6.2.2 Climate and Other Environmental Policies
Section 6.2.1 sets the general policy context in
which any environmental policy will operate. This section focuses on specific
policies to address climate change. The various policy instruments are assessed
generically. In other words, there is not a sector-specific focus, because it
is beyond the scope of this chapter. This may create some bias insofar as most
sector-specific policies are technology oriented and of the command-and-control
22.214.171.124 Regulatory Standards
Regulatory environmental standards set either technology standards or performance
standards, enforceable through fines and other penalties24
(voluntary standards are discussed in Section 126.96.36.199).
They may attach to a product, a line of products (e.g., US Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards), or the provision of a service (e.g., Japan requires
that firms employ an energy manager).25
In this chapter regulatory standards are distinguished from economic or market-based
instruments (taxes and fees, permits, subsidies). Although all regulatory standards
have consequences upon economic decision making, they differ from market-based
instruments, which operate by directly changing relative prices rather than
by specifying technology or performance outcomes.
Regulatory standards can be effective policies to address market failures and
barriers associated with information, organization, and other transactions costs.
They also are widely used to require actors to account for environmental externalities
and, if continually modified to account for technical progress, they can provide
dynamic innovation incentives (see Section 6.5.3). The
principal sources of inefficiency associated with some regulatory standards
derive from too narrow specifications of uniform behaviour in heterogeneous
situations, weakness in controlling aggregate levels of pollution, and relatively
more difficult application to products other than component or turnkey technologies.
By requiring a certain level of performance without specifying how it should
be achieved, performance standards generally reduce losses through inflexibility
when compared to technology standards.
On the whole, energy efficiency standards have proved to be an effective energy
conservation policy tool. Energy efficiency standards are widely used in over
50 nations and the number of standards is still growing.26
For appliance standards enacted in the USA, cumulative energy savings in 1990
to 2010 are estimated at 24 etajoules (EJ), consumer life-cycle costs savings
at US$46 billion, and emission reductions at about 400MtCO2. For
an early estimate, see McMahon (1992). The introduction of refrigerator and
freezer standards in the EU is estimated to generate 300 TeraWatt hours (TWh)
of cumulative electricity savings during 1995 to 2010 (Lebo and Szabo, 1996).
Similar measures in Central and Eastern Europe are expected to save 60 TWh energy
and to reduce emissions by 25 MtCO2 (Bashmakov and Sorokina, 1996).
In Japan, the law concerning the rational use of energy was strengthened on
1 April 1999 and is expected to reduce, in combination with the industries
voluntary actions plan, a maximum of 140 MtCO2 in industry, transportation,
and other sectors in total (Yamaguchi, 2000). Energy efficiency standards are
especially effective in countries with high and growing appliance ownership
and in countries in which consumers energy awareness is low because of
historically low energy prices.
The development of an effective regulatory standard requires national and,
potentially, international, leadership to balance the interests of manufacturers,
consumers, environmental non-government organizations (NGOs), and other interest
groups, while creating sufficient societal support and incentives for successful
implementation. While decisions to introduce regulatory standards are commonly
made by legislatures, the development and implementation of standards over time
is often left to a less transparent public administration. Although the enforcement
and monitoring of all policy instruments is costly and subject to failures,
including discriminatory treatment and corruption, social science literature
that examines the implementation of regulatory standards is more extensive.
Recent literature indicates that regulatory standards often precede market-based
instruments and build institutional capacity in policy evaluation, monitoring,
and enforcement (Legro et al., 1999). This is especially true in developing
countries that lack both trained personnel and the financial resources to implement
Technology standards have provided the initial training ground for public officials
unfamiliar with any approach to environmental regulation. Russell and Powell
(1996) found that developing countries with a better institutional capacity
developed through experience with regulatory standards generally are more successful
in implementing market-based environmental policies than less well-equipped
countries. Cole and Grossman (1998) suggest that when historical, technological,
and institutional contexts are taken into account, technology standards are
efficient in the initial stages of environmental policy development.
The use of regulatory standards to force the internalization of environmental
costs has initial distributional consequences different from those of environmental
taxes or subsidies.30
Regulatory standards reduce economic benefits previously shared by consumers,
capital, and labour only to the extent of compliance costs and/or output foregone.
Unlike environmental taxes or auctioned permits, regulatory standards do not
extract the value of environmental costs on inframarginal production that continues
after the policy is mandated.
Regulatory standards may also be used to correct barriers that arise from information
failures and can yield net benefits to society if the costs associated with
the regulation are less than the losses due to informational barriers.