, GDPmexa |
Per Capita Income, GDPmex/capita |
Primary Energy Use |
Hydrocarbon Resource Useb |
Land- Use Changec |
|
A1 |
Lutz (1996)
Low
~7 billion
1.4 IND
5.6 DEV |
Very high
1990- 2020: 3.3 (2.8- 3.6)
1990- 2050: 3.6 (2.9- 3.7)
1990- 2100: 2.9 (2.5- 3.0) |
Very high
in IND:
US$ 107,300 (60,300- 113,500)
in DEV:
US$ 66,500 (41,400- 69,800) |
Very high
2.226 (1,002- 2,683) EJ
Low energy intensity of 4.2 MJ/ US$
(1.9- 5.1) |
Varied in four scenario groups:
Oil: Low to very high 20.8 (11.5- 50.8) ZJ
Gas: High to very high 42.2 (19.7- 54.9) ZJ
Coal: Medium to very high 15.9 (4.4- 68.3) ZJ |
Low.
1990- 2100:
3% cropland,
6% grasslands
2% forests |
|
A2 |
Lutz (1996)
High
~15 billion
2.2 IND
12.9 DEV |
Medium
1990- 2020: 2.2 (2.0- 2.6)
1990- 2050: 2.3 (1.7- 2.8)
1990- 2100: 2.3 (2.0- 2.3) |
Low in DEV
Medium in IND
in IND:
US$ 46,200 (37,100- 64,500)
in DEV:
US$ 11,000 (10,300- 13,700) |
High
1,717 (1,304- 2.040) EJ
High energy intensity of 7.1 MJ/ US$
(5.2- 8.9) |
Scenario dependent:
Oil: Very low to medium 17.3 (11.0- 22.5) ZJ
Gas: Low to high 24.6 (18.4- 35.5) ZJ
Coal: Medium to Very high 46.8 (20.1- 47.7) ZJ |
Medium
n.a. from ASF |
|
B1 |
Lutz (1996)
Low
~7 billion
1.4 IND
5.7 DEV |
High
1990- 2020: 3.1 (2.9- 3.3)
1990- 2050: 3.1 (2.9- 3.5)
1990- 2100: 2.5 (2.5- 2.6) |
High
in IND:
US$ 72,800 (65,300- 77,700)
In DEV:
US$ 40,200 (40,200- 45,200) |
Low.
514 (514- 1,157) EJ
Very low energy intensity of
1.6 EJ/ US$ (1.6- 3.4) |
Scenario dependent:
Oil: Very low to high 19.6 (15.7- 19.6) ZJ
Gas: Medium to high 14.7 (14.7- 31.8) ZJ
Coal: Very low to high 13.2 (3.3- 27.2) ZJ |
High
1990- 2100:
-28% cropland
-45% grassland
+30% forests |
|
B2 |
UN (1998)
Median
~10 billion
1.3 IND
9.1 DEV |
Medium
1990- 2020: 3.0 (2.2- 3.1)
1990- 2050: 2.8 (2.1- 2.9)
1990- 2100: 2.2 (2.0- 2.3) |
Medium
in IND:
US$ 54,400 (42,400- 61,100)
In DEV:
US$ 18,000 (14,200- 21,500) |
Medium
1,357 (846- 1,625) EJ
Medium energy intensity of 5.8 MJ/ US$ (4.3- 6.5) |
Oil: Low to medium
19.5 (11.2- 22.7) ZJ by 2100
Gas: Low to medium 26.9 (17.9- 26.9) ZJ by 2100
Coal: Low to very high 12.6 (12.6- 44.4) ZJ by 2100 |
Medium
1990- 2100:
+22% cropland
+9% grasslands
+5% forestsd |
|
A. Exponential growth rates after World Bank (1999) method (given on
pages 371 to 372) are calculated using the different base years from the
models.
B. Resource availability is generally combined with scenario specific
rates of technological change.
C. Residual and other land- use categories are not shown in the Table.
D. Land- use data for B2 marker taken from AIM land- use B2 scenario
run.
|
As discussed above, the SRES scenarios were designed to reflect inherent uncertainties
of future developments by adopting a range of salient input assumptions, but
without attempting to cover the extremes from the scenario literature. Given
the nature of the SRES open process and its multi-model approach, as well as
the need for documented input assumptions, published scenario extremes are difficult
to reproduce using alternative model approaches or insufficiently documented
input data. (For instance, many long-term emission scenarios do not report their
underlying population assumptions (see Chapters 2 and
3), which is especially true for extreme scenarios that
are usually performed within the context of model sensitivity analysis.)
Compared to the previous IS92 scenario series there are important similarities,
but also important differences. For instance, three different future population
scenarios were adopted, albeit that the future population levels are somewhat
lower and the range more compressed than those in IS92 this reflects advances
in demographic modeling and population projections. Conversely, the range of
assumptions that concern resource availability and future technological change
is much wider compared to earlier scenarios, reflecting in particular the results
of the IPCC WGII Second Assessment Report (SAR; Watson et al., 1996). Another
distinguishing characteristic of the SRES scenarios is an attempt to reflect
the most recent understanding on the relationships between important scenario
driving-force variables. For instance, no scenario combines low fertility with
high mortality assumptions, which reflects the consensus view from demographers
(see Chapter 3). Equally, all SRES scenarios assume a
qualitative relationship between demographics and social and economic development
trends, which reflects both the literature (see Chapter 3)
and the results of the evaluation of the IS92 scenario series (Alcamo et al.,
1995). All else being equal, fertility and mortality trends are thus lower in
scenarios with high-income growth assumptions, but the multidimensionality of
the causal linkages must be recognized and so no particular cause-effect model
is postulated here. Finally, the scenarios also attempt to reflect recent advances
(as reviewed in Chapter 3) in understanding of the evolution
of macro-economic and material productivity (e.g., their coupling via capital
turnover rates), uncertainties in future levels of "dematerialization" (reflected
in the difference between the B1 and A1 scenarios), and the likely evolution
of local and regional environmental policies (e.g., all scenarios assume various
degrees of sulfur-control policies).
The main aspects of translating the storylines into scenario drivers are summarized
below. For each scenario family an overview of all scenario quantifications
is given. Scenarios that share harmonized input assumptions with the respective
scenario marker in terms of global population and GDP profiles (see Tables
4-1 and 4-3) are indicated in italics in the subsequent
discussion. Altogether, 26 scenarios in the four scenario families share similar
assumptions about population and GDP at the global level. The other 14 scenarios
either do not fully comply with the agreed common input assumptions concerning
global population and GDP or explore important sensitivities of future demographic
and economic developments beyond that described in the 24 scenarios. These sensitivities
include resource availability, technology development, or land-use changes and
describe similar demographic and economic development patterns as other scenarios
within a family, even if they do not fall within the range suggested by the
harmonization criteria (see Table 4-1). Combined,
the SRES scenario set comprises 40 scenarios grouped into four scenario families
and different scenario groups (see Table 4-3).
Each scenario family is illustrated by a designated marker scenario. A marker
is not necessarily the mean or mode of comparable scenario quantifications,
nor would it be possible to construct an internally consistent scenario reflecting
medians/modes of all salient scenario characteristics (both in terms of scenario
input assumptions as well as scenario outcomes, i.e. emissions). Marker scenarios
should also not be interpreted as being the more likely alternative scenario
quantifications. However, only the four marker scenarios were subjected to the
SRES open process through the SRES website and they have also received closest
scrutiny by the entire writing team.
|